The entrypoint removed the old tree before it copied the new one. A
copy that failed left the volume without a working Moodle, and every
restart removed again instead of recovering. It now copies into a
staging directory inside the volume and swaps the trees once the copy
is complete, so a failed copy leaves the old tree in place.
An image that ships an older release than the volume records no longer
replaces it and exits with a message instead. Two instances on
different releases would otherwise overwrite each other's tree.
upgrade.php reports "No upgrade needed" on stderr, so the task counted
every run on a current site as a change. It reads stderr now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
MCP Adapter 0.7.0 for WordPress refuses a request that follows
initialize without the MCP-Protocol-Version header: 'Invalid Request:
MCP-Protocol-Version header is required for a 2025-06-18 session'. The
contract probe never sent it, so the CLI test of web-app-wordpress
failed at tools/list.
The probe now keeps the version the server answers initialize with and
sends it on every later request of the streamable HTTP transport, which
the specification asks of a client since 2025-06-18.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The pin moved from 4.5.11 to 5.3.0, and the role fitted neither a new
install nor an existing one.
Moodle 5 serves from public/ and routes every other path through
r.php. nginx now uses public/ as its root, hands unknown paths to the
router and passes PATH_INFO for scripts with slash arguments, and
config.php declares the router as configured. The paths the role checks
and writes (version.php, auth, webservice, the OIDC plugin) moved below
public/, the URL of the OIDC plugin stays auth/oidc. The source archive
no longer contains vendor/, so the image installs the Composer
dependencies it declares. The OIDC plugin is pinned to v5.2.1, the
newest release.
An existing site kept its old code: the entrypoint filled the code
volume once and never again. It now records the release it copied and
replaces the tree when the image carries another one, and a new task
runs admin/cli/upgrade.php. Plugins that were installed through the web
interface are not carried over, the README says how to ship them.
A site installed with 5.3 forces login by default, which 4.5 did not,
so its start page answers 303 to the login page and the webserver
health check refused it. The role declares 200 and 303 as the codes
that check accepts: 200 is what an upgraded site keeps answering.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The guard required a register on every async kcadm job and nothing more.
A result that is registered but no longer handed to async_reap_jobs,
directly or through the list it is collected into, passed it, although
the reap then neither polls that job nor sees it fail.
The test now follows each registered result to an async_reap_jobs
expression, by variable name with word boundaries, so kc_declared_client
does not pass for kc_declared_client_jobs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The stub answered every absolute name, so a guard that asked for the
backend twice and never for the exporter passed both tests. The stub now
records the names it is asked for, and the tests require the backend and
the exporter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
COLLABORA_WOPI_HOST read the scheme and the port with
lookup('tls', 'web-app-nextcloud', ...) and the host with
lookup('domain', 'web-app-nextcloud'). The tls lookup aligns an app term
to its consumer: for a clearnet Collabora it answers for the clearnet
sibling of an onion-primary Nextcloud, while the domain lookup keeps the
onion name. Such a deployment renders https://<onion>:443, an origin
Nextcloud does not use, so the allowlist does not match its WOPI calls.
Nextcloud pins overwritehost and overwriteprotocol to its primary domain,
so the allowlist now asks the tls lookup for that domain instead of for
the app.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Since the targets take their scheme from the domain they probe, two
switches of the http_ready module no longer fit. Both still followed the
TLS state of the Prometheus vhost.
fail_if_not_ssl refused an http target, an onion vhost for example, as
soon as Prometheus itself was served over TLS. It is false now. The
module does not follow redirects, so the scheme of the target URL already
decides the transport.
insecure_skip_verify switched certificate checks off whenever Prometheus
itself had no TLS, also for an https target. Checks now stay on, except in
a self-signed deployment whose CA is not mounted into the Prometheus
containers, where the exporter has nothing to verify against.
The per-role test of the spec parsed every answer of the query API as
JSON. An answer that is not OK now counts as "no probe yet", so the poll
keeps waiting instead of ending on a parse error.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The check listed the torrcs without the limit through "grep -L ...; true".
With no torrc under /opt/chutney/net/nodes, or with one that cannot be
read, grep printed nothing, the trailing true turned its error into
success, and the test reported that every node runs one worker.
The check now counts the limit per file with "grep -cH" and reads the exit
status. A status above 1 or an empty answer fails the test, and a file
with a count of 0 is named as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tor starts its worker threads by the number of CPU cores it detects, and
the cpus limit of the container does not change that number. On a host
with 20 cores every node of the private chutney network ran 21 threads and
grew to about 0.6 GB. The seven relays and authorities filled the 2g
limit and its swap within ten minutes, the kernel killed them one by one,
and no circuit could be built any more.
The entrypoint now writes NumCPUs 1 into the torrc of every chutney node
before it starts the network. Measured on that host over ten minutes: the
nodes run 3 threads and stay at 65 to 86 MB, the container at 0.47 GB
without swap, where it had filled 2 GB plus 2 GB of swap before.
The CLI test of the role fails when a chutney node runs without the limit.
Closes#824
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nobody could sign in to Odoo through Keycloak. Odoo sent an http redirect
URI, and Keycloak refused it as "Invalid parameter: redirect_uri".
The addon auth_oauth_https builds that URI from web.base.url. Two things
kept it from doing so after the image moved to Odoo 20.
Its manifest declared version 19.0.1.8.0, and Odoo marks a module whose
version names another series as not installable. It only warns about that,
so the install task stayed green and the addon was missing. The manifest
now declares 1.8.0, which Odoo prefixes with its own series.
Once installed, the addon read the parameter with get_param, which Odoo 20
replaced by typed getters. The call raised AttributeError, a broad except
logged it and fell back to the URL of the request, which is http behind
the proxy. The addon reads the parameter with get_str now and no longer
catches the error.
A deploy now fails when the addon is not installed afterwards. The check
reads ir_module_module, because the output of "odoo -i" does not tell an
installed module from a skipped one.
The spec logged out by navigating to /web/session/logout. Odoo 20 accepts
POST only on that route and answered 405, so both SSO tests failed after
a successful login. The spec logs out through the user menu now.
A host that runs the suite with several workers still failed it. Odoo
computes the session token of an account from its OAuth access token, so
every new sign-in ends the other sessions of that account, and the spec
files share the administrator. The role caps its suite at one worker
with PLAYWRIGHT_MAX_WORKERS, which the central config now honours, and
the spec asserts the cap.
Closes#822
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every blackbox probe of a Tor deployment answered 404, so AppDown fired for
all deployed apps although they were up. The job built its targets from
canonical_domains_map(DOMAIN_PRIMARY), which knows no onion domain. In a Tor
deployment the vhosts answer under <sub>.<onion> only, and the front proxy
served the clearnet names from its default server.
The targets now come from lookup('domains'), the map the vhosts are built
from, and each target takes its scheme from the domain it probes instead of
from the Prometheus vhost.
Which roles are probed follows lookup('roles_with_service', 'prometheus'),
the list the role's own spec expects metrics for. It leaves out the database
roles, which have a domain in the map and no vhost, and the roles that
declare scrape: false because their vhost carries no Prometheus block.
Two roles declared more than their vhost delivers. web-svc-mirror renders a
vhost of its own with no backend behind it, and on a live stack its probe
answered 404 under the onion name as well, so it declares scrape: false now.
web-app-peertube has a backend, but its vhost template never included the
Prometheus locations. It includes them now.
The spec could not see any of this in a compose deployment. dotenv_quote
wraps PROMETHEUS_TARGET_ROLES_JSON in quotes there, JSON.parse returned a
string, the role list came out empty and the per-role test was skipped. The
value is decoded now, and the test also requires probe_success == 1 for
every role in the list.
Closes#792
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Of the 76 open code scanning alerts, 39 point at code that can change.
svc-ai-mcp-adapter:
- A path argument that is empty or made only of dots is refused.
Percent-encoding keeps a separator inside its segment, but "." and ".."
need none, so an upstream that resolves dot segments could answer from a
path the contract does not name.
- parse_duration splits on the units. The pattern it used before rescanned
a long run of digits from every start position.
Tests and the README generators:
- Every Jinja environment built with autoescape=False and a "noqa: S701"
uses select_autoescape now, as six test modules and
utils/templating/jinja.py already did. It escapes templates named
*.html, *.htm and *.xml, which none of these call sites loads.
- Dead code goes: a doubled "rel" block in the email lint, an unread
_SKIP_DIRS, and a module that _resolve returned to no caller.
- Two "except ...: pass" blocks become contextlib.suppress and
assertRaises.
- Nine test modules import unittest.mock one way instead of two, and one
lookup test imports its module once.
Closes#807
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
In the async pass the role runs kcadm jobs side by side. Every kcadm call in
the Keycloak container shares one config file. kcadm rewrites that file when
it refreshes the access token, about every 55 seconds, takes the file lock
with tryLock() and gives up at once when another kcadm process holds it. One
of two overlapping declared-client jobs then failed with "Failed to get lock
on /opt/keycloak/.keycloak/kcadm.config", and the deploy with it.
keycloak_kcadm_update now repeats a call that lost the lock, up to ten times
one second apart. The call fails while it refreshes its token, before it
sends its own request, so repeating it is safe. Every other error still ends
the call at once.
That covers the module only, so the async jobs are reduced to the ones that
go through it:
- The default-scope assignment was an async shell task. It ran beside the
shell tasks that follow it, and neither side repeats a lost lock. It runs
in line now.
- The two mail-settings jobs were async without a register, so nothing
reaped them and a failure was never seen. They run in line now.
The client job and the declared-client jobs stay async. A test fails when an
async kcadm task does not use the module or is not registered for the reap.
A config file of its own per call was the other option. It does not work by
itself, because the admin session lives only in the shared file.
Closes#805
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
nginx resolves its upstreams once, at start, so the frontend starts through
a guard that waits until `backend` and `exporter` resolve. A container
resolves with a search domain, and the zone of a deployment answers every
name with the address of the ingress. A service that Docker's DNS did not
know yet therefore resolved anyway, as `backend.<domain>`. The guard let
nginx start at once and nginx pinned the ingress as its backend. Every API
call then failed with 502 and the SPA showed "Bad Gateway" instead of the
login form, until the container was restarted.
The guard now asks for the absolute names, `backend.` and `exporter.`. The
search domain is not applied to those, so the lookup fails until the
services themselves resolve.
Closes#806
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The extension installer returned as soon as an add-on was installed, in
whatever version. A new pin in meta/addons/ therefore reached a fresh wiki
only, and an existing wiki kept the version it was first deployed with.
The installer now skips an add-on only when the installed version equals
the pin. Otherwise it calls install(id, version, namespace), which the
Extension Manager resolves as an upgrade, and it reports an error when the
add-on is not on the pin afterwards.
The check that follows the installer compared presence only. It takes the
pin as well, so a deploy fails when an add-on is installed in another
version.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The unit test of the alarm script built its Jinja environment with
autoescape switched off, which code scanning reports as a possible XSS
sink and fails the PR on. The template is a shell script, so
select_autoescape() leaves it unescaped exactly as before, and the finding
no longer applies.
Refs #790
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stalwart closes a connection that exceeds its per-IP connection budget
without a greeting. msmtp reports that as "the server sent an empty reply"
with exit 76, and the mail health check treated exit 76 as permanent. One
such drop, in a second in which Alertmanager flushed its notifications,
failed a deploy although the same path accepted a mail one second later.
The health check now retries exit 76 when msmtp names the empty reply,
within the ten attempts it already gives to exit 69, 75 and 124. Every
other protocol error still ends the check at once.
The alarm mail was sent once, so the alarm about a failed unit was lost to
the same drop. It now makes three attempts ten seconds apart for the
transient cases of the health check and still reports the last error.
The limit on the server is left alone. Exempting the node's own senders by
source address would also exempt Tor clients and, in swarm, every external
client. That question is tracked in #793.
Closes#790
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Formatter output only: the parsed YAML and the Python AST of every touched file equal their previous versions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
test-e2e-cli loads test.env with `set -a && . test.env && set +a`. The
unquoted `ONION_PORTS=25 80 110 ...` is not an assignment there but the
command `80` with a one-word env prefix: bash prints `command not found`,
leaves ONION_PORTS unset, and onion_ports.py reports "no onion-forwarded
ports declared; nothing to probe". The port check passed vacuously in every
tor job with more than one forwarded port (OpenResty, Listmonk, Pixelfed in
run 35661520542) and only ran where a single port was declared.
Pass the value through dotenv_quote, which quotes a space-separated value in
both compose and swarm and keeps the env-file lint satisfied. A unit test
renders the template in both modes and sources it the way test-e2e-cli does.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tor attaches a stream to an onion to the rendezvous circuit that matches its
isolation and keeps it there until SocksTimeout; it never moves the stream to a
fresh circuit. The probe connected without SOCKS authentication and gave up
after 60s, so a dead rendezvous circuit would absorb both passes. That is the
most likely reading of run 35661520542 (web-app-mastodon#1, public Tor), where
<onion>:80 timed out twice right after curl had reached the same onion port.
Authenticate every connect with fresh random username/password credentials.
Tor accepts any and, under its default IsolateSOCKSAuth, builds a separate
rendezvous circuit per credential set, so a retry can no longer land on the
circuit that failed the attempt before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review had these removed across the role once already, and the 11 September
pass cleared every file that was flagged. The seal-key pin and the
recovery-key work then reintroduced the same pattern in nine new places.
Also removes two that predate the review and were never flagged: the
healthcheck note in meta/services.yml and the entrypoint note in
compose.yml.j2. Both are the same narrative-exception shape.
Param docs, file headers and the plain contract notes in the Playwright specs
stay: separate categories, none of them objected to. What the deleted
comments recorded lives in the role README.
Six assertions: the key is persisted on the deploy that creates it, it is
loaded before the logins that may need it, recovery is gated on both logins
having failed and a key existing, the rebuilt AppRole is the inventory one
rather than the recorded one, the recovery path ends by re-pinning, and a
rejected key fails loudly.
Recovering to the recorded pair instead of the inventory pair would strand
the next deploy the same way, which is why that one is asserted directly.
Nothing stopped the seal key drifting back into the per-deploy rotation, and
the regression is invisible until a deploy is skipped and the node cannot
unseal. Assert the pin on the seal key and its absence on both AppRole
credentials.
Brings in Kevin's AI-agent work, the svc-net-firewall role and the update
tooling. One conflict, in the MCP proxy audit: both sides appended a role to
privileged_control_plane, ours web-app-openbao and upstream svc-net-firewall.
Taken as a union at 25, which is what test_mcp_audit_completeness requires -
neither role declares meta/mcp.yml, so the audit is the only place they are
classified.
ONLYOFFICE listed onlyoffice 10.2.0 in the Nextcloud appstore on 2026-09-18 at
10:16:31Z and never published the matching GitHub artifact; the tag itself does
not exist. `occ app:install` takes the newest compatible release, so it dies on
a 404 that no retry can heal. CI proved that twice independently: upstream run
35329488812 and fork run 35330645276 both fail Nextcloud#4 at that task after
six attempts, on the same commit, for the same reason.
The fault had three layers, each visible only once the one above it was gone.
Install. meta/addons/onlyoffice.yml pins `config.archive` to v10.1.2, whose
artifact answers 200 and which the appstore also lists for this server major.
01_install.yml stages that archive on the node and unpacks it into custom_apps
through a stdin pipe: the webroot is a named volume, so the node can only reach
the app directory through the container, and piping avoids both `container cp`
and a cleanup step that would have to run as a user which does not own the file.
Enable and configure needed no change at all. With the release already on disk
`occ app:install` reports "already installed", which nextcloud_install_status
has always mapped to runnable, so 02_enable.yml and 03_configure.yml proceed as
they always did. That is why this commit adds no branch to the plugin pipeline.
Update. `occ app:update --all` then dragged the pinned app back to the broken
10.2.0 and killed the deploy. occ offers no exclusion flag, but it does offer
`--showonly` and single app ids, so a pinned app is simply not updated. The old
`--all` call stays byte-identical and now carries a `when`: with nothing pinned,
thirteen of the fourteen variants take exactly the path they took before. This
layer cannot appear in CI at all, because it needs a second deploy with the app
already installed, and the install always died first.
The classifier test is inverted rather than deleted:
test_an_advertised_release_whose_artifact_is_gone_stays_fatal pins the decision
that a dead artifact fails loudly instead of degrading to a silent skip.
Verified by a local compose deploy of variant 4: ok=2508 changed=149 failed=0
and `✓ 36 tests/addons/onlyoffice.spec.js:12:1`, which drives the whole
JWT-authenticated round trip to the document server over its onion address, not
merely an enabled plugin. In the live container beforehand: `occ app:enable`
returned "onlyoffice 10.1.2 enabled", `occ app:install` returned "already
installed", and `occ app:update onlyoffice` reproduced the 404 that the pin now
avoids.
The loop expression was wrong before this commit and is fixed here: Jinja reads
'\1' as an octal escape, so the backreference produced chr(1) instead of an app
id. Evaluated against ansible-core's own filters over four shapes, the tail is
now cut instead of captured, which removes the escaping hazard entirely.
occ output is not localised: with default_language=de and a de_DE.UTF-8 locale
the strings are unchanged, so parsing them is as safe as the five markers the
role already relied on.
Residual: the per-app update branch has never run with a real item inside a
deploy. Its chain and `occ app:update <id>` are each verified separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The checker matches accepted codes by hostname, and a clearnet vhost
shares only its leftmost label with its onion twin, so --accept-status
mirror.<primary>=404 never applied to mirror.<host>.onion. That vhost
serves the same by-design 404, so the probe called it unreachable and
systemd failed the service -- with the identical message the missing
flag produced, while the status had already moved from 2/INVALIDARGUMENT
to 1/FAILURE.
--skip-domain carried this derivation all along, in is_skipped_domain;
replacing it with --accept-status dropped it. The expansion now runs on
the same label rule, in the wrapper rather than the lookup, because the
onion address does not exist yet when the unit is rendered -- only the
wrapper sees both names, and it reads them from the nginx configs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The systemd unit has passed --accept-status since f247b29fd0, but the
wrapper script never learned the flag. argparse rejected it, so the
service failed with status=2/INVALIDARGUMENT on every host that deploys
the role, in compose and in swarm alike.
The checker consumes every token after a list flag that does not start
with "--", and a URL does not, so both lists now share a single
separator placed before the URLs. The previous placement sat directly
behind --ignore-network-blocks-from and would have fed a second list
straight into the URL parser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
