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The ruff toolchain was unpinned, so host venvs, the lint container and CI installed different releases over time. That drift is why lint-python only failed on CI: locally ruff 0.15.x preview-gated ISC004/FURB192 and (falsely) fired S310 on urllib.request.Request, while CI's 0.16.0 has ISC004/FURB192 stable and drops the S310-on-Request false positive. Pin ruff==0.16.0 in pyproject.toml's dev extras (Dependabot keeps it current) and have utils.install.lint.ruff read that pin and reinstall whenever the found version drifts, so every environment resolves the same ruff. Then fix what 0.16.0 flags: parenthesise the implicit string concatenations (ISC004), use min() over sorted()[0] (FURB192), drop the now-unused S310 noqa on the Request() builders (RUF100), and delete the narration comments that the comment lint surfaces in the touched files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
142 lines
5.0 KiB
Python
142 lines
5.0 KiB
Python
"""Lint guard: ``# noqa`` for a bandit (``S###``) finding MUST be justified.
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Background
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==========
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Ruff's ``S`` rules (flake8-bandit) flag security-relevant patterns:
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tar extraction (``S202``), ``urlopen`` of attacker-influenceable URLs
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(``S310``), ``subprocess(..., shell=True)`` (``S602``), and similar.
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Suppressing one with a bare ``# noqa: S202`` silently disables the only
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local signal that the line was reviewed — exactly the situation that let
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``py/tarslip`` reach CodeQL.
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CodeQL ignores ruff ``# noqa`` markers, so a suppressed ``S###`` keeps
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producing code-scanning alerts anyway. The cheap, durable fix is to
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require every security suppression to carry an inline justification, so a
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reviewer (and the next reader) can see *why* it is safe.
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Convention enforced here
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========================
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Any ``# noqa:`` marker whose code list contains a bandit ``S###`` code
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MUST be followed by free-text justification on the same line, e.g.::
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tar.extractall(tmpdir) # noqa: S202 - members validated for path traversal
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A bare ``# noqa: S310`` with nothing after the code is rejected.
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Ratchet
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=======
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Files in ``_BASELINE`` predate the rule and carry unjustified security
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suppressions today; they are grandfathered so the guard can land green.
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The set MUST only shrink: justify the marker (or fix the finding), then
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delete the path here. New security suppressions anywhere else fail.
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Caching
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=======
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File walk and content reads route through ``utils.cache.files``.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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import unittest
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from pathlib import Path
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from utils.cache.files import iter_project_files, read_text
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from . import PROJECT_ROOT
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# Match ``(#|//) noqa: <codes>`` and capture the comma-separated code list.
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_NOQA_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?:#|//)\s*noqa\s*:\s*"
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r"(?P<codes>[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9\-]*(?:\s*,\s*[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9\-]*)*)",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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# A bandit security code: ``S`` followed by digits (S101, S202, S310, …).
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_SECURITY_CODE_RE = re.compile(r"^S\d+$")
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_BASELINE: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
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{
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"cli/administration/deploy/dedicated/runner.py",
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"cli/administration/deploy/development/deploy.py",
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"cli/administration/deploy/development/proc.py",
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"cli/contributing/mirror/cleanup/__main__.py",
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"plugins/lookup/nginx.py",
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"roles/svc-bkp-remote-2-local/files/pull_specific_host.py",
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"roles/svc-opt-ssd-hdd/files/script.py",
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"roles/sys-ctl-cln-bkps/files/script.py",
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"roles/sys-ctl-rpr-container-soft/files/script.py",
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"roles/sys-svc-compose-ca/files/compose_ca.py",
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"roles/sys-svc-compose/files/compose.py",
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"roles/sys-svc-container/files/container.py",
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"roles/web-app-erpnext/files/scripts/apply/oidc_settings.py",
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"roles/web-app-keycloak/library/keycloak_kcadm_update.py",
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"utils/github/playwright_summary.py",
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"utils/update/docker.py",
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}
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)
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def _file_offenders(path: Path) -> list[tuple[int, str]]:
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"""Return ``[(lineno, marker), ...]`` for unjustified security
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suppressions on this file's lines."""
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try:
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text = read_text(str(path))
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except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError):
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return []
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findings: list[tuple[int, str]] = []
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for lineno, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), start=1):
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for match in _NOQA_RE.finditer(line):
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codes = [c.strip() for c in match.group("codes").split(",")]
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if not any(_SECURITY_CODE_RE.match(c) for c in codes):
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continue
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if not line[match.end() :].strip():
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findings.append((lineno, match.group(0)))
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return findings
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class TestSecurityNoqaJustified(unittest.TestCase):
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"""Every bandit (``S###``) ``noqa`` suppression MUST carry a reason."""
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def test_security_noqa_markers_are_justified(self) -> None:
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offenders: dict[Path, list[tuple[int, str]]] = {}
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for path_str in iter_project_files(extensions=(".py",)):
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path = Path(path_str)
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try:
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rel = path.relative_to(PROJECT_ROOT).as_posix()
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except ValueError:
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continue
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if rel in _BASELINE:
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continue
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issues = _file_offenders(path)
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if issues:
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offenders[path] = issues
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if not offenders:
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return
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def rel(p: Path) -> str:
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return p.relative_to(PROJECT_ROOT).as_posix()
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lines = [
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(
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f"{len(offenders)} file(s) suppress a bandit (S###) finding with an "
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"unjustified ``# noqa``. Append an inline reason, e.g. "
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"``# noqa: S202 - members validated for path traversal``, or fix the "
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"finding. Security suppressions must never be silent."
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),
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"",
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]
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for path, issues in sorted(offenders.items()):
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lines.append(f" - {rel(path)}:")
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for lineno, marker in issues:
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lines.append(f" * line {lineno}: {marker}")
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self.fail("\n".join(lines))
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if __name__ == "__main__": # pragma: no cover
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unittest.main()
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