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New lint test_no_raw_goto.py forbids raw `page.goto(...)` in role playwright specs + persona flows (the gotoOnion wrapper in personas/utils is exempt) so navigation retries transient Tor-transport errors over onion. Migrates every raw call across ~75 roles (343 sites) to `gotoOnion(page, ...)` and teaches gotoOnion to detect relative onion URLs (`isOnionCanonical`). gotoOnion is a behaviour-identical drop-in on clearnet (single attempt, same return). Verified: no-raw-goto lint green, eslint 0 errors, make test green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
155 lines
5.8 KiB
JavaScript
155 lines
5.8 KiB
JavaScript
const { test, expect } = require("@playwright/test");
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const { resolveTimeout } = require("./timeouts");
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const { skipUnlessServiceEnabled, isServiceEnabled } = require("./service-gating");
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const { normalizeBaseUrl, decodeDotenvQuotedValue, performKeycloakLoginForm, gotoOnion } = require("./personas");
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const baseUrl = normalizeBaseUrl(process.env.BASEROW_BASE_URL || "");
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const adminUsername = decodeDotenvQuotedValue(process.env.ADMIN_USERNAME || "");
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const adminPassword = decodeDotenvQuotedValue(process.env.ADMIN_PASSWORD || "");
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const FORGED_IDENTITY_HEADERS = {
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"X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username": "administrator",
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"X-Forwarded-User": "administrator",
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"X-Forwarded-Email": "administrator@example.com",
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"X-Forwarded-Groups": "/roles/web-app-baserow/administrator",
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};
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test.use({ ignoreHTTPSErrors: true });
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test("oidc-security: a forged identity header cannot bypass the oauth2-proxy gate", async ({ browser }) => {
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skipUnlessServiceEnabled("sso");
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expect(baseUrl, "BASEROW_BASE_URL must be set").toBeTruthy();
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const expectedBase = baseUrl.replace(/\/$/, "");
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const context = await browser.newContext({
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ignoreHTTPSErrors: true,
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extraHTTPHeaders: FORGED_IDENTITY_HEADERS,
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});
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try {
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const page = await context.newPage();
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await gotoOnion(page, `${expectedBase}/`, { waitUntil: "domcontentloaded" });
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await expect
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.poll(() => page.url(), {
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timeout: resolveTimeout(60_000),
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message: "a forged identity header must be bounced to Keycloak, never into Baserow",
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})
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.toContain("openid-connect/auth");
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const sessionCookies = await context.cookies(expectedBase);
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expect(
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sessionCookies.some((cookie) => cookie.name === "jwt_token"),
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"no Baserow jwt_token session cookie may be minted from a forged header",
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).toBe(false);
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} finally {
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await context.close();
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}
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});
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test("oidc-security: a forged identity header cannot mint a Baserow JWT through the trusted-header bridge", async ({ browser }) => {
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skipUnlessServiceEnabled("sso");
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expect(baseUrl, "BASEROW_BASE_URL must be set").toBeTruthy();
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const expectedBase = baseUrl.replace(/\/$/, "");
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const context = await browser.newContext({
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ignoreHTTPSErrors: true,
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extraHTTPHeaders: FORGED_IDENTITY_HEADERS,
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});
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try {
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const response = await context.request.get(`${expectedBase}/api/infinito/sso/token/`);
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const body = await response.text();
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let mintedAccessToken = null;
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try {
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mintedAccessToken = JSON.parse(body).access_token;
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} catch {
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mintedAccessToken = null;
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}
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expect(
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mintedAccessToken,
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`the trusted-header bridge must never mint a token for an un-proxied request (got ${response.status()}: ${body.slice(0, 200)})`,
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).toBeFalsy();
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expect(
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response.url(),
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"the bridge token endpoint must sit behind the oauth2-proxy gate",
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).toContain("openid-connect/auth");
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} finally {
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await context.close();
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}
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});
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test("oidc-security: the trusted-header bridge stays inert while SSO is disabled", async ({ browser }) => {
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test.skip(isServiceEnabled("sso"), "SSO enabled — forged-header gating is covered by the tests above");
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expect(baseUrl, "BASEROW_BASE_URL must be set").toBeTruthy();
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const expectedBase = baseUrl.replace(/\/$/, "");
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const context = await browser.newContext({
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ignoreHTTPSErrors: true,
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extraHTTPHeaders: FORGED_IDENTITY_HEADERS,
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});
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try {
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const response = await context.request.get(`${expectedBase}/api/infinito/sso/token/`);
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const body = await response.text();
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let mintedAccessToken = null;
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try {
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mintedAccessToken = JSON.parse(body).access_token;
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} catch {
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mintedAccessToken = null;
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}
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expect(
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response.ok(),
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`the SSO bridge endpoint must not be mounted while SSO is disabled (got ${response.status()}: ${body.slice(0, 200)})`,
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).toBe(false);
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expect(
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mintedAccessToken,
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"a forged identity header must never mint a Baserow token while SSO is disabled",
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).toBeFalsy();
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} finally {
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await context.close();
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}
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});
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test("oidc-security: injected identity headers cannot re-identify an authenticated session", async ({ page }) => {
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skipUnlessServiceEnabled("sso");
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expect(adminUsername, "ADMIN_USERNAME must be set").toBeTruthy();
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expect(adminPassword, "ADMIN_PASSWORD must be set").toBeTruthy();
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await page.context().clearCookies();
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const expectedBase = baseUrl.replace(/\/$/, "");
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await gotoOnion(page, `${expectedBase}/`);
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await performKeycloakLoginForm(page, adminUsername, adminPassword);
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await expect
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.poll(() => page.url(), { timeout: resolveTimeout(90_000), message: `expected redirect back to ${expectedBase}` })
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.toContain(expectedBase.replace(/^https?:\/\//, ""));
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const forgedMarker = "forgedescalationprobe";
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const response = await page.request.get(`${expectedBase}/api/infinito/sso/token/`, {
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headers: {
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"X-Forwarded-Email": `${forgedMarker}@attacker.invalid`,
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"X-Forwarded-Preferred-Username": forgedMarker,
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"X-Forwarded-User": forgedMarker,
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"X-Forwarded-Name": forgedMarker,
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"X-Forwarded-Groups": "/roles/web-app-baserow/administrator",
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"X-Auth-Request-Email": `${forgedMarker}@attacker.invalid`,
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"X-Auth-Request-Preferred-Username": forgedMarker,
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"X-Auth-Request-User": forgedMarker,
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"Remote-User": forgedMarker,
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},
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});
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const body = await response.text();
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expect(
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response.ok(),
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`the bridge must still mint a token for the genuine proxied session (got ${response.status()}: ${body.slice(0, 200)})`,
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).toBe(true);
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const tokenData = JSON.parse(body);
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const resolvedIdentity = `${tokenData.user?.email || ""} ${tokenData.user?.username || ""}`.toLowerCase();
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expect(
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resolvedIdentity,
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`the oauth2-proxy identity must win over injected headers (resolved: ${resolvedIdentity})`,
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).not.toContain(forgedMarker);
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});
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