An image bump in a provider redeployed every variant of every consumer,
including the variants that switch that provider off and therefore never
deploy the bumped image at all. The diff-derived whitelist now narrows each
affected role to the variants whose own round closure still reaches a seed,
emitted as `role#0,2` selection tokens. That closure is walked on the same
variant-merged services maps the matrix planner builds its rounds from, so the
narrowing follows a parent's variant choice across every generation of the
chain. It covers every auto-derived whitelist: the weekly update PRs,
Dependabot, and any other diff-driven run.
The narrowing never shrinks the matrix on partial information. A seed role
keeps every variant, because its own files changed. A role reached only
through a run_after edge keeps every variant too, because the round closure
does not follow that edge and a role whose hits are empty is therefore
unnarrowed rather than dropped.
A pinned token naming a role the discovery query does not return now warns
instead of aborting the run. The diff-derived whitelist legitimately names
roles the lifecycle envelope filters out, and once it pins variants such a
token would abort every chunk; role names are still checked against roles/
before the run starts, so a typo is caught one layer earlier.
The round's variant merge moves out of the deploy inventory package into
utils/roles/applications/variants.py. The CI selection has to build the same
maps, and importing the deploy package for them pulls in a module that reads
INFINITO_SRC_DIR at import time, which the runner host does not set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
test_the_committed_report_is_freshly_generated compares the committed table
against a fresh render, and baserow had moved to 2.3.4 in its services.yml
while the table still read 2.3.3.
The bump arrived from the image-version updater, which edits services.yml and
nothing else. The report is derived from those files but is committed, so every
version bump for an MCP-serving role leaves it stale until someone runs
`make mcp-audit`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The merge from main moved web-app-baserow to 2.3.4 without regenerating the
report the version is rendered into, so test_mcp_audit_report saw a document
that no longer matched a fresh generation. Produced by make mcp-audit.
Brings in Kevin's AI-agent work, the svc-net-firewall role and the update
tooling. One conflict, in the MCP proxy audit: both sides appended a role to
privileged_control_plane, ours web-app-openbao and upstream svc-net-firewall.
Taken as a union at 25, which is what test_mcp_audit_completeness requires -
neither role declares meta/mcp.yml, so the audit is the only place they are
classified.
The swarm drill against web-app-openbao establishes both meshes, rotates
every key mid-run and completes the update pass without an operator touch,
and every spoke crosses the tunnel with a full-size payload.
0d1ba1777f set ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK_TARGETS=true in July with the right
diagnosis: Fider's SSRF guard refuses the OAuth token exchange when the
Keycloak host resolves to an internal address, so login 500s and never
completes. The image pin stayed at v0.36.0, which does not read that variable,
so the fix has been inert ever since.
Read out of the binaries rather than the release notes: `stable` contains the
string ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK_TARGETS, v0.36.0 contains it zero times. Upstream
added the opt-in on 2026-06-24 and the check now returns before the hostname is
resolved, which is what puts the OAuth token path under it as well.
CI showed this as three red specs on Fider#0, admin sso login, biber sso login
and the seaweedfs tenant-logo upload, all with a missing .c-menu-user. The
artifact says why the selector is missing: the page is Fider's own 500 screen,
and fider.log carries the cause four times over, `Token URL is not allowed:
This URL is not allowed because it targets a private or internal network
address (app/services/oauth/oauth.go:320)`. The selector was right; there was
no session to render.
The tag is `stable` and not a version because upstream published v0.36.1 on
GitHub on 2026-07-03 and never pushed the matching image. Docker Hub's newest
release tag remains v0.36.0, and `stable` was rebuilt three days after that
release, carrying the opt-in. The marker on the line records both that and the
condition for removing it.
This is a moving tag in a repository that has just finished pinning fifteen of
them, and the mirror copies by tag, so an existing copy of `stable` can go
quietly stale. That is the accepted cost of the only build upstream ships with
the fix, and the TODO is what closes it.
audit.md moves with it: the report is generated from the pins and the lint
fails when the committed copy differs from a fresh generation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The role alters host routing and forwarding, so it belongs with the roles that
require an audited operations gateway rather than general-purpose application
MCP. Absence is not a disposition, and the completeness lint enforces that.
Two hub-and-spoke meshes over the five hosts default.env already names, with
the manager as the only member of both and therefore the router between the
swarm and data planes. Records the three consequences of that shape as accepted
rather than hiding them: the hub carries worker-to-worker overlay traffic, it
carries all worker storage traffic because workers are not data-plane members,
and losing its tunnel stops running containers in a way plain swarm does not.
The subnet-collision criterion comes from the topology rather than the design:
the lab underlay is 192.168.244.0/24, Docker holds 10.208.0.0/12, and per-role
subnets sit in the lower 192.168.0.0/16, so a mesh has to be allocated clear of
all three and checked before a deploy.
10c5b35e88 moved simpleicons and roulette-wheel from node:26-bookworm to
node:26-slim. Both declare healthcheck flavor curl, which renders
CMD curl -f <url>, and neither Dockerfile installed anything. Measured with
docker create and docker cp: node:26-bookworm carries /usr/bin/curl at 280800
bytes, node:26-slim carries neither curl nor wget. The probe therefore fails
from the first beat and the container never reports healthy.
sys-svc-compose waits on the database container alone in compose and on every
stack task in swarm, so the consequence splits by mode. Under swarm the task
dies with non-zero exit (137): dockerexec: unhealthy container, is rescheduled,
dies again, and the converge wait fails after 600 attempts. Five jobs across
the two runs on a534d5d46 died that way, and none of them on the role they are
named after: ERPNext#0, Decidim#0, Hugo#0, Nextcloud#9 and Nextcloud#12 all
carry web-app-dashboard in their closure, dashboard enables simpleicons, and
the failure reads 'not converged: simpleicons_simpleicons'.
All five are swarm and tor, which reads like the tor axis until XWiki#1 is put
beside them: swarm, tor, green, and simpleicons is not in its closure. The
discriminator is the service, not the axis.
Of the seven roles 10c5b35e88 rebased, bridgy-fed and postmarks probe over tcp,
and flowise and bookwyrm install curl themselves. These two were the remainder.
roulette-wheel had not been deployed yet when this was written, so it is the
same defect caught before it was observed. The install goes into the runtime
stage of the multi-stage build; the builder stage would have left the runtime
image unchanged and nothing would have gone red.
The lint reads the binary out of the probe the declaration renders rather than
restating a flavor-to-binary table, so a flavor that changes its command moves
the check with it, and it locates the flavor line per service so one marker
cannot silence a sibling. Its scope stops at slim: nginx:1.31.6-alpine was
measured too and ships curl as a real 272 KB binary plus busybox wget, so the
four alpine roles that declare those flavors are served by their base, and
widening the rule to them needs that measurement per image rather than an
assumption from the word alpine.
Not built. The image with the new layer has not been produced, and whether a
second fault waits behind the healthcheck is decided by the next deploy. The
apt path itself is not blind: BookWyrm#1 installs curl the same way on
python:3.11-slim and is green in this run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings this pre-swarm branch up to the current swarm-era codebase: 3681 commits
across 7221 files. Our side contributed almost nothing by comparison, so the
conflict surface stayed at the 17 files both sides had touched.
Resolutions:
- The 15 legacy svc-net-wireguard-{core,firewalled,plain} files conflicted as
modify/delete and rename/delete (upstream renamed 01_core.yml to 00_core.yml).
All resolved as deletions: this branch is starting wireguard over. Five more
files of those roles came back silently because upstream had not touched them
since the merge base, and were removed after the merge.
- sys-svc-container/templates/daemon.json.j2 took upstream's structure, which
adds default-address-pools and json-file log limits and makes storage-driver
conditional on DOCKER_IN_CONTAINER. Our unconditional version would have set
fuse-overlayfs on bare-metal hosts too, so theirs is the correct semantics;
only the value now routes through SYS_SVC_CONTAINER_STORAGE_DRIVER.
- sys-svc-container/vars/main.yml keeps that variable, which upstream never had
and nothing supersedes, and adopts upstream's removal of the MTU comment.
Follow-up the merge itself required: the root README role table was regenerated
and the privileged_control_plane list in requirement 035 dropped from 24 to 21,
both of which still enumerated the deleted roles.
The consolidated svc-net-wireguard role, its requirement document and the three
references that only existed to support it go away together: the lint ignore for
a load failure inside its tasks, the requirements index entry, and the tunnel
subnet variable nothing else consumed.
Left in place deliberately: the WireGuard mention in the svc-net category
description, which is upstream prose about networking roles in general rather
than anything this role owned.
Nothing here was typed by hand. The docs generator rebuilt the MCP audit
table against pins that had already landed, so fider reads v0.36.0 instead
of stable, jenkins 2.568.3-lts instead of lts, pretix 2026.7.0 instead of
stable, and flowise 24-slim instead of 24-bookworm-slim. That is the table
catching up with da665ab69 and 10c5b35e8, reading the same declaration the
updater reads.
Autoformat wrapped three test files from the same series: one condition
pulled onto a single line, three assertEqual calls broken across lines.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A codename carries no ordering, so 'bookworm' and 'trixie' are two opaque
strings and no updater can tell that one supersedes the other. A pin that
names its Debian release that way is frozen on that release for as long as
it stands, and the freeze is invisible because the tag keeps resolving.
Numeric tags are comparable and stay inside the freshness pipeline, so the
rule is worth holding for the whole repository rather than fixing case by
case.
The check reads two shapes, because a codename reaches the tree in two
spellings. A 'name:tag' reference is recognised by the absence of a space
after the colon, which is what separates 'debian:bookworm' from the YAML
'image: python' and covers Dockerfile FROM lines and heredocs without a
second parser. A 'version:' value is read as a key, because '3.11-bookworm'
carries no colon at all.
False positives are kept out by two independent gates: a word-boundary
prefilter, so 'residual' and 'inside' are not read as 'sid', and a split of
the tag on '-', '.' and '_' that requires a whole component to be a
codename. That is what lets 'cache buster', '.stretched-link',
'fa-bullseye' and a tags list containing 'stretch' through. Every codename
occurrence in the repository was checked against the matcher by hand, and
the check was negative-controlled in both shapes, including an untracked
file.
Four references had to move for the rule to hold. meta/distros.yml takes
'debian:13' rather than '13.6': at depth 1 the updater can raise it across
a major, while depth 2 pins it inside the 13.x line forever. The whole
'make install' path was run in a debian:13 container to back that: all
twenty-four Depends and Recommends resolve on trixie, the docker repository
bootstrap derives the right suite and installs docker-ce-cli, and the
package builds and installs.
The workspace DiD probe moves to 'debian:13-slim'. An earlier version of
this change carried a suppression claiming the probe had to follow the
suite the apt proxy mirrors. That was wrong twice over: it cited a function
that has nothing to do with the probe, and the coupling does not exist,
because the cache frontend rewrites by path prefix and the suite never
enters a routing decision. Replaying the probe verbatim against
debian:13-slim fetches all three trixie suites through the
bookworm-configured proxies, so the suppression is gone rather than
reworded.
The rule ships with an escape hatch and no uses of it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SOFTWARE_NAME, SOFTWARE_DOMAIN, SOFTWARE_URL and ORGANIZATION are declared once in group_vars/all/00_general.yml and derive from each other. Eleven templates wrote the value instead, so a rename would reach the four declarations and every consumer that reads them, and silently miss the literal.
The lint reads the name from the declaration rather than carrying it, and searches case-insensitively: the domain is the name lowered, the URL is https:// plus the domain and the organization is the name again, so one literal finds the value of all four. A hit is reported with the variable it should have been, derived from the scheme in front of it and its case. The escape is nocheck: software-identity, same line or the one above.
Every migrated template renders the same bytes as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ansible warns that the name is already in use and carries on. Carrying on is the problem: inside the loop the original value is gone, so every lookup, template and nested include reading that name sees the loop item instead, and the task still reports success. The damage lands in a log nobody greps.
The lint collects every key declared in group_vars and in each role's vars or defaults, then reports any loop_var matching one. A denylist of known-bad names would have found application_id and missed domain, which is the same class in four more places.
All seven existing sites are marked, each with the reason read at the source rather than inferred. The three application_id loops pass the role id as the item, and the include_vars that follows loads that role's own application_id with the same value, so both meanings coincide by construction. The four domain loops hand the vhost to sys-stk-front-proxy, whose tasks read front_proxy_domain from exactly that name, so the shadowing is the interface.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A fragment declares its own nftables table. An accept there terminates that table's base chain and nothing else: the packet still traverses every other base chain at the same hook, and a drop in any of them wins. Docker sets the filter FORWARD policy to drop by default, so a fragment that accepts is not permitting anything, it is declining to decide.
Measured rather than argued. Converting a role's appended iptables FORWARD accept into a fragment rule at priority -10 delivered 0 of 3 forwarded packets under that policy where the rule it replaced delivered 3 of 3, and the fragment's own counter showed the accept had matched all three. Both versions deployed green, which is why this belongs in a lint and not in a paragraph.
The message names both ways out: express the intent as a drop of what must not pass, or put the rule in the chain that carries the policy it has to overrule.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A templated script is opaque to every tool that reads shell. shellcheck parses Jinja as syntax errors, the repository's own .sh guards skip the file because it is not a .sh, and nothing can execute it to test it: what runs on the host never exists in the repository, so a defect in the rendered half is found by deploying it.
The lint reports any *.sh.j2 under roles and points at the static slot sys-service already resolves, files/shell/script.sh, with the values passed as ExecStart arguments or Environment entries the way this repository's python scripts already take them.
None of the seven templates present meets the bar the marker is for, which is a script whose shape is generated rather than its values. Each is grandfathered with a marker naming what it interpolates, because converting a deployed script to argv changes what runs on the host. The guard exists to stop the next one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
sys-service resolves the template, writes it into the unit directory, reloads the daemon, enables and starts the unit, and carries the timer, async and flush behaviour. A role that renders its own service.j2 with a bare template task gets the file and none of the rest, and every one of those omissions is silent: a unit that exists but was never enabled looks installed until the host reboots.
The lint reports any src pointing at a service.j2 inside a role's tasks. desk-ssh was the one finding left after sys-svc-firewall moved over, and it migrates here: its ssh-agent unit now comes from sys-service in the user scope, with the type, ordering, environment and Install section supplied as template fields. RuntimeMaxSec is pinned empty on purpose, because the default applies it to anything that is not oneshot and would kill a long-running agent after a day.
The unversioned unit is retired first. sys-service names units by version, so the old file would otherwise stay behind enabled and a second agent would bind the same socket.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
svc-net-tor rendered its own guard script, its own unit and its own handler, and hooked the rules into DOCKER-USER with an insert, because a rule appended to a chain docker owns lands behind the RETURN docker puts there. The script flushed its chain and refilled it rule by rule, so the boundary was gone for the duration of the refill.
A role that needs packet filter rules now writes templates/nftables.conf.j2 declaring its own table and includes svc-net-firewall, which renders it to /etc/nftables.d/<role>.conf, rejects it with nft -c, loads it, reads the table back and refuses one that carries no chain. Deployed on its own the role installs nftables and the ruleset that loads every fragment at boot. That ruleset is a distribution decision, so its path follows os_family: RedHat reads /etc/sysconfig/nftables.conf, the others /etc/nftables.conf. The unit is only enabled, never started, because on Debian its ExecStop flushes the whole ruleset, docker's tables included.
One table per role removes the shared path: a fragment replaces its own table and touches no other, and docker never touches either. nft -f on an existing table merges, so each fragment creates, deletes and redeclares its table in one transaction. The tests load every fragment twice into a throwaway network namespace and require the listing to match, because a merging fragment loads twice without error and shows up only as a duplicated rule.
The tor guard now applies in both deploy modes. It was pinned to swarm while torrc binds TransPort and DNSPort on the bridge address in compose too, so on a single-host install those ports answered every on-link neighbour. The guard drops rather than admits, so nothing short-circuits another table, and ip saddr carries an implicit ipv4 dependency, which leaves the ipv6 exposure exactly where the iptables rules left it. svc-net-tor reads its own chain back and refuses a guard that drops nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A port under ports.local or ports.public binds an address on the stack host, which is what a HiddenServicePort can forward to. Whether it should be forwarded has a cost in both directions: silently off leaves a service unreachable that the operator believes is on the onion, and silently on publishes a database, an admin interface or a SOCKS proxy to everyone holding the onion address. Neither belongs in a default, so the flag is now mandatory and every false carries the reason it is false.
The first run produced 165 findings, of which 131 were one architectural fact repeated rather than 131 decisions. Four groups are therefore settled once in the lint instead: the proxy-fronted http, sso and websocket, because the node onion already forwards port 80 to the reverse proxy that routes every vhost, oauth2 hop and socket upgrade behind it; the implicit-TLS variants, because Tor is already the transport encryption and container_ports drops those listeners when TLS is off, which an onion deployment always is; the categories a hidden service cannot carry, listed once in plugins.lookup.tor_ports.UDP_ONLY_CATEGORIES, which the lint imports rather than restates; and any entity that already answers the question through exposed:.
That leaves 23 real per-port decisions, each with a reason naming its own consumer. svc-net-tor keeps its own socks, trans and dns off the onion: a published SOCKS port is an open proxy, and SocksPolicy cannot refuse it because the forward arrives from the node's own address.
Mailu turns smtp, submission, imap and pop3 on, which is what makes sending and receiving work over the onion, and leaves sieve off because ManageSieve manages filters rather than mail. Measured end to end through the merged applications view, across all 105 roles the deploy now forwards exactly 25, 110, 143 and 587.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An unset secret or variable resolves to the empty string, not to an error, so
an undocumented one is invisible twice: the administrator cannot know to set it,
and the run that needed it degrades quietly instead of failing. The guard reads
every ${{ secrets.X }} and ${{ vars.X }} out of .github/workflows and demands
the name in the page that owns it, secrets.md or configuration.md.
It compares the reference against the page rather than the page against itself,
so it also catches a doc naming something the workflows no longer read.
Three gaps were already there. DOCKERHUB_USERNAME and DOCKERHUB_TOKEN
authenticate the image mirror against Docker Hub and lift the anonymous
pull-rate limit; both are declared required: false and the login step is gated
on them being non-empty, so their absence does not fail a run, it walks the
mirror into the rate limit. Neither was documented anywhere.
PLAYWRIGHT_KEEP_ALL is the sharper one: configuration.md listed
INFINITO_PLAYWRIGHT_KEEP, which is the name the workflow forwards it under, not
the name an administrator sets. Following the documentation produced a variable
nothing reads.
Commented-out lines are skipped. cron-security-scorecard.yml carries
`# repo_token: ${{ secrets.SCORECARD_TOKEN }}` as an option nobody has taken,
and demanding a doc row for it would describe an input no run asks for.
GITHUB_TOKEN is exempt in _PROVIDED_SECRETS because GitHub mints it per run; it
is not administered and cannot be set. A second case asserts the scan finds
workflow files at all, so the guard cannot pass vacuously.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The gateway could reach exactly one remote provider, through a bare
OPENROUTER_API_KEY group_var with an empty-string default and an `{% if %}`
around a single hardcoded model entry. OpenAI and Anthropic had no path at all.
All three are now declared in roles/svc-ai-litellm/meta/secrets.yml, which
mapping.py already calls the application config schema, so a key lands at
applications.svc-ai-litellm.secrets.credentials.<provider>_api_key like every
other credential. Each carries the `type` and `regex` its value must satisfy and
defaults to the central API.<provider>.api_key block, which keeps one
operator-facing place to fill a provider in while the role owns the shape.
type and regex had to become real to be worth declaring. 192 `validation:`
blocks sit in the role schemas today and not one line of Python enforces them,
so a `regex` would have joined a pile of decoration. validate_supplied_value
now runs on every path a value arrives from outside — the --set override, a
value already in the inventory, and the value standing next to a `default:`.
A generated value stays exempt because the algorithm that produced it is named
by the same schema and generate_value takes no schema argument. min_length is
deliberately left unenforced: the generators ignore it, so holding them to it
would fail where nothing is wrong.
The pattern is written for the paste, not for the vendor. OpenAI moved issuance
from sk- to sk-proj- without notice and Anthropic issues sk-ant-api03-; a schema
pinning a prefix would reject a valid key and abort inventory creation. `\S{20,}`
accepts every form those three issue today and one nobody has announced, and
rejects a trailing newline, an embedded space, a truncated copy and a
<placeholder>. A key pasted into the wrong provider's slot is caught at deploy
instead, where the route it publishes answers nothing.
The gateway iterates one LITELLM_REMOTE_BACKENDS list instead of three `{% if %}`
blocks; config.yaml.j2 and env.j2 read the same list and selectattr('key')
decides. LITELLM_CHAT_MODEL falls back to the first configured remote alias
rather than to a hardcoded openrouter/auto.
For CI the keys travel as INFINITO_API_{OPENAI,ANTHROPIC,OPENROUTER}_KEY through
default.env, the passthrough allowlist, the infinito service in compose.yml, the
workflow env block and the development inventory. The compose leg is not
optional: the env lint rejected the change without it, because a key the
inventory reads but compose does not forward resolves to empty inside the
container with no error. The workflow reads `secrets.X || vars.X` so a variable
works as asked while a secret wins, which matters because a variable is not
masked and the development inventory sets MASK_CREDENTIALS_IN_LOGS: false.
An unset key is not an error anywhere: the provider's routes stay unpublished
and the CLI test asserts their absence rather than skipping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Only two files were touched by both sides. env.js merged automatically: the
incoming side owns recordVideoOptions and this branch had cherry-picked that
same function from it, so the result carries one definition. README.md is the
generated roles index and both sides append rows; resolved as a union, taking
the incoming side for the three rows it edits (OnlyOffice, Open WebUI, OpenClaw)
and keeping ours only for OpenBao, then re-sorted.
The incoming side adds lint rules and resources that this role then violated.
Five fixes, each the remedy the failing rule names:
* services.openbao.ports.local.http 8081 -> 8093; svc-ai-litellm now holds 8081.
* meta/networks.yml subnet 192.168.221.0/24 -> 192.168.222.0/24; svc-ai-mcp-adapter
now holds 221, and the suggester only sub-allocates inside occupied /24s, so
the next free block was taken directly.
* services.email bond 1 -> 0; the entry is disabled and the resource model skips
it before reading the weight.
* README Quick Setup regenerated from the template it had drifted from.
* Credits link the implementer, matching how they are credited elsewhere.
* docs/requirements/035-mcp-proxy-expansion.md disposes of web-app-openbao as
privileged_control_plane, which is what a secrets manager is, and the list
count follows.
Verified against a worktree of #454 alone so the baseline is measured rather
than assumed: lint 501 passed with only the branch-name rule failing, which
fails identically on that baseline because the worktree branch is named
merge/*; unit 5665 passed with the same three host-environment failures the
baseline has; integration 324 passed, 0 failed.
`process.env.X || <value>` is a second source for something the deployment
already renders, and the two drift without a sound. playwright.config.js read
`process.env.PLAYWRIGHT_ACTION_TIMEOUT || 30_000` while nothing ever set that
variable, so every run used the unscaled 30 s and no failure said so.
Normalising an absent variable stays allowed, because it substitutes nothing:
`|| ""`, `|| '[]'`, `|| false`, `|| 0` and falling through to another
`process.env` entry only let the caller test absence itself.
The six sites the rule found:
n8n and flowise built a Postgres port from `|| '5432'` while env.j2 renders it
from `lookup('database', application_id, 'port')`. Node throws
ERR_SOCKET_BAD_PORT on the resulting NaN, so an unfed port now names itself
instead of connecting somewhere plausible.
The bluesky broker did the same with BROKER_PORT, which compose.yml.j2 renders
unconditionally. Its INSECURE_TLS default was `"false"`, which is what `""`
already evaluates to.
matomo defaulted MATOMO_TRACKING_SCOPE to "sub"; the only comparison is against
"root", so `""` takes the identical branch.
moodle and simpleicons defaulted a name their playwright.env.j2 always renders.
simpleicons already asserts the value is truthy; moodle now fails on the scope
it cannot find rather than on a name nobody configured.
Four values the code itself owns keep a default under `// nocheck: env-default`:
PDS_INTERNAL_URL (which falls through to requireEnv, not to a literal),
HANDOFF_COOKIE_NAME, HANDOFF_COOKIE_MAX_AGE and PASSWORD_SALT_HASH_ROUNDS. No
role renders any of them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ansible renders the values of a structure loaded through include_vars and leaves its keys as written, so the mapping key a564385068 wrote as a Jinja expression reached Nextcloud as its own source text. occ config:app:get sociallogin custom_providers on a live variant-1 instance returns "groupMapping": {"/{{ lookup('rbac_group_path', application_id=application_id, role='administrator') }}": "admin"} while every neighbouring value of the same provider is rendered, scope among them.
Keycloak emits /roles/web-app-nextcloud/administrator, so the mapping matched nothing and the account sociallogin provisions on first login stayed out of admin. occ group:list on that instance shows admin holding only the local administrator while keycloak-ac165525-e9e8-4230-9381-13b1acd83fc0 exists and belongs to no group, and every Playwright spec that needs an admin settings section answered 'Access forbidden'.
An independent reproduction outside this repo showed the same split on ansible-core 2.21.4 and 2.20.6: in a payload of the same shape the sibling value rendered and the key did not, so it is not a version artifact. Nextcloud 34.0.3 settles the other half: Manager.php hands an admin the unfiltered settings of a section and ai is a core section of the always-enabled settings app, so an admin cannot receive 403 there whatever is installed.
Writing the whole mapping as one expression makes jinja2_native, which this deployment has on, return a real mapping with the key computed. The lint takes the class: no meta payload may carry Jinja in a mapping key. It found exactly this one case in the whole meta tree, and it ignores a line that itself opens with the expression so the corrected form does not trip it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ansible templates delegate_to before it evaluates the task's when, so a task delegating to N8N_HOST_NODE kills the play with 'N8N_HOST_NODE' is undefined whenever the resolver that sets it was skipped, even though the delegating task would have been skipped too. 43e09ebf0d put the resolver inside the same conditional block. Run 34653754175 shows the pair directly above the failure: the include skipped on the false condition while the setup call had returned status 200, and the play ended at 01_bootstrap.yml:92.
The resolver now runs unconditionally, before the block. It costs one lookup per deploy and changes no state.
The new lint reads the class rather than this instance: a conditional resolve_host_cid include whose PREFIX_HOST_NODE a delegate_to in the same role reads, unless an unconditional resolver or set_fact defines that prefix role-wide. The walker carries the condition through block, rescue and always, so an include nested in a block does not read as unconditional. Against the pre-fix file it reports would flag: ['N8N'].
It found one more: web-app-yourls/tasks/install.yml wrapped its tasks in a block whose when repeated the IS_STACK_HOST condition that main.yml already carries on the include. The wrapper is gone and the tasks are dedented; nothing had broken there because the condition always held.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
At -vvv Ansible prints each module argument and result, so a password in
a command line, a request body, a header or a fact lands in the deploy
log. Nothing enforced masking outside the MCP task files, and no check
looked at parents at all.
A new lint, test_credential_tasks_are_masked, finds tasks whose printed
parts (module arguments, environment, loop) reference an identifier ending
in password, secret, token, api_key or private_key, or
secrets.credentials. A task passes when it or an enclosing block sets
no_log, when every file that pulls it in does so through include_tasks
with apply.no_log or import_tasks with no_log (transitively), when the
secret only reaches a parameter the module masks itself, or when the
module masks its values. no_log on an include_tasks task itself does not
count, because it does not reach the included tasks. The rule can be
suppressed per task with `# nocheck: credential-masking`, now listed in
the suppression catalog, and the lint tests its parent and suppression
logic on synthetic cases.
It found 39 unmasked tasks in 19 roles, all real: join tokens, client
secrets, API tokens in Cloudflare headers, database passwords in
command lines, the ChatGPT bot login body and more. Each now sets
no_log from MASK_CREDENTIALS_IN_LOGS. The sys-dns-hetzner-rdns alias
hetzner_no_log, which only restated that switch, is gone.
Not covered yet: template and copy tasks whose rendered file carries a
secret print it as a diff under --diff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ubuntu CI image build (job 103277644636) hung on Canonical's
archive: apt fetched 26 MB at 417 kB/s, then 61.6 kB in 29 s, then sat
on the package download until the job was cancelled after 23 minutes,
while download.docker.com delivered 42.8 MB in under a second on the
same runner. Locally archive.ubuntu.com and security.ubuntu.com took
20-26 s to the first byte against 2 s for a university mirror.
INFINITO_APT_UBUNTU_MIRRORS in default.env is now the one list of
Ubuntu mirrors, in failover order: de.archive.ubuntu.com, ftp.fau.de,
ftp.halifax.rwth-aachen.de, archive.ubuntu.com.
- Image builds: the Dockerfile sources the list alongside the install
scripts and runs scripts/install/apt-mirrors.sh first. In an image
with ubuntu.sources it points both stanzas at apt's mirror+file
method, priorities in list order, and sets Acquire::http::Timeout to
10 s, so apt moves on from a mirror that fails or goes silent; other
distros are untouched. In ubuntu:latest apt-get update took 8 s
against 110 s on the stock sources, a dead first mirror was left
behind within 25 s against 62 s on apt's defaults, and the swarm node
packages (80 debs) came in 17 s. The Dockerfile's own RUN lines ran
clean on ubuntu, debian, fedora and arch.
- Package cache: package.sh proxies the first entry as the primary
Ubuntu repos and the second as their fallback. Nexus revalidates
metadata on every request here (metadataMaxAge 0), which costs a
full download from a mirror without an ETag; both de.archive and
ftp.fau.de send one, and the 15 MB universe index now comes back
from the cache in 0.02 s.
- tests/external/repository/test_apt_ubuntu_mirrors.py keeps the list
honest: the first mirror must answer InRelease within 5 s (median of
three) or the test names a faster later one, no mirror's -updates may
lag the freshest by more than 24 h, and every entry must be the
primary archive, a Canonical country alias or an enabled official
mirror in Launchpad's registry. It caught the first draft of the
list: mirrors.edge.kernel.org is not an official Ubuntu mirror.
After pulling, an existing checkout needs `make dotenv-force`: plain
`make dotenv` re-reads the old .env through BASH_ENV and keeps its
values.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
test_packages_available failed locally in every quality pass with
"91 package(s) could not be checked at all ... archive.ubuntu.com:
timed out". The dev stack routes archive.ubuntu.com to the package-cache
frontend, which re-runs a request against the -mirror repo only once
the primary Nexus repo answers 502/503/504. From this host's docker
network Canonical's IPv4 addresses take seconds to connect and then
send nothing, and Nexus tries all nine addresses of archive.ubuntu.com
in turn before it gives up: apt-ubuntu answered 502 after 21-25 s, so
the frontend's first byte arrived after 27-46 s, past the probe's 20 s
timeout. apt-ubuntu-mirror (de.archive.ubuntu.com) served the same
files in 0.08 s.
The four primary locations now carry proxy_read_timeout 8s: nginx
gives up on Nexus itself, its own 504 hits the existing error_page, and
the mirror answers. A shorter Nexus upstream timeout was tried first and
dropped, because Nexus spends it once per address and still took
9-21 s. The mirror locations keep the global 300 s, and a healthy
primary answers well inside the bound, as before.
Measured after a compose restart: the ubuntu index arrives after
8-12.6 s with Origin: Ubuntu, debian still in 0.03-0.16 s, npm and PyPI
in 0.13 s; make test-external passed 13 of 13 and the full
make quality-high went green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Run 34421944328 n8n#1: Open WebUI 0.11.0 ships only a Streamable HTTP
MCP client. n8n 1.95.3's MCP Server Trigger speaks SSE only and answered
the client's POST to /webhook/infinito-mcp/sse with 404, so "every
registered MCP server answers Open WebUI's client" failed.
n8n moves to 1.100.1 and the managed trigger to typeVersion 2, which
serves Streamable HTTP at /mcp/<path>. meta/mcp.yml declares
transport: streamable_http at /mcp/infinito-mcp (the trigger path stays
infinito-mcp) and points source_url at the 1.100.1 tree. Open WebUI's
supported_transports drops sse, which its client never spoke; no
provider declares sse any more, so no pairing is lost.
n8n#0: the guest spec probed ${APP_BASE_URL}${MCP_ENDPOINT_PATH} and
expected a refusal of >= 300 without an event stream. The trigger is
exposure: internal, so the public vhost must answer 404; the spec now
asserts exactly that through mcpEndpointUrl(..., N8N_BASE_URL), and the
bearer guard itself is proven in-cluster by the CLI MCP contract.
Requirement 035 and the MCP audit table follow the version and
transport.
Upgrade path, read from upstream at both tags: the postgres migrations
are identical (45/45) and the only new common migration is
AddProjectDescriptionColumn, an additive nullable column; BREAKING-
CHANGES.md lists only 1.98.0 in range (route metric format, Form node
tag attributes, Node >= 20), none of which this deployment uses. A fresh
1.100.1 install ran all 89 migrations and passed the MCP bridge, server,
non-member and guest specs locally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the last cross-link acceptance criterion: the requirement now names
infinito-nexus/core#611 in its header and in the criterion itself, and the PR
description links back to this document. Also deep-links the upstream story
instead of pointing at the OpenProject root.
LITELLM_BACKEND_ROLES read lookup('deployment').groups, which deployment.py
fills from group_names. That variable is host-scoped: it lists only the groups
the host currently being processed belongs to.
On a swarm round the manager carries svc-ai-ollama, svc-ai-lmstudio and
svc-ai-litellm while the workers carry three groups and none of them is an AI
backend. Both branches of LITELLM_CHAT_MODEL therefore missed on a worker and,
with OPENROUTER_API_KEY empty, the model resolved to the empty string.
Only one task made that visible. Every stateful task in the gateway include
carries delegate_to STACK_HOST plus run_once, so it templates in the manager's
scope and wrote the correct model into the database. The assert carries
neither, so it re-templated in each worker's own scope and failed there while
the manager passed.
The manager-only membership is not a placement decision. The swarm test
inventory is provisioned with a single --host MGR, so every role of the round's
closure gets that one host, and extend_inventory then widens only
svc-swarm-node, svc-storage-nfs-client, svc-storage-nfs-server and the round's
own application. The three AI roles declare no placement at all; they are
manager-only because nothing widened them.
Add an inventory selector next to the host-scoped one, built from the play-wide
groups magic var, skipping groups without hosts and Ansible's implicit all and
ungrouped, sorted so the cache key is stable. The key takes it too, or two
hosts with equal group_names but different inventories would share an entry.
The blast radius is two readers, both in 16_ai.yml, and both ask only whether
svc-ai-ollama or svc-ai-lmstudio is present. On the manager the new value gains
exactly svc-storage-nfs-server and svc-bkp-nfs-2-local, neither of which either
reader tests, so the manager's answer does not move and only the workers change,
to match it.
This is the third step on the same line. 46a16127fc set .running; b149ad0d22
corrected that to .groups because a targeted apps= round leaves only the
command-line roles in the whitelist. .groups solves the targeted round and not
the multi-host one, because group_names stays host-scoped either way.
Measured in a two-host play with a real group_vars file and the real lookup:
the worker resolves ollama false through group_names and true through the new
selector, the manager is true both ways, and the assert that failed in CI
passes on both hosts.
Requirement 036 named the host-scoped backend selection as the thing that has
to change and deferred it. That residual is closed, so the paragraph now
describes the selector in use and why the two rejected ones are wrong.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two of them lived inside docs/ next to the pages they render, which is why both had grown a __file__ upward walk to find the repository root, a sys.path insert to import from utils, and a nocheck for each. A generator parked among documents reads as documentation and drops out of the checks that apply to code.
Moving them surfaced six real violations that the old location had hidden: yaml.safe_load instead of the shared cache, two uncached read_text calls, five hard-coded role paths instead of ROLE_FILE_META_SERVICES and ROLE_FILE_META_MCP, two make targets without an alias, and a requirement reference in code. All six are fixed at the root, none with a suppression, and both generators lose their project-root exemptions because a package supplies PROJECT_ROOT.
cli/build/readme joins them so the three generators that write into docs/ sit together. A new lint keeps docs/ to .md, .html, .rst and .nocheck; it enumerates through git ls-files so untracked __pycache__ is not its business. Checked against HEAD, it names exactly the three .py files that moved.
026-unified-addon-syntax stated that the matrix generator stays under docs/requirements/. The lint makes that impossible, so the requirement now records where the generator actually lives.
Verified: every one of the twelve modules under the new tree imports, no old module path survives anywhere in the repository, 482 lint tests and 1246 cli unit tests pass, and both generators run without drift.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
confluence 10.2.16 to 10.2.18, erpnext v16.34.1 to v16.34.2, espocrm 10.0.7 to 10.0.8, hermes v2026.7.20 to v2026.9.7, mattermost 11.10.1 to 11.11.0, nextcloud context_agent 2.7.0 to 2.8.0, seaweedfs 4.45 to 4.46, coturn 4.17.2 to 4.18.0. The automated updater opens one PR per role and had not reached these eight; playwright and elasticsearch were already current in the tree.
audit.md follows rather than leads: the MCP report carries a version column and test_mcp_audit_report compares the committed file against a fresh generation, so hermes and mattermost move there too. Regenerated with audit.gen.py as that test instructs. Note that make docs does not run this generator, so the report only tracks reality when somebody calls it by hand.
Verified by the docker-version check itself: eleven Outdated warnings before, zero after.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The hub serves 94 tools across 23 categories, write tools included, and enabling the ExApp switches every category on. That surface was published on the public vhost and every discovered client was handed an app password for it. svc-ai-mcp-adapter now sits in front in mcp_passthrough mode: clients present credentials.mcp_bearer to contextagentmcp and reach the nine read tools of calendar, contacts and files, which files/mcp/tools.json names and the sidecar enforces per call. Those three categories are the ones whose upstream is_available is unconditional, so the served set does not vary with which optional apps a deployment installs.
Enforcing it in the sidecar rather than in each client is what makes it hold: web-app-openwebui renders no per-tool filter at all, so a client-side include list would have bounded two consumers out of three.
06c13e7f3e withdrew the declared path from the edge for exactly this reason - "that surface is what the adapter exists to narrow". Nextcloud answers the same route under a second spelling, without the /index.php front controller, which try_files rewrites back onto the route after the edge has already declined to block it. The withdrawal becomes a regex covering both, and only where stripping the front controller changes the path, so the four adapter providers without one render unchanged.
The app password is minted after the stack renders, so it reaches the sidecar through upstream.env and rebuild.yml rather than the compose environment: compose up resolves env_file while creating the container, a restart does not. The sidecar is the last service in the template because a Jinja set has no block scope and its env_file would otherwise displace the one talk, whiteboard and talk_recording each carry.
Two suites cover what nothing measured: the vhost template rendered without a container, asserting both spellings are withdrawn, and every shipped tools.json loaded through the adapter own loader, so a bad contract fails in a second instead of as a probe timing out an hour into a deploy. The guest spec probed mcp.endpoint.path, which this change makes the proxy answer 404 for its own reasons; it now probes all three public paths and requires no MCP body.
Not yet deployed: the sidecar build, the upstream.env delivery and the hub answering exactly nine tools are unverified against a running stack.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
supported_version and minimum_version sat in 24 roles and were read by no template, no task and no lookup. Their only consumer was the audit report version column, which turned false the moment an automated image bump ran: qdrant reported a verified version nobody had verified, two releases long. Both leave MCP_KEYS, so a role that declares them again fails the schema lint instead of carrying a field with no effect.
Requirement 025 mandated minimum_version as a MUST and 035 carried it in an example; both are corrected here, otherwise the repository would contradict its own code.
The gate then surfaced five dead docs.mattermost.com links. Mattermost moved to /administration-guide/ and /deployment-guide/, and every replacement was probed for 200 rather than guessed. The MCP page is gone with no successor, so mattermost now points at mcpserver/README.md in the Agents repository, the source rather than a rendered mirror.
Both concerns share three files - mattermost's meta/mcp.yml, requirement 025, and the generated audit.md, which derives from a source of each - so splitting them would commit an artifact that does not match its sources.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
