The 16.2.0 release commit (e2501cb1de) shipped a locally generated
`compose/package-cache-frontend/upstreams.conf`, the output of the cache
generator that only exists on the feature branches (230d9a1e5e). It adds
TLS server blocks for argos-net.com, huggingface.co, index.crates.io,
registry.ollama.ai and static.crates.io, but main's `cert-gen.sh` issues
no certificates for them. nginx then dies on start with
cannot load certificate "/etc/nginx/certs/argos-net.com.crt"
the frontend stays unhealthy, pypi.org on the runner refuses connections,
and `make install-lint` fails in every workspace job (run 39482585010).
Restore the file byte for byte to its state before the release (blob
b5c5ef08e7), the version every workspace job passed with in run
39443109355.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Snipe-IT v8.8.1 refuses any `login_remote_user_header_name` matching
`/^HTTP_/i`, so the configured `HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PREFERRED_USERNAME`
stopped minting sessions behind oauth2-proxy.
Apache in the image now copies `X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username` into
the server variable `INFINITO_SSO_USER`, and only when the request also
carries `X-Infinito-Sso-Proxy` equal to the new per-inventory
`sso_proxy_secret`; an empty secret keeps the bridge closed. openresty
sends that header on every proxied request, so a client reaching the
container directly cannot log in by forging the identity header. A
deploy-time check asserts both directions (forged 200, with secret 302).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Declare `__all__` in every package `__init__.py` whose `PROJECT_ROOT`
is imported by its modules (163 packages), so the constant counts as
exported; list every public name where the package defines more.
- Empty the 15 package `__init__.py` files whose `PROJECT_ROOT` no module
imports.
- Declare the public API of `utils.github.variant.axes` in `__all__`,
re-exports included, instead of silencing them with `noqa: F401`; the
list matches the one `feature/store-i18n` already carries.
- Use `import unittest.mock as mock` in `test_applications.py`, as the
rest of the suite does.
- Spell `_NON_PRINTABLE` in `utils/yaml_bootstrap.py` as the equivalent
BMP-only positive class; it matches exactly the same 2111 code points
as the old negated class across U+0000..U+10FFFF.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The seeded salt was the first 16 bytes of sha256(seed + secret). bcrypt
stores its salt in clear inside the hash, so every seeded hash published
a fast sha256 digest of the password under a seed that is public in the
repository (`web-app-wazuh:indexer-admin`). Anyone holding the hash could
test password guesses at sha256 speed instead of paying bcrypt's cost.
The salt is now sha256(seed)[:16]. The hash stays deterministic for one
password, still changes when the password rotates, and its salt carries
nothing computed from the secret. Existing Wazuh deployments get a new
hash once; `securityadmin.sh` re-applies `internal_users.yml` on every
deploy and the hash still verifies the unchanged password.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
baudolo 7.1.x writes volume generations with `rsync -aHAX`, so the
producing host keeps `user.*` extended attributes (OpenCloud keeps its
storage metadata in `user.oc.*`). Every later copy dropped them again,
because none of the other rsync calls passed `-X` (nor `-A`/`-H`):
- NFS export snapshots (svc-bkp-nfs-2-local `script.sh`),
- the backup host's pull (svc-bkp-remote-2-local `pull_specific_host.py`),
- the device sync (svc-bkp-local-2-device `script.py`),
- every recover into a live target (`utils/recovery/base.py`, used by the
volume, NFS and device recover scripts),
- the `recover full` and `recover remote` tree pulls.
A disaster recovery through the documented chain therefore restored
OpenCloud without `user.oc.*`, silently: the copies succeeded and the
dirval stamp does not cover attributes.
All of these now run `rsync -aHAX` (`-aHAXP` for the device sync). A
target filesystem without xattr support makes rsync exit non-zero as soon
as a source file carries attributes, so the hop fails loudly instead of
dropping them; there is no per-device opt-out. The single-image pull in
`recover remote` keeps `-a`. The provider's ssh-wrapper needs no change:
its glob accepts any server flags and its character guard allows them.
Two tests write a `user.oc.id` attribute and assert it survives the NFS
snapshot and the recover; with the old `-a` both fail with
`OSError: [Errno 61] No data available`.
Closes#1021
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every swarm job on ubuntu-26.04 runners (kernel 7.0) died at the NFS
probe write with `[Errno 121] Remote I/O error`. ganesha's NFSv4 debug log
in the rescue bundles shows the cause on every client, the same second as
the failure:
Request 2: opcode 46 is OP_GET_DIR_DELEGATION
Status of OP_GET_DIR_DELEGATION in position 2 = NFS4ERR_OP_ILLEGAL
Linux 6.19 added directory delegations: after ACCESS, CREATE, REMOVE or
RENAME the client adds GET_DIR_DELEGATION to the directory's next GETATTR
(`should_request_dir_deleg`, gated per request by the nfsv4 parameter
`directory_delegations`). nfs-ganesha before 9.11 routes op 46 to
`nfs4_op_illegal`, whose reply carries opcode 10044; the client decoder
expects 46 and fails the call with EREMOTEIO. Upstream fixed it in
nfs-ganesha#1385 (98eb77c4, first in V9.11), which answers NOTSUPP; the
client then drops the capability. The distro packages the role installs
predate it: Debian trixie 6.5-5, Ubuntu 26.04 6.5-8.
Every client and the controller now read the server's installed
nfs-ganesha release and, below 9.11, set `directory_delegations=N` right
after the mount and before the first access (the mount itself never sends
op 46), plus `options nfsv4 directory_delegations=N` in /etc/modprobe.d for
later module loads. No ganesha release grants directory delegations, so
the end state equals a fixed server. The parameter is kernel-wide and is
only ever set to N, so clients sharing one kernel cannot flip it back on
each other. Servers on 9.11 or later and the kernel nfsd flavor keep the
client default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When the IPAM config of a compose project's network changes (#999 added
`ip_range`), compose recreates the network on the next `up`. With a
foreign endpoint attached, as every worktree stack is on the primary's
network, compose first stops the project's own containers, then fails
with `error while removing network: ... has active endpoints`, and a
repeated `up` or `up --force-recreate` does not recover. On 2026-10-19
this took the shared registry/package cache and coredns down for every
local session.
`make compose-network-recreate` (alias `i8conere`) runs the sequence that
recovered it: detach every running container of another project from the
network, `docker compose down --remove-orphans` without `-v` so the
caches keep their volumes, the normal `up`, then attach the detached
containers again, which draw addresses from the dynamic pool. If `up`
fails, the still-detached containers are listed instead of reattached.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`security-apparmor-teardown` ran `aa-teardown`, which unloads every
profile including dockerd's in-memory `docker-default`. dockerd only loads
that profile when it starts, so every container start afterwards that
requests it fails until dockerd restarts. Since #1067 runs the teardown on
the GitHub runners, BuildKit failed each RUN of the swarm node image three
times (run 39332343490, 39 of 40 swarm jobs):
runc run failed: unable to start container process: error during
container init: unable to apply apparmor profile: apparmor failed to
apply profile: write .../attr/apparmor/exec: no such file or directory
The teardown now removes each loaded profile by name through securityfs
and skips `docker-default` and child profiles, which leave with their
parent. Dev hosts gain the same: no dockerd restart is needed after
`make environment-bootstrap`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ubuntu-26.04 runner images load per-binary AppArmor profiles (wg-quick,
dig, who, fusermount3, ~150 upstream). Path-based attachment applies to
every unconfined task, so the profiles also attach inside our privileged
`apparmor=unconfined` containers. The upstream wg-quick profile only allows
`/usr/bin/ip`; on CentOS and Fedora nodes `ip` lives at `/usr/sbin/ip`, so
`svc-net-wireguard : Bring 'data' up` failed with rc=126:
/usr/bin/wg-quick: line 32: /usr/sbin/ip: Permission denied
apparmor="DENIED" operation="exec" profile="wg-quick" name="/usr/sbin/ip"
(run 39268090162, Fediwall#0, CentOS swarm VPN).
Dev hosts never see this: `environment-bootstrap` runs
`security-apparmor-teardown`. The runners skipped that preparation. The
deploy, workspace and DNS workflows now run the same target on the runner
host before any container starts (skipped under act, whose job container
cannot reach the host's policy), so CI matches the dev-host state for all
profiles, not only the ones seen so far.
A dedicated permissive profile for the containers was rejected: every
AppArmor host without that profile loaded would refuse to start them,
including dev hosts and act.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
On ubuntu-26.04 runners the swarm deploy fails at svc-storage-nfs-client's
probe-write, right after a successful probe-mount, on every client node:
`Destination directory /run/svc-storage-nfs-client/probe does not exist`.
The rescue bundles cannot say why: ganesha writes to
/var/log/ganesha/ganesha.log, which the swarm diagnostics never collected,
and its NFS_V4 component logged nothing below EVENT.
Debug runs now log NFS_V4 at DEBUG, and the diagnostics append the tail
of ganesha.log to the nfs-boundary section.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The workflows pin `runs-on: ubuntu-NN.NN`, so no job moves to a new Ubuntu
release behind our back, but nothing raised the pin either. A sixth job of
`🔄 Update versions` closes that: `utils/update/runner.py` reads the image
table of actions/runner-images, takes the newest x64 Ubuntu label whose
image carries no preview or beta badge, and raises every older bare
`runs-on: ubuntu-NN.NN` to it; arch-suffixed labels stay untouched. The job
opens the change as one PR over `.github/workflows`, so its CI run tests
the new image before it reaches main.
This commit carries the updater's first result: every job now runs on
ubuntu-26.04 (49 `runs-on`).
actionlint 1.7.12, the newest release, does not know `ubuntu-26.04` yet
(rhysd/actionlint#682, fix proposed in rhysd/actionlint#743), so
`.github/actionlint.yaml` declares the label until a release knows it.
act maps each `ubuntu-NN.NN` label the workflows use to the local platform
image, derived from `.github/workflows`, instead of a fixed list that did
not know ubuntu-26.04.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`ubuntu-latest` moved from ubuntu-24.04 to ubuntu-26.04 on its own
schedule, in the middle of run 39166850273, and every job that landed on
the new image met a different OS: sudo-rs instead of sudo, no ip_tables
loaded, and now the NFS probe-write of svc-storage-nfs-client failing on
26.04 swarm nodes. The same branch went red without a code change.
Every `runs-on` now names `ubuntu-24.04`. GitHub still rebuilds that image
weekly, so patches and tool updates keep arriving; only the release jump
becomes a deliberate change of the label. The CodeQL job drops its dead
swift/macos-latest branch, since no swift language is in its matrix. act
already maps ubuntu-24.04 to the local platform image.
A lint rejects any job whose `runs-on` contains a `*-latest` label.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
#414 merged web-app-wazuh with a meta/networks.yml that carries only
`local`, and test_mesh_subnet_pool.py requires every stack role to ship
`meshes: []` so a compose host can join meshes through it. main's
test-lint has been red since d0698daa5e:
AssertionError: 'meshes' not found in {'local': {'subnet': '192.168.81.0/24'}}
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Generations a swarm node wrote to the NFS share before the node-local
bind stay under the export's backup/ directory, hidden from the nodes,
outside every cleanup and pull. No production swarm install carries any,
so the README states the manual removal instead of migrating.
Refs #1012
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two holes in the node-local backup bind, both reproduced with the role's
own tasks against a ganesha NFSv4.2 mount:
- The store was created with mode 0700. The role runs twice per deploy
(constructor svc-storage group, then 02_server), and between the runs
user-backup and the two cleanup roles converge the same inode to
root:root 0755. The second run then chmodded it to root:root 0700, the
backup user lost access (`ls` rc=2), and the backup host's pull would
list no repositories and exit 0. The store now uses 0755, the mode the
cleanup roles converge it to, so the second run changes nothing.
- A changed NFS mount line (options, version, server) makes
ansible.posix.mount fall back from `mount -o remount` to a plain
`umount`, which the child bind now blocks: `umount.nfs4: device is
busy`. A check-mode pass detects the pending change and unmounts the
bind first; the bind task mounts it again afterwards.
Refs #1012
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
