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kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5.5
4e1c8e2de1
An external report flagged the Bash(*) allow in the committed
.claude/settings.json. Bash(*) stays: every command still runs inside
the OS sandbox, and deny and ask take precedence over it. Reviewing the
file against its own documentation turned up two real gaps instead.
security.md and settings.md cite an rm -rf* deny rule as the guard
against `rm -rf .` wiping the worktree and .git/, but the rule was lost
in ee30f6d446 when the deny list was rewritten. It is back.
denyRead covered ~/.aws, ~/.config/gcloud, ~/.gnupg and ~/.kube only.
~/.docker/config.json holds registry logins inline, ~/.git-credentials
and ~/.netrc hold plaintext credentials, and the default ~/.ssh/id_*
keys were readable because Assumption 10 kept ~/.ssh open for an
ask-gated git push that has since moved to deny. All nine paths are
denied now. The rest of ~/.ssh stays readable, so SSH fetches keep
known_hosts and authenticate through the agent socket. Sandboxed docker
calls pull anonymously and print a config warning on stderr.
Thanks to Hanno Horrmeyer for the report.
Reported-by: Hanno Horrmeyer
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude Code 🤖
This folder documents the Claude Code agent configuration for this project. The authoritative policy lives in .claude/settings.json; the pages here explain the reasoning behind each entry so future contributors understand why a rule exists before they change it.
For general agent workflow rules shared across all agents (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, others), see common.md. For the Claude Code permission model reference, see docs.anthropic.com.