Files
computer-playbook/roles/sys-svc-proxy/templates/headers/upstream_strips.conf.j2
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5.5 d89c74feab feat(security): harden PHP services and proxy response headers
Proxy:
- server_tokens off, X-Powered-By stripped from upstream responses,
  HSTS max-age raised to one year.
- No global X-Content-Type-Options: under nosniff, ORB (step 3.4)
  blocks no-cors cross-origin responses typed text/html, e.g. tracking
  beacons answered with an empty 204.

PHP (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619):
- New role sys-svc-compose-php installs a shared ini (expose_php Off,
  session.upload_progress.enabled 0, fatal_error_backtraces 0 for
  PHP 8.5, interim memory_limit -1) and a PHP-FPM [www] drop-in
  (pm.max_requests = PHP_FPM_MAX_REQUESTS) once per stack host,
  before 04_files renders any compose file.
- The host file names carry a sha1 prefix of the controller-side
  source, so a content change alters every PHP app's compose.yml and
  recreates it, also on remote deploys where compose_volumes cannot
  read the stack host file and hashes the path instead.
- 20 PHP roles mount the ini as a compose/swarm config into their
  image's scan dir; moodle, nextcloud and shopware also mount the FPM
  drop-in. Magento keeps its own pool: its php-fpm.conf has no
  include= and is rendered without notify.
- Joomla's php-upload.ini now loads as zzz-joomla-uploads.ini so its
  own memory_limit wins: the media API compares Content-Length with
  toBytes(memory_limit) and rejects every upload at -1.

TODOs record the memory_limit revert condition and accepted
trade-offs, Akaunting on PHP 8.1, FusionDirectory on PHP 7.4 and the
public Keycloak admin console.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 21:03:38 +02:00

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Django/Jinja

# Drop response headers that the proxy must control instead of the upstream.
# nginx's `proxy_hide_header` is array-replacement-inherited (just like
# `add_header`), so this partial MUST be included in every location block
# rather than set once at server level — otherwise child overrides wipe
# the parent strips.
#
# - Strict-Transport-Security: rendered by the proxy when TLS is enabled;
# over plaintext (onion) transport it must never leak from the upstream
# (RFC 6797), so the strip is unconditional.
# - Deprecated security headers (X-Frame-Options & friends): superseded
# by CSP, rendered from each role's meta/csp.yml via build_csp_header.
proxy_hide_header Strict-Transport-Security;
proxy_hide_header X-Frame-Options;
proxy_hide_header X-XSS-Protection;
proxy_hide_header X-Download-Options;
proxy_hide_header X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies;
proxy_hide_header X-Powered-By;