In swarm mode `docker stack deploy` ignores the host IP of a short port
mapping, so every `127.0.0.1:<port>:<port>` that container_ports renders for
a `ports.local` entry is published by the ingress routing mesh on every
node, via docker-proxy on 0.0.0.0 and [::] plus DNAT in nat PREROUTING.
Databases, LDAP and application backends answered from outside the cluster.
svc-swarm-node now loads an nftables table through svc-net-firewall. Its
prerouting filter chain (priority mangle, ahead of Docker's dstnat) drops
packets addressed to the node for any ingress-published port that no
application declares under `ports.public`. Loopback, docker0,
docker_gwbridge, the user bridges and the swarm nodes' own addresses stay
admitted. Host-side provisioning over 127.0.0.1, containers that reach a
host port through host-gateway, and node-to-node consumers such as the
registry-cache mirror keep working.
Both sets are read live on the manager (`docker service inspect` for
`.Endpoint.Ports`, `docker node inspect` for `.Status.Addr`), so ephemeral
ingress ports and nodes outside `--limit` are covered. The table is loaded
on a node before it joins, reloaded on every node after the join, and
reloaded after each stack deploy by the sys-svc-compose swarm handler.
Refs #1089
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Of the 76 open code scanning alerts, 39 point at code that can change.
svc-ai-mcp-adapter:
- A path argument that is empty or made only of dots is refused.
Percent-encoding keeps a separator inside its segment, but "." and ".."
need none, so an upstream that resolves dot segments could answer from a
path the contract does not name.
- parse_duration splits on the units. The pattern it used before rescanned
a long run of digits from every start position.
Tests and the README generators:
- Every Jinja environment built with autoescape=False and a "noqa: S701"
uses select_autoescape now, as six test modules and
utils/templating/jinja.py already did. It escapes templates named
*.html, *.htm and *.xml, which none of these call sites loads.
- Dead code goes: a doubled "rel" block in the email lint, an unread
_SKIP_DIRS, and a module that _resolve returned to no caller.
- Two "except ...: pass" blocks become contextlib.suppress and
assertRaises.
- Nine test modules import unittest.mock one way instead of two, and one
lookup test imports its module once.
Closes#807
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dnsmasq binds the docker bridge address with the clearnet upstreams configured and the node's own .onion records loaded, and no rule covered port 53. Any source that could route a packet to that address got an open resolver plus the split-DNS records. c89ca42c46 claimed local-service closed this; abb6f37297 showed the keyword never took effect.
The guard now carries two named sets instead of one plus a special case. 'containers' is the docker pool list, for tor's own transparent and DNS ports. 'internal' is NETWORK_INTERNAL_CIDRS, for the resolver and the SOCKS port. Every guarded entry names its set, which folds the hand-written SOCKS rule and its manual append into the same list the reverse-path sets are built from.
The resolver takes the wider set deliberately: 'internal' is the list torrc.j2 already spends on SocksPolicy accept. The narrow set carries only 10.208.0.0/12 and 10.7.7.0/24 out of 10.0.0.0/8, which leaves out swarm's ingress network, every overlay docker allocates without an ipam block, and a node whose own address sits elsewhere in 10/8. A query bound to such an address was measured timing out against the narrow set. Guarding the resolver more strictly than the proxy beside it would refuse a name lookup to a source that is handed a full SOCKS proxy six lines earlier.
NETWORK_DNS_PORT lives next to the other resolver constants rather than in meta/services.yml: ports.local describes host-bound container ports, where 53 collides with svc-dns-unbound and falls outside every PORT_BANDS band.
Measured on the rendered artifact: the table loads and reloads with a byte-identical listing, every compose source of port 53 resolves inside 'internal' and every source of 9040/9053 inside 'containers', and a mistyped set name, an empty CIDR list or a missing admitted key each fail loudly at validate time. Port 53 newly passes a strict reverse-path check, so an asymmetrically routed client loses name resolution.
test_fragments built its guard list from a fixture of three entries while the role shipped six, so it validated the template against a port list nobody deploys. It now takes the shape from the declaration and fills only the numbers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An audit of what the host actually filters found a single input chain in the whole ruleset, covering three tor ports. ss showed two more binds with nothing in front of them: the SOCKS port on 0.0.0.0, and dnsmasq on the bridge address.
Each gets the layer it belongs in. SOCKS gets a packet filter rule against the same CIDRs SocksPolicy already accepts, so no client loses access while the filter closes if tor's own config ever stops enforcing. Reusing the narrower guard set was deliberately avoided: it excludes the LAN blocks SocksPolicy admits, so it would have changed the policy rather than hardened it.
dnsmasq gets local-service, which answers only directly connected networks. A packet filter rule there would have sat on the container DNS path, which daemon.json points at that same bridge address, in exchange for closing an exposure that needs an extra route onto the bridge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The role advertised holding a forwarding or masquerade rule for a tunnel. A fragment cannot do that: it lives in its own table, and an accept there terminates only its own base chain, so a DROP policy another component set still executes. svc-net-wireguard-firewalled was measured losing every forwarded packet that way.
The use case is replaced by one the design does serve, and the rule that decides it is written down where the next author will look rather than left in a commit body.
The fragment test no longer seeds the two wireguard interface names; the fragment they described is gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
svc-net-tor rendered its own guard script, its own unit and its own handler, and hooked the rules into DOCKER-USER with an insert, because a rule appended to a chain docker owns lands behind the RETURN docker puts there. The script flushed its chain and refilled it rule by rule, so the boundary was gone for the duration of the refill.
A role that needs packet filter rules now writes templates/nftables.conf.j2 declaring its own table and includes svc-net-firewall, which renders it to /etc/nftables.d/<role>.conf, rejects it with nft -c, loads it, reads the table back and refuses one that carries no chain. Deployed on its own the role installs nftables and the ruleset that loads every fragment at boot. That ruleset is a distribution decision, so its path follows os_family: RedHat reads /etc/sysconfig/nftables.conf, the others /etc/nftables.conf. The unit is only enabled, never started, because on Debian its ExecStop flushes the whole ruleset, docker's tables included.
One table per role removes the shared path: a fragment replaces its own table and touches no other, and docker never touches either. nft -f on an existing table merges, so each fragment creates, deletes and redeclares its table in one transaction. The tests load every fragment twice into a throwaway network namespace and require the listing to match, because a merging fragment loads twice without error and shows up only as a duplicated rule.
The tor guard now applies in both deploy modes. It was pinned to swarm while torrc binds TransPort and DNSPort on the bridge address in compose too, so on a single-host install those ports answered every on-link neighbour. The guard drops rather than admits, so nothing short-circuits another table, and ip saddr carries an implicit ipv4 dependency, which leaves the ipv6 exposure exactly where the iptables rules left it. svc-net-tor reads its own chain back and refuses a guard that drops nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5.5