Commit Graph
5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5.5 d89c74feab feat(security): harden PHP services and proxy response headers
Proxy:
- server_tokens off, X-Powered-By stripped from upstream responses,
  HSTS max-age raised to one year.
- No global X-Content-Type-Options: under nosniff, ORB (step 3.4)
  blocks no-cors cross-origin responses typed text/html, e.g. tracking
  beacons answered with an empty 204.

PHP (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619):
- New role sys-svc-compose-php installs a shared ini (expose_php Off,
  session.upload_progress.enabled 0, fatal_error_backtraces 0 for
  PHP 8.5, interim memory_limit -1) and a PHP-FPM [www] drop-in
  (pm.max_requests = PHP_FPM_MAX_REQUESTS) once per stack host,
  before 04_files renders any compose file.
- The host file names carry a sha1 prefix of the controller-side
  source, so a content change alters every PHP app's compose.yml and
  recreates it, also on remote deploys where compose_volumes cannot
  read the stack host file and hashes the path instead.
- 20 PHP roles mount the ini as a compose/swarm config into their
  image's scan dir; moodle, nextcloud and shopware also mount the FPM
  drop-in. Magento keeps its own pool: its php-fpm.conf has no
  include= and is rendered without notify.
- Joomla's php-upload.ini now loads as zzz-joomla-uploads.ini so its
  own memory_limit wins: the media API compares Content-Length with
  toBytes(memory_limit) and rejects every upload at -1.

TODOs record the memory_limit revert condition and accepted
trade-offs, Akaunting on PHP 8.1, FusionDirectory on PHP 7.4 and the
public Keycloak admin console.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 21:03:38 +02:00
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Fable 5 d88f272f9f Merge branch 'feature/swarm-nfs' into feature/svc-net-tor
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 15:31:08 +02:00
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 4.8 33fa48bcad fix(proxy): strip upstream HSTS unconditionally (never leak over plaintext onion)
The Strict-Transport-Security strip in the shared per-location partial
was gated on 'lookup(tls, app, enabled)', so on plaintext transports
(onion, and pure-http clearnet) it never rendered and the upstream
app's own HSTS header (kix: max-age=31536000; openproject/Rails
force_ssl: same) leaked to the http client. That violates RFC 6797 and
the onion e2e TLS/HSTS specs caught it.

Make the strip unconditional. No behaviour change on TLS nodes: the
proxy still adds its own HSTS in the tls-gated ssl block of
nginx_ssl_header.j2. On http-only/onion vhosts nothing re-adds it (the
add is in the same tls-gated block), so the leaked upstream header is
simply removed — which is correct, since HSTS over plaintext is invalid.

Verified live: kix onion emits no HSTS header and its tls-hsts spec
passes; openproject rides the same shared partial.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 21:08:27 +02:00
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 4.8 6ce6780575 refactor(meta): split server.yml into csp/domains/networks.yml
Extract the csp, domains, and networks blocks out of roles/*/meta/server.yml
into dedicated meta files, each mapping to its own top-level applications key
via the recursive meta-walk:

  csp:      -> meta/csp.yml      -> applications.<app>.csp
  domains:  -> meta/domains.yml  -> applications.<app>.domains
  networks: -> meta/networks.yml -> applications.<app>.networks

Residual nginx/proxy keys (status_codes, client_max_body_size, locations,
ip6_enabled, config_upstream_url) stay in server.yml; an emptied server.yml is
deleted. 98 server.yml -> 249 new files, 74 deleted.

- Consumers repointed applications.<app>.server.{csp,domains,networks} ->
  applications.<app>.{csp,domains,networks} across templates, vars, tasks,
  lookups and filters.
- Infra readers migrated: canonical_domains_map, application_domain_index,
  build_ldap_role_entries, service-registry overlay discovery,
  roles_with_service, and the file-based readers utils/domains/list.py +
  utils/meta/scan.py (read the now-deleted server.yml directly).
- Detection + mapping: _META_TOPICS gains csp/domains/networks;
  ROLE_FILE_META_{CSP,DOMAINS,NETWORKS} constants + ROLE_FILES entries.
- New self-expiring lint guard (test_server_meta_no_split_fields) fails if a
  server.yml still carries a split field; auto-fails from 2026-12-28 as a
  delete reminder.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-28 22:45:05 +02:00
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 4.7 e746368c20 fix(sys-svc-proxy): CSP is SPOT — strip deprecated security headers + add regression lint
Browser vendors deprecated X-Frame-Options/X-XSS-Protection/X-Download-Options/
X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies; CSP (rendered from each role's
meta/server.yml via build_csp_header) is the modern replacement. To make the
SPOT actually win against upstream apps (e.g. Keycloak/Quarkus still emits
X-Frame-Options), the proxy now hides those headers on every location type.
Includes a fail-loud lint that catches any future add_header / Header set/add
re-introduction in .conf / .conf.j2 / .htaccess / .j2 / .jinja / .tmpl files.

- sys-svc-proxy: new upstream_strips.conf.j2 partial bundles HSTS + the 4
  deprecated header strips; included in html/media/ws/upload + web-svc-logout
  + web-app-oauth2-proxy locations (nginx array-replacement inheritance forces
  per-location placement)
- web-app-keycloak: meta/server.yml frame-ancestors allows the primary-domain
  wildcard with the dynamic TLS protocol so dashboard silent-check-sso iframe
  loads cleanly
- web-app-dashboard/playwright: drop isOidcSilentCheckNoise — root cause is
  now fixed, no noise filter needed
- web-app-dashboard/nginx + web-app-nextcloud/nginx: remove the deprecated
  add_header lines themselves
- tests + docs: new lint registers `deprecated-http-header` suppression rule

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-18 22:36:05 +02:00