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kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5
c94a0a0b5d
Nine roles enabled an MCP surface without a browser-side spec, so nothing
ever asked what the endpoint answers a caller with no credential at all.
Lift gitea's assertion into two shared registrars and register them per
role, and give each role the MCP_SERVICE_ENABLED flag they gate on.
mcpEndpointUrl now takes the base URL rather than reading APP_BASE_URL
unconditionally: jellyfin and zammad export their own base variable, and
declaring APP_BASE_URL for them would un-skip the shared guest persona,
which collapses itself on that variable being absent.
The env-gate scanner follows require("./x") into the shared harness so a
gate declared there counts as consumed, and strips block comments first
so service-gating.js's own doc examples do not credit EMAIL, SSO and OICD
to every role that imports it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
33 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash
33 lines
1.9 KiB
Bash
ADMIN_PASSWORD={{ lookup('users', 'administrator').password | dotenv_quote }}
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ADMIN_USERNAME={{ lookup('users', 'administrator').username | dotenv_quote }}
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APP_BASE_URL={{ lookup('tls', application_id, 'url.base') }}
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CANONICAL_DOMAIN={{ lookup('domain', application_id) | dotenv_quote }}
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# nocheck: playwright-service-gate — covered by sys-svc-mail integration tests, not the persona surface
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EMAIL_SERVICE_ENABLED={{ lookup('config', application_id, 'services.email.enabled') | string | lower }}
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LOGOUT_SERVICE_ENABLED={{ lookup('config', application_id, 'services.logout.enabled') | string | lower }}
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MATOMO_BASE_URL={{ lookup('tls', 'web-app-matomo', 'url.base') | dotenv_quote }}
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MATOMO_SERVICE_ENABLED={{ lookup('config', application_id, 'services.matomo.enabled') | string | lower }}
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MCP_SERVICE_ENABLED={{ lookup('config', application_id, 'mcp.enabled') | string | lower }}
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NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0
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OIDC_ISSUER_URL={{ OIDC.CLIENT.ISSUER_URL | dotenv_quote }}
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# nocheck: persona-block-rationale — not blocked: tasks/03_admin.yml:20-30 provisions a Snipe-IT account under lookup('users','administrator').username, which is exactly the column the trusted-header bridge matches (files/php/apply/sso_config.php:10), so the administrator journey is runnable.
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PERSONA_ADMINISTRATOR_BLOCKED=false
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# nocheck: persona-block-rationale — snipe-it's oauth2-proxy declares no allowed_groups (meta/services.yml:76-87), so biber passes the gate, but LoginController::loginViaRemoteUser() signs in only an existing users.username (files/php/apply/sso_config.php:10) and the role provisions the administrator row alone (tasks/03_admin.yml:20-30); biber ends up back on the native login form.
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PERSONA_BIBER_BLOCKED=true
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SNIPE_IT_BASE_URL={{ lookup('tls', application_id, 'url.base') | dotenv_quote }}
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SSO_SERVICE_ENABLED={{ lookup('config', application_id, 'services.sso.enabled') | string | lower }}
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