The previous strip targeted only `--local` config and the resulting CI log showed local was already empty, yet the push still authed as github-actions[bot]. The auth has to be coming from --global, --system, --worktree, or GH_TOKEN itself is GITHUB_TOKEN. Dump every scope's http/credential/url entries before and after the strip, and probe /installation/repositories with GH_TOKEN so the HTTP status alone (no secret in logs) tells us whether it's an App installation token or the workflow GITHUB_TOKEN. Will replace this with the real fix once the next CI run surfaces where the rogue Authorization actually originates. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Update Pipeline 🔄
Shell helpers that drive the scheduled Update: Versions workflow.
Scope 📋
This directory contains the helpers invoked by update.yml to bump pinned upstream versions and open a pull request once per day. The helpers are thin wrappers: the image-version and repository-ref bumpers delegate to Python CLIs under cli/contributing/ that scan roles/*/meta/services.yml and rewrite version pins in place; the PR-open helper commits, force-pushes the update branch, and creates or refreshes the PR via gh. Helpers MUST NOT be called from workflows other than Update: Versions; the CI_ENABLE_AUTO_UPDATES gate is enforced once, at the workflow's job level, and bypassing it from another caller would create PRs even when auto-updates are intentionally disabled.
Each shim MUST resolve the repository root relative to its own location so it can run from any working directory, MUST forward arguments to the underlying CLI so --dry-run and similar flags keep working from the shell, and MUST exit non-zero on CLI failure so the workflow surfaces the error.
For the workflow catalog see workflows.md. For the repository variable that gates the workflow see configuration.md. For the App-token secrets that the PR-opening step requires see secrets.md.