Files
computer-playbook/tests/lint/filesystem/python/test_security_noqa_justified.py
T
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5 eea380a747 fix(sys-ctl-cln-bkps): stop the cleanup loop when a pass deletes nothing
The loop condition is the usage of the whole filesystem, which the script cannot move once every remaining version is the last one of its application: is_directory_deletable always skips those. It then repeats an identical, empty pass. The journal of a real unit shows 132192 iterations in two minutes, and systemd kills the unit on its start timeout long before the script's own hour-long limit, so the failure surfaces as 'Active: failed (Result: timeout)'. The sys-service handler turns that into a failed play, nine minutes before the first application role runs.

b694f9335 already fixed this busy-loop for the shape where no backup versions exist at all, by breaking when average_version_directories reaches zero. With one version per application the average is one, so that guard never fires. Key the exit on the outcome instead: a pass that deleted nothing ends the loop. While anything is deletable the behaviour is unchanged, and the last version of an application stays untouched as before.

The regression test needs a running clock, because the shared helper freezes time.time() at zero and a regression would therefore hang rather than fail, plus a Path.is_dir mock that delegates outside the backup tree so runpy keeps working.

Touching the file pulled it into the comment lint, which flagged five pre-existing comments. Four were narration and are deleted; the fifth justified the noqa S602 marker and moves onto that marker's line, where the security lint expects it, so the file leaves that lint's baseline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 13:24:53 +02:00

141 lines
5.0 KiB
Python

"""Lint guard: ``# noqa`` for a bandit (``S###``) finding MUST be justified.
Background
==========
Ruff's ``S`` rules (flake8-bandit) flag security-relevant patterns:
tar extraction (``S202``), ``urlopen`` of attacker-influenceable URLs
(``S310``), ``subprocess(..., shell=True)`` (``S602``), and similar.
Suppressing one with a bare ``# noqa: S202`` silently disables the only
local signal that the line was reviewed — exactly the situation that let
``py/tarslip`` reach CodeQL.
CodeQL ignores ruff ``# noqa`` markers, so a suppressed ``S###`` keeps
producing code-scanning alerts anyway. The cheap, durable fix is to
require every security suppression to carry an inline justification, so a
reviewer (and the next reader) can see *why* it is safe.
Convention enforced here
========================
Any ``# noqa:`` marker whose code list contains a bandit ``S###`` code
MUST be followed by free-text justification on the same line, e.g.::
tar.extractall(tmpdir) # noqa: S202 - members validated for path traversal
A bare ``# noqa: S310`` with nothing after the code is rejected.
Ratchet
=======
Files in ``_BASELINE`` predate the rule and carry unjustified security
suppressions today; they are grandfathered so the guard can land green.
The set MUST only shrink: justify the marker (or fix the finding), then
delete the path here. New security suppressions anywhere else fail.
Caching
=======
File walk and content reads route through ``utils.cache.files``.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from utils.cache.files import iter_project_files, read_text
from . import PROJECT_ROOT
# Match ``(#|//) noqa: <codes>`` and capture the comma-separated code list.
_NOQA_RE = re.compile(
r"(?:#|//)\s*noqa\s*:\s*"
r"(?P<codes>[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9\-]*(?:\s*,\s*[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9\-]*)*)",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# A bandit security code: ``S`` followed by digits (S101, S202, S310, …).
_SECURITY_CODE_RE = re.compile(r"^S\d+$")
_BASELINE: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
{
"cli/administration/deploy/dedicated/runner.py",
"cli/administration/deploy/development/deploy.py",
"cli/administration/deploy/development/proc.py",
"cli/contributing/mirror/cleanup/__main__.py",
"plugins/lookup/nginx.py",
"roles/svc-bkp-remote-2-local/files/pull_specific_host.py",
"roles/svc-opt-ssd-hdd/files/script.py",
"roles/sys-ctl-rpr-container-soft/files/script.py",
"roles/sys-svc-compose-ca/files/compose_ca.py",
"roles/sys-svc-compose/files/compose.py",
"roles/sys-svc-container/files/container.py",
"roles/web-app-erpnext/files/scripts/apply/oidc_settings.py",
"roles/web-app-keycloak/library/keycloak_kcadm_update.py",
"utils/github/playwright_summary.py",
"utils/update/docker.py",
}
)
def _file_offenders(path: Path) -> list[tuple[int, str]]:
"""Return ``[(lineno, marker), ...]`` for unjustified security
suppressions on this file's lines."""
try:
text = read_text(str(path))
except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError):
return []
findings: list[tuple[int, str]] = []
for lineno, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), start=1):
for match in _NOQA_RE.finditer(line):
codes = [c.strip() for c in match.group("codes").split(",")]
if not any(_SECURITY_CODE_RE.match(c) for c in codes):
continue
if not line[match.end() :].strip():
findings.append((lineno, match.group(0)))
return findings
class TestSecurityNoqaJustified(unittest.TestCase):
"""Every bandit (``S###``) ``noqa`` suppression MUST carry a reason."""
def test_security_noqa_markers_are_justified(self) -> None:
offenders: dict[Path, list[tuple[int, str]]] = {}
for path_str in iter_project_files(extensions=(".py",)):
path = Path(path_str)
try:
rel = path.relative_to(PROJECT_ROOT).as_posix()
except ValueError:
continue
if rel in _BASELINE:
continue
issues = _file_offenders(path)
if issues:
offenders[path] = issues
if not offenders:
return
def rel(p: Path) -> str:
return p.relative_to(PROJECT_ROOT).as_posix()
lines = [
(
f"{len(offenders)} file(s) suppress a bandit (S###) finding with an "
"unjustified ``# noqa``. Append an inline reason, e.g. "
"``# noqa: S202 - members validated for path traversal``, or fix the "
"finding. Security suppressions must never be silent."
),
"",
]
for path, issues in sorted(offenders.items()):
lines.append(f" - {rel(path)}:")
for lineno, marker in issues:
lines.append(f" * line {lineno}: {marker}")
self.fail("\n".join(lines))
if __name__ == "__main__": # pragma: no cover
unittest.main()