Kevin Veen-Birkenbach 747ce379cc fix(app): stop trusting X-Forwarded-For, and pin what the audit found ...

ProxyFix defaults x_for to 1, so ProxyFix(app.wsgi_app, x_proto=1) never
disabled it: request.remote_addr and the access log were forgeable by any
client that reached the app directly. It is x_for=0 now, asserted rather
than assumed.

A mutation audit over the change set reverted 196 deliberate behaviours
and found 47 that no test noticed. This closes the ones that carry damage:

- apod_background lost its key check, its transport guard, its status
  guard and its media-type check without a single test failing. Each one
  turns a slow or unhappy NASA into a 500 on every page.
- Untrusted values reached innerHTML through window.I18N, which the
  translation backend writes, and the modal's click handlers stacked so a
  later click opened an earlier popup's URL.
- The sync tool could ask for HTML instead of text, translate from "auto"
  instead of English, run without a timeout, store an empty translation
  that marks the string done for good, abandon 28 languages because one
  could not be written, and report success after reaching nothing.
- Neither the lint target, the CI jobs, the vendored RTL stylesheet, the
  documented environment keys, nor any of the four hardenings in
  scripts/run-e2e.sh was observed by anything.

Three of the new tests passed for the wrong reason on their first cut —
a mock that answered None whether or not the guard existed, a
raise_for_status that was never called, a string that stayed in the file
after the mutation. The audit found those too; all 24 reverts now fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-08-22 17:19:15 +02:00

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