The update bot opened a version PR for web-app-jira (#821) although the role is end of life: none of the updaters looked at the lifecycle. utils.update.base.is_maintained now answers that question once, and the collectors for image versions, declared version sources, pip pins, repository refs and the addon check skip a role whose lifecycle is eol.
The lint that requires every semver pin to be watched shares that scope, otherwise it would report the pins of the eol roles as unwatched. Every other stage, deprecated included, stays in the update scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The version-source updater only read meta/services.yml. An addon pinned in
meta/addons/<id>.yml stayed where it was: the ONLYOFFICE connector for
Nextcloud sat on v10.1.2, which does not install on Nextcloud 35, until
someone bumped it by hand.
The updater now reads addon files too. An addon declares its source in the
`update:` block it already has, beside monitored, catalog and upstream_id.
A monitored addon of the github-releases catalog needs nothing more: its
upstream_id names the repository whose tags are its versions. The
update-version-sources job opens the PRs, one per role.
Every pinned addon is wired:
- nextcloud onlyoffice carries its own version pin now. Its archive URL
stays a literal that carries the pin, because
test_pinned_addon_archives_available reads it as written
- wordpress mcp-adapter, moodle auth_oidc and jellyfin sso-authentication
follow the tags of their repository, moodle within its v4.5 series
- the three xwiki extensions read their Maven metadata
- pretix-oidc reads the PyPI simple index. The JSON API answers 404 behind
the package cache the test stack routes pypi.org through
- joomla's plugin is built here and jellyfin's ldap-authentication is bound
to the md5 of its archive; both are opted out with that reason
A bump rewrites the pin and the config.archive line together, and an
archive that does not carry the pin fails test_version_keys, so the two
cannot drift apart again. test_version_pins_are_watched covers addon pins
as well: a new one without a source or a reasoned opt-out fails the lint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The report aggregated each role's meta/mcp.yml into one table, and its
freshness test failed on every image-version bump of an MCP-serving role,
because the updater edits services.yml and nothing regenerates the committed
report. The table added nothing the sources lack: scope and credential subject
were identical for every role, so it restated its inputs.
The generator, the report, its freshness test, make mcp-audit and the i8mcau
alias go, and make docs no longer calls the generator. The metadata stays in
each role's meta/mcp.yml, where test_mcp_schema.py enforces its shape, and
requirement 035 now says so. The classification and completeness lints stay,
because they check the lists in 035 against the roles, not the report.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
test_the_committed_report_is_freshly_generated compares the committed
table against a fresh render. The image updater edits only
meta/services.yml, so the pretix row still read 2026.7.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
test_the_committed_report_is_freshly_generated compares the committed
table against a fresh render. The image updater edits only
meta/services.yml, so the mattermost row still read 11.11.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
test_the_committed_report_is_freshly_generated compares the committed
table against a fresh render. The image updater edits only
meta/services.yml, so the gitea row still read 1.27.3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
test_the_committed_report_is_freshly_generated compares the committed
table against a fresh render. The image updater edits only
meta/services.yml, so the checkmk row still read 2.4.0p32.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
test_the_committed_report_is_freshly_generated compares the committed
table against a fresh render. The image updater edits only
meta/services.yml, so the baserow row still read 2.3.4.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
lifecycle.md said a deprecated role is still covered by the test suite while the tested envelope already left it out. A deprecated role is now untested: the matrix-deploy MUST NOT exercise it and a failure in it MUST NOT block a release, while planned, pre-alpha and eol stay open to best-effort runs. The complexity legend says untested too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
layout.md listed six of the nine lifecycle stages the layout lint accepts and left out rc, maintenance and eol. It now defers to the stages in lifecycle.md, which already define every value, deprecated included, with its criteria.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
0d1ba1777f set ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK_TARGETS=true in July with the right
diagnosis: Fider's SSRF guard refuses the OAuth token exchange when the
Keycloak host resolves to an internal address, so login 500s and never
completes. The image pin stayed at v0.36.0, which does not read that variable,
so the fix has been inert ever since.
Read out of the binaries rather than the release notes: `stable` contains the
string ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK_TARGETS, v0.36.0 contains it zero times. Upstream
added the opt-in on 2026-06-24 and the check now returns before the hostname is
resolved, which is what puts the OAuth token path under it as well.
CI showed this as three red specs on Fider#0, admin sso login, biber sso login
and the seaweedfs tenant-logo upload, all with a missing .c-menu-user. The
artifact says why the selector is missing: the page is Fider's own 500 screen,
and fider.log carries the cause four times over, `Token URL is not allowed:
This URL is not allowed because it targets a private or internal network
address (app/services/oauth/oauth.go:320)`. The selector was right; there was
no session to render.
The tag is `stable` and not a version because upstream published v0.36.1 on
GitHub on 2026-07-03 and never pushed the matching image. Docker Hub's newest
release tag remains v0.36.0, and `stable` was rebuilt three days after that
release, carrying the opt-in. The marker on the line records both that and the
condition for removing it.
This is a moving tag in a repository that has just finished pinning fifteen of
them, and the mirror copies by tag, so an existing copy of `stable` can go
quietly stale. That is the accepted cost of the only build upstream ships with
the fix, and the TODO is what closes it.
audit.md moves with it: the report is generated from the pins and the lint
fails when the committed copy differs from a fresh generation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nothing here was typed by hand. The docs generator rebuilt the MCP audit
table against pins that had already landed, so fider reads v0.36.0 instead
of stable, jenkins 2.568.3-lts instead of lts, pretix 2026.7.0 instead of
stable, and flowise 24-slim instead of 24-bookworm-slim. That is the table
catching up with da665ab69 and 10c5b35e8, reading the same declaration the
updater reads.
Autoformat wrapped three test files from the same series: one condition
pulled onto a single line, three assertEqual calls broken across lines.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A port under ports.local or ports.public binds an address on the stack host, which is what a HiddenServicePort can forward to. Whether it should be forwarded has a cost in both directions: silently off leaves a service unreachable that the operator believes is on the onion, and silently on publishes a database, an admin interface or a SOCKS proxy to everyone holding the onion address. Neither belongs in a default, so the flag is now mandatory and every false carries the reason it is false.
The first run produced 165 findings, of which 131 were one architectural fact repeated rather than 131 decisions. Four groups are therefore settled once in the lint instead: the proxy-fronted http, sso and websocket, because the node onion already forwards port 80 to the reverse proxy that routes every vhost, oauth2 hop and socket upgrade behind it; the implicit-TLS variants, because Tor is already the transport encryption and container_ports drops those listeners when TLS is off, which an onion deployment always is; the categories a hidden service cannot carry, listed once in plugins.lookup.tor_ports.UDP_ONLY_CATEGORIES, which the lint imports rather than restates; and any entity that already answers the question through exposed:.
That leaves 23 real per-port decisions, each with a reason naming its own consumer. svc-net-tor keeps its own socks, trans and dns off the onion: a published SOCKS port is an open proxy, and SocksPolicy cannot refuse it because the forward arrives from the node's own address.
Mailu turns smtp, submission, imap and pop3 on, which is what makes sending and receiving work over the onion, and leaves sieve off because ManageSieve manages filters rather than mail. Measured end to end through the merged applications view, across all 105 roles the deploy now forwards exactly 25, 110, 143 and 587.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The gateway could reach exactly one remote provider, through a bare
OPENROUTER_API_KEY group_var with an empty-string default and an `{% if %}`
around a single hardcoded model entry. OpenAI and Anthropic had no path at all.
All three are now declared in roles/svc-ai-litellm/meta/secrets.yml, which
mapping.py already calls the application config schema, so a key lands at
applications.svc-ai-litellm.secrets.credentials.<provider>_api_key like every
other credential. Each carries the `type` and `regex` its value must satisfy and
defaults to the central API.<provider>.api_key block, which keeps one
operator-facing place to fill a provider in while the role owns the shape.
type and regex had to become real to be worth declaring. 192 `validation:`
blocks sit in the role schemas today and not one line of Python enforces them,
so a `regex` would have joined a pile of decoration. validate_supplied_value
now runs on every path a value arrives from outside — the --set override, a
value already in the inventory, and the value standing next to a `default:`.
A generated value stays exempt because the algorithm that produced it is named
by the same schema and generate_value takes no schema argument. min_length is
deliberately left unenforced: the generators ignore it, so holding them to it
would fail where nothing is wrong.
The pattern is written for the paste, not for the vendor. OpenAI moved issuance
from sk- to sk-proj- without notice and Anthropic issues sk-ant-api03-; a schema
pinning a prefix would reject a valid key and abort inventory creation. `\S{20,}`
accepts every form those three issue today and one nobody has announced, and
rejects a trailing newline, an embedded space, a truncated copy and a
<placeholder>. A key pasted into the wrong provider's slot is caught at deploy
instead, where the route it publishes answers nothing.
The gateway iterates one LITELLM_REMOTE_BACKENDS list instead of three `{% if %}`
blocks; config.yaml.j2 and env.j2 read the same list and selectattr('key')
decides. LITELLM_CHAT_MODEL falls back to the first configured remote alias
rather than to a hardcoded openrouter/auto.
For CI the keys travel as INFINITO_API_{OPENAI,ANTHROPIC,OPENROUTER}_KEY through
default.env, the passthrough allowlist, the infinito service in compose.yml, the
workflow env block and the development inventory. The compose leg is not
optional: the env lint rejected the change without it, because a key the
inventory reads but compose does not forward resolves to empty inside the
container with no error. The workflow reads `secrets.X || vars.X` so a variable
works as asked while a secret wins, which matters because a variable is not
masked and the development inventory sets MASK_CREDENTIALS_IN_LOGS: false.
An unset key is not an error anywhere: the provider's routes stay unpublished
and the CLI test asserts their absence rather than skipping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Run 34421944328 n8n#1: Open WebUI 0.11.0 ships only a Streamable HTTP
MCP client. n8n 1.95.3's MCP Server Trigger speaks SSE only and answered
the client's POST to /webhook/infinito-mcp/sse with 404, so "every
registered MCP server answers Open WebUI's client" failed.
n8n moves to 1.100.1 and the managed trigger to typeVersion 2, which
serves Streamable HTTP at /mcp/<path>. meta/mcp.yml declares
transport: streamable_http at /mcp/infinito-mcp (the trigger path stays
infinito-mcp) and points source_url at the 1.100.1 tree. Open WebUI's
supported_transports drops sse, which its client never spoke; no
provider declares sse any more, so no pairing is lost.
n8n#0: the guest spec probed ${APP_BASE_URL}${MCP_ENDPOINT_PATH} and
expected a refusal of >= 300 without an event stream. The trigger is
exposure: internal, so the public vhost must answer 404; the spec now
asserts exactly that through mcpEndpointUrl(..., N8N_BASE_URL), and the
bearer guard itself is proven in-cluster by the CLI MCP contract.
Requirement 035 and the MCP audit table follow the version and
transport.
Upgrade path, read from upstream at both tags: the postgres migrations
are identical (45/45) and the only new common migration is
AddProjectDescriptionColumn, an additive nullable column; BREAKING-
CHANGES.md lists only 1.98.0 in range (route metric format, Form node
tag attributes, Node >= 20), none of which this deployment uses. A fresh
1.100.1 install ran all 89 migrations and passed the MCP bridge, server,
non-member and guest specs locally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two of them lived inside docs/ next to the pages they render, which is why both had grown a __file__ upward walk to find the repository root, a sys.path insert to import from utils, and a nocheck for each. A generator parked among documents reads as documentation and drops out of the checks that apply to code.
Moving them surfaced six real violations that the old location had hidden: yaml.safe_load instead of the shared cache, two uncached read_text calls, five hard-coded role paths instead of ROLE_FILE_META_SERVICES and ROLE_FILE_META_MCP, two make targets without an alias, and a requirement reference in code. All six are fixed at the root, none with a suppression, and both generators lose their project-root exemptions because a package supplies PROJECT_ROOT.
cli/build/readme joins them so the three generators that write into docs/ sit together. A new lint keeps docs/ to .md, .html, .rst and .nocheck; it enumerates through git ls-files so untracked __pycache__ is not its business. Checked against HEAD, it names exactly the three .py files that moved.
026-unified-addon-syntax stated that the matrix generator stays under docs/requirements/. The lint makes that impossible, so the requirement now records where the generator actually lives.
Verified: every one of the twelve modules under the new tree imports, no old module path survives anywhere in the repository, 482 lint tests and 1246 cli unit tests pass, and both generators run without drift.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
confluence 10.2.16 to 10.2.18, erpnext v16.34.1 to v16.34.2, espocrm 10.0.7 to 10.0.8, hermes v2026.7.20 to v2026.9.7, mattermost 11.10.1 to 11.11.0, nextcloud context_agent 2.7.0 to 2.8.0, seaweedfs 4.45 to 4.46, coturn 4.17.2 to 4.18.0. The automated updater opens one PR per role and had not reached these eight; playwright and elasticsearch were already current in the tree.
audit.md follows rather than leads: the MCP report carries a version column and test_mcp_audit_report compares the committed file against a fresh generation, so hermes and mattermost move there too. Regenerated with audit.gen.py as that test instructs. Note that make docs does not run this generator, so the report only tracks reality when somebody calls it by hand.
Verified by the docker-version check itself: eleven Outdated warnings before, zero after.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The hub serves 94 tools across 23 categories, write tools included, and enabling the ExApp switches every category on. That surface was published on the public vhost and every discovered client was handed an app password for it. svc-ai-mcp-adapter now sits in front in mcp_passthrough mode: clients present credentials.mcp_bearer to contextagentmcp and reach the nine read tools of calendar, contacts and files, which files/mcp/tools.json names and the sidecar enforces per call. Those three categories are the ones whose upstream is_available is unconditional, so the served set does not vary with which optional apps a deployment installs.
Enforcing it in the sidecar rather than in each client is what makes it hold: web-app-openwebui renders no per-tool filter at all, so a client-side include list would have bounded two consumers out of three.
06c13e7f3e withdrew the declared path from the edge for exactly this reason - "that surface is what the adapter exists to narrow". Nextcloud answers the same route under a second spelling, without the /index.php front controller, which try_files rewrites back onto the route after the edge has already declined to block it. The withdrawal becomes a regex covering both, and only where stripping the front controller changes the path, so the four adapter providers without one render unchanged.
The app password is minted after the stack renders, so it reaches the sidecar through upstream.env and rebuild.yml rather than the compose environment: compose up resolves env_file while creating the container, a restart does not. The sidecar is the last service in the template because a Jinja set has no block scope and its env_file would otherwise displace the one talk, whiteboard and talk_recording each carry.
Two suites cover what nothing measured: the vhost template rendered without a container, asserting both spellings are withdrawn, and every shipped tools.json loaded through the adapter own loader, so a bad contract fails in a second instead of as a probe timing out an hour into a deploy. The guest spec probed mcp.endpoint.path, which this change makes the proxy answer 404 for its own reasons; it now probes all three public paths and requires no MCP body.
Not yet deployed: the sidecar build, the upstream.env delivery and the hub answering exactly nine tools are unverified against a running stack.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
supported_version and minimum_version sat in 24 roles and were read by no template, no task and no lookup. Their only consumer was the audit report version column, which turned false the moment an automated image bump ran: qdrant reported a verified version nobody had verified, two releases long. Both leave MCP_KEYS, so a role that declares them again fails the schema lint instead of carrying a field with no effect.
Requirement 025 mandated minimum_version as a MUST and 035 carried it in an example; both are corrected here, otherwise the repository would contradict its own code.
The gate then surfaced five dead docs.mattermost.com links. Mattermost moved to /administration-guide/ and /deployment-guide/, and every replacement was probed for 200 rather than guessed. The MCP page is gone with no successor, so mattermost now points at mcpserver/README.md in the Agents repository, the source rather than a rendered mirror.
Both concerns share three files - mattermost's meta/mcp.yml, requirement 025, and the generated audit.md, which derives from a source of each - so splitting them would commit an artifact that does not match its sources.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ansible forks a fresh worker process for every task, so the in-process
cache behind lookup('applications') was cold in every task. Each task that
touched the merged applications tree (config, domains, nginx, tls, cdn and
their callers) paid a full render: about 16 s on main and 21 to 23 s on this
branch, where ten more application roles carry MCP and AI Jinja. Measured on
the workspace jobs of run 33574056480 against the main run: 331 such tasks
(93 min, 39 % of the job) versus 391 (141 min, 43 %); the same unit is 9 to
43 % of every compose and swarm deploy job on disk. The parent process
rendered once per play, late, while templating a task name, and only the
tasks after that point ran warm.
The constructor now renders once through the new applications_carrier
action and parks the payload with its cache key in the host fact
_INFINITO_APPLICATIONS_RENDERED. Every later worker inherits the fact at
fork time and get_merged_applications serves it while the key (roles dir,
applications, users, DOMAIN_PRIMARY, SYSTEM_EMAIL_DOMAIN) still matches; a
mismatch falls back to the old render. The action masks its own result: the
payload is the whole tree with every credential, and CI runs with
MASK_CREDENTIALS_IN_LOGS false.
The task sits after the networks, design and service_provider merges, after
the add_host placements and after the token store. An independent review
showed that an earlier position bakes stale values into the play: the
web-app-wordpress title rendered to 'Blog by ' because service_provider did
not exist yet. User records inside the payload are the token store's state
at render time; readers of tokens captured later keep using lookup('users')
or lookup('config', app, 'users.…'), which read the users cache fresh.
Expected savings per job: about 130 min on a fork workspace run, 16 min on
an average compose deploy and 28 min on an average swarm deploy. The
constructor's own lookups before the carrier stay cold.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The contract check ran as an Ansible task in the middle of every provider deploy, and the two client checks ran the same way. A test that is part of the deploy cannot be run without deploying, cannot be re-run on its own, and reports its verdict as a deploy failure. Twenty-seven task files lose 491 lines to this.
It is now what it always was. Each provider ships files/test/test.sh, templates/test.env.j2 and meta/tests.yml, and test-e2e-cli stages one shared harness beside it: run.sh drives contract.sh in a throwaway container on the provider's own network, then isolation.sh for adapter-fronted providers. The read probe each provider offers moved from the calling task into meta/mcp.yml next to the allowlist it must satisfy, and the schema now rejects a read probe naming a tool outside that allowlist.
The bearer the test presents is the one a client resolves through mcp.credential, via the new mcp_client_bearer lookup over resolve_credential, which moved to utils.roles.applications.mcp so it is the same function mcp_servers renders every client connection with. The probe presented whatever the calling role passed, which for the fifteen adapter-fronted providers is a different secret than any client holds.
Sidecar isolation is read from the engine rather than measured inside the container, so it no longer needs a delegation to the node holding the task: attachment is compared by network name, which drops the gwbridge special case, and a swarm worker says it cannot measure instead of skipping silently.
Retrying is bounded by wall clock against MCP_DEADLINE_SECONDS, which scales through the same lookup('timeout') as the harness budget it has to stay under. A flag that is neither true nor false aborts rather than reading as off.
mcp-provider-probe becomes mcp-provider-cli-test: an enabled provider must ship the test rather than include the task. mcp-probe-bearer becomes mcp-adapter-bearer, tying ADAPTER_BEARER to the declared credential key now that no probe include carries it. A new integration test renders the shared env template for every provider through Ansible's own templar, so a later change to it breaks visibly instead of poisoning twenty deploys quietly.
Hermes and OpenClaw keep their client-side proof as CLI tests of their own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
32dd66099 gave web-app-jenkins the third consumer its neighbours already
had, and the report reads that list from the same mcp_consumer edges the
derivation does. One cell.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
enabled and shared were hand-maintained in 24 roles and wrong in both
directions. Both now resolve from the mcp_consumer edges already declared
in meta/services.yml: a server takes the consumers it admits, a client
takes the servers that admit it, and the pair renders as "'peer' in
group_names or ...", or False when no peer is admitted at all. setdefault
keeps meta/mcp.yml and meta/variants.yml as the override channel, so
pinning either key still wins.
The resolved block replaces the mapping instead of being written into it.
_build_role_base_config parks the YAML cache's own object under mcp, so an
in-place setdefault injected the derived keys into every later raw read and
made test_mcp_schema pass alone but fail in a directory run.
The derivation keys on peer presence, never on a peer's own value: a
re-entrant read under _RENDER_GUARD returns the unrendered dict.
Four lints now ask the resolver instead of reading meta/mcp.yml, which they
could not do while the key was hand-written. That is what exposed the eleven
missing hostile-path specs the previous commit closed.
Carries one change that belongs to the WordPress probe but shares a file
with this one: the tool allowlist moves to the hyphenated names the adapter
actually serves.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
bb975843f1 raised web-app-gitea to 1.27.3 in meta/services.yml and left the audit
table at 1.27.2, so test_mcp_audit_report.py has been failing since:
AssertionError: audit.md differs from a fresh generation.
Regenerate and commit it by running audit.gen.py from the repository root
Regenerated, nothing else. audit.gen.py:54-62 reads the version out of each role's
own meta/services.yml and makes no network call, so the file is a pure projection
of the tree and drifts only when a version changes -- this is real drift, not a
flaky check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
allowed_consumers was twenty hand-kept lists of which fourteen were identical, so every new client meant an edit in every provider. A client now declares services.<own-entity>.mcp_consumer: true once and a provider refuses one with mcp_consumer: false, which is also what tells a deliberate exclusion apart from a forgotten entry.
The group_names-gated consumer entries give the inventory resolver the co-deploy edge meta/mcp.yml never had: one of sixty-nine matrix rounds carried an MCP client before, twenty-three role/round pairs do now. bond 0.5 keeps the clients out of round 0 so the host memory budget still holds.
BREAKING CHANGE: meta/mcp.yml no longer accepts allowed_consumers; declare services.<entity>.mcp_consumer on the client instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The least-privilege half of the criterion could not hold as built.
provision_mcp.py creates the endpoint owner's workspace through
CoreHandler().create_workspace, which makes that account its ADMIN, and
2.3.3 knows only ADMIN and MEMBER - both write table data. There is no
read-only workspace role to demote to, so mutating_tools_enabled: false
bounded nothing while create_rows, update_rows and delete_rows sat in the
served allowlist.
The adapter's contract simply omits them: a client calling one is refused
with DENY_UNKNOWN_TOOL. Omission is the mechanism, since passthrough.py
refuses to load a contract that lists a mutating tool while mutations are
off. The other ten stay recorded under upstream_serves so a version bump
enabling one shows up as drift rather than as a silently wider surface.
The transport was what reverted this twice. Baserow speaks classic
HTTP+SSE, where a GET opens the response stream and the stream names a
second URL for requests, while the adapter only ever spoke Streamable
HTTP. adapter.upstream_transport selects sse.py and defaults to
streamable_http, so no existing provider changes.
The endpoint key stops being a client credential. Clients present
credentials.mcp_bearer to the sidecar; the key reaches the sidecar as
ADAPTER_UPSTREAM_PATH_KEY and is spliced in percent-encoded, so it never
enters the rendered contract and a key carrying a separator cannot open a
path of its own.
Deploy is green: the probe reached list_databases over SSE, the served
surface matched the contract, and the sidecar proved it reaches only its
provider.
The move left every relative path pointing one level short. Most are
links, but the generator's REPO_ROOT is not: with parents[5] it resolves
to docs/contributing/, ROLES_DIR matches nothing, and the report is
written empty instead of the run failing.
The three files shared an 'mcp-' prefix as siblings of the other service
design docs, which the prefix-group lint reads as a folder that was never
created. Their content is unchanged; the generator's path adjustment
follows in its own commit.
The audit read as prose, so a role could sit under a classification nobody had checked against its own declaration, and "blocked" could not be told apart from "nobody looked". The sections are now named after the exact values a role declares, which makes the section titles the vocabulary: one rule holds every role under its own declared classification, a second rejects a classification outside the vocabulary, and a third requires a named blocker per blocked role while forbidding a blocked role from shipping an enabled surface.
The report itself is generated from the roles' own metadata and a drift check imports the generator and compares against the committed file, which caught a stale report twice while this work was in progress. It lives under docs/contributing rather than beside the requirements, because a generated file in that directory reads like a finished criterion.
The criteria across seven requirement files now carry what they rest on: what closed them, or what blocks them and where that was measured. Two coverage limits stay stated rather than hidden: the report is built only from roles that declare an MCP block, so a role blocked without one is invisible to it, and a ticked criterion here means implemented and tested rather than proven in operation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
834 commits from the Tor onion-service branch against 299 of ours, from merge
base 7b646bdece: 127 conflicted files, 3506 files changed.
The two sides are largely orthogonal. Theirs adds svc-net-tor and a `tor` service
across the role tree, plus two sweeping refactors: shipped scripts sorted by
language (files/ruby/, files/python/, files/shell/, scripts/lint/*.sh) and the
unit suite moved under tests/unit/python/. Ours is requirement 036, the native AI
gateway, plus the MCP role work. Most conflicts were both sides appending to the
same service map, resolved as unions.
Resolutions that were not unions:
Credentials moved namespace. Theirs renamed meta/schema.yml to meta/secrets.yml
and re-addressed credentials as secrets.credentials.<name>. Git carried our
litellm_api_key blocks through the rename, but every consumer we added still read
'credentials.<name>', which no longer resolves. All 45 call sites are migrated.
plugins/filter/container_volumes.py is deleted by theirs and relocated to
plugins/lookup/container_volumes.py, where it carries the same tmpfs defect our
f85996b43 had just fixed: a hard-coded {"size": ...} that silently drops a per
mount `mode`. The fix is re-applied in the relocated file, as that commit's merge
note anticipated.
compose.yml keeps only INFINITO_PLAYWRIGHT_REPORTS_BASE_DIR. Theirs also forwards
INFINITO_PLAYWRIGHT_STAGE_BASE_DIR; that line is deliberately dropped, per the
analysis recorded in 45804e9ad -- STAGE has a drift-proof role-vars fallback,
while forwarding it promotes a setdefault-pinnable .env value above that SPOT.
tasks/stages/01_constructor.yml takes their include, ./tasks/utils/setup/group.yml,
because their refactor removed tasks/groups/*-roles.yml, leaving our include
target nonexistent. Our task name is kept, since svc-virt is in the loop.
Makefile swarm-zombie is a union: their validate plus teardown, then our
lab_subnet cleanup, which their side dropped while leaving lab_subnet.sh as the
only orphaned reference in the file.
01_bootstrap.sh keeps our deterministic --ip pinning, which distinguishes an
already-attached node from a real failure, over their `|| true`.
Their language-sorted layout orphaned references our side still held: zammad's
two scripts/apply/*.rb, jenkins' java-with-ca-trust.sh, and the notify topics
their handlers renamed to hyphenated form. All corrected.
roles/sys-svc-compose/files/shell/swarm/stack_ready.sh gains our latched-update
block: paused, rollback_paused, rollback_started and rollback_completed exit 2
rather than polling a state that cannot resolve without another deploy.
config_from_run is unioned to (title, logged, jobs); the production caller in
trigger/__main__.py now passes jobs, without which our suite suppression would
have been inert.
READMEs are regenerated rather than hand-merged: 15 LiteLLM rows and 91 Tor rows
now derive from the merged metadata, which is itself evidence the meta merge is
coherent.
Verified: 5161 unit tests pass. The single failure, test_query.py TestSortSpec,
also fails on fork/feature/svc-net-tor at b51d2f9919, measured in a baseline
worktree -- so this merge introduces no new unit-test failure. Two modules are
excluded from that run because `baudolo`, a dependency their branch introduces,
is not installed on this host.
Not verified: no deploy has run against the merged tree, and make quality has not
been run end to end here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every script a role ships now lives under `files/<language>/`, and the unit
suite is split the same way: `tests/unit/python/` beside new sibling trees for
the other languages. `tests/lint/filesystem/test_role_files_layout.py` keeps it
that way; directories whose shape is dictated from outside carry a `.nocheck`
naming the constraint (Docker build contexts, WordPress mu-plugins, the Joomla
extension, Odoo addons, Playwright suites, the `files/test/test.sh` harness
that `test-e2e-cli` resolves generically).
This cannot be applied in halves. Moving a file and repointing what names it
are the same change: 14 references resolve only at deploy time, so the tree is
green either before or after, never between.
Those 14 were found by static resolution over every reference class, not by the
test suite -- a full `make quality-high` was green while all of them were
broken:
* 7 `src:` values built from a role variable holding a bare filename
(svc-bkp-remote-2-local, decidim, espocrm, friendica, joomla, pixelfed x2).
The variable doubles as the destination name inside the container, so the
language segment belongs at the call site, not in the variable.
* `sys-service/tasks/04_base.yml` resolved every consumer's systemd script
through `first_found(..., errors='strict')` over `files/script.{sh,py}`.
18 roles ship exactly that and have no template fallback: the play would
have died on each.
* `sys-front-inj-javascript` fell back to `<role>/files/javascript.js`; the
interface now reads `files/javascript/javascript.js`.
* `sys-front-inj-logout/templates/head_sub.j2` built the cache-busting mtime
path through `path_absolute(... 'files', ...)`.
* 4 `ansible.builtin.script:` invocations naming a bare command
(pull.py, prune.sh, set_postgres_superuser_password.sh, ganesha-serve.sh).
* `dev-python/files/shell/install.sh` pointed at a sibling role's script.
Depth-dependent paths inside the moved trees were bumped accordingly: 59
`parents[N]` computations, 12 relative climbs, and the per-role recover CLI,
whose path `cli/administration/recover/recoverers.py` still assembled from the
pre-move location.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the deploy-line sequencing section, which documented the
three-mode split, the serial/parallel decision and mode_fail_fast --
the only place any of that was written down.
Records what a run now does instead: why chunks exist at all (the queue
clock), how the chunk size and count are derived, what priority means
now that a named role is deployed in every combination it can take
rather than sampled, and how the mode and tor rotations are decoupled
for the regular rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Eight prose references still pointed at the pre-rename root, and one of them
did more than mislead a reader: the addons lint told an author to reach a
secret through lookup('config', application_id, 'credentials.<name>') at the
exact moment it rejected their literal, so the guidance produced the next
defect. The check itself only tests whether the value is templated, so no
enforcement changes here.
variants.md gains the reason rather than a corrected list. A variant entry is
baked into host_vars raw, which makes its top-level key the inventory path, so
a key no meta topic produces is silently discarded. The previous list drifted
precisely because it stated the set without stating why it was the set.
design/variants.md was wrong twice over: the old root, and an argument order in
lookup('config', 'credentials', '<provider>') that could never have resolved.
The erpnext key was checked against svc-db-mariadb/vars/main.yml rather than
prefixed on faith.
Left alone on purpose: test_credentials_roundtrip and the layout lint name
meta/schema.yml and schema/main.yml as history and as the legacy directory the
lint forbids. Both are correct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
meta/schema.yml became meta/secrets.yml, but its content still landed at
applications.<app>.credentials — the one meta file whose payload did not sit
under a root named after the file. Every other topic obeys that rule:
meta/volumes.yml goes to volumes, meta/rbac.yml to rbac. Credentials now go to
secrets.credentials.
The path exists exactly once, in utils/manager/credential_key.py, and
OVERRIDE_SECTION is derived from its two segments rather than spelled beside
them, so the dotted form used by --set and the nested form used by the
inventory cannot drift. Six consumers read it: the loader, the generator, the
CLI override parser, the two emit helpers, and the four lookup validators.
--set now accepts exactly one key shape,
applications.<app>.secrets.credentials.<key>. The three short forms are
rejected instead of guessed at: the same short key names different credentials
on different apps. That also retired primary_app_id, which only existed to
disambiguate them.
Three defects surfaced while wiring this up. _apply_one_role_schema still wrote
to the old root, so an app's own credentials would have moved while its
providers' stayed behind. web-app-pgadmin reads through
lookup('applications', ...).credentials.<key>, an access path no regex over
lookup('config', ...) could see, and would have deployed with an empty postgres
password. And _META_NON_GENERIC_TOPICS still listed 'schema' — a bare topic
name, invisible to any path search — so the generic file-root loop assigned the
raw schema under secrets and the follow-up write landed inside the cached
document, truncating keycloak's four credentials to one for every later
reader.
tests/integration/ansible/lookups/config/test_credentials_roundtrip.py pins both
directions of the seam and the cache invariant that last defect broke.
Existing inventories still carry the pre-rename root; migrating them is
deliberately out of scope here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
meta/schema.yml held credential definitions and their runtime values, but the
name said 'schema' and read like structural metadata next to services.yml and
volumes.yml. Nothing in the file is a schema in the sense the other meta files
use the word, and a contributor had to open it to learn it holds secrets.
62 role files renamed. ROLE_FILE_META_SCHEMA becomes ROLE_FILE_META_SECRETS and
keeps its role as the SPOT the path is built from.
Two readers bypassed that constant and spelled the name themselves:
utils/cache/applications.py built meta_dir / 'schema.yml' twice, and
plugins/lookup/application_gid.py carries the filename in the marker list it
detects application roles by. Left behind, the rename would not have raised —
credentials would have resolved empty and the role would have stopped counting
as an application.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Under swarm an unpinned role's volumes are rewritten onto the shared NFS
export while its services run one task per node. A role that declares no
RDBMS keeps its state in-process, so several replicas then write the same
SQLite file, Mnesia store or search index over NFS and corrupt it. This
already cost a deploy: openclaw ran three replicas against one shared
export and its state directory answered "file is not a database".
The existing unpinned-no-engine-volume lint states the right rule but
detects state through a hardcoded path list, so app-specific paths slip
through and each case gets pinned reactively after it fails. Add a lint
that joins three facts the roles already declare: the volume is NFS
backed (asked of the production swarm_nfs_backed, not re-derived), it is
mounted read-write, and the role runs no RDBMS. Share-safe payloads carry
a justification marker.
Replicas resolve service-first and fall back to the primary entity, and
a role whose swarm mode is disabled is skipped; both cases exist in tree.
Also correct the requirement and the design doc, which still described
the per-volume opt-in model that b09598dc8 replaced with placement
derived backing. Requirement 023 contradicted itself: line 76 already
described the implemented behaviour.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The schema lint demands a delegation block whenever a role claims to act on the
caller's behalf, pinning refresh, revocation and audience binding at one exact
version, because a rendered deployment bearer is a service account whatever the
metadata says. The lint can reject a missing block but cannot say why those
three facts and no others, so the design note carries that.
The requirement is brought up to date, and the agent cheatsheet gains the two
worktree skills.
The block sat under services but never behaved like a service. A service has
exactly one providing role, declared with provides, so the registry can map the
key to that role and consumers bind their flag to its presence. No role declares
provides: mcp. There are seventeen providers and the pairing is done by
allowed_consumers inside the block itself.
Every rule that enforces the service model therefore needed an exemption for it:
a shared-provider suppression in fourteen roles, a playwright-service-flag
suppression, and two freshly added exemptions in the dynamic-flag and
variants-static-override checks. Four independent rules, four escape hatches,
one cause. They are all gone now, together with a bond key that only the
resource budgeter reads and only for entries under services, and a wordpress
addon bridge that pointed at a service block that no longer exists.
The block moves to meta/mcp.yml. The applications loader maps meta/<name>.yml to
applications.<app>.<name> generically, so the move needs no wiring; the file
takes the same shape as meta/rbac.yml. Every config path follows, the variant
overrides are lifted out of their services map, and the vocabulary module leaves
the services package because it no longer describes one. roles_with_service
gains an explicit topic parameter rather than an implicit fallback, so nothing
silently resolves against the wrong container.
Files that are otherwise unrelated to this move are included where the committed
tree would otherwise keep pointing at a path that no longer resolves: thirteen
vars files, eleven playwright env templates and one task file.
Thirty-nine criteria are now ticked against thirteen new pieces of evidence,
strongest among them the five per-server tool counts hermes reported live and the
status-code check passing on every domain with MCP enabled.
Two criteria are reworded rather than ticked. 206 asked a client to restrict the
tool server to the role's group and closed on someone entitled to drive it not
needing to be an administrator; a user's roles list carries no application
context, so that is not what the platform can express today and the text now says
so. 208 allowed both readings of tools.mutating_tools_enabled, which is why two
roles carried opposite values for the same situation; it now states that the
field records intent and the README names the missing enforcement.
The design doc gains the public exposure section, including that the proxy ships
no rate limiting, and why stdio is not deployed.
Nine criteria stay open: two are PR artefacts, three are blocked upstream, and
four need deploys that have not run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a blocker vocabulary so a role whose upstream MCP path this
deployment cannot use says why instead of reporting an absence. Without
it OpenProject reads as "upstream has no MCP", which is false: the server
ships, it is Enterprise-only. A blocker and a served surface are mutually
exclusive, so a role cannot claim both.
Add endpoint.key_credential and endpoint.suffix for servers that address
a session through the URL path. Baserow streams from
{base}/mcp/{key}/sse, and endpoint fields must stay literal, so the
composition belongs in the discovery layer. A server that declares a path
key without a resolvable value is dropped rather than handed to clients
half-built.
Carry the upstream provenance in the role block, so the audit derives it
instead of keeping a second copy.
Require an explicit mutating_tools_enabled: false for a privileged
auth_subject; the rule previously only fired when the key was present and
true, so omitting it slipped an administrator-scoped surface through.
Move the MCP filters into plugins/filter/mcp/ so they stop sharing a name
prefix with their siblings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add basic_auth to the MCP auth schema so Jenkins can declare its
HTTP-Basic endpoint through the contract instead of around it.
Introduce the client-side renderers: mcp_authorization builds the
Authorization header per scheme, mcp_tool_server_connections builds the
Open WebUI tool-server entries and drops servers whose scheme it cannot
present, and mcp_renderable_servers filters a server list, since Jinja
select() needs a test and the repo ships no test plugins.
Replace the inline MCP_DISCOVERED_SERVERS Jinja with a mcp_servers
lookup, and carry auth and username per entry so basic_auth consumers can
build their credential.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
