A suppression entry under <service>.security.suppressions now names either
one CVE (id) or one image tag (image_tag), each with until. An image_tag
entry accepts every finding of the service's image while the owner runs that
tag; each owner of a shared digest is judged by its own tag (Config.Image at
runtime, the pinned version in the mirror scan), so a container on any other
tag stays unsuppressed. Host suppressions are the id entries of the engine
services; an image_tag entry there covers the engine's own image.
The cve lint requires image_tag to equal the service's version, and the
Docker image updater drops a service's image_tag entries with their markers
when it moves the service to another version, so a tag suppression never
outlives its tag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The scan threshold becomes a severity-to-verdict mapping in
roles/sys-ctl-hlth-runtime/meta/services.yml, CRITICAL: fail and HIGH: warn,
for production and CI alike. A finding mapped to fail fails the service and
the deploy, a warn prints a warning line and passes, a suppressed one prints
an info line. Engine errors, missing databases and PHP hardening violations
still fail. The old list form is rejected with a config error. The daily
mirror scan stays strict: every unsuppressed fail or warn finding is a row,
so it fails while an image is red.
Every run publishes one list of judged findings four ways:
- report.json of the latest run (summary + records) under
DIR_HEALTH_RUNTIME_REPORT, written atomically;
- findings.jsonl under DIR_HEALTH_RUNTIME_LOG, one record per finding,
appended per run and rotated weekly by a logrotate drop-in;
- one JSON line per target plus a summary line on stdout for the journal;
- infinito_hlth_runtime.prom in DIR_METRICS_TEXTFILE when web-app-prometheus
is deployed: findings per target, kind, image, severity, scanner and
verdict (no CVE label), last run time and success, scanner errors.
Each record carries run_id, timestamp, host, environment, target, kind,
image, scanner, id, severity, package, installed_version, fixed_version,
suppressed, suppressed_until and verdict. The paths are SPOT variables in
group_vars/all/05_paths.yml, the script takes them as arguments.
Requirement 070 and the role README describe the mapping, the outputs and
the per-image vulnerability issue of the previous commit.
Part of #1324
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #1326 CI failed in two places:
- The vulnerability-db job stopped on `unable to create listing temp file:
open /tmp/grype-db-listing…: permission denied`. The repository runs the
engines as `docker run --user <uid>:<gid>`, and the Grype and Syft images
set no User and WorkingDir /tmp, which only root may write. The dry-run
mirror scan failed the same way: 156 Syft errors and the Grype database.
Every engine now gets TMPDIR pointing at its writable /work mount.
- Every workspace job died in `make system-purge`: `git clean -fdX` could
not remove build/vulnerability-db, because the job bound that directory
as its own mount inside the mounted checkout. On GitHub the workspace job
now keeps its databases under ${RUNNER_TEMP}, outside the checkout; act
keeps the shared host directory.
Part of #1324
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The runtime check judged PHP by its upstream version and failed every
container on an end-of-life line. Distribution builds backport fixes without
raising that number, so main run 41154895895 failed Checkmk#0 on
`PHP 8.1.2-1ubuntu2.28 runs the end-of-life line 8.1`, a build Ubuntu lists
as fixed for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619.
- The role now runs Trivy, Grype and OSV-Scanner, with a Syft SBOM per
target, against the host and the images of the running containers, in
bounded parallel lanes. Targets, engines and the failing severities are
lists in meta/services.yml; the default is every target and engine at
CRITICAL and HIGH with a fix available.
- Grype always scans the binary-classified packages of the SBOM, so a PHP
built from source in an official php image (8.4.26) still fails on the
CVEs fixed in 8.4.27, which Trivy and OSV do not see.
- OSV reads an SBOM copy whose distro purls carry the source package name.
- A CVE is suppressed only in the role owning the image, under
services.<service>.security.suppressions with id, until and a
`# nocheck: cve <reason>` marker; a lint rejects bare, malformed and
expired entries.
- The deploy-time run fails on its first finding: sys-service gains
system_service_run_once and sys-service-terminator skips the retries
only for those units. The timer runs daily at 00:00 UTC.
- The PHP version floors are removed; the php_hardening check stays.
- make test-security replaces make security-runtimes: Syft builds an SBOM
of every pinned image straight from the GHCR mirror, cached by digest,
and the three engines scan it with the role's threshold and suppressions.
Part of #1324
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three CodeRabbit findings on PR #1265:
- script.py listed the running containers with `container ps` and
`container inspect` without a timeout, so a hung engine kept the daily
unit active forever and blocked the next timer run. Both calls now use
EXEC_TIMEOUT_SECONDS; main turns a timeout or engine error into a
one-line failure and exit 1 instead of a traceback.
- runtime.py's PHP_PACKAGE_PATTERN requires a digit after "php", so an
image installing an unversioned interpreter package (`php-cli`) and
setting no PHP_VERSION was reported as PHP-free. The interpreter
packages php, php-cli, php-fpm, php-cgi, php-phpdbg and
libapache2-mod-php are now recorded as PhpRuntime.packages and reported
with an unknown patch level; extension and library packages
(php-mysql, php-pear, php-common, phpmyadmin) and paths do not count.
- php_finding returned early for a patched PHP_VERSION, so an end-of-life
package line installed next to it (e.g. php7) was never reported. The
version only returns a finding now; otherwise the lines are judged too.
Every finding has unit tests that fail on the previous code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Answering "which deployed containers run a vulnerable PHP?" after
CVE-2026-109618/109619 took a manual inventory of registry metadata, and
nothing noticed a hardening ini that an image never loads.
- New role sys-ctl-hlth-runtime, routed through sys-svc-compose next to
sys-ctl-hlth-container. A daily timer runs `php` in every running
container and fails, alerting through sys-ctl-alm-compose, when PHP is
below the floor of its line or on a line older than every floor (7.4,
8.1). Every service that mounts php_hardening in meta/volumes.yml fails
while expose_php or session.upload_progress.enabled is on; other PHP
containers of such a stack are listed as info. Compose and swarm
containers are matched by their project/stack and service labels. The
check is not run at deploy time, so a finding never fails a deploy.
- The floors (8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27, 8.5.12) live once, in
HEALTH_RUNTIME_FLOORS of the role's vars/main.yml.
- `make security-runtimes` lists the PHP of every pinned role image
without pulling: Docker Hub tags through the Hub API, which no pull rate
limit meters, other registries through the OCI config blob (new
registry.config_blob, which the healthcheck probe now reuses).
PHP_VERSION, distro PHP packages and a PHP_BASE build argument count. It
exits 1 on an image below its floor or one the registry did not answer.
Today it flags nfrastack/fusiondirectory:1.5 (line 7.4) and
shopware/docker-base:8.3 (8.3.25).
The role TODO.md keeps the follow-ups: further runtimes, the split web
SAPI of web-app-lam, a scheduled CI run of the report and the CVE scan.
Refs #1127
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>