The check listed the torrcs without the limit through "grep -L ...; true".
With no torrc under /opt/chutney/net/nodes, or with one that cannot be
read, grep printed nothing, the trailing true turned its error into
success, and the test reported that every node runs one worker.
The check now counts the limit per file with "grep -cH" and reads the exit
status. A status above 1 or an empty answer fails the test, and a file
with a count of 0 is named as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tor starts its worker threads by the number of CPU cores it detects, and
the cpus limit of the container does not change that number. On a host
with 20 cores every node of the private chutney network ran 21 threads and
grew to about 0.6 GB. The seven relays and authorities filled the 2g
limit and its swap within ten minutes, the kernel killed them one by one,
and no circuit could be built any more.
The entrypoint now writes NumCPUs 1 into the torrc of every chutney node
before it starts the network. Measured on that host over ten minutes: the
nodes run 3 threads and stay at 65 to 86 MB, the container at 0.47 GB
without swap, where it had filled 2 GB plus 2 GB of swap before.
The CLI test of the role fails when a chutney node runs without the limit.
Closes#824
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nobody could sign in to Odoo through Keycloak. Odoo sent an http redirect
URI, and Keycloak refused it as "Invalid parameter: redirect_uri".
The addon auth_oauth_https builds that URI from web.base.url. Two things
kept it from doing so after the image moved to Odoo 20.
Its manifest declared version 19.0.1.8.0, and Odoo marks a module whose
version names another series as not installable. It only warns about that,
so the install task stayed green and the addon was missing. The manifest
now declares 1.8.0, which Odoo prefixes with its own series.
Once installed, the addon read the parameter with get_param, which Odoo 20
replaced by typed getters. The call raised AttributeError, a broad except
logged it and fell back to the URL of the request, which is http behind
the proxy. The addon reads the parameter with get_str now and no longer
catches the error.
A deploy now fails when the addon is not installed afterwards. The check
reads ir_module_module, because the output of "odoo -i" does not tell an
installed module from a skipped one.
The spec logged out by navigating to /web/session/logout. Odoo 20 accepts
POST only on that route and answered 405, so both SSO tests failed after
a successful login. The spec logs out through the user menu now.
A host that runs the suite with several workers still failed it. Odoo
computes the session token of an account from its OAuth access token, so
every new sign-in ends the other sessions of that account, and the spec
files share the administrator. The role caps its suite at one worker
with PLAYWRIGHT_MAX_WORKERS, which the central config now honours, and
the spec asserts the cap.
Closes#822
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every blackbox probe of a Tor deployment answered 404, so AppDown fired for
all deployed apps although they were up. The job built its targets from
canonical_domains_map(DOMAIN_PRIMARY), which knows no onion domain. In a Tor
deployment the vhosts answer under <sub>.<onion> only, and the front proxy
served the clearnet names from its default server.
The targets now come from lookup('domains'), the map the vhosts are built
from, and each target takes its scheme from the domain it probes instead of
from the Prometheus vhost.
Which roles are probed follows lookup('roles_with_service', 'prometheus'),
the list the role's own spec expects metrics for. It leaves out the database
roles, which have a domain in the map and no vhost, and the roles that
declare scrape: false because their vhost carries no Prometheus block.
Two roles declared more than their vhost delivers. web-svc-mirror renders a
vhost of its own with no backend behind it, and on a live stack its probe
answered 404 under the onion name as well, so it declares scrape: false now.
web-app-peertube has a backend, but its vhost template never included the
Prometheus locations. It includes them now.
The spec could not see any of this in a compose deployment. dotenv_quote
wraps PROMETHEUS_TARGET_ROLES_JSON in quotes there, JSON.parse returned a
string, the role list came out empty and the per-role test was skipped. The
value is decoded now, and the test also requires probe_success == 1 for
every role in the list.
Closes#792
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Of the 76 open code scanning alerts, 39 point at code that can change.
svc-ai-mcp-adapter:
- A path argument that is empty or made only of dots is refused.
Percent-encoding keeps a separator inside its segment, but "." and ".."
need none, so an upstream that resolves dot segments could answer from a
path the contract does not name.
- parse_duration splits on the units. The pattern it used before rescanned
a long run of digits from every start position.
Tests and the README generators:
- Every Jinja environment built with autoescape=False and a "noqa: S701"
uses select_autoescape now, as six test modules and
utils/templating/jinja.py already did. It escapes templates named
*.html, *.htm and *.xml, which none of these call sites loads.
- Dead code goes: a doubled "rel" block in the email lint, an unread
_SKIP_DIRS, and a module that _resolve returned to no caller.
- Two "except ...: pass" blocks become contextlib.suppress and
assertRaises.
- Nine test modules import unittest.mock one way instead of two, and one
lookup test imports its module once.
Closes#807
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
In the async pass the role runs kcadm jobs side by side. Every kcadm call in
the Keycloak container shares one config file. kcadm rewrites that file when
it refreshes the access token, about every 55 seconds, takes the file lock
with tryLock() and gives up at once when another kcadm process holds it. One
of two overlapping declared-client jobs then failed with "Failed to get lock
on /opt/keycloak/.keycloak/kcadm.config", and the deploy with it.
keycloak_kcadm_update now repeats a call that lost the lock, up to ten times
one second apart. The call fails while it refreshes its token, before it
sends its own request, so repeating it is safe. Every other error still ends
the call at once.
That covers the module only, so the async jobs are reduced to the ones that
go through it:
- The default-scope assignment was an async shell task. It ran beside the
shell tasks that follow it, and neither side repeats a lost lock. It runs
in line now.
- The two mail-settings jobs were async without a register, so nothing
reaped them and a failure was never seen. They run in line now.
The client job and the declared-client jobs stay async. A test fails when an
async kcadm task does not use the module or is not registered for the reap.
A config file of its own per call was the other option. It does not work by
itself, because the admin session lives only in the shared file.
Closes#805
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
nginx resolves its upstreams once, at start, so the frontend starts through
a guard that waits until `backend` and `exporter` resolve. A container
resolves with a search domain, and the zone of a deployment answers every
name with the address of the ingress. A service that Docker's DNS did not
know yet therefore resolved anyway, as `backend.<domain>`. The guard let
nginx start at once and nginx pinned the ingress as its backend. Every API
call then failed with 502 and the SPA showed "Bad Gateway" instead of the
login form, until the container was restarted.
The guard now asks for the absolute names, `backend.` and `exporter.`. The
search domain is not applied to those, so the lookup fails until the
services themselves resolve.
Closes#806
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The extension installer returned as soon as an add-on was installed, in
whatever version. A new pin in meta/addons/ therefore reached a fresh wiki
only, and an existing wiki kept the version it was first deployed with.
The installer now skips an add-on only when the installed version equals
the pin. Otherwise it calls install(id, version, namespace), which the
Extension Manager resolves as an upgrade, and it reports an error when the
add-on is not on the pin afterwards.
The check that follows the installer compared presence only. It takes the
pin as well, so a deploy fails when an add-on is installed in another
version.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The unit test of the alarm script built its Jinja environment with
autoescape switched off, which code scanning reports as a possible XSS
sink and fails the PR on. The template is a shell script, so
select_autoescape() leaves it unescaped exactly as before, and the finding
no longer applies.
Refs #790
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stalwart closes a connection that exceeds its per-IP connection budget
without a greeting. msmtp reports that as "the server sent an empty reply"
with exit 76, and the mail health check treated exit 76 as permanent. One
such drop, in a second in which Alertmanager flushed its notifications,
failed a deploy although the same path accepted a mail one second later.
The health check now retries exit 76 when msmtp names the empty reply,
within the ten attempts it already gives to exit 69, 75 and 124. Every
other protocol error still ends the check at once.
The alarm mail was sent once, so the alarm about a failed unit was lost to
the same drop. It now makes three attempts ten seconds apart for the
transient cases of the health check and still reports the last error.
The limit on the server is left alone. Exempting the node's own senders by
source address would also exempt Tor clients and, in swarm, every external
client. That question is tracked in #793.
Closes#790
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Formatter output only: the parsed YAML and the Python AST of every touched file equal their previous versions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
test-e2e-cli loads test.env with `set -a && . test.env && set +a`. The
unquoted `ONION_PORTS=25 80 110 ...` is not an assignment there but the
command `80` with a one-word env prefix: bash prints `command not found`,
leaves ONION_PORTS unset, and onion_ports.py reports "no onion-forwarded
ports declared; nothing to probe". The port check passed vacuously in every
tor job with more than one forwarded port (OpenResty, Listmonk, Pixelfed in
run 35661520542) and only ran where a single port was declared.
Pass the value through dotenv_quote, which quotes a space-separated value in
both compose and swarm and keeps the env-file lint satisfied. A unit test
renders the template in both modes and sources it the way test-e2e-cli does.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tor attaches a stream to an onion to the rendezvous circuit that matches its
isolation and keeps it there until SocksTimeout; it never moves the stream to a
fresh circuit. The probe connected without SOCKS authentication and gave up
after 60s, so a dead rendezvous circuit would absorb both passes. That is the
most likely reading of run 35661520542 (web-app-mastodon#1, public Tor), where
<onion>:80 timed out twice right after curl had reached the same onion port.
Authenticate every connect with fresh random username/password credentials.
Tor accepts any and, under its default IsolateSOCKSAuth, builds a separate
rendezvous circuit per credential set, so a retry can no longer land on the
circuit that failed the attempt before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review had these removed across the role once already, and the 11 September
pass cleared every file that was flagged. The seal-key pin and the
recovery-key work then reintroduced the same pattern in nine new places.
Also removes two that predate the review and were never flagged: the
healthcheck note in meta/services.yml and the entrypoint note in
compose.yml.j2. Both are the same narrative-exception shape.
Param docs, file headers and the plain contract notes in the Playwright specs
stay: separate categories, none of them objected to. What the deleted
comments recorded lives in the role README.
Six assertions: the key is persisted on the deploy that creates it, it is
loaded before the logins that may need it, recovery is gated on both logins
having failed and a key existing, the rebuilt AppRole is the inventory one
rather than the recorded one, the recovery path ends by re-pinning, and a
rejected key fails loudly.
Recovering to the recorded pair instead of the inventory pair would strand
the next deploy the same way, which is why that one is asserted directly.
Nothing stopped the seal key drifting back into the per-deploy rotation, and
the regression is invisible until a deploy is skipped and the node cannot
unseal. Assert the pin on the seal key and its absence on both AppRole
credentials.
Brings in Kevin's AI-agent work, the svc-net-firewall role and the update
tooling. One conflict, in the MCP proxy audit: both sides appended a role to
privileged_control_plane, ours web-app-openbao and upstream svc-net-firewall.
Taken as a union at 25, which is what test_mcp_audit_completeness requires -
neither role declares meta/mcp.yml, so the audit is the only place they are
classified.
ONLYOFFICE listed onlyoffice 10.2.0 in the Nextcloud appstore on 2026-09-18 at
10:16:31Z and never published the matching GitHub artifact; the tag itself does
not exist. `occ app:install` takes the newest compatible release, so it dies on
a 404 that no retry can heal. CI proved that twice independently: upstream run
35329488812 and fork run 35330645276 both fail Nextcloud#4 at that task after
six attempts, on the same commit, for the same reason.
The fault had three layers, each visible only once the one above it was gone.
Install. meta/addons/onlyoffice.yml pins `config.archive` to v10.1.2, whose
artifact answers 200 and which the appstore also lists for this server major.
01_install.yml stages that archive on the node and unpacks it into custom_apps
through a stdin pipe: the webroot is a named volume, so the node can only reach
the app directory through the container, and piping avoids both `container cp`
and a cleanup step that would have to run as a user which does not own the file.
Enable and configure needed no change at all. With the release already on disk
`occ app:install` reports "already installed", which nextcloud_install_status
has always mapped to runnable, so 02_enable.yml and 03_configure.yml proceed as
they always did. That is why this commit adds no branch to the plugin pipeline.
Update. `occ app:update --all` then dragged the pinned app back to the broken
10.2.0 and killed the deploy. occ offers no exclusion flag, but it does offer
`--showonly` and single app ids, so a pinned app is simply not updated. The old
`--all` call stays byte-identical and now carries a `when`: with nothing pinned,
thirteen of the fourteen variants take exactly the path they took before. This
layer cannot appear in CI at all, because it needs a second deploy with the app
already installed, and the install always died first.
The classifier test is inverted rather than deleted:
test_an_advertised_release_whose_artifact_is_gone_stays_fatal pins the decision
that a dead artifact fails loudly instead of degrading to a silent skip.
Verified by a local compose deploy of variant 4: ok=2508 changed=149 failed=0
and `✓ 36 tests/addons/onlyoffice.spec.js:12:1`, which drives the whole
JWT-authenticated round trip to the document server over its onion address, not
merely an enabled plugin. In the live container beforehand: `occ app:enable`
returned "onlyoffice 10.1.2 enabled", `occ app:install` returned "already
installed", and `occ app:update onlyoffice` reproduced the 404 that the pin now
avoids.
The loop expression was wrong before this commit and is fixed here: Jinja reads
'\1' as an octal escape, so the backreference produced chr(1) instead of an app
id. Evaluated against ansible-core's own filters over four shapes, the tail is
now cut instead of captured, which removes the escaping hazard entirely.
occ output is not localised: with default_language=de and a de_DE.UTF-8 locale
the strings are unchanged, so parsing them is as safe as the five markers the
role already relied on.
Residual: the per-app update branch has never run with a real item inside a
deploy. Its chain and `occ app:update <id>` are each verified separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The checker matches accepted codes by hostname, and a clearnet vhost
shares only its leftmost label with its onion twin, so --accept-status
mirror.<primary>=404 never applied to mirror.<host>.onion. That vhost
serves the same by-design 404, so the probe called it unreachable and
systemd failed the service -- with the identical message the missing
flag produced, while the status had already moved from 2/INVALIDARGUMENT
to 1/FAILURE.
--skip-domain carried this derivation all along, in is_skipped_domain;
replacing it with --accept-status dropped it. The expansion now runs on
the same label rule, in the wrapper rather than the lookup, because the
onion address does not exist yet when the unit is rendered -- only the
wrapper sees both names, and it reads them from the nginx configs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The systemd unit has passed --accept-status since f247b29fd0, but the
wrapper script never learned the flag. argparse rejected it, so the
service failed with status=2/INVALIDARGUMENT on every host that deploys
the role, in compose and in swarm alike.
The checker consumes every token after a list flag that does not start
with "--", and a URL does not, so both lists now share a single
separator placed before the URLs. The previous placement sat directly
behind --ignore-network-blocks-from and would have fed a second list
straight into the URL parser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
08b4d0f2ff was committed while the gate was still running, so ruff format wrapped the dict.fromkeys call after the commit had already been written.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2f533eb279 read TOR_ONION_SSH_ENABLED straight out of the lookup's variables, but group vars reach a lookup unrendered, so the flag arrived as its own template text and boolean() refused it. The torrc render aborted, and with it every tor row: 14 jobs across both runs on 095ea5e882 failed with the same line, Baserow#0 in compose and Nextcloud#1 in swarm among them.
Quoted from job 104843161609: The lookup plugin 'tor_extra_ports' failed: The value '{{ lookup('config', application_id, 'services.tor.forwards.ssh') | bool }}' is not a valid boolean. Reproduced locally: boolean() on that literal raises with the identical message.
tor_egress_clients.py:43 in this same role has resolved its own references through templar.template(trust_as_template(...)) since bf32f57b85. _flag now does the same and names the variable when the value is still not a boolean afterwards.
The unit tests passed real booleans, which is why they stayed green through seven gate runs; the new case sends template text through a templar, the shape production delivers. No lint or unit test could have caught this, because it only appears once ansible hands the variable over unrendered.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The probe dropped every canonical and alias domain of a role whose server.status_codes.default named anything at or above 400, so a single by-design 4xx removed the whole vhost from CSP inspection. The checker now takes --accept-status <domain>=<code>, which keeps the page navigated and its policy evaluated, so the declaration buys coverage instead of costing it.
csp_accept_status reads the existing SPOT in utils/roles/applications/status_codes.py rather than restating the rule. That resolves per vhost, because server.status_codes is keyed like domains.canonical, so two domains of one role can differ; the old filter looked only at default and was blind to seaweedfs declaring its api, filer and master keys separately. The threshold is the checker's own: anything below 300 passes unflagged, so a declared redirect is named too.
csp_skip_domains keeps only the half that has no vhost to probe at all, a canonical domain owned by a disabled service, and gains the tests that half never had.
Measured: 14 domains move from skipped to probed, among them jenkins, mattermost, n8n, prometheus, mirror and xmpp. 28 domains carry an entry in total. Across the CI diagnostics of this run 473 of 476 observed responses were 200, the single infinito vhost answering 403 is api.seaweedfs, and it declares that code, so it stays green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The tor extra-ports test carried '# noqa: SLF001' on the three lines that set lookup._templar and lookup._loader, which the test must do because the plugin reads the variables it is handed from them. Ruff reports no violation there any more, so RUF100 removed the directives as unused during make autoformat.
A suppression that suppresses nothing asserts a conflict that does not exist and invites the next reader to treat the access as a problem.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The skip list gated its whole loop body on the group_names selection, so a role reaching a node through a runtime include_role never contributed its server.status_codes.default. web-svc-mirror arrives that way on every Tor node and declares 404 as healthy; on a node provisioned from the svc-net-tor README the probe read that 404 as unreachable and hlth-csp could not start.
Measured in CI job 104622514568: the unit rendered without --skip-domain and the checker reported ERR_SOCKS_CONNECTION_FAILED on the mirror onion 26 times. Only the service-disabled half depends on the selection now. The widened branch can contribute at most 14 of 266 applications, and naming a domain no vhost serves is inert because script.py filters an nginx-enumerated list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
group_vars/all/README.md forbids role-specific configuration in that directory, and 19_tor.yml held five variables no role but svc-net-tor ever read. They now live where the README points: the values an operator may override in meta/services.yml, where the inventory's applications block is deep-merged on top, and the derived ones in vars/main.yml.
The exception is the egress virtual range, which moves the other way into 08_networks.yml. It is not a property of the role but a claim on shared address space, and 0f6728a4c1 records what a collision costs: tor's upstream default 10.192.0.0/10 swallowed the docker pool at 10.208.0.0/12, and every connection to a container address came back as 'errno 104 Connection reset by peer'. The two numbers that must not overlap now sit one line apart.
The onion's HTTP forward becomes a declaration rather than a derivation. lookup('tor_ports') walks group_names and collects what those roles declare under ports.onion; port 80 belongs to svc-prx-openresty, which a node acquires through sys-stk-front-proxy and which therefore appears in no dependency list an inventory carries. A node provisioned with --include svc-net-tor published an onion forwarding SSH and nothing else, leaving every app it serves unreachable - measured as ERR_SOCKS_CONNECTION_FAILED in the CI instructions replay. The new role-local tor_extra_ports lookup composes the flagged forwards with the derived ones and collapses a port named twice, since torrc writes one HiddenServicePort line per entry.
Not moved: tor_ports stays in plugins/lookup because tor_reachable imports from it and three database roles use that; and the flags sit outside ports.onion because every key there mirrors a port the role declares under ports.local, which neither sshd nor the front proxy is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dnsmasq binds the docker bridge address with the clearnet upstreams configured and the node's own .onion records loaded, and no rule covered port 53. Any source that could route a packet to that address got an open resolver plus the split-DNS records. c89ca42c46 claimed local-service closed this; abb6f37297 showed the keyword never took effect.
The guard now carries two named sets instead of one plus a special case. 'containers' is the docker pool list, for tor's own transparent and DNS ports. 'internal' is NETWORK_INTERNAL_CIDRS, for the resolver and the SOCKS port. Every guarded entry names its set, which folds the hand-written SOCKS rule and its manual append into the same list the reverse-path sets are built from.
The resolver takes the wider set deliberately: 'internal' is the list torrc.j2 already spends on SocksPolicy accept. The narrow set carries only 10.208.0.0/12 and 10.7.7.0/24 out of 10.0.0.0/8, which leaves out swarm's ingress network, every overlay docker allocates without an ipam block, and a node whose own address sits elsewhere in 10/8. A query bound to such an address was measured timing out against the narrow set. Guarding the resolver more strictly than the proxy beside it would refuse a name lookup to a source that is handed a full SOCKS proxy six lines earlier.
NETWORK_DNS_PORT lives next to the other resolver constants rather than in meta/services.yml: ports.local describes host-bound container ports, where 53 collides with svc-dns-unbound and falls outside every PORT_BANDS band.
Measured on the rendered artifact: the table loads and reloads with a byte-identical listing, every compose source of port 53 resolves inside 'internal' and every source of 9040/9053 inside 'containers', and a mistyped set name, an empty CIDR list or a missing admitted key each fail loudly at validate time. Port 53 newly passes a strict reverse-path check, so an asymmetrically routed client loses name resolution.
test_fragments built its guard list from a fixture of three entries while the role shipped six, so it validated the template against a port list nobody deploys. It now takes the shape from the declaration and fills only the numbers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The line that mocks the role_subnets dependency exceeded the line length; the project formatter broke it across three. No behaviour changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The guard drops every source outside the list tor_egress_clients returns, and containers reach the TransPort and the DNSPort through exactly those rules. Nothing held that relationship: narrowing a pool, renaming a key or dropping an entry from the lookup would have taken the resolver and the transparent proxy away from every container at once, in production.
The test runs the real lookup over the repository's real network declarations rather than a fixture, so it fails where the mistake is made. Its templar resolves the cross references those declarations carry, because without it the lookup would compare unrendered template text and the check would pass on nothing.
It also pins the decision that the admitted list is deliberately narrower than SocksPolicy: 10.0.0.0/8 stays out, because a transparent proxy and a resolver with no access control of their own do not belong to the whole LAN. Left unwritten, that reads like an oversight and gets repaired on the next pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An audit of what the host actually filters found a single input chain in the whole ruleset, covering three tor ports. ss showed two more binds with nothing in front of them: the SOCKS port on 0.0.0.0, and dnsmasq on the bridge address.
Each gets the layer it belongs in. SOCKS gets a packet filter rule against the same CIDRs SocksPolicy already accepts, so no client loses access while the filter closes if tor's own config ever stops enforcing. Reusing the narrower guard set was deliberately avoided: it excludes the LAN blocks SocksPolicy admits, so it would have changed the policy rather than hardened it.
dnsmasq gets local-service, which answers only directly connected networks. A packet filter rule there would have sat on the container DNS path, which daemon.json points at that same bridge address, in exchange for closing an exposure that needs an extra route onto the bridge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The role advertised holding a forwarding or masquerade rule for a tunnel. A fragment cannot do that: it lives in its own table, and an accept there terminates only its own base chain, so a DROP policy another component set still executes. svc-net-wireguard-firewalled was measured losing every forwarded packet that way.
The use case is replaced by one the design does serve, and the rule that decides it is written down where the next author will look rather than left in a commit body.
The fragment test no longer seeds the two wireguard interface names; the fragment they described is gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
svc-net-tor rendered its own guard script, its own unit and its own handler, and hooked the rules into DOCKER-USER with an insert, because a rule appended to a chain docker owns lands behind the RETURN docker puts there. The script flushed its chain and refilled it rule by rule, so the boundary was gone for the duration of the refill.
A role that needs packet filter rules now writes templates/nftables.conf.j2 declaring its own table and includes svc-net-firewall, which renders it to /etc/nftables.d/<role>.conf, rejects it with nft -c, loads it, reads the table back and refuses one that carries no chain. Deployed on its own the role installs nftables and the ruleset that loads every fragment at boot. That ruleset is a distribution decision, so its path follows os_family: RedHat reads /etc/sysconfig/nftables.conf, the others /etc/nftables.conf. The unit is only enabled, never started, because on Debian its ExecStop flushes the whole ruleset, docker's tables included.
One table per role removes the shared path: a fragment replaces its own table and touches no other, and docker never touches either. nft -f on an existing table merges, so each fragment creates, deletes and redeclares its table in one transaction. The tests load every fragment twice into a throwaway network namespace and require the listing to match, because a merging fragment loads twice without error and shows up only as a duplicated rule.
The tor guard now applies in both deploy modes. It was pinned to swarm while torrc binds TransPort and DNSPort on the bridge address in compose too, so on a single-host install those ports answered every on-link neighbour. The guard drops rather than admits, so nothing short-circuits another table, and ip saddr carries an implicit ipv4 dependency, which leaves the ipv6 exposure exactly where the iptables rules left it. svc-net-tor reads its own chain back and refuses a guard that drops nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
lint-python runs ruff, which the pytest lint suite does not cover, so these
slipped through locally: an unnecessary lambda around bool, and a Jinja
Environment left on the implicit autoescape default. The suppression has to sit
on the autoescape argument itself, which is where ruff anchors the violation.
Sending to a .onion needs two things of the node: a resolver that answers the suffix, and a route from the container to Tor's transparent port. Neither existed. Compose pointed Mailu at unbound, which knows nothing about .onion, and in swarm Tor's DNSPort and TransPort listen inside the container where the host's dnsmasq and nat rules cannot reach them, so the forwarding rules that were already there pointed at a closed port on every swarm node.
Compose resolves through unbound, which now forwards the onion zone to Tor's DNSPort on the bridge it already owns. The forward alone would have answered SERVFAIL: the signed root proves that onion does not exist, so with auto-trust-anchor-file set every answer below it validates as bogus, and Tor's DNSPort can supply no DS. The zone is therefore declared insecure. Swarm resolves through the node dnsmasq instead, which every container already uses because container_dns puts the bridge resolver into daemon.json wherever svc-net-tor is deployed, and which now reaches Tor because its ports are published host-mode next to the SOCKS port that was published there already.
The transport rule changed target rather than mechanism. REDIRECT rewrites the destination to the primary address of the interface the packet arrived on, which is a different project bridge for every role, so Tor would have had to listen on all of them. A DNAT naming the bridge keeps one listener, and in swarm the same address reaches the published port through the proxy docker runs there.
That leaves the exposure. SocksPort has SocksPolicy; DNSPort and TransPort have no equivalent, and a swarm-published port carries no host address to bind to, so in swarm the packet filter is their only boundary. Compose needs none, because there Tor binds loopback and the bridge and nothing else. The swarm guard admits this deployment's own address space and drops the rest, and it is installed as a unit ordered after docker rather than as ansible-applied rules: nothing here persists netfilter state, so docker recreating its chains at boot would have left Tor back on the wildcard with the guard gone. It rebuilds its chain instead of appending to it, because the appending version could only ever be loosened. It hooks INPUT and DOCKER-USER both, since host-local traffic reaches a published port through docker's proxy and external traffic through FORWARD.
The deploy now proves all of it back and fails when a rule is missing, the router no longer runs on swarm nodes that carry no Tor, and the CLI test probes the forwarded ports over SOCKS instead of assuming a HiddenServicePort line means a reachable service.
Measured so far: Tor accepts the non-loopback binds and reports circuit-established, and the chain, its order and the DOCKER-USER hooks read back correctly from a deployed host. The swarm path is not yet exercised.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
meta/addons/oidc_login.yml gates on lookup('sso_oidc_plugin'), which the applications render evaluates while it is still in flight. Under that re-entry guard the merged view hands out service flags as their own Jinja text, and bool("{{ ... }}") is True. The lookup read services.sso.enabled and services.ldap.enabled as enabled on a deployment with neither Keycloak nor OpenLDAP and announced oidc_login, so Nextcloud advertised a login hand-off to a provider that is not there.
lookup('config', ...) renders the value it returns, which is why the roughly ninety '| bool' sites in meta/ do not have this problem. 238bc285c7 established reaching the merged config through the lookup loader; this one had not been converted. utils.roles.applications.config.get is the raw accessor and does not render.
Measured against the real render: with only web-app-nextcloud deployed the addon set is now empty; adding Keycloak yields sociallogin; adding OpenLDAP as well yields oidc_login. That is the resolution order the lookup's own docstring documents. All 14 nextcloud variants pin both flags as literal booleans, so no CI-deployed variant changes.
The stub next to the plugin answered every lookup with the applications payload; it now mirrors lookup('config', app, path, default). A stub resolves a path but does not render it, so it cannot see this defect at all: the regression test renders for real.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every one of these breaks into something that looks like ordinary drift rather
than a defect: a state read moved after the backend include leaves the node
sealed, a token helper fed the first login's stdout gets an empty string on
every rotated deploy and fails later at the first write, an ungated SecretID
swap answers 500 on every deploy that did not rotate, and a swap that never
destroys the old SecretID revokes nothing at all.
