Files
computer-playbook/tests/lint/filesystem/python/test_security_noqa_justified.py
T
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 4.8 d9a53a0545 chore(lint): pin ruff to 0.16.0 and resolve the rules that version enforces
The ruff toolchain was unpinned, so host venvs, the lint container and CI
installed different releases over time. That drift is why lint-python only
failed on CI: locally ruff 0.15.x preview-gated ISC004/FURB192 and (falsely)
fired S310 on urllib.request.Request, while CI's 0.16.0 has ISC004/FURB192
stable and drops the S310-on-Request false positive.

Pin ruff==0.16.0 in pyproject.toml's dev extras (Dependabot keeps it current)
and have utils.install.lint.ruff read that pin and reinstall whenever the
found version drifts, so every environment resolves the same ruff. Then fix
what 0.16.0 flags: parenthesise the implicit string concatenations (ISC004),
use min() over sorted()[0] (FURB192), drop the now-unused S310 noqa on the
Request() builders (RUF100), and delete the narration comments that the
comment lint surfaces in the touched files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 23:08:26 +02:00

142 lines
5.0 KiB
Python

"""Lint guard: ``# noqa`` for a bandit (``S###``) finding MUST be justified.
Background
==========
Ruff's ``S`` rules (flake8-bandit) flag security-relevant patterns:
tar extraction (``S202``), ``urlopen`` of attacker-influenceable URLs
(``S310``), ``subprocess(..., shell=True)`` (``S602``), and similar.
Suppressing one with a bare ``# noqa: S202`` silently disables the only
local signal that the line was reviewed — exactly the situation that let
``py/tarslip`` reach CodeQL.
CodeQL ignores ruff ``# noqa`` markers, so a suppressed ``S###`` keeps
producing code-scanning alerts anyway. The cheap, durable fix is to
require every security suppression to carry an inline justification, so a
reviewer (and the next reader) can see *why* it is safe.
Convention enforced here
========================
Any ``# noqa:`` marker whose code list contains a bandit ``S###`` code
MUST be followed by free-text justification on the same line, e.g.::
tar.extractall(tmpdir) # noqa: S202 - members validated for path traversal
A bare ``# noqa: S310`` with nothing after the code is rejected.
Ratchet
=======
Files in ``_BASELINE`` predate the rule and carry unjustified security
suppressions today; they are grandfathered so the guard can land green.
The set MUST only shrink: justify the marker (or fix the finding), then
delete the path here. New security suppressions anywhere else fail.
Caching
=======
File walk and content reads route through ``utils.cache.files``.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from utils.cache.files import iter_project_files, read_text
from . import PROJECT_ROOT
# Match ``(#|//) noqa: <codes>`` and capture the comma-separated code list.
_NOQA_RE = re.compile(
r"(?:#|//)\s*noqa\s*:\s*"
r"(?P<codes>[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9\-]*(?:\s*,\s*[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9\-]*)*)",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# A bandit security code: ``S`` followed by digits (S101, S202, S310, …).
_SECURITY_CODE_RE = re.compile(r"^S\d+$")
_BASELINE: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
{
"cli/administration/deploy/dedicated/runner.py",
"cli/administration/deploy/development/deploy.py",
"cli/administration/deploy/development/proc.py",
"cli/contributing/mirror/cleanup/__main__.py",
"plugins/lookup/nginx.py",
"roles/svc-bkp-remote-2-local/files/pull_specific_host.py",
"roles/svc-opt-ssd-hdd/files/script.py",
"roles/sys-ctl-cln-bkps/files/script.py",
"roles/sys-ctl-rpr-container-soft/files/script.py",
"roles/sys-svc-compose-ca/files/compose_ca.py",
"roles/sys-svc-compose/files/compose.py",
"roles/sys-svc-container/files/container.py",
"roles/web-app-erpnext/files/scripts/apply/oidc_settings.py",
"roles/web-app-keycloak/library/keycloak_kcadm_update.py",
"utils/github/playwright_summary.py",
"utils/update/docker.py",
}
)
def _file_offenders(path: Path) -> list[tuple[int, str]]:
"""Return ``[(lineno, marker), ...]`` for unjustified security
suppressions on this file's lines."""
try:
text = read_text(str(path))
except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError):
return []
findings: list[tuple[int, str]] = []
for lineno, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), start=1):
for match in _NOQA_RE.finditer(line):
codes = [c.strip() for c in match.group("codes").split(",")]
if not any(_SECURITY_CODE_RE.match(c) for c in codes):
continue
if not line[match.end() :].strip():
findings.append((lineno, match.group(0)))
return findings
class TestSecurityNoqaJustified(unittest.TestCase):
"""Every bandit (``S###``) ``noqa`` suppression MUST carry a reason."""
def test_security_noqa_markers_are_justified(self) -> None:
offenders: dict[Path, list[tuple[int, str]]] = {}
for path_str in iter_project_files(extensions=(".py",)):
path = Path(path_str)
try:
rel = path.relative_to(PROJECT_ROOT).as_posix()
except ValueError:
continue
if rel in _BASELINE:
continue
issues = _file_offenders(path)
if issues:
offenders[path] = issues
if not offenders:
return
def rel(p: Path) -> str:
return p.relative_to(PROJECT_ROOT).as_posix()
lines = [
(
f"{len(offenders)} file(s) suppress a bandit (S###) finding with an "
"unjustified ``# noqa``. Append an inline reason, e.g. "
"``# noqa: S202 - members validated for path traversal``, or fix the "
"finding. Security suppressions must never be silent."
),
"",
]
for path, issues in sorted(offenders.items()):
lines.append(f" - {rel(path)}:")
for lineno, marker in issues:
lines.append(f" * line {lineno}: {marker}")
self.fail("\n".join(lines))
if __name__ == "__main__": # pragma: no cover
unittest.main()