One conflict, in roles/web-app-n8n/files/python/provision/mcp.py.
Both sides fixed the same failure. This branch added records() to name the
shape a list endpoint returned instead of dying on 'str' object has no
attribute 'get', deliberately refusing to guess at an unwrapping rule for a
shape nobody had observed. Upstream observed it: e4078c05f provisions against
the n8n 2 API, and 75f024e71 and ad99ded58 page through api keys and workflows.
Upstream's side is a superset - its api_keys_labelled() and workflows_named()
call records() themselves, and its records() handles the paged
{"data": {"items": [...]}} that this branch would only have reported. Taken
whole.
One test moved with it: the nested-payload case asserted the old wording, and
upstream's message names the keys it found rather than the type.
The readiness module http_ready rendered insecure_skip_verify from
TLS_MODE and lookup('ca_injected', application_id) (#851). The lookup is
true only when Prometheus itself has a domain, TLS and the self-signed
mode, so in a self-signed deployment where Prometheus runs in another
mode the exporter had no CA file and skipped verification. All targets
share the module, so a target with a publicly trusted certificate was
probed without verification too, and anyone on the probe's path could
answer for a failed application.
http_ready now always verifies. A second module, http_ready_private_ca,
skips verification, and only the targets that need it select it: those
in the self-signed mode while the CA is not mounted into Prometheus,
through the __param_module label, which overrides the job's module for
that target. The default self-signed deployment mounts the CA and keeps
every target on the verifying module.
Verified on a local self-signed Tor round, where the CA is mounted:
the rendered blackbox.yml holds http_ready with insecure_skip_verify:
false and http_ready_private_ca with true, and no target of the scrape
configuration carries the module label. All targets of that round are
http onion names, so the https path itself ran only in the unit tests:
tests/unit/python/roles/web-app-prometheus pass, among them a publicly
trusted target that keeps the verifying module while the CA is missing,
a self-signed target that switches to the private-CA module, and the
verifying module rendering insecure_skip_verify: false without the CA.
Against the templates of main the three new cases fail.
Closes#851
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A local deploy stopped four times in two days in "Ensure Docker apt key
and sources are consistent" (#849). apt_repo.sh downloads the Docker GPG
key on every run, and when download.docker.com refused the connection,
curl's four attempts were over within about six seconds and the script
returned 1, although the key from an earlier run was installed and is
all the following apt operations need.
install_key now fails only when no key is installed. With a key in
place, a refused download prints a warning and keeps it. A downloaded
key that differs still replaces the installed one, and the 0644 mode is
enforced in every case. The keyring path became an argument:
ensure-key-and-sanitize passes the keyring it already hands to
sanitize_sources, so the role's call still resolves to
/etc/apt/keyrings/docker.asc, and a test can point the script at a
temporary keyring.
Verified: tests/unit/python/roles/sys-svc-container/files/test_apt_repo.py
stubs curl and sudo. A refused download keeps the installed key and ends
with changed=0, a refused download without a key exits 1, and a new key
replaces the installed one. A copy of the script whose keep branch always
errors, the old behaviour, fails the first test. Two local deploys ran
the new script with rc 0 and an empty stderr and left the installed key
untouched. shellcheck is clean.
Not verified live: the refused download itself, which needs
download.docker.com to refuse a connection during a deploy. A host
without a key still needs the download and still fails when it is
refused.
Closes#849
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
make lint runs install-lint once and then dispatches its fifteen targets
in parallel. scripts/lint/mermaid.sh provisioned chrome-headless-shell
inside that parallel phase with `npx puppeteer browsers install
--install-deps`, whose `apt-get satisfy` carries no lock timeout. In a
fresh stack container another target held the apt lock, the shared
libraries stayed missing, the script only warned, and all 289 Markdown
files then failed on libnspr4.so (#795).
utils/install/lint/mermaid_cli.py now provisions the browser right after
mmdc, inside the serial install-lint step, as root with --install-deps
and as a user without it, because puppeteer refuses to install libraries
without root. A failed install deletes the chrome-headless-shell cache
folder and retries once under a 900 second timeout per attempt; a cut-off
download otherwise leaves a folder without its executable, and puppeteer
refuses every later install of that build. The install-lint stamp counts
as fresh only while the browser executable exists, so a recreated
container provisions it again.
mermaid.sh no longer calls apt-get or npx. It renders one minimal diagram
first and, when that fails, exits with mmdc's output instead of reporting
every Markdown file.
Verified: tests/unit/python/scripts/lint/test_mermaid.py stubs mmdc,
npx and apt-get. With a browser that cannot load libnspr4.so the script
exits 1 with that line, before any Markdown file renders, and mmdc is the
only tool it calls. Against main's mermaid.sh the same test fails: it
calls apt-get and npx and reports the files one by one. The installer and
stamp cases pass, shellcheck is clean.
Not verified: a full make lint in a recreated stack container. The race
reproduced in one of two runs in the issue.
feature/store-i18n changed the provisioning in mermaid.sh with 2f5f52bd1a
and dc67bce5f0 (timeout, deleting a cut-off browser). Both behaviours
moved into mermaid_cli.py here, so its merge takes this version of
mermaid.sh.
Closes#795
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A compose deploy job labelled centos or arch built its stack image from
pkgmgr-debian and ran it as infinito_nexus_debian (#794). distros.sh
exports INFINITO_DISTRO per iteration and sources load.sh again, but the
loader returned early because INFINITO_ENV_LOADED and the .env mtime were
unchanged. A full reload would not have helped either: the debian values
were already exported, so the restore step kept them as caller intent.
load.sh now records the distro it loaded for. Another INFINITO_DISTRO
defeats the early return and drops INFINITO_CONTAINER,
INFINITO_PARENT_IMAGE and INFINITO_IMAGE, the three keys the env handlers
derive from the distro. When the requested distro also differs from the
one .env was generated for, the loader sources a set that
`python -m cli.meta.env --output` generates for it in a private temp
directory and leaves .env untouched, so a local multi-distro run does not
switch the checkout's distro. A caller value set for the loaded distro
still wins.
Verified: tests/unit/python/scripts/meta/env/test_load.py and the new
distros.sh case pass. Against main's loader both fail with the symptom of
the issue: INFINITO_DISTRO=centos next to infinito_nexus_debian and
pkgmgr-debian:stable, and distros.sh handing debian, arch and centos the
same debian parent. shellcheck is clean.
Consequence: CI jobs labelled arch, ubuntu, fedora or centos now build
and deploy that distro, so a failure that shows up there was masked
before.
feature/store-i18n carries 3f973eb137, which resolves the parent image
for scripts/image/push.sh on its own, and 05e4dbafcb, which inserts the
INFINITO_INSTANCE slot check into the block this commit restructures. The
merge keeps the slot check ahead of the distro check.
Closes#794
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The guarantees were asserted against the declared swarm and data pair,
so they proved two meshes work rather than that the planner works. A
deployment declares its own, and the review asks for any number of them with
the nodes arranged however the client wants.
The same invariants now run over generated topologies: one to eight meshes,
three arrangements each, hosts dealt out so some belong to several meshes and
some to none. 2247 subtests, four seconds, and the planner needed no change to
pass them.
Run 38009212981 lost web-app-n8n#0 to this, after thirty retries of a
deterministic failure:
File "<stdin>", line 121, in api_key
AttributeError: 'str' object has no attribute 'get'
GET /rest/api-keys answered 200 with something that is not a list of records.
'(body or {}).get("data") if isinstance(body, dict) else body' hands a string
or a dict straight to a comprehension, which iterates it character by
character or key by key, and .get dies naming neither the endpoint nor the
shape.
records() accepts a bare list or {"data": [...]} and otherwise exits saying
which listing failed and what type arrived. It does not guess at an unwrapping
rule for a shape nobody has observed - two n8n version bumps just landed
upstream, so the next run reports the real shape in one line instead.
The message never carries the body: the credentials listing holds secrets.
Left alone: the create path extracts a single object the same way. It is the
same family, but it is not what failed.
report_failures asked `gh api --paginate` for the run's jobs with the jq
filter `[.jobs[] | {name, conclusion}]`. gh applies that filter to each page
and prints one array per page, so a run with more jobs than one page holds
produced two JSON documents, and json.loads stopped with "Extra data: line 2
column 1". Main run 38218402254 (113 jobs) failed its "Report main role
failures" job that way, and no issue was opened for its failed roles.
The listing now emits one job object per line and parses the lines one by
one, the same way logs/download/github.py lists jobs.
Verified: the old parse of the real output of run 38218402254 raises the
same "Extra data: line 2 column 1 (char 8491)" as CI; list_jobs on that run
returns all 113 jobs, 16 of them failed, grouped into 12 failed roles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
roles/web-app-n8n/meta/services.yml conflicted on the n8n pin: main already
carries 2.43.4 from #900, newer than this branch's 2.43.2, so main's side is
kept. The provisioning fixes of this branch are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The repository is bind-mounted into the infinito container, and every deploy
runs `make setup` there, which depends on `dotenv`. The generator therefore
rewrote the host's .env with the values the container sees: the host lost
INFINITO_RUNNING_ON_GITHUB=true that way, and the guide replay pulled
alpine:latest past the GHCR mirror.
compose.yml now marks the infinito service with INFINITO_DOTENV_HOST_OWNED,
and `python -m cli.meta.env` keeps an existing .env while that marker is
"true". A missing .env is still generated, and `make dotenv-force` (env -i)
still rewrites it. The key stays out of the env registry: only compose.yml
sets it, it is no configuration value, and a .env entry could freeze the
host .env.
test_distros now also strips INFINITO_ENV_LOADED. load.sh returns early
while that guard is set and the mtime of .env is unchanged, so the test only
reloaded the budget keys it strips because the container kept rewriting .env.
Verified: unit tests cover a kept .env, a missing one being generated, and a
rewrite without the marker. Local compose deploys print "Kept .env: the host
checkout owns it" where they printed "Wrote .env" before, the host .env
checksum stayed the same across a deploy, and the four keys holding host
paths resolve inside the container under the same paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The network probe used community.docker.docker_network_info, whose
get_network() scans GET /networks and returns the first entry whose Name
equals the requested name OR whose Id starts with it, in a list order that
changes between calls. In main run 38038541631 (Zammad#1, swarm) the
central redis overlay got the ID n8nwzb1q39m3u4k7awwwmt6yg, the probe for
the not yet created provider network "n8n" returned it as existing, the
create step was skipped, docker stack deploy attached hermes to the redis
overlay as "n8n", and the oauth2-proxy then reached the password-protected
central redis by its bare host name: "NOAUTH Authentication required".
The same scan can also return the ID-prefix twin of a network that does
exist, so comparing the returned name alone would turn that network into
"missing" and fail the create with "already exists".
Both probes now run `container network ls --filter name=<entity> --format
'{{json .}}'`, whose name filter never matches an ID. The new lookup
network_driver picks the entry named exactly after the entity and returns
its driver, '' when there is none; the drift checks, their messages and the
create steps all read that one entry. No docker module is left in the file,
so its two docker-module-uses-container-cli suppressions go too.
Verified: on the host daemon GET /networks/<id prefix> returns a network of
another name and docker network ls --filter name=<id prefix> returns
nothing. In ansible-playbook against real docker network ls output the
lookup returned the exact network's driver in 20 of 20 probes beside an
ID-prefix twin, an empty driver (create path) for a missing network and for
a name only contained in a sibling, and the drift path for a foreign
driver. Unit tests cover the same cases; with a substring match instead of
the exact name the two sibling cases fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The GHCR mirror covered role images only. The images the runner pulls on
its own went straight to Docker Hub: coredns from compose.yml, the cache
stack in compose/cache.override.yml and alpine:latest, the init image of
scripts/docker/cache/package-frontend/certs.sh. With the anonymous
githubactions quota spent, the guide step of Postmarks#0 (main run
37954203718) and Shopware#2 (#872) died on "toomanyrequests" while pulling
alpine:latest, after coredns had hit the same limit.
iter_runner_images (utils/docker/image/discovery.py) finds those images,
and the mirror sync and the fork-PR wait now cover them next to the role
images. On a real GitHub runner compose_file_args layers a generated
build/compose/runner-mirror.override.yml that points only the services of
the layered compose files at their mirror, and the certificate generator
gets the mirrored init image. Local runs and act are unchanged, and the
coredns literal stays in compose.yml for Dependabot. test-dns now waits for
images-mirror-missing like the deploy and workspace jobs, since it brings up
the stack too.
Verified with docker compose config on a simulated GitHub runner: the
service set is unchanged and only the runner images point at
ghcr.io/infinito-nexus/core/mirror/docker.io/..., and an existing role mirror
under that scheme pulls anonymously.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The arm existed to answer one question: how much of the meshed arm's
cost is the connection plugin and how much is the tunnel. Runs 37592061960
(docker), 37753506661 (SSH on the underlay) and 37621556682 (SSH over
WireGuard) answered it on web-app-gitea#0, debian/ext4:
pass 1 5964s / 8511s / 8832s
pass 2 5319s / 7472s / 7705s
Leaving ansible_connection: docker costs +4700s, the tunnel +554s - 89.5%
against 10.5%. The answer is recorded; the scaffolding does not need to ship.
Reverts d792519725, 1b28f87b37, 89b8a8c8d1, 0470491e1a, 529c5ace43,
dd3d10a9a2, c20dd0e5f5, 458d8956e1, 63ade1e03b, d281555945 and 4adfb6e3d2.
95cfc8b7b7 is already superseded by bbfd82f89, which sets the profiling limit
upstream.
Both provisioners follow nextCursor for workflows and step skip for API
keys until a short page arrives. A cursor n8n repeats, or a key listing
that ignores skip, would keep that loop running forever and hang the
deploy instead of failing it.
workflows_named now remembers every cursor it followed and exits with
"FAILED listing workflows: nextCursor repeats" when one comes back.
api_keys_labelled exits when a non-empty page brings no key id it has not
already seen. Normal paging is unchanged.
Four regression tests drive both scripts against a fake API that repeats
its cursor or ignores skip; without the guards exactly those four fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`make quality-high` rewrote these files on every branch: the SuiteCRM
README and the root role table lacked the Redis service #881 added, the
session path test was not formatted, and an OpenTalk secret description
from #873 was not wrapped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
n8n 2 returns ten API keys and a hundred workflows per page by default. A
stale managed key behind the first page survived, and a managed workflow
behind it was created a second time. Both scripts now follow every page,
narrowed by label or name, and keep the exact match in the script.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
n8n 2 pages GET /rest/api-keys as {data: {items, counts, totals, owners}},
ten keys at a time, and matches `label` as a substring, so walking the body
raised "'str' object has no attribute 'get'". It also enforces API key
scopes, so activating the MCP server workflow needs `workflow:activate`.
Both scripts now read every list and create response through one
normalisation that unwraps the page, look the managed key up by label, and
name an unexpected shape by its keys only. The normalisation is taken over
from a392e2dd49 on feature/store-i18n.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
With three swarm replicas the PHP session files on the shared NFS volume
were read as empty under concurrent requests of one browser, so SuiteCRM
answered 403 on /api/graphql and dropped the session. Sessions now live in
Redis with session locking that waits like flock did; the phpredis version
is pinned in services.yml with its own update source, and the engine lookup
renders the save path.
Refs #879
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ruff format rewraps the read-back line in test_repository.py, and ruff
check reports the nested with in test_fetch.py as SIM117. Both fail
lint-python.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An http_regex source read one document, so a tag whose parts upstream
keeps in two files could only carry the second part as a literal. Every
pin also fetched its document on its own: a failed request left one pin
of a release behind while the others moved.
url now takes a list whose bodies are searched as one text, and every
document is fetched once per run, so all pins that read it resolve against
the same snapshot. The HTTP reads move into utils/update/fetch.py.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The repository updater assigns ref: lines to entities by position: every
entity that pins a value takes the next line carrying that value. A ref
that declares its own source was dropped before it took its line, so a
second entity pinning the same value was given the sourced entity's line,
and an update of it would have rewritten the wrong ref.
A sourced ref now takes its line first and is skipped afterwards, the
same order the nocheck marker already follows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
One test asserts ansible_host lands on the given address, the other
that a missing member raises. Either would have caught the UNREACHABLE run
before it was dispatched.
A pin that names its own upstream in an update: block was still collected
by the image updater or, for a ref, by the repository updater. Those raise
it to the newest tag of its registry or repository, which for a component
of a release is not the release's value. A tag built from several upstream
values, such as <freeswitch>-<bigbluebutton>, could not be resolved at
all: the resolver takes one capture and keeps a pin on its suffix.
The image updater now skips a version and the repository updater a ref
that declares a source for itself. An http_regex source accepts a template
over the pattern's named groups, and a templated pin moves whenever the
assembled value changes, its suffix included.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A pin that names its own upstream in an update: block was still collected
by the image updater, which raises it to the newest tag of its registry.
For a component of a release bundle that tag is not the bundle's, so the
two updaters would propose different versions for the same line and such
a pin had to carry nocheck: docker-version.
The image updater now skips a version that declares a source for itself.
The source resolver alone bumps it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Under SSO the role tried to let applications relay without SMTP AUTH by
widening the relay rule to the private networks. The rule compared the
peer address to the text of a CIDR, which never matches, so an
application could reach local mailboxes but got "550 5.1.2 Relay not
allowed" for every external recipient. Repairing the comparison would
have opened a relay, because published ports, Tor and the swarm mesh all
hand outside clients an address inside those networks.
Stalwart checks app passwords before it asks the external directory, so
a bot can authenticate while the directory is OIDC. With SSO enabled the
role now creates one app password per bot, acting for that account as
the recovery admin, and stores it in the token store the SMTP password
is already read from. A bot gets a new one when its entry is deleted in
Stalwart or its token is removed.
The relay rule is back to authenticated sessions only. The lookup loses
its SSO relay branch and the role its submission_via_relay flag, so an
SSO deployment submits on 465 with AUTH like every other one.
The role's CLI test now fails when an unauthenticated session is given
an external recipient, or when the bot credential is refused one.
Closes#793
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`native_metrics_target` was a Jinja filter, so it could not read
DEPLOYMENT_MODE: filters see no Ansible variables. It returned
`<services.<key>.name>:<port>` unconditionally, which is `matrix-synapse:9000`
for matrix. Compose serves that name; swarm does not, because `docker stack
deploy` ignores `container_name` and the alias never exists. This repository
says as much itself, through `lookup('compose_only', 'container_name', ...)`.
The target was therefore scraped and refused, and `playwright.spec.js:274`
reported `web-app-matrix: 1 matching target(s) reporting up != 1`, meaning one
matching target whose `up` value is not 1.
It becomes a lookup that delegates host resolution to `scrape_target`, which
was already mode-aware, so exactly one plugin knows the difference between the
two modes. The port has to be handed over explicitly: matrix exposes metrics on
9000 while `services.synapse.ports.internal.http` is 8008, so the existing
internal-port lookup cannot serve this case on its own.
`scrape_target` now refuses `port` together with an explicit `port_kind`.
Before, `port` won silently and the error text still named the
`ports.internal.<port_kind>` path that the call had never consulted.
`native_metrics_apps` drops an app that pins itself to compose through
`compose_mode_force` while the cluster runs swarm, because the scrape target
would then name the wrong object. Only the literal case: matrix declares that
override as a Jinja expression over its flavour, which this lookup cannot
resolve from the scraping role's variable scope, so variant 0 on swarm stays a
latent mismatch.
The two comment lines claiming `container_name:port` went with the change;
after it they state the opposite of what the code does.
Verified by mutation: with the swarm branch of `scrape_target` disabled, the
new test emits `matrix-synapse:9000`, the exact string CI reported.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
provision_ai_gateway.php and provision_mcp.php shared a prefix inside one
directory, which test_prefix_grouped_files rejects. Both move into
files/php/provision/ as ai_gateway.php and mcp.php, the layout
web-app-n8n already uses for its Python provisioning scripts.
The two lookups that feed the scripts to the container follow, and the
unit test moves to its mirrored path as provision/AiGatewayTest.php.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Moodle 5 keeps AI provider settings in provider instances, not in the
plugin configuration. The deploy kept writing aiprovider_openai/* through
cfg.php and read the same value back, so its own check stayed green while
no provider existed. The gateway spec then found no settings page and
web-app-moodle#2 failed in run 37646050826.
The deploy now pipes files/php/provision_ai_gateway.php into the
container. It finds the instance by class and name or creates it through
core_ai\manager, points the three text actions at the chat endpoint,
switches image generation off, stores the virtual key and prints what
Moodle stored. The task asserts on that output. An instance an
administrator added is left alone.
The spec finds the instance by MOODLE_AI_PROVIDER_NAME on the providers
page and reads the endpoint from its generate_text action page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
