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Resolve the 80 open CodeQL/code-scanning alerts on this branch. Security-sensitive fixes: - cli/administration/deploy/development: break the unsafe import cycle by extracting the env/arg helpers into a leaf module `env.py`, giving the load-time DAG compose -> common -> deps -> env. - web-app-bluesky login-broker server.js: prototype-pollution guard on cookie parsing, CR/LF + control-char log sanitisation, HTML-escaped exception text, and a ReDoS-bounded handle regex. - web-app-baserow SSO: harden the open-redirect `next` handling. - network diagnose probes: require TLS >= 1.2. - actionlint installer: validate tar members against path traversal. - decidim/apt-purge lint regexes: rewrite to avoid catastrophic backtracking. - 6x Playwright URL regexes anchored; crs-k/stale-branches pinned to a commit SHA. Mechanical cleanups: unused imports/globals/locals, empty-except comments, import-and-import-from, implicit-string-concat, multiple-definition, unreachable/useless-assignment. False positives are intentionally left in place (Django settings patches, Odoo __manifest__, side-effect imports, cross-module symbols). Recurrence guards: - import-linter contract (pyproject + tests/lint) locks the dev-deploy package acyclic; a new cycle now fails CI instead of only CodeQL. - new lint test requires every bandit (S###) `noqa` to carry a justification. - BLE001 (blind-except) added to ruff as a ratchet (tests/roles exempt, current production offenders grandfathered). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
143 lines
5.2 KiB
Python
143 lines
5.2 KiB
Python
"""Lint guard: ``# noqa`` for a bandit (``S###``) finding MUST be justified.
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Background
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==========
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Ruff's ``S`` rules (flake8-bandit) flag security-relevant patterns:
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tar extraction (``S202``), ``urlopen`` of attacker-influenceable URLs
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(``S310``), ``subprocess(..., shell=True)`` (``S602``), and similar.
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Suppressing one with a bare ``# noqa: S202`` silently disables the only
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local signal that the line was reviewed — exactly the situation that let
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``py/tarslip`` reach CodeQL.
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CodeQL ignores ruff ``# noqa`` markers, so a suppressed ``S###`` keeps
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producing code-scanning alerts anyway. The cheap, durable fix is to
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require every security suppression to carry an inline justification, so a
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reviewer (and the next reader) can see *why* it is safe.
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Convention enforced here
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========================
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Any ``# noqa:`` marker whose code list contains a bandit ``S###`` code
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MUST be followed by free-text justification on the same line, e.g.::
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tar.extractall(tmpdir) # noqa: S202 - members validated for path traversal
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A bare ``# noqa: S310`` with nothing after the code is rejected.
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Ratchet
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=======
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Files in ``_BASELINE`` predate the rule and carry unjustified security
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suppressions today; they are grandfathered so the guard can land green.
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The set MUST only shrink: justify the marker (or fix the finding), then
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delete the path here. New security suppressions anywhere else fail.
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Caching
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=======
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File walk and content reads route through ``utils.cache.files``.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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import unittest
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from pathlib import Path
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from utils.cache.files import iter_project_files, read_text
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from . import PROJECT_ROOT
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# Match ``(#|//) noqa: <codes>`` and capture the comma-separated code list.
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_NOQA_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?:#|//)\s*noqa\s*:\s*"
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r"(?P<codes>[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9\-]*(?:\s*,\s*[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9\-]*)*)",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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# A bandit security code: ``S`` followed by digits (S101, S202, S310, …).
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_SECURITY_CODE_RE = re.compile(r"^S\d+$")
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# Files that still carry an unjustified security suppression today. Burn-down
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# only: justify or fix, then remove the entry. Do NOT add to this set.
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_BASELINE: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
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{
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"cli/administration/deploy/dedicated/runner.py",
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"cli/administration/deploy/development/deploy.py",
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"cli/administration/deploy/development/proc.py",
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"cli/contributing/mirror/cleanup/__main__.py",
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"plugins/lookup/nginx.py",
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"roles/svc-bkp-remote-2-local/files/pull_specific_host.py",
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"roles/svc-opt-ssd-hdd/files/script.py",
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"roles/sys-ctl-cln-bkps/files/script.py",
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"roles/sys-ctl-rpr-container-soft/files/script.py",
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"roles/sys-svc-compose-ca/files/compose_ca.py",
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"roles/sys-svc-compose/files/compose.py",
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"roles/sys-svc-container/files/container.py",
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"roles/web-app-erpnext/files/scripts/apply_oidc_settings.py",
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"roles/web-app-keycloak/library/keycloak_kcadm_update.py",
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"utils/github/playwright_summary.py",
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"utils/update/docker.py",
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}
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)
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def _file_offenders(path: Path) -> list[tuple[int, str]]:
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"""Return ``[(lineno, marker), ...]`` for unjustified security
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suppressions on this file's lines."""
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try:
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text = read_text(str(path))
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except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError):
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return []
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findings: list[tuple[int, str]] = []
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for lineno, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), start=1):
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for match in _NOQA_RE.finditer(line):
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codes = [c.strip() for c in match.group("codes").split(",")]
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if not any(_SECURITY_CODE_RE.match(c) for c in codes):
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continue
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# Justification = any non-whitespace text after the code list.
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if not line[match.end() :].strip():
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findings.append((lineno, match.group(0)))
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return findings
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class TestSecurityNoqaJustified(unittest.TestCase):
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"""Every bandit (``S###``) ``noqa`` suppression MUST carry a reason."""
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def test_security_noqa_markers_are_justified(self) -> None:
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offenders: dict[Path, list[tuple[int, str]]] = {}
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for path_str in iter_project_files(extensions=(".py",)):
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path = Path(path_str)
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try:
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rel = path.relative_to(PROJECT_ROOT).as_posix()
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except ValueError:
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continue
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if rel in _BASELINE:
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continue
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issues = _file_offenders(path)
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if issues:
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offenders[path] = issues
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if not offenders:
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return
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def rel(p: Path) -> str:
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return p.relative_to(PROJECT_ROOT).as_posix()
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lines = [
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f"{len(offenders)} file(s) suppress a bandit (S###) finding with an "
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"unjustified ``# noqa``. Append an inline reason, e.g. "
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"``# noqa: S202 - members validated for path traversal``, or fix the "
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"finding. Security suppressions must never be silent.",
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"",
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]
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for path, issues in sorted(offenders.items()):
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lines.append(f" - {rel(path)}:")
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for lineno, marker in issues:
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lines.append(f" * line {lineno}: {marker}")
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self.fail("\n".join(lines))
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if __name__ == "__main__": # pragma: no cover
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unittest.main()
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