834 commits from the Tor onion-service branch against 299 of ours, from merge
base 7b646bdece: 127 conflicted files, 3506 files changed.
The two sides are largely orthogonal. Theirs adds svc-net-tor and a `tor` service
across the role tree, plus two sweeping refactors: shipped scripts sorted by
language (files/ruby/, files/python/, files/shell/, scripts/lint/*.sh) and the
unit suite moved under tests/unit/python/. Ours is requirement 036, the native AI
gateway, plus the MCP role work. Most conflicts were both sides appending to the
same service map, resolved as unions.
Resolutions that were not unions:
Credentials moved namespace. Theirs renamed meta/schema.yml to meta/secrets.yml
and re-addressed credentials as secrets.credentials.<name>. Git carried our
litellm_api_key blocks through the rename, but every consumer we added still read
'credentials.<name>', which no longer resolves. All 45 call sites are migrated.
plugins/filter/container_volumes.py is deleted by theirs and relocated to
plugins/lookup/container_volumes.py, where it carries the same tmpfs defect our
f85996b43 had just fixed: a hard-coded {"size": ...} that silently drops a per
mount `mode`. The fix is re-applied in the relocated file, as that commit's merge
note anticipated.
compose.yml keeps only INFINITO_PLAYWRIGHT_REPORTS_BASE_DIR. Theirs also forwards
INFINITO_PLAYWRIGHT_STAGE_BASE_DIR; that line is deliberately dropped, per the
analysis recorded in 45804e9ad -- STAGE has a drift-proof role-vars fallback,
while forwarding it promotes a setdefault-pinnable .env value above that SPOT.
tasks/stages/01_constructor.yml takes their include, ./tasks/utils/setup/group.yml,
because their refactor removed tasks/groups/*-roles.yml, leaving our include
target nonexistent. Our task name is kept, since svc-virt is in the loop.
Makefile swarm-zombie is a union: their validate plus teardown, then our
lab_subnet cleanup, which their side dropped while leaving lab_subnet.sh as the
only orphaned reference in the file.
01_bootstrap.sh keeps our deterministic --ip pinning, which distinguishes an
already-attached node from a real failure, over their `|| true`.
Their language-sorted layout orphaned references our side still held: zammad's
two scripts/apply/*.rb, jenkins' java-with-ca-trust.sh, and the notify topics
their handlers renamed to hyphenated form. All corrected.
roles/sys-svc-compose/files/shell/swarm/stack_ready.sh gains our latched-update
block: paused, rollback_paused, rollback_started and rollback_completed exit 2
rather than polling a state that cannot resolve without another deploy.
config_from_run is unioned to (title, logged, jobs); the production caller in
trigger/__main__.py now passes jobs, without which our suite suppression would
have been inert.
READMEs are regenerated rather than hand-merged: 15 LiteLLM rows and 91 Tor rows
now derive from the merged metadata, which is itself evidence the meta merge is
coherent.
Verified: 5161 unit tests pass. The single failure, test_query.py TestSortSpec,
also fails on fork/feature/svc-net-tor at b51d2f9919, measured in a baseline
worktree -- so this merge introduces no new unit-test failure. Two modules are
excluded from that run because `baudolo`, a dependency their branch introduces,
is not installed on this host.
Not verified: no deploy has run against the merged tree, and make quality has not
been run end to end here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three conflicts, each resolved by combining both sides rather than picking one.
compose.yml passes both env vars through to the container: swarm-nfs adds
INFINITO_SWARM_MGR_IP, this branch adds INFINITO_TOR_SOCKS_PORT, and neither
substitutes for the other.
daemon.json.j2 takes the data-root block from swarm-nfs and keeps HEAD's dns
key. The incoming side writes networks.internet.dns directly; lookup(
'container_dns') already returns that value as its clearnet entry and prepends
the docker0 bridge on a Tor node in compose mode, so the incoming form is a
strict subset and dropping it loses nothing.
The WordPress CA-trust addon spec gains skipUnlessServiceEnabled("sso") from
swarm-nfs alongside HEAD's gotoOnion and resolveTimeout, and asserts on the
Plugin Name the mu-plugin header declares - the mustuse screen renders that,
not the filename - with resolveTimeout applied to the literal the incoming
side left bare.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
losetup -f prints the device with a trailing (lost) marker when its node is missing, and both claim sites fed the whole string to mknod. The recovery path that materialises /dev/loop8 and beyond therefore never worked, which is why the pool appeared to stop at the eight preallocated nodes even though max_loop is 0. Strip the marker before the node is built.
Nothing released the data-root loop a node claims, so each distro round leaked four of them: across 140 job logs leg 1 always applies 5 and declines 0, leg 2 applies 3 and declines 2, leg 3 declines 4. The declining nodes fall back to overlayfs, which disables the btrfs snapshot mode the script exists to exercise, and the DR drill then finds no device at all.
Detach right after the mount instead. The mount holds the opener, so the kernel arms autoclear rather than detaching, and the loop plus its sparse image are reclaimed when the node container takes its mount namespace down. Verified in a privileged container: the mount survives the detach, AUTOCLEAR reads 1, the filesystem stays writable, btrfs subvolume create still works, and the loop is released on umount.
Drop the teardown block added earlier: it filtered on (lost), which marks a missing device node rather than a missing backing file, so it selected exactly the devices losetup -d cannot detach, ran unprivileged, and printed success unconditionally. Restore the (deleted) filter in the drill. Require mountpoint up front so a missing tool declines instead of killing the node.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every node runs docker_dataroot.sh, which attaches a loop for its data root, and nothing ever detached them. Run 30699990912 shows the consequence: all eight kernel loop devices bound to docker-fs.img in two inode groups, i.e. two rounds' worth, leaving none for the DR drill's LUKS image.
Release the orphaned ones after the nodes are gone -- only then is a loop unambiguously ours to reclaim, rather than a concurrent run's. Match (lost) as well as (deleted): a backing file inside a removed container's overlay becomes unfindable rather than merely unlinked, which is why the existing cleanup in 02_luks_device.sh never fired.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
compose names the swarm-test volume after its project, so every cluster
left a <cluster>_nfs-export behind that no teardown path touched. At
roughly 5GB each they filled the host disk after ~30 runs, which showed
up as unexplained playwright timeouts once writes started stalling.
Remove it per cluster in teardown, per worktree subnet in lab-reclaim,
and host-wide in swarm-clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The controller mount of DIR_VAR_LIB survived the teardown, so the next
distro cycle inherited an NFS session whose server container was already
gone: the kernel logged 'server not responding, timed out' and every
access under /var/lib/infinito wedged, taking the deploy down with it.
All five swarm jobs of the last manual run died this way, each on a
different distro but always on the third lab cycle.
Both halves of the old teardown were unable to clear it. The guard
`mountpoint -q` blocks on exactly the dead mount it is asked about, so
the timeout dropped the unmount that was needed; and `umount -lf` ran
without sudo on a non-root runner, so the EPERM went into `|| true`.
Detection now reads /proc/self/mountinfo, which touches no filesystem,
the unmount elevates when the caller is not root, and a mount that
survives all of it fails loudly instead of silently poisoning the next
cycle. The bootstrap runs the same release before bringing a lab up, so
a cycle whose teardown never ran cannot hand the mount on either.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pin node hostnames to their lab-net IPs (dual-homed nodes let Docker
DNS hand workers the cache-net IP while the registry binds only the
lab IP), quiesce the CI compose tor before bootstrap (it publishes the
same onion identity as the cluster), and reap wedged nodes with a
retried SIGKILL so leftovers cannot starve later phases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
swarm_stack_ready.sh piped 'docker stack services' through a process
substitution, so the timeout wrapper added in 8516e3167 turned a slow or
wedged manager into an empty listing, an empty not_running set and exit
0: the convergence gate would have gone green with zero running replicas.
Capture the listing, fail on a non-zero rc.
That exposed the second half: post_deploy gated the swarm wait on the
cluster-wide DEPLOYMENT_MODE, so forced-compose roles (matrix ansible
flavor, bigbluebutton) ran it against a stack that does not exist and
only passed because the old code swallowed the error. Gate it on
compose_mode, like the handlers already do.
teardown.sh: the NFS mountpoint and umount calls, the likeliest hang
sites, were the only ones left unwrapped, and the timeout around docker
inspect inverted the D-state warning (a hung inspect returned 124, the
if went false and the script reported a clean teardown). Warn on rc 0
and 124, and shrink the per-node budget so the script fits inside its
step timeout.
Swarm step budget: the bounded steps alone summed to 365 over a 360-min
cap, so cleanup was still starved. Deploy 240, diagnostics 15, playwright
15, rescue 25, cleanup 15.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
27 jobs of run 29147179243 burned their full 360-min budget. Three
systemic layers, all addressed here:
- The CLI e2e task ran the staged test.sh unbounded, and test.sh blocks
in 'systemctl start' on a oneshot backup unit with no JobTimeout; on a
wedged dockerd or a stalled NFS mount both freeze silently for hours.
The task now runs the script under 'timeout TEST_E2E_CLI_TIMEOUT'
(60 min via the timeout lookup, so TIMEOUT_FACTOR scales it) and the
unit starts are bounded by BKP_TEST_HEALTH_TIMEOUT.
- The converge probe re-ran the full per-service diagnostics (service ps,
service logs, inspect, journalctl) on EVERY retry, so 600 nominal
2-second attempts cost 25-33s each and silently outlived the step
timeout. The block is gone (the workflow-level container.py rescue
snapshot already collects it recursively on failure) and every docker
call is timeout-bounded. Same removal in the swarm collect script,
which keeps only the NFS and render evidence container.py does not see.
- Playwright-collect, rescue diagnostics and Cleanup had no
timeout-minutes, and teardown.sh calls docker against D-state nodes,
so a failed job hung there for hours until the job cap killed it
without artifacts. Every step is bounded now, every teardown call is
timeout-wrapped, and the deploy steps (swarm 270, compose 300) leave
room for diagnostics and cleanup below the 360-min cap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
routine/08_cleanup.sh becomes utils/clean/teardown.sh and topology/
becomes utils/topology/ so routine/ holds only the sequenced flow; all
consumers (workflow steps, compose/swarm.yml env guards, relative
sources, README) follow. The shell rescue collector and its lint are
gone: utils/diagnostics/container.py covers compose and swarm
identically. extend_inventory gains the backup-host placements the DR
drill deploys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5