Both provisioners follow nextCursor for workflows and step skip for API
keys until a short page arrives. A cursor n8n repeats, or a key listing
that ignores skip, would keep that loop running forever and hang the
deploy instead of failing it.
workflows_named now remembers every cursor it followed and exits with
"FAILED listing workflows: nextCursor repeats" when one comes back.
api_keys_labelled exits when a non-empty page brings no key id it has not
already seen. Normal paging is unchanged.
Four regression tests drive both scripts against a fake API that repeats
its cursor or ignores skip; without the guards exactly those four fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`make quality-high` rewrote these files on every branch: the SuiteCRM
README and the root role table lacked the Redis service #881 added, the
session path test was not formatted, and an OpenTalk secret description
from #873 was not wrapped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
n8n 2 returns ten API keys and a hundred workflows per page by default. A
stale managed key behind the first page survived, and a managed workflow
behind it was created a second time. Both scripts now follow every page,
narrowed by label or name, and keep the exact match in the script.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
n8n 2 pages GET /rest/api-keys as {data: {items, counts, totals, owners}},
ten keys at a time, and matches `label` as a substring, so walking the body
raised "'str' object has no attribute 'get'". It also enforces API key
scopes, so activating the MCP server workflow needs `workflow:activate`.
Both scripts now read every list and create response through one
normalisation that unwraps the page, look the managed key up by label, and
name an unexpected shape by its keys only. The normalisation is taken over
from a392e2dd49 on feature/store-i18n.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
With three swarm replicas the PHP session files on the shared NFS volume
were read as empty under concurrent requests of one browser, so SuiteCRM
answered 403 on /api/graphql and dropped the session. Sessions now live in
Redis with session locking that waits like flock did; the phpredis version
is pinned in services.yml with its own update source, and the engine lookup
renders the save path.
Refs #879
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Buildx 0.38.0 gates host networking in bake behind an entitlement that
Compose never grants, so `make compose-up` failed wherever Compose had to
build the image itself. The build block asked for it without need:
scripts/image/build.sh builds the same Dockerfile on the bridge network.
Closes#875
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ruff format rewraps the read-back line in test_repository.py, and ruff
check reports the nested with in test_fetch.py as SIM117. Both fail
lint-python.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An http_regex source read one document, so a tag whose parts upstream
keeps in two files could only carry the second part as a literal. Every
pin also fetched its document on its own: a failed request left one pin
of a release behind while the others moved.
url now takes a list whose bodies are searched as one text, and every
document is fetched once per run, so all pins that read it resolve against
the same snapshot. The HTTP reads move into utils/update/fetch.py.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The repository updater assigns ref: lines to entities by position: every
entity that pins a value takes the next line carrying that value. A ref
that declares its own source was dropped before it took its line, so a
second entity pinning the same value was given the sourced entity's line,
and an update of it would have rewritten the wrong ref.
A sourced ref now takes its line first and is skipped afterwards, the
same order the nocheck marker already follows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
One test asserts ansible_host lands on the given address, the other
that a missing member raises. Either would have caught the UNREACHABLE run
before it was dispatched.
A pin that names its own upstream in an update: block was still collected
by the image updater or, for a ref, by the repository updater. Those raise
it to the newest tag of its registry or repository, which for a component
of a release is not the release's value. A tag built from several upstream
values, such as <freeswitch>-<bigbluebutton>, could not be resolved at
all: the resolver takes one capture and keeps a pin on its suffix.
The image updater now skips a version and the repository updater a ref
that declares a source for itself. An http_regex source accepts a template
over the pattern's named groups, and a templated pin moves whenever the
assembled value changes, its suffix included.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A pin that names its own upstream in an update: block was still collected
by the image updater, which raises it to the newest tag of its registry.
For a component of a release bundle that tag is not the bundle's, so the
two updaters would propose different versions for the same line and such
a pin had to carry nocheck: docker-version.
The image updater now skips a version that declares a source for itself.
The source resolver alone bumps it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Under SSO the role tried to let applications relay without SMTP AUTH by
widening the relay rule to the private networks. The rule compared the
peer address to the text of a CIDR, which never matches, so an
application could reach local mailboxes but got "550 5.1.2 Relay not
allowed" for every external recipient. Repairing the comparison would
have opened a relay, because published ports, Tor and the swarm mesh all
hand outside clients an address inside those networks.
Stalwart checks app passwords before it asks the external directory, so
a bot can authenticate while the directory is OIDC. With SSO enabled the
role now creates one app password per bot, acting for that account as
the recovery admin, and stores it in the token store the SMTP password
is already read from. A bot gets a new one when its entry is deleted in
Stalwart or its token is removed.
The relay rule is back to authenticated sessions only. The lookup loses
its SSO relay branch and the role its submission_via_relay flag, so an
SSO deployment submits on 465 with AUTH like every other one.
The role's CLI test now fails when an unauthenticated session is given
an external recipient, or when the bot credential is refused one.
Closes#793
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`native_metrics_target` was a Jinja filter, so it could not read
DEPLOYMENT_MODE: filters see no Ansible variables. It returned
`<services.<key>.name>:<port>` unconditionally, which is `matrix-synapse:9000`
for matrix. Compose serves that name; swarm does not, because `docker stack
deploy` ignores `container_name` and the alias never exists. This repository
says as much itself, through `lookup('compose_only', 'container_name', ...)`.
The target was therefore scraped and refused, and `playwright.spec.js:274`
reported `web-app-matrix: 1 matching target(s) reporting up != 1`, meaning one
matching target whose `up` value is not 1.
It becomes a lookup that delegates host resolution to `scrape_target`, which
was already mode-aware, so exactly one plugin knows the difference between the
two modes. The port has to be handed over explicitly: matrix exposes metrics on
9000 while `services.synapse.ports.internal.http` is 8008, so the existing
internal-port lookup cannot serve this case on its own.
`scrape_target` now refuses `port` together with an explicit `port_kind`.
Before, `port` won silently and the error text still named the
`ports.internal.<port_kind>` path that the call had never consulted.
`native_metrics_apps` drops an app that pins itself to compose through
`compose_mode_force` while the cluster runs swarm, because the scrape target
would then name the wrong object. Only the literal case: matrix declares that
override as a Jinja expression over its flavour, which this lookup cannot
resolve from the scraping role's variable scope, so variant 0 on swarm stays a
latent mismatch.
The two comment lines claiming `container_name:port` went with the change;
after it they state the opposite of what the code does.
Verified by mutation: with the swarm branch of `scrape_target` disabled, the
new test emits `matrix-synapse:9000`, the exact string CI reported.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A variant that pins `services.tor.enabled: true` while enabling a role whose
own `meta/services.yml` pins `tor.enabled: false` declares a combination the
deployment cannot hold. The role rides no node onion, so on that round its
surface lives at a clearnet host no onion browser reaches, and the dashboard's
`frame-src 'self' http://*.<onion>` forbids embedding it outright. Run
36651124458 job 109692287333 shows the result: five specs fail at once,
dashboard tile, matomo tracker, css injection, logout and the coturn metric
label, all on hosts that are the only non-onion ones in the whole job.
web-app-nextcloud variant 11 was such a round: bigbluebutton on, tor on, while
bigbluebutton declares no onion. Variant 8 already answers the identical
question for PeerTube (65538c40da, "clearnet, because the OIDC plugin rejects a
plaintext onion issuer"), so variant 11 now does the same. With that,
bigbluebutton never meets a tor node and needs no consumer gates of its own.
Two roles keep a gate, for reasons that differ from each other:
web-app-seaweedfs is not clearnet-only. It deploys on tor as the object store
other roles reach over the internal network, and only its browser frontend is
off there, which `frontend.enabled` on main already says. Its logout, dashboard
and prometheus declarations claimed a surface that round does not deploy, so
they take the same gate the file's own frontend and sso blocks use.
web-svc-coturn belongs on a tor node and cannot serve one: STUN/TURN runs on
UDP plus a 20000-port relay range that no onion descriptor can publish, and its
only HTTP is a gateway answering a plaintext OK. Deploying it is right,
advertising it as a prometheus consumer is not, because that scrape goes
through the browser path. It is exempt from the rule itself, since it claims no
visitable surface, and its `dynamic-flag` markers now carry the reasons the
rule's own message asks for; one of the four was a duplicate of the line below
it and is gone.
The lint states the rule. It found these five pairings on its own, matching a
hand count made before it existed, and reports none after the variant fix.
`test_sso_variant_requires_tor` covers the complementary half, every variant of
a role that has an onion must pin it on, and exempts the clearnet-only role
itself; this rule covers the consumers that bind one. The suppression marker
belongs on the bound role when the reason is that role's own shape, because a
consumer-side marker would also silence every other clearnet role in the file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
test_workflow_references matched the path .github/workflows/<file>.yml
wherever it appeared, including inside a link to another GitHub
repository. Requirement 037 cites the publish workflow of
koala73/worldmonitor, so the lint searched this tree for docker-publish.yml
and failed test-lint.
A github.com/<owner>/<repo>/ URL that does not point at infinito-nexus/core
is now removed from the line before the patterns run. The rest of the line
is still checked, and so is every own URL, relative path and API path. The
dispatch target check is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
provision_ai_gateway.php and provision_mcp.php shared a prefix inside one
directory, which test_prefix_grouped_files rejects. Both move into
files/php/provision/ as ai_gateway.php and mcp.php, the layout
web-app-n8n already uses for its Python provisioning scripts.
The two lookups that feed the scripts to the container follow, and the
unit test moves to its mirrored path as provision/AiGatewayTest.php.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Moodle 5 keeps AI provider settings in provider instances, not in the
plugin configuration. The deploy kept writing aiprovider_openai/* through
cfg.php and read the same value back, so its own check stayed green while
no provider existed. The gateway spec then found no settings page and
web-app-moodle#2 failed in run 37646050826.
The deploy now pipes files/php/provision_ai_gateway.php into the
container. It finds the instance by class and name or creates it through
core_ai\manager, points the three text actions at the chat endpoint,
switches image generation off, stores the virtual key and prints what
Moodle stored. The task asserts on that output. An instance an
administrator added is left alone.
The spec finds the instance by MOODLE_AI_PROVIDER_NAME on the providers
page and reads the endpoint from its generate_text action page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The entrypoint removed the old tree before it copied the new one. A
copy that failed left the volume without a working Moodle, and every
restart removed again instead of recovering. It now copies into a
staging directory inside the volume and swaps the trees once the copy
is complete, so a failed copy leaves the old tree in place.
An image that ships an older release than the volume records no longer
replaces it and exits with a message instead. Two instances on
different releases would otherwise overwrite each other's tree.
upgrade.php reports "No upgrade needed" on stderr, so the task counted
every run on a current site as a change. It reads stderr now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
bcrypt_hash takes an optional salt_seed. Without a seed it keeps the random salt. With a seed the salt is derived from the seed and the secret, so the same password always gives the same hash. Wazuh passes a fixed seed for the indexer admin and the dashboard service hashes, so internal_users.yml no longer changes on every run and no longer triggers a restart.
One conflict, in the generated role overview table of README.md.
Both sides had edited the same block. Upstream dropped Redis from the pihole
row; this branch still listed it. Upstream also listed svc-net-wireguard-core,
-plain and -firewalled, which this branch removed in e706170a0b as superseded
by the unified svc-net-wireguard role.
Resolved by taking upstream's block and then running `make readme-index`, so
the table is generated from the roles that actually exist rather than
hand-merged: Redis is gone from pihole, the three legacy WireGuard roles stay
gone, and svc-net-wireguard is listed once. `make readme-index check=true`
reports the table up to date.
Git kept the role deletions silently and correctly - upstream has not touched
those three directories since the merge base, so there was no modify/delete
conflict to resolve.
MCP Adapter 0.7.0 for WordPress refuses a request that follows
initialize without the MCP-Protocol-Version header: 'Invalid Request:
MCP-Protocol-Version header is required for a 2025-06-18 session'. The
contract probe never sent it, so the CLI test of web-app-wordpress
failed at tools/list.
The probe now keeps the version the server answers initialize with and
sends it on every later request of the streamable HTTP transport, which
the specification asks of a client since 2025-06-18.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The pin moved from 4.5.11 to 5.3.0, and the role fitted neither a new
install nor an existing one.
Moodle 5 serves from public/ and routes every other path through
r.php. nginx now uses public/ as its root, hands unknown paths to the
router and passes PATH_INFO for scripts with slash arguments, and
config.php declares the router as configured. The paths the role checks
and writes (version.php, auth, webservice, the OIDC plugin) moved below
public/, the URL of the OIDC plugin stays auth/oidc. The source archive
no longer contains vendor/, so the image installs the Composer
dependencies it declares. The OIDC plugin is pinned to v5.2.1, the
newest release.
An existing site kept its old code: the entrypoint filled the code
volume once and never again. It now records the release it copied and
replaces the tree when the image carries another one, and a new task
runs admin/cli/upgrade.php. Plugins that were installed through the web
interface are not carried over, the README says how to ship them.
A site installed with 5.3 forces login by default, which 4.5 did not,
so its start page answers 303 to the login page and the webserver
health check refused it. The role declares 200 and 303 as the codes
that check accepts: 200 is what an upgraded site keeps answering.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A heap, a cache size or a PHP limit written as a literal drifts away
from the mem_limit its service declares. The lint scans roles/ and
group_vars/ for the known spellings of such parameters and requires
each value to reach lookup('service_memory_mb'), or the Node lookup for
the V8 heap, on its own line or through the variables it reads.
It follows names inside {{ }} and $NAME through the definitions of the
role and of group_vars, reads a command list, a folded scalar and a
wrapped expression as one line, and counts a literal fallback as a
literal. A sidecar snippet has to name its own role as provider.
It knows a list of spellings and layouts. A parameter written another
way is not seen.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A Redis sidecar whose consumer declares no services.redis.mem_limit
runs in a container that inherits the consumer's primary entity limit.
Since the lookup replaced the old filter, maxmemory followed that limit
and rose from 204 MiB to between 819 and 3276 MiB in 17 roles.
lookup('service_memory_mb', ..., provider=<role>) caps the result at
the same share of the provider's own limit when the application does
not declare one for that service. A declared limit is not capped, and a
container smaller than the provider keeps its own share. The Redis
sidecar passes provider='svc-db-redis': those 17 roles get 409 MiB, the
seven with a 256 MiB container stay at 204.
The lookup now rejects unknown options and a provider that is no role
or declares no limit for the service, so a misspelled option fails
instead of silently lifting the cap.
The memcached sidecar's literal -m 64 takes the same lookup and keeps
its value.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
lookup('service_memory_mb', application_id, service_name, share) returns
a share of a service's mem_limit in whole MiB. It resolves the limit the
way sys-svc-container resolves the container's own: the named service,
then the role's primary entity, then RESOURCE_MEM_LIMIT.
It replaces the three filters of memory_filters, each with its own unit
parser and its own idea of the limit: Redis maxmemory at 0.8 of the
limit, and the Confluence and Jira heap at 0.7 and 0.35.
The central Redis (409 MiB), Confluence (5734/2867) and Jira (4300/2150)
keep their values. A Redis sidecar without a mem_limit of its own does
not: the filter fell back to a fixed 256m, which gave 204 MiB, while the
lookup takes the limit that container really runs with, the primary
entity's. That moves 25 roles to between 409 and 3276 MiB.
The heap clamps of the old filters are gone: the 1024 MiB floor, limit
minus 1024, the 12288 cap and Xms bounded by mem_reservation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
