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kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5
ead858f481
The platform reserves a user key per role, so hermes and openclaw existed as non-privileged accounts before either role claimed one. Claiming the key is what turns a reservation into an identity the agent may authenticate as, and gives the account its description and its mailbox. Neither role declares a password: provisioning stores one for every declared account, and a role whose registration rejects the shell-safe alphabet says so in its own meta/users.yml rather than carrying a second credential beside the account it already owns. The lint derives the agent set from the sandbox-runtime scan rather than a list and holds three properties: the role claims its own reserved key, the claimed account carries no role because an agent employee is never an administrator, and no second credential sits beside it. Pointing an agent at an account that already exists needs no code, since the inventory users variable overrides the same key. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
5 lines
264 B
YAML
5 lines
264 B
YAML
---
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openclaw:
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description: Platform account the OpenClaw agent employee acts as. Non-privileged by design, with its own mailbox. Override the `openclaw` key through the
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inventory `users` variable to point the agent at an account that already exists instead.
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