03_wait_converge built the DB service name from the engine type:
"${DB_DEP}_${DB_DEP}" -> mariadb_mariadb. That name is only correct when
the database is central. force_shared_db deliberately leaves a
manager-pinned role carrying a literal `shared: false` alone, so
web-app-magento keeps its embedded engine, and sys-svc-rdbms deploys it as
magento_database inside magento's own stack.
The name came from the engine, which is global, and was looked up with
`docker service ls` across the whole swarm instead of the role's stack, so
the `shared` flag never entered the check at any step. Both polarities were
wrong:
variant #1 - no consumer pulls the central provider in, so
mariadb_mariadb does not exist. Run 32630684501 job 97175522113 polled it
ninety times and failed the drill, while the rescue artifact shows
magento_database at 1/1 Running and the play at failed=0.
variant #0 - matomo and mailu declare a Jinja `shared`, get force-shared
and drag svc-db-mariadb in. Job 95662862942 then reported
`db(mariadb): 1/1 Running 2 hours ago` beside `magento: Running 21
minutes ago` - green on a database magento never touches.
resolve_db_service asks the deployed swarm which service carries this
role's database: <entity>_database first, else <dep>_<dep>. The two cannot
collide, because sys-svc-rdbms renders the _database sidecar only under
`lookup('database', application_id, 'local')`. Exact-line matching, not
docker's substring name filter, per 246558a13.
Only web-app-magento changes behaviour: it is the one role that is both
pinned by force_shared_db and seen by the DB_DEP grep. matrix and
bigbluebutton never reach the DB half - their entity key carries no image,
so skip_if_no_swarm_service exits first - and discourse resolves
postgres_postgres exactly as before, in every variant.
A role that declares a DB dep no service serves now says so and gates the
app half alone, instead of polling a name nobody deployed.
diagnostics.sh carried the same guess in its container filter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both were left by earlier commits and are collapsed by markdownlint-cli2 and shfmt respectively, so every make quality run left the tree dirty and the change would eventually have ridden along in an unrelated commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The converge gate polls STACK_NAME_PRIMARY_SERVICE_KEY. Four roles never
create that name and each was given a static `workload: node-local` to make
the gate skip itself:
21fe9e984 web-svc-cdn ships only cdn_build, never cdn_cdn
2c6c8b763 web-app-matrix names its services matrix_synapse and friends
76508c946 svc-runner deploys node-local compose projects per node
cb52a72f2 bigbluebutton phantom service, and the DR drill must still run
Four hand-written claims for one observable fact. The claim is also static
where the truth is not: web-app-discourse renders `services: {}` only while
its sidecars are shared, and job 94965456921 of run 31864448027 polled
discourse_discourse ninety times for a stack that had none. Declaring the
role node-local would have blinded the gate in the variants where its
sidecars are local and a stack does exist.
has_swarm_service asks the deployed stack for the exact name instead. Every
caller runs behind `if rc == 0`, so an absent service is the role's shape and
not a broken deploy. Exact-line matching, not docker's name filter, which
matches substrings.
No coverage is lost: 03_wait_converge cannot pass without that service, and
05/06/07 plus the backup drill only run once it has. The four roles keep the
skip they were given; discourse and every future case get it without a
declaration. The teardown branch in the drill keeps its meaning - stack rm
where the service exists, compose stop per node where it does not.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
hostname(1) is not installed in every node image. In run 30830377785 the arch
drill printed
trigger_units.sh: line 22: hostname: command not found
starting svc-bkp-local-2-device.11.6.0.infinito.nexus.service on
so the node name came out empty on all three call sites. The cosmetic one is the
progress line; the damaging one is the journal dump path, which becomes
"${unit}..journal.txt" and is identical on every node. Four hosts writing the
same filename into the shared dumps directory means the artifact keeps whichever
one wrote last, and a unit failure gets investigated against another host's
journal.
uname is coreutils and present wherever the drill runs. Reading it once also
drops three subshells from the loop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three conflicts, each resolved by combining both sides rather than picking one.
compose.yml passes both env vars through to the container: swarm-nfs adds
INFINITO_SWARM_MGR_IP, this branch adds INFINITO_TOR_SOCKS_PORT, and neither
substitutes for the other.
daemon.json.j2 takes the data-root block from swarm-nfs and keeps HEAD's dns
key. The incoming side writes networks.internet.dns directly; lookup(
'container_dns') already returns that value as its clearnet entry and prepends
the docker0 bridge on a Tor node in compose mode, so the incoming form is a
strict subset and dropping it loses nothing.
The WordPress CA-trust addon spec gains skipUnlessServiceEnabled("sso") from
swarm-nfs alongside HEAD's gotoOnion and resolveTimeout, and asserts on the
Plugin Name the mu-plugin header declares - the mustuse screen renders that,
not the filename - with resolveTimeout applied to the literal the incoming
side left bare.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
losetup -f prints the device with a trailing (lost) marker when its node is missing, and both claim sites fed the whole string to mknod. The recovery path that materialises /dev/loop8 and beyond therefore never worked, which is why the pool appeared to stop at the eight preallocated nodes even though max_loop is 0. Strip the marker before the node is built.
Nothing released the data-root loop a node claims, so each distro round leaked four of them: across 140 job logs leg 1 always applies 5 and declines 0, leg 2 applies 3 and declines 2, leg 3 declines 4. The declining nodes fall back to overlayfs, which disables the btrfs snapshot mode the script exists to exercise, and the DR drill then finds no device at all.
Detach right after the mount instead. The mount holds the opener, so the kernel arms autoclear rather than detaching, and the loop plus its sparse image are reclaimed when the node container takes its mount namespace down. Verified in a privileged container: the mount survives the detach, AUTOCLEAR reads 1, the filesystem stays writable, btrfs subvolume create still works, and the loop is released on umount.
Drop the teardown block added earlier: it filtered on (lost), which marks a missing device node rather than a missing backing file, so it selected exactly the devices losetup -d cannot detach, ran unprivileged, and printed success unconditionally. Restore the (deleted) filter in the drill. Require mountpoint up front so a missing tool declines instead of killing the node.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The role runs ganesha at -N NIV_EVENT, and roughly eighteen init steps between the CLIENT commits and the listener log below that level, so the silence in run 30699990912 marked the edge of visibility rather than the fault. Raise INIT and DISPATCH under MODE_DEBUG: nfs_Init_svc(), which binds 2049, logs under COMPONENT_DISPATCH, so INIT alone would have missed exactly the step in question.
Add a userspace backtrace beside the kernel stack dump, which only ever says futex_do_wait. eu-stack names the function holding the lock; elfutils goes into the lab image rather than the role, since a production NFS server should not carry a debugger.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every node runs docker_dataroot.sh, which attaches a loop for its data root, and nothing ever detached them. Run 30699990912 shows the consequence: all eight kernel loop devices bound to docker-fs.img in two inode groups, i.e. two rounds' worth, leaving none for the DR drill's LUKS image.
Release the orphaned ones after the nodes are gone -- only then is a loop unambiguously ours to reclaim, rather than a concurrent run's. Match (lost) as well as (deleted): a backing file inside a removed container's overlay becomes unfindable rather than merely unlinked, which is why the existing cleanup in 02_luks_device.sh never fired.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The DR drill's cryptsetup step died claiming a loop device and the artifact carried nothing to say why: no losetup -a, no /dev listing, and the backup host appears in no other collector loop. Record both views, what the kernel has attached and which nodes the container's /dev carries, so an exhausted pool and a missing device node are told apart at a glance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The parenthetical claimed the capture names the address and errno of a failed bind. dnsmasq logs that at startup only, and a startup bind failure is fatal, so the half-bound state seen in the artifact cannot originate there. The dynamic bind path is measurably silent on success and untested on failure. The neighbouring markers in this collector carry no description either.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The socket table already shows which listening address is missing, but nothing recorded why. A build that cannot resolve dies on the node whose dnsmasq never bound the advertised resolver, and the journal is the only place naming the address and errno. Captured whole rather than tailed, because a failed bind is logged at startup and the neighbouring captures keep only the tail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Twelve conflicts, resolved by intent rather than by side.
Six shared one shape: the incoming side adds the new rescue_index.sh call but
drops this branch's `# nocheck: shell-or-true` markers. The markers carry a
lint contract here, so the incoming structure was taken and the markers put
back — dedicated.sh, guide/one.sh, guide/host_deploy.sh, swarm/routine/00_one.sh
and trigger_units.sh, where the incoming version additionally writes the full
journal to a file instead of only echoing a tail.
web-app-matrix keeps HEAD's _synapse_extra_args accumulator (the superset: CA
mount plus the onion case) but adopts the incoming improvement inside it — the
inlined regex_replace gives way to lookup('subnet_gateway').
handlers/__init__.py drops rescue_diagnostics_dir from the old import group
(the incoming side moved it under .infinito.rescue, keeping both would import
it twice) and keeps tor_socks_port, a HEAD-only handler ORDERED_HANDLERS still
needs.
svc-bkp-volume-2-local takes the incoming side throughout: both branches landed
the same feature, but swarm-nfs evolved it — the knob moved from the global
STORAGE_BACKUP_SNAPSHOT_MODE to services.volume-2-local.snapshot_mode, plus the
subvolume helper, 04_snapshot_subject.yml, meta/packages.yml and baudolo 3.2.2.
Three files that left behind were removed: files/baudolo_snapshot.py and the two
worktree tests at their pre-refactor paths, all byte-identical to their moved
counterparts.
Six follow-on failures the merge produced, fixed at the root:
- STORAGE_BACKUP_SNAPSHOT_MODE lost its last reader with the config-lookup
design and is gone from group_vars.
- utils/github/variant_bundle_limits.py sat next to variant_bundles.py, which
the prefix lint forbids; the pair now lives in utils/github/variant/ as
bundles.py and bundle_limits.py, with the -m entry point, the ruff
per-file-ignore, the design-doc link and the mirroring test path updated.
- The incoming WordPress addon spec navigated with a raw page.goto and carried
three bare timeout literals; both route through gotoOnion and resolveTimeout
now, which is what makes navigation survive onion transport.
- Six unmarked `|| true` got a concrete reason each: docker.socket is absent on
distros that ship docker without it, the loop device is already detached when
the probe failed before attaching, and modprobe zfs may fail because the
/dev/zfs check decides.
make quality green across all four targets. The cold-domains budget test that
had to be waived here passes on its own now — 19d56f07e raises it to 100s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The collector carried a shell-side default for INFINITO_RESCUE_DIAGNOSTICS_DIR,
which the SPOT lint forbids because a second source drifts unnoticed - and this
one already had: the fallback spelled /tmp/rescue-diagnostics, the value of
INFINITO_RESCUE_DIAGNOSTICS_BASE, while the variable it stood in for resolves to
/tmp/infinito-rescue-diagnostics. Had it ever been used, the collector would have
written where no artifact collects.
A `:?` guard replaces it, matching the six the DR drill already carries. The
only caller sets the variable explicitly for both collectors, and _context.sh
sources the env layer regardless, so the guard should never fire.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three of the six failures triaged today were explainable only after downloading
a rescue artifact, and two not even then. The job log carried "not converged:
docker_docker", a bare "rc=1", and "failed after 3 attempt(s)".
The convergence gate now prints the task rows of a service that will not
converge - but only those whose error field is filled. A stack coming up
normally stays silent, while the one that killed svc-db-postgres would have
shown `error=Head "https://ghcr.io/...": request canceled` in the job log
instead of hiding it in an artifact. awk rather than grep: grep exits 1 when
nothing matches, which under set -e would take the script with it.
The remote pull decodes its exit status. os.system returns rc << 8, so the
message said 5888 where rsync said 23, and every attempt now names its code.
The sleep after the final attempt is gone - five wasted minutes per run.
The matomo poller hands its last 40 lines to stderr on deadline, redacted at
the source, and the failing task interpolates them the way the compose flavor
already does. No no_log: MASK_CREDENTIALS_IN_LOGS is force-set anyway and would
have censored exactly the payload this exists to deliver.
The `-p warning` filter added to trigger_units.sh a few commits ago is removed.
systemd journals a unit's stdout and stderr at info, so that filter would have
swallowed the per-provider attribution the same commit introduced.
stack_ready.sh gets its first tests: replica comparison, the completed-oneshot
branch, and both halves of the new reporting - the error reaches the caller, the
error-free rows do not.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The DR drill's remote pull exits 1 after 65 minutes and nothing says why. The
unit loops over two providers and only counts errors, so which one failed is
unrecoverable; the pull runs `rsync -abP`, whose --progress writes one journal
line per file - 77137 of them on a nextcloud pull - and the drill captured
`journalctl -n 60`. The entire diagnostic was therefore rsync filenames.
The unit now names the host it could not pull from. rsync keeps --partial and
trades --progress for --info=stats2, turning the flood into a closing balance.
trigger_units.sh writes the complete journal of a failed unit into the rescue
dump directory the artifact ships as local-dumps, and prints only the lines
from warning upwards.
That directory arrives as an argument instead of a second copy of the paths
SPOT: the drill reads INFINITO_RESCUE_DIAGNOSTICS_DIR once, which the env
handler derives from group_vars/all/05_paths.yml, and hands it to every call
site. A test pins that contract, and it earned its place immediately - it found
two call sites that a grep for the file name cannot see, and both were the
units this change exists for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Of six CI failures triaged today, three were explainable only from downloaded
artifacts and two not even there: the job log carried "not converged:
docker_docker" or a bare "rc=1", while this collector drowned that same log in
compose trees, env listings and ganesha thread stacks.
diagnostics.sh switches its stdout per section with exec, so every topic lands
in its own file under the rescue directory and the log keeps one line. An
unwritable output directory degrades to stdout rather than killing the
collector - a failed mkdir would otherwise abort the script at the first
redirection, which the caller swallows with `|| true`, leaving no diagnostics
at all and no sign of it. For the same reason the collector says so when it
ends up having captured nothing.
00_one.sh hands the same directory to both collectors. The variable was scoped
to the python one, so the shell collector wrote where no artifact picks it up.
The capture grows by exactly what today's investigations went without: per-node
resolv.conf, daemon.json, listening sockets, NAT rules and a resolve probe
against the three hosts that killed builds, plus df and docker system df.
rescue_index.sh runs last and lists what was collected together with the note
that it is downloadable. The index is the one thing worth printing.
A test pins the routing against a stub docker: one file per section, no bleed
between them, a single log line, and the degrade path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three conflicts, none resolved by picking a side wholesale:
- Makefile: took the incoming ACT_INPUTS, which routes through SWARM_DISTROS
instead of inlining the same expression a second time.
- test-e2e-playwright/02_run_one.yml: took the incoming rc handling. An absent
rc now counts as failure; the previous default(0) let an aborted Playwright
run pass silently, contradicting the debug message right above it.
- web-app-peertube spec: combined both. Kept gotoOnion and resolveTimeout,
which this branch's lint enforces, and adopted the incoming retry-inside-poll
for the OIDC button plus its networkidle wait.
The topology SPOT read default.env only, so every lab took the same subnet no matter what the generated .env said. Two labs on one host therefore collided with "invalid pool request: Pool overlaps", which is what stopped a worktree lab from running beside the primary checkout's.
Collect the generated .env first, then default.env, and emit each assignment as := so precedence becomes exported environment, then .env, then default.env. default.env stays the fallback because the workflow sources this file before make dotenv has run, which was the original reason for reading it directly.
A line that does not parse as a balanced assignment now aborts naming the line. Sourced as-is it would have become an unconditional assignment and silently defeated the precedence this change exists to establish.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The artifact of the wedged run carried journal, unit status and mounts but no process data, so the hang could be localized to the export config commit and not pinned to a syscall. wchan and syscall per thread close that gap.
MainPID 0 is its own likely state given Restart=on-failure with the start-rate limit disabled, so that branch reports the unit counters instead. Every read keeps 2>&1 because /proc stack and syscall are EPERM on hardened kernels.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ganesha unregisters its RPC programs from inside nfs_Init_svc(), before
the sockets are ever put into listen(). That unregister reaches
libntirpc's rpcb_unset -> CLNT_DESTROY -> svc_vc_destroy_it, which spins
on nanosleep({0,0}) with no timeout -- and it only takes that path when
the AF_LOCAL connect to /var/run/rpcbind.sock succeeds. So a reachable
rpcbind is what wedges the server, not a missing one.
The wedged instance burned 5m30s of CPU while serving nothing, never
logged NFS SERVER INITIALIZED, and left the controller mount retrying
into ECONNREFUSED for 1706s before the deploy failed 20 minutes further
downstream. Masking and stopping both rpcbind units before ganesha starts
makes the spin unreachable: without a local socket rpcb_unset returns
false immediately. Wants=rpcbind.service is not Requires=, so a masked
unit is logged and ignored, and v4 registration is explicitly optional in
ganesha -- which is why this holds only while the export set stays
NFSv4-only.
The unit list is probed first so distros without rpcbind are skipped
rather than failing the play, and the probe distinguishes "no such unit"
from an unreachable manager so the mask can never be skipped silently.
The Type=forking unit reports started while the daemon is still spinning,
so a wait_for on 2049 turns a 28-minute mystery into a named failure, and
the diagnostics now carry rpcbind's journal plus what actually listens.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The controller mount of DIR_VAR_LIB survived the teardown, so the next
distro cycle inherited an NFS session whose server container was already
gone: the kernel logged 'server not responding, timed out' and every
access under /var/lib/infinito wedged, taking the deploy down with it.
All five swarm jobs of the last manual run died this way, each on a
different distro but always on the third lab cycle.
Both halves of the old teardown were unable to clear it. The guard
`mountpoint -q` blocks on exactly the dead mount it is asked about, so
the timeout dropped the unmount that was needed; and `umount -lf` ran
without sudo on a non-root runner, so the EPERM went into `|| true`.
Detection now reads /proc/self/mountinfo, which touches no filesystem,
the unmount elevates when the caller is not root, and a mount that
survives all of it fails loudly instead of silently poisoning the next
cycle. The bootstrap runs the same release before bringing a lab up, so
a cycle whose teardown never ran cannot hand the mount on either.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
d9a4498b3 collapsed eleven CI steps into one, which broke the assumption every handover in the drill rested on: a $GITHUB_ENV write only comes back in the NEXT step. Inside one step nobody sees it. matrix.py reads os.environ["MGR_IP"], so every swarm job died with KeyError before the first deploy round; 05 -> 06 -> 07 passed INITIAL_NODE/NEW_NODE the same way and would have died next.
The node IPs now come from the topology SPOT: compose.yml already pins every node to those INFINITO_SWARM_*_IP keys, so the docker-inspect capture only read back what compose had set. It goes, together with the $GITHUB_ENV publish and lab_net. lab_domain_target reads the env instead, guarded by an assert task because lookup('env') yields '' for a missing key and an empty dnsmasq `address=/domain/` is valid syntax meaning NODATA -- the failure would have surfaced 30 retries later as a DNS problem.
INITIAL_NODE/NEW_NODE move to a SWARM_DRILL_ENV file, created fresh per distro so the previous distro's node cannot leak into the next drain. The out-of-drill callers of _context.sh keep working through a visible guard; both writers stay strict via :?.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The discover job was named after the full distro list and the plan summary printed all five, but test-deploy-swarm.yml never set INFINITO_DISTROS, so every run fell back to the default.env distro and only debian was ever exercised. The job name has been advertising coverage that did not exist.
The workflow now passes the distros input into the env and hands the drill to the shared loop from 1bbe7a0eb. Bootstrap, setup, matrix deploy, seed, drain and assert move out of eleven separate steps into routine/00_one.sh, which is what the loop runs once per distro.
Collection and teardown move with them, into an EXIT trap: it replaces the removed 'if: always()' and 'if: failure()' step conditions and returns the original exit code so cleanup cannot mask the deploy failure. The always() teardown step stays as a second net for a step that times out as a whole.
Playwright reports and rescue diagnostics gain a distro segment, matching the layout the compose path already writes, because a second distro would otherwise overwrite the first one's evidence. The structure summary carries the distro in its heading for the same reason.
The README described the old shape and is corrected: the loop entries are listed, topology_summary.sh was missing, and 01_bootstrap.sh is no longer 'one CI step'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Conflicts: keep both new passthrough env vars; adopt the swarm-nfs
ollama manager-ops split while porting our model-pull retry hardening
into it. Strip three narration comments the stricter comment lint
rejects.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every DinD node is attached to a second network by the bootstrap cache connect, so the embedded DNS returns two A records per node name in undefined order; workers that resolved the manager onto the cache network could not reach the registry bound to the lab IP and rejected locally built images with 'No such image', pushing all replicas onto the manager. Pin a fixed lab ipv4_address per node and every node name via extra_hosts (files-first resolution wins over DNS); the subnet and IPs live in default.env as the INFINITO_SWARM_* SPOT consumed by compose interpolation and the topology exports. Proven by A/B: the identical friendica variant-2 swarm job went from worker rejects to fully green including the drain test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves the runner Dockerfile to the lint-standard Acquire::Retries=3
and keeps the collabora TODO wording; hardens the merged tree for the
stricter lints (apt retries in the tor Dockerfile, shell-or-true
markers, comment cleanup).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pin node hostnames to their lab-net IPs (dual-homed nodes let Docker
DNS hand workers the cache-net IP while the registry binds only the
lab IP), quiesce the CI compose tor before bootstrap (it publishes the
same onion identity as the cluster), and reap wedged nodes with a
retried SIGKILL so leftovers cannot starve later phases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
swarm-exec reaches a DinD node; reaching a swarm service container (moodle,
openldap) needed a nested docker exec. Add swarm-app-exec, which resolves one
running replica on the node and runs a base64-encoded command inside it, so
live in-container inspection stays on a sanctioned make helper. Adding a
second exec_* script tripped the prefix-group lint, so exec_node.sh moves to
exec/node.sh and the new one lands at exec/service.sh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
07_assert_state.sh sources _context.sh under set -o pipefail, and the printf | head-n1 that picked the first NFS volume raised a broken-pipe write error the moment head closed the pipe after line one. Any role with two or more NFS volumes (erpnext ships erpnext_sites and erpnext_logs) crashed the reschedule assertion before it could check the surviving marker. Plain parameter expansion returns the same first line with no pipe.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The swarm deploy job now renders the same summary page as compose:
role runtimes, a swarm structure section (topology roles plus live node
list and service placement from the manager) and the Playwright table.
The matrix deploy tees its ansible output and prints the compose
matrix-deploy round/PASS markers, so the runtime parser segments swarm
runs per variant round too.
The runtime table unifies tasks and roles with a Type column (tasks
first), appends the recap total row and flags a mismatch between the
parsed sum and the recap total; rows are read from ROLES RECAP sections
only, which removes the double-counted TASKS RECAP task rows. Each role
row carries one column per host: executed, skipped or failed, with
ignored failures downgraded. The Playwright variant column drops the
redundant variant- prefix. Verified against the logs of runs
29656268771 (swarm) and 29620158441 (compose): every segment's parsed
sum matches the recap total within 0.05s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The context derived PRIMARY_NFS_VOLUME from the first declared volume, but gitlab's first volume is repositories with nfs: false (gitaly cannot run on NFS), so the seed step wrote its pre-drain marker into a state directory that never exists on the export and killed a job whose deploy had already converged. Volumes declaring nfs: false are now skipped, making the drain check target a volume that actually lives on the export (gitlab_shared).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The swarm convergence gate derived runner_runner-1 from the services
metadata and polled a stack service the role never creates: the runner
fleet deploys as node-local compose projects on every node because each
runner needs its own node's docker socket and identity. Declare
workload: node-local on the runner services entry and let the gate
context map it to HAS_SWARM_SERVICE=false, so the stack-service gates
skip themselves while the swarm deploy, the registry distribution chain
and the CLI e2e keep running. Roles without the attribute keep the
image/template heuristic; workload: stack forces the gates on. Document
the runner architecture for both deploy modes in the role README.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Move files that share a delimiter-bounded name prefix within a folder (threshold 2) into a subfolder named after the prefix, dropping the prefix from the filename. Covers plugins/filter (docker, generate, has, merge, get/all), env handler subpackages, utils/roles/entity, utils/tests/swarm/write, role SQL/scripts/templates, keycloak/mailu task-includes, shared tasks/utils/load, and CI scripts. Update every import, query_file/script/include_tasks/src/lookup target, compose bind mount, and python -m path to the new locations.
Extend the prefix-grouped-files lint to threshold 2 with dir-level .nocheck and file-head nocheck opt-outs, and skip groups whose shortest member's stem equals the shared prefix. Keep flat only where a loader forbids nesting: WordPress mu-plugins and the docs/requirements namespace. Ansible filter discovery is recursive, so nested filters stay Jinja-resolvable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add DIR_BACKUPS to utils.paths and INFINITO_DIR_BACKUPS /
INFINITO_DIR_SECRETS env handlers, derive the recover-console constants
(including NFS_EXPORT_STATE) from utils.paths and the nfs export SPOT,
and switch every remaining self-built /var/lib/infinito subpath - the
secrets recover targets, the swarm extras backup source, the users
token-store candidate chain, the CI recover drill, the swarm NFS
diagnostics and the playwright reports dir - to those constants. Tests
consume the env constants directly; narration comments in the touched
files are dropped per the comment lint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Node image now builds FROM the distro infinito image (python, ansible, CLI baked in) instead of installing a per-node .deb, so there is no per-node bootstrap or timeout; the swarm CI job depends on the distribution build. Move compose/swarm.yml to compose/swarm/compose.yml and relocate the swarm matrix orchestrator from cli.administration.deploy.swarm to utils.tests.swarm (test code out of the shipped CLI).
Back the NFS export root with a disk-backed named volume instead of a RUNNER_TEMP bind: local-act RUNNER_TEMP resolves onto tmpfs and ganesha FSAL_VFS cannot export a tmpfs, so it loaded zero exports and the controller mount got ENOENT. Add optional compose/swarm/cache.override.yml wiring swarm nodes to the package-cache frontend when present, leaving CI without a cache unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds make swarm-diagnostic (alias i8sadi): read-only probes across a
live swarm-test cluster's nodes via exec_node.sh - backup unit state +
recent journal, NFS mounts, D-state (wedged-NFS) processes, running
rsync/db-dump processes, and disk usage - so a hung backup unit can be
root-caused without hand-writing docker exec pipelines.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A wedged manager (act-swarm containerd stall) made the docker exec tar
block up to 900s; on a cancelled job that ate the runner's grace window
and the always() Cleanup step never ran, leaking the DiD cluster. Probe
the manager first (10s) and cap the copy at 120s with --kill-after so a
hung exec is force-reaped; teardown then always follows. Reports stay
collected before teardown, since they live inside the manager node.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
swarm_stack_ready.sh piped 'docker stack services' through a process
substitution, so the timeout wrapper added in 8516e3167 turned a slow or
wedged manager into an empty listing, an empty not_running set and exit
0: the convergence gate would have gone green with zero running replicas.
Capture the listing, fail on a non-zero rc.
That exposed the second half: post_deploy gated the swarm wait on the
cluster-wide DEPLOYMENT_MODE, so forced-compose roles (matrix ansible
flavor, bigbluebutton) ran it against a stack that does not exist and
only passed because the old code swallowed the error. Gate it on
compose_mode, like the handlers already do.
teardown.sh: the NFS mountpoint and umount calls, the likeliest hang
sites, were the only ones left unwrapped, and the timeout around docker
inspect inverted the D-state warning (a hung inspect returned 124, the
if went false and the script reported a clean teardown). Warn on rc 0
and 124, and shrink the per-node budget so the script fits inside its
step timeout.
Swarm step budget: the bounded steps alone summed to 365 over a 360-min
cap, so cleanup was still starved. Deploy 240, diagnostics 15, playwright
15, rescue 25, cleanup 15.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
27 jobs of run 29147179243 burned their full 360-min budget. Three
systemic layers, all addressed here:
- The CLI e2e task ran the staged test.sh unbounded, and test.sh blocks
in 'systemctl start' on a oneshot backup unit with no JobTimeout; on a
wedged dockerd or a stalled NFS mount both freeze silently for hours.
The task now runs the script under 'timeout TEST_E2E_CLI_TIMEOUT'
(60 min via the timeout lookup, so TIMEOUT_FACTOR scales it) and the
unit starts are bounded by BKP_TEST_HEALTH_TIMEOUT.
- The converge probe re-ran the full per-service diagnostics (service ps,
service logs, inspect, journalctl) on EVERY retry, so 600 nominal
2-second attempts cost 25-33s each and silently outlived the step
timeout. The block is gone (the workflow-level container.py rescue
snapshot already collects it recursively on failure) and every docker
call is timeout-bounded. Same removal in the swarm collect script,
which keeps only the NFS and render evidence container.py does not see.
- Playwright-collect, rescue diagnostics and Cleanup had no
timeout-minutes, and teardown.sh calls docker against D-state nodes,
so a failed job hung there for hours until the job cap killed it
without artifacts. Every step is bounded now, every teardown call is
timeout-wrapped, and the deploy steps (swarm 270, compose 300) leave
room for diagnostics and cleanup below the 360-min cap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
routine/08_cleanup.sh becomes utils/clean/teardown.sh and topology/
becomes utils/topology/ so routine/ holds only the sequenced flow; all
consumers (workflow steps, compose/swarm.yml env guards, relative
sources, README) follow. The shell rescue collector and its lint are
gone: utils/diagnostics/container.py covers compose and swarm
identically. extend_inventory gains the backup-host placements the DR
drill deploys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the per-node docker-run bring-up with a single node image
(compose/swarm/Dockerfile bakes python3/dnsmasq/openssh/rsync/cryptsetup)
declared in compose/swarm.yml, one compose up, and one ansible play
(compose/swarm/playbook.yml over ansible_connection: docker) that waits for
systemd, captures IPs, wires lab DNS and installs the .deb per node. Reshape
the harness into topology/ (naming SPOT), routine/ (01_bootstrap + the
sequenced 02-08 steps) and utils/ (clean/, collect/, shared helpers); the
workflow, matrix.py and Makefile follow the new paths. swarm init/join was
already ansible-owned (svc-swarm-node), corrected in the README diagram.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
