Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5.5 090e3c115d fix(security): keep OSV downloads atomic, bound the issue sync and lint every suppression entry
CodeRabbit review of PR #1326:

- fetch_databases downloads each OSV archive to all.zip.part and replaces
  all.zip only after the transfer completes. An OSError removes the partial
  file and comes back as an `osv <ecosystem>: <error>` line instead of a
  traceback.
- run_gh bounds every gh call with a 120 s timeout. A failed or hung create,
  edit or close becomes a `failed <action>: <error>` line while the other
  issues and the close pass still run, and the command exits 1.
- The suppression lint checks every list item of a suppressions block, so an
  entry that starts with `until:` still needs its `# nocheck: cve <reason>`
  marker.

Part of #1324

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 12:45:24 +01:00
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5.5 ca6faac318 fix(ci): share the vulnerability databases with act runs and local deploys
Under act the deploy job pinned an engine but skipped the cache restores, so
every local swarm-* run stopped on a missing Grype database. The swarm
matrix also ran inside the act job container, where the shared host
directory did not exist, and the workspace job would have kept a copy of
about 5 GB in every worktree.

- scripts/tests/deploy/act/workflow.sh requires
  INFINITO_VULNERABILITY_DB_HOST_PATH, creates it on the host and binds it
  into the job container at the same path, because that container drives
  the host daemon, which resolves every stack and swarm node bind on the
  host.
- call-test-deploy.yml pins engine and database path in one step that runs
  only outside act; under act the deploy draws an engine and refreshes the
  shared directory. call-test-workspace.yml takes the shared path under act.
- The refresh lock moves into the shared directory, so host deploys and act
  runs serialize on one file, and a root refresh hands its files to the
  directory owner. hand_over skips paths a mocked download never created,
  which failed four TestRefresh cases when the gate ran as root.
- A missing INFINITO_VULNERABILITY_DB_HOST_PATH stops compose up with a
  "run 'make dotenv'" hint instead of a KeyError.
- Rationale paragraphs in the database and compose docstrings are dropped.

Part of #1324

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 02:44:59 +01:00
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5.5 043e001669 feat(ci): rotate the vulnerability engine per row and hand its databases over
Each CI deploy row now draws one vulnerability engine (trivy, grype or osv)
as a fifth rotation axis, shown in the job name next to distro and
filesystem (🔬 axis, 🔺 trivy, 🍇 grype, 🐙 osv). The deploy-time scan of
sys-ctl-hlth-runtime runs that engine behind Syft and the Grype runtime pass.

- A vulnerability-db job keeps one Actions cache per database and day and
  downloads only the missing ones. Every deploy job restores Grype plus its
  drawn engine, fails on a cache miss and never downloads a database itself.
- Local stacks share one host directory, INFINITO_VULNERABILITY_DB_HOST_PATH,
  mounted read-only at INFINITO_VULNERABILITY_DB_DIR in compose.yml and in
  every swarm node. A local deploy without a pinned engine draws one and
  refreshes only the databases it reads, at most once a day, under a lock.
- A pinned engine whose database is missing stops the deploy before it
  starts.

Part of #1324

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 02:44:58 +01:00
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5.5 6b36c8579a fix(sys-ctl-hlth-runtime): scan with Trivy, Grype and OSV instead of PHP floors
The runtime check judged PHP by its upstream version and failed every
container on an end-of-life line. Distribution builds backport fixes without
raising that number, so main run 41154895895 failed Checkmk#0 on
`PHP 8.1.2-1ubuntu2.28 runs the end-of-life line 8.1`, a build Ubuntu lists
as fixed for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619.

- The role now runs Trivy, Grype and OSV-Scanner, with a Syft SBOM per
  target, against the host and the images of the running containers, in
  bounded parallel lanes. Targets, engines and the failing severities are
  lists in meta/services.yml; the default is every target and engine at
  CRITICAL and HIGH with a fix available.
- Grype always scans the binary-classified packages of the SBOM, so a PHP
  built from source in an official php image (8.4.26) still fails on the
  CVEs fixed in 8.4.27, which Trivy and OSV do not see.
- OSV reads an SBOM copy whose distro purls carry the source package name.
- A CVE is suppressed only in the role owning the image, under
  services.<service>.security.suppressions with id, until and a
  `# nocheck: cve <reason>` marker; a lint rejects bare, malformed and
  expired entries.
- The deploy-time run fails on its first finding: sys-service gains
  system_service_run_once and sys-service-terminator skips the retries
  only for those units. The timer runs daily at 00:00 UTC.
- The PHP version floors are removed; the php_hardening check stays.
- make test-security replaces make security-runtimes: Syft builds an SBOM
  of every pinned image straight from the GHCR mirror, cached by digest,
  and the three engines scan it with the role's threshold and suppressions.

Part of #1324

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-01 02:44:58 +01:00