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Addresses three CodeRabbit findings on PR #1265. 1. LAM hardening invisible to the probe (thread 4413764929): the runtime check probes PHP with `php -r`, the CLI SAPI. web-app-lam mounted the hardening ini only into /etc/php/8.4/apache2/conf.d, which the Debian CLI does not scan, so the probe read unhardened CLI settings and the check failed for LAM. The php_hardening entry now also mounts the ini into /etc/php/8.4/cli/conf.d. No other role mounts it into a Debian per-SAPI directory; the rest use the shared scan dir of the official image or of Alpine. The TODO entry now names the remaining gap: the probe reads only the CLI copy. 2. Explanatory comment above HEALTH_RUNTIME_FLOORS (thread 4413764949): removed. The README already states the end-of-life rule and now also defines a floor as the lowest patched release of each line. 3. `apk --no-cache add` missed (thread 4415018662): PACKAGE_INSTALL_PATTERN required `add` right after `apk`, so `RUN apk --no-cache add php7` passed as an image without PHP. The apk branch now accepts options before `add`, like the apt branch. New tests cover the option form and guard that `apk` in a path or a comment is no package install. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
552 B
552 B
To-dos
- Extend
HEALTH_RUNTIME_FLOORS, the container probe andmake security-runtimestonode,python,rubyandjava. - Verify the web SAPI where an image splits it from the CLI.
web-app-lammounts the hardening ini into both/etc/php/8.4/apache2/conf.dand/etc/php/8.4/cli/conf.d, and the probe reads only the CLI copy, so a wrong Apache target would still pass. - Run
make security-runtimesin a scheduled CI workflow. - Scan the pinned images for CVEs (Trivy or Grype) in the scheduled CI and report new criticals as issues.