volume_is_fully_ignored can only skip a volume when every container using it is ignored, so a container holding a derived tree next to state that must be kept cannot express the exclusion at all. The matrix docker-in-docker runner is exactly that: matrix_mdad_docker, matrix_mdad_matrix and matrix_mdad_state all hang off one container, and the derived one is an inner overlay2 store that no rsync in the chain can restore faithfully (none carries -X, so trusted.overlay.* is stripped in both directions).
--volumes-no-backup-required names volumes directly. The check runs before containers_using_volume, so an excluded volume costs no docker call and the decision no longer depends on which containers happen to exist at backup time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The kernel refuses a snapshot whose destination sits on another
filesystem. Placing it at <parent>/.baudolo-<tag> hit that on the most
sensible layout there is: a dedicated disk mounted straight onto
/var/lib/docker, where the parent directory belongs to a different
filesystem and every run failed with EXDEV.
Placing it at <subject>/.baudolo-<tag> makes source and destination the
same filesystem by construction, so the failure cannot occur on any
layout. It also aligns the two backends: the zfs path already resolves
its snapshot inside the subject, at <subject>/.zfs/snapshot/<tag>.
btrfs does not include nested subvolumes in a snapshot, so a leftover
from an interrupted run appears in the next snapshot as an empty
directory rather than recursing, and the copy only ever reads the volume
tree below it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four defects in the snapshot mode 3.2.0 introduced.
The resolver dropped the trailing separator get_storage_path puts on a
volume path, because os.path.abspath strips it. rsync reads "dir" as
"copy the directory" where "dir/" means "copy its contents", so every
snapshot generation landed at <volume>/files/_data/... while the live
path lands at <volume>/files/... . Restores read the live layout, and
--link-dest found nothing to match against the previous generation. The
e2e never caught it because its driver appended the separator by hand.
Snapshot teardown was fatal and masking. A busy `btrfs subvolume delete`
raised out of the finally, which skipped the generation stamp and the
compose handling on a run whose data was already complete, and replaced
whatever the body had raised. The leftover is reported instead; removing
it is a cleanup problem, not a reason to discard a good generation.
A volume created after the snapshot was taken aborted the whole run: the
volume list is enumerated inside the snapshot context, and nothing is
stopped in snapshot mode, so the host keeps creating volumes for the
duration of the copy. Such a volume is now copied live with a warning,
which is exactly what the pre-snapshot code did for it.
The snapshot pass compares by content again. 3.2.0 dropped --checksum
because a snapshot source cannot move, which is true, but the comparison
that matters is against --link-dest: a file that changed while keeping
its size and whole-second mtime was hard-linked stale out of the previous
generation, and the single snapshot pass had no authoritative pass to
repair it the way the live path does. It is still one pass against two.
--hard-restart-projects is refused alongside --snapshot, the same way
--shutdown already is: the flag exists for stacks whose database cannot
be backed up hot, which is what a snapshot removes.
Tests: the trailing separator, both teardown behaviours, the new refusal,
and app.main driving the snapshot branch - the caller that runs in
production, which no test had exercised and where the layout defect
therefore stayed invisible. The e2e driver now feeds the resolver the
string shape get_storage_path really produces.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backing up a live volume with rsync copies a moving target: a database
written to mid-copy lands on disk in a state no engine ever committed.
Stopping the container avoids that at the cost of downtime.
A snapshot removes both. `--snapshot {btrfs,zfs}` with `--snapshot-subject`
freezes the docker root once per run, and every volume copy is then read
from that frozen tree while the containers keep serving. A restore of such
a copy is an ordinary crash recovery, which every supported engine performs
on its own at startup.
An unsupported filesystem or an unknown snapshot kind fails loudly rather
than degrading to a live copy, since a silent fallback would return exactly
the torn backup the mode exists to prevent. `--shutdown` is rejected
alongside `--snapshot` instead of being ignored: under a snapshot no
container is ever stopped, so accepting the flag would promise downtime
semantics the run does not deliver.
Copies out of a snapshot skip rsync's --checksum verification. The source
is immutable for the lifetime of the copy, so size-and-mtime cannot race,
and dropping the second full read roughly halves the I/O per volume.
backup/app.py grew past what one module could carry and is split into
layout, policy and dumps along the lines it already had internally.
Tests: unit coverage for the new snapshot, layout, policy, volume and cli
units; e2e cases drive real btrfs, zfs and ext4 filesystems on loop devices
in a privileged container, including a MariaDB that is written to across
the snapshot and must recover from the restored copy without losing a
committed row. CI installs zfs and sets E2E_REQUIRE_FILESYSTEMS so a
missing kernel module fails the build instead of silently skipping a
filesystem.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Each volume is copied twice into the same destination: once hot with the
container running, once cold after it is stopped. The cold pass is meant to
correct the hot one, but it uses rsync's quick check, which compares size and
whole-second mtime.
A pre-allocated 16 MiB WAL segment never changes size. When its last pre-stop
write and postgres' shutdown checkpoint fall in the same whole second, the cold
pass skips it while still replacing global/pg_control, whose previous write was
seconds earlier. The generation then holds a post-shutdown pg_control pointing at
a checkpoint LSN whose WAL bytes are still zero. Restoring it gives
invalid record length at 0/3CB7A20: expected at least 24, got 0
invalid checkpoint record
PANIC: could not locate a valid checkpoint record at 0/3CB7A20
and postgres crash-loops until the restore test gives up after 1200s. Observed in
infinito-nexus-core CI run 30586213932, debian leg; the centos leg of the same
run restored cleanly, and the two generations differ by exactly one 16 MiB WAL
segment.
authoritative is a required keyword rather than an optional flag, so each of the
four call sites states which pass it is. Set, it adds --checksum, so the cold
pass compares content. The hot passes keep the quick check.
Reproduced with real rsync in both directions: without --checksum the WAL stays
zero while pg_control is post-shutdown; with it the pair is consistent. Hardlink
dedup against --link-dest is unaffected, measured at 20/20 with generation size
unchanged.
Rejected alternatives, both measured rather than argued: --ignore-times destroys
dedup (20/20 to 0/20 hardlinks, generation 36 to 72 MiB), and --modify-window=-1
makes correctness depend on the destination filesystem preserving sub-second
mtimes, which silently degrades on NFS or ext3.
COST. The quick check scales with file count; --checksum scales with bytes, read
on both sides, and it runs while the container is stopped. Measured warm-cache on
215 MiB: 0.10s to 0.39s, a factor of 3.9. Derived for disk-bound runs, the extra
stop time stays under a minute up to roughly 4 GB on spinning disk, 15 GB on a
SATA SSD, 60 GB on NVMe. At 1 TB it is 17 minutes on NVMe and over three hours on
spinning disk; at 10 TB it is hours to days. No size threshold is built in - a
guessed one would drop the guarantee exactly where an unrestorable backup costs
most. Volumes at that scale need filesystem snapshots or pg_basebackup rather
than two rsync passes over a live tree, which is a limit of this approach and not
of this change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both default to an empty list so a pure file backup needs no dummy
arguments; an empty stop whitelist keeps the conservative stop-all
behavior.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Match --images-no-stop-required and --images-no-backup-required against
the container's exact .Config.Image instead of a substring, so callers
pass full repo:tag references (registry prefix included) and near-miss
image names no longer flip the stop/skip decision. Rename the opt-in
--hard-compose-restart flag to --hard-restart-projects.
The e2e suite pins a SPOT for the DB images and in-container data dirs
(postgres:alpine at /var/lib/postgresql, mariadb:latest at
/var/lib/mysql) and passes exact image refs to the --images-* flags.
BREAKING CHANGE: --images-* now require exact image references, not
substrings; --hard-compose-restart is renamed to --hard-restart-projects.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rename --docker-compose-hard-restart-required to --hard-compose-restart
and change its default from ["mailu"] to [] (nargs="*"): the compose
down/up is now opt-in, so compose hosts pass "mailu" while swarm hosts,
where the dir is a stack whose overlay network collides with compose up,
pass nothing. Make --backups-dir mandatory (no /var/lib/backup/ default)
so a run can never silently target the wrong backup root.
BREAKING CHANGE: the old flag name is removed, the implicit mailu default
is gone, and --backups-dir must be passed explicitly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Treating every failed swarm-task inspect as skippable opened a false-green
window: a transient inspect failure on a still-running, non-whitelisted
container skipped the stop and backed the volume up hot while the run
reported success. Re-check whether the container is still listed; only a
genuinely vanished container skips, an existing one re-raises so a broken
daemon keeps failing the run loudly. Covered by unit tests for both paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backup: a container that vanishes between the docker ps listing and the
swarm-task inspect (--rm one-shots, task-history GC) no longer aborts the
whole backup run; it counts as not stoppable and is skipped.
Restore: the postgres replay streams the dump through a spooled temp file
instead of buffering it three times in memory (multi-GB dumps OOMed the
restore mid-replay), and the superuser-only line filter is COPY-aware: data
rows inside COPY ... FROM stdin blocks pass through untouched, so a row
that happens to start with COMMENT ON EXTENSION or ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES
is no longer silently dropped.
The e2e runner talks to the DinD daemon through docker exec instead of a
host-published tcp://127.0.0.1:2375: port publishing is unreachable from
sandboxed runners and from hosts with broken loopback publishing, and the
unencrypted root API port disappears from the host. The debug tmp dump
shrinks to tar plus docker cp against the DinD container itself.
New coverage: an e2e reproducing the swarm flake end to end (service task
on the volume, nothing whitelisted: the backup must succeed, the very same
task container must keep running, and the service must never replace a
task), unit tests for the COPY-aware filter, the swarm-task probe including
the vanished-container path, filter_stoppable ordering, and the one-session
FOREIGN_KEY_CHECKS drop assembly. Full suite: 35 unit, 9 integration,
30 e2e green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Restore fixes, both hit by the infinito svc-bkp e2e drill:
- mariadb --empty dropped tables one docker exec at a time with SET
FOREIGN_KEY_CHECKS=0 issued in a separate client session, so the
session-scoped toggle never applied and any FK-referenced parent table
(mailu.users) died with ERROR 1451. Issue the toggle and all DROPs in
one session.
- postgres --empty now drops only current_user-owned objects (extension
members like pg_trgm's set_limit are superuser-owned) with IF EXISTS
absorbing CASCADE fallout, and the replay skips superuser-only dump
lines (COMMENT ON EXTENSION, ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES) that abort an
app-user psql run under ON_ERROR_STOP.
Backup fixes:
- pg_dump now runs with --no-owner --no-privileges so future dumps are
replayable by the owning app user in the first place.
- Swarm task containers are never stopped or started manually: the
orchestrator replaces a stopped task and a later docker start fails on
the detached overlay network. filter_stoppable skips them visibly and
the whitelist stop check ignores them.
Validated end to end against a live infinito compose stack: the full
svc-bkp-volume-2-local drill (verify, restore cycle, sql replay for
mailu, keycloak and one more db) passes with these patches applied.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Detect compose files case-insensitively and support:
- compose.yml / compose.yaml
- docker-compose.yml / docker-compose.yaml
Replace hard-coded docker-compose.yml checks with a shared
finder helper and extend unit tests accordingly.
https://chatgpt.com/share/69873720-d444-800f-99f7-f7799fc10c0b
- Handle missing or empty databases.csv gracefully with warnings and empty DataFrame
- Add unit tests for robust databases.csv loading behavior
- Adjust seed tests to assert warnings across multiple print calls
- Replace Debian docker.io with docker-ce-cli to avoid Docker API version mismatch
- Install required build tools (curl, gnupg) for Docker repo setup
https://chatgpt.com/share/697e6d9d-6458-800f-9d12-1e337509be4e
- Gracefully handle empty databases.csv by creating header columns and emitting a warning
- Add _empty_df() helper for consistent DataFrame initialization
- Add unit tests for baudolo-seed including empty-file regression case
- Apply minor formatting fixes across backup and e2e test files
https://chatgpt.com/share/69628f0b-8744-800f-b08d-2633e05167da
- read databases.csv with stable types (dtype=str, keep_default_na=False)
- validate database field: require '*' or concrete name (no empty/NaN)
- support Postgres cluster dumps via '*' entries (pg_dumpall)
- write SQL dumps atomically to avoid partial/empty files
- early-skip fully ignored volumes before creating backup directories
- update seed CLI to enforce new contract and update by (instance,database)
- adjust tests: sql dir naming + add E2E coverage for early-skip and '*' seeding
- rename dump-only flag to --dump-only-sql across docs and tests
- update backup logic: skip files/ only for DB volumes when dumps succeed; fallback to files when dumps fail
- extend e2e helpers to support dump_only_sql
- add e2e mixed-run regression test (DB dump => no files/, non-DB => files/)
- add e2e CLI/argparse contract test (--dump-only-sql present, --dump-only rejected)
- fix e2e files test to expect file backups for non-DB volumes in dump-only-sql mode and verify restore
- update changelog + README flag table
https://chatgpt.com/share/69522d9c-ce08-800f-9070-71df3bd779ae
- Change DB backup helpers to return whether a dump was actually produced
- Detect DB containers without successful dumps in --dump-only mode
- Fallback to file backups with a warning instead of skipping silently
- Refactor DB dump logic to return boolean status
- Add E2E test covering dump-only fallback when databases.csv entry is missing
https://chatgpt.com/share/6951a659-2b0c-800f-aafa-3e89ae1eb697
