Files
computer-playbook/utils/cache/base.py
T
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 4.7 191bc1229a chore(ruff): enable S (bandit) rule family — 269 → 0
Adds ``S`` (flake8-bandit) to the strict ruleset. ``PTH`` was scoped
out: it surfaced 1000+ violations with no auto-fix support (most PTH
sub-rules are warning-only because each ``str`` ↔ ``Path`` conversion
is context-sensitive). Reserved for its own dedicated commit.

Config tuning
=============
Global ``ignore`` additions with rationale:
- ``S603`` (subprocess call without ``shell=False``) and ``S607`` (start
  process with partial path) are over-eager for a project whose CLI
  invokes ``make`` / ``git`` / ``docker`` / ``ansible-playbook`` from
  PATH using list-form args. The list-form already prevents shell
  injection (Python's ``subprocess`` does not parse argv[0] as a shell
  command), and resolving every binary's absolute path in the source
  would couple the code to the host filesystem layout. The genuinely
  dangerous shell-injection patterns (``shell=True``) are still caught
  by S602 / S605.

New ``[tool.ruff.lint.per-file-ignores]`` for ``tests/**``:
- ``S101``         — ``assert`` is the unittest idiom.
- ``S102``         — ``exec`` is used to load script-under-test by file path.
- ``S105`` / ``S106`` — hardcoded credentials in fixtures / dummy creds.
- ``S108``         — ``/tmp`` paths in tempdir fixtures.
- ``S110`` / ``S112`` — ``try``/``except``/``pass``/``continue`` in cleanup helpers.

Hand-fixes (38 across 23 files)
================================
S101 × 3
  Type-narrowing asserts (``cli/deploy/development/proc.py`` —
  ``p.stdout is not None`` after ``stdout=PIPE``) and an upstream-Odoo
  invariant assert in ``roles/web-app-odoo/.../res_users.py``.

S105 × 1
  ``cli/core/app.py`` argv parser comparing ``token == "--log"`` —
  ``token`` is a CLI argv element, not a credential. Inline noqa.

S106 × 1
  ``utils/cache/users.py`` Jinja template string ``"{{ 42 |
  strong_password }}"`` rendered to a real password at runtime; not a
  literal credential. Inline noqa.

S108 × 6
  Container-internal paths bind-mounted from the host:
  - ``/tmp/infinito/ca/root-ca.crt`` and ``/tmp/infinito/bin/with-ca-trust.sh``
    in ``roles/sys-svc-compose-ca/files/compose_ca.py`` and
    ``roles/sys-svc-container/files/container.py`` (CA-injection
    contract between role and wrapper).
  - ``/tmp/cache_nginx_general/`` and ``/tmp/cache_nginx_image/`` in
    ``plugins/lookup/nginx.py`` (well-known nginx cache dirs).

S110 × 1
  ``roles/web-app-bigbluebutton/filter_plugins/compose_mods.py``: filter
  intentionally swallows YAML parse errors and falls back to the
  unmodified text. Inline noqa.

S112 × 5
  Filter plugins / inventory builders iterating over role config files
  with skip-on-malformed semantics. The pattern is intentional
  throughout (CLI tools / Ansible plugins shouldn't crash on a single
  bad role file). Per-line noqa with rationale.

S324 × 2
  ``utils/cache/base.py`` uses md5 as a fast non-cryptographic
  fingerprint for cache keying; ``utils/manager/value_generator.py``
  uses sha1 when the caller selects ``algorithm == "sha1"`` for legacy
  app compatibility. Both gained ``usedforsecurity=False`` (Python 3.9+
  hashlib API) which silences the rule structurally; comments document
  the non-security purpose.

S310 × 8
  ``urlopen`` calls to fixed HTTPS registries (``api.github.com``,
  ``hub.docker.com``, ``ghcr.io``). URL prefix is a literal; only the
  ``namespace`` / ``image`` segment varies and comes from the project's
  own ``meta/services.yml``, never user input. No ``file://`` scheme
  exposure. Inline noqa per call site.

S602 / S605 / S606 × 8
  Role-deployed scripts that legitimately use ``shell=True`` /
  ``os.system`` for pipes/``&&``, or ``os.execvp`` in list-form (safe by
  construction — no shell parses argv). Each call site gained an inline
  noqa with a per-call rationale identifying where the command string
  is sourced (Ansible-templated config, host-trusted, never untrusted
  external input).

Verification
============
- ``ruff check .`` → All checks passed
- ``ruff format --check .`` → 894 files formatted
- 1621 unit tests → all pass
- Integration suite: 44 baseline failures (unchanged)

23 files changed, +97 / −38. Combined with the prior commits the
branch satisfies 21 ruff rule families end-to-end. ``PTH``
(modernise ``os.path`` to ``pathlib``) is the remaining big-impact
candidate, deferred to its own session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 17:57:29 +02:00

288 lines
10 KiB
Python

"""Cross-cutting helpers for the `utils.cache.*` package.
Holds primitives that the domain modules (`users`, `applications`,
`domains`) all need but no domain owns: filesystem constants, YAML
loaders, deep-merge, cache-key + content-fingerprint signatures,
templar-render machinery, and the cross-domain re-entry guard.
Stays import-cheap so that `utils.cache.applications` (consumed on
GitHub Actions runner hosts that ship without ansible — see CI runs
24934007615 / 24935979190) can pull this module without dragging
ansible in. The single ansible-coupled symbol exposed from here is
`_render_with_templar`, which lazy-imports `utils.templating` only
when actually invoked.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import copy
import os
import threading
from collections.abc import Mapping
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
# `merge_with_defaults` is a pure-Python helper with no `ansible` dependency,
# so it stays at module scope.
from plugins.filter.merge_with_defaults import (
merge_with_defaults, # noqa: F401 re-exported
)
from . import PROJECT_ROOT, ROLES_DIR # noqa: F401
try:
from ansible.parsing.vault import EncryptedString as _AnsibleEncryptedString
except Exception:
_AnsibleEncryptedString = None
def _decrypt_ansible_encrypted_strings(value: Any) -> Any:
"""Recursively convert Ansible EncryptedString values to plaintext str.
Ansible 2.19+ refuses to store EncryptedString as an intermediate variable
during task arg finalization, so decrypt at the lookup boundary.
"""
if _AnsibleEncryptedString is not None and isinstance(
value, _AnsibleEncryptedString
):
try:
return str(value)
except Exception:
return value
if isinstance(value, Mapping):
return {k: _decrypt_ansible_encrypted_strings(v) for k, v in value.items()}
if isinstance(value, list):
return [_decrypt_ansible_encrypted_strings(v) for v in value]
if isinstance(value, tuple):
return tuple(_decrypt_ansible_encrypted_strings(v) for v in value)
return value
DEFAULT_TOKENS_FILE = Path("/var/lib/infinito/secrets/tokens.yml")
# Re-entry guard. Cross-lookups ({{ lookup('users', ...) }} inside applications
# and vice versa) can otherwise drive unbounded recursion once strings are
# trust-tagged and actually rendered (Ansible 2.19+). When a re-entrant call is
# detected, callers return the pre-render (still-templated) payload, which the
# caller's own templar will resolve lazily at use-site. Lives here because both
# `users` and `applications` modules need to touch the same flag.
_RENDER_GUARD = threading.local()
_FINGERPRINT_BY_ID: dict[int, str] = {}
def _cache_key(roles_dir: Path) -> str:
return str(roles_dir.resolve())
def _fingerprint_mapping(obj: Any) -> str:
"""Cheap-ish content fingerprint for cache keying.
Ansible 2.19+ composes a fresh `variables` mapping per task via
VariableManager.get_vars() and — empirically — often reconstructs the
inventory-level `applications`/`users` dicts too, so keying on `id(obj)`
misses the cache across tasks. A content fingerprint hits across tasks
whenever the inventory payload is unchanged.
Fast path: id()-keyed memo (within a single task the same dict instance is
typically reused for multiple lookups, so we avoid re-hashing).
Slow path: repr-based MD5. Non-mapping values collapse to an "id:..." tag
so we don't accidentally collide across unrelated types.
"""
if obj is None:
return "0"
obj_id = id(obj)
cached = _FINGERPRINT_BY_ID.get(obj_id)
if cached is not None:
return cached
try:
import hashlib
data = repr(sorted(obj.items())) if isinstance(obj, Mapping) else repr(obj)
# md5 used as a fast non-cryptographic fingerprint for cache keying.
digest = hashlib.md5(
data.encode("utf-8", errors="replace"),
usedforsecurity=False,
).hexdigest()
except Exception:
digest = f"id:{obj_id}"
_FINGERPRINT_BY_ID[obj_id] = digest
return digest
def _stable_variables_signature(variables: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> tuple:
"""Build a content-based cache signature from the subset of `variables`
that influences the merged applications/users payload.
See `_fingerprint_mapping` for why id()-only keys don't work reliably.
"""
if not variables:
return ("0", "0", "", "")
return (
_fingerprint_mapping(variables.get("applications")),
_fingerprint_mapping(variables.get("users")),
str(variables.get("DOMAIN_PRIMARY") or ""),
str(variables.get("SYSTEM_EMAIL_DOMAIN") or ""),
)
def _tokens_file_signature(path: Path) -> tuple:
"""Return a cheap stat-based signature for the tokens file.
The merged-users cache must invalidate whenever sys-token-store persists a
new token — otherwise downstream `lookup('users', ...)` returns stale tokens
within the same play. stat() is cheap and captures in-place writes.
"""
try:
st = path.stat()
except (FileNotFoundError, OSError):
return (str(path), 0, 0)
return (str(path), st.st_mtime_ns, st.st_size)
def _deep_merge(base: Any, override: Any) -> Any:
if isinstance(base, Mapping) and isinstance(override, Mapping):
merged = {k: copy.deepcopy(v) for k, v in base.items()}
for key, value in override.items():
merged[key] = _deep_merge(merged.get(key), value)
return merged
return copy.deepcopy(override)
def _resolve_roles_dir(*, roles_dir: str | os.PathLike[str] | None = None) -> Path:
return Path(roles_dir).resolve() if roles_dir else ROLES_DIR.resolve()
def _resolve_override_mapping(
variables: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
key: str,
templar: Any = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Return runtime override mappings defensively.
Nested `lookup('template', ...)` renders sometimes expose top-level lookup
inputs like `applications`/`users` as non-mapping placeholder values instead
of the original inventory overrides. Try to coerce via templar before
falling back to aggregated defaults.
"""
variables = variables or {}
value = variables.get(key, {})
if value is None:
value = {}
if not isinstance(value, Mapping) and templar is not None:
try:
rendered = templar.template(value, fail_on_undefined=False)
except TypeError:
try:
rendered = templar.template(value)
except Exception:
rendered = value
except Exception:
rendered = value
if isinstance(rendered, Mapping):
value = rendered
if not isinstance(value, Mapping):
raw_key = {
"applications": "_INFINITO_APPLICATIONS_RAW",
"users": "_INFINITO_USERS_RAW",
}.get(key)
if raw_key:
raw = variables.get(raw_key)
if isinstance(raw, Mapping):
value = raw
if isinstance(value, Mapping):
return dict(value)
return {}
def _render_with_templar(
value: Any,
*,
templar: Any,
variables: dict[str, Any] | None,
raw_applications: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
raw_users: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
max_rounds: int = 4,
) -> Any:
if templar is None:
return value
# Lazy import: `_templar_render_best_effort` pulls
# `ansible.errors.AnsibleError`. Keeping the import lazy means
# ansible-less importers of `utils.cache.base` (e.g. the runner-host
# CLI path) never pay the cost.
from utils.templating import _templar_render_best_effort
# Start from whatever the templar already had available so that
# ansible_facts/hostvars stay accessible during nested renders. Overlay the
# caller-supplied variables on top, then inject our raw.*_RAW helpers.
prev_templar_avail = getattr(templar, "available_variables", None)
base_variables: dict[str, Any] = (
dict(prev_templar_avail) if prev_templar_avail else {}
)
if variables:
base_variables.update(variables)
if raw_applications is not None:
base_variables["_INFINITO_APPLICATIONS_RAW"] = raw_applications
if raw_users is not None:
base_variables["_INFINITO_USERS_RAW"] = raw_users
def _render_scalar(raw: Any) -> Any:
if isinstance(raw, str) and "{{" not in raw and "{%" not in raw:
return raw
data = copy.deepcopy(raw)
if isinstance(data, str):
for _ in range(max_rounds):
try:
rendered = _templar_render_best_effort(
templar, data, base_variables
)
except Exception:
return data
if rendered == data:
break
data = rendered
return data
for _ in range(max_rounds):
try:
rendered = templar.template(data, fail_on_undefined=False)
except TypeError:
rendered = templar.template(data)
except Exception:
return data
if rendered == data:
break
data = rendered
return data
def _render_deep(raw: Any) -> Any:
if isinstance(raw, Mapping):
return {key: _render_deep(item) for key, item in raw.items()}
if isinstance(raw, list):
return [_render_deep(item) for item in raw]
if isinstance(raw, tuple):
return tuple(_render_deep(item) for item in raw)
return _render_scalar(raw)
try:
if hasattr(templar, "available_variables"):
templar.available_variables = base_variables
data = _render_deep(value)
finally:
if hasattr(templar, "available_variables"):
templar.available_variables = prev_templar_avail
return _decrypt_ansible_encrypted_strings(data)
def _reset() -> None:
"""Clear the per-process content-fingerprint memo. Domain modules
own their own caches and provide their own `_reset()`; this one
only owns `_FINGERPRINT_BY_ID`. The facade `data._reset_cache_for_tests`
orchestrates all four resets."""
_FINGERPRINT_BY_ID.clear()