The manager and indexer nofile limits now live next to their other resource settings in services.yml and the compose template reads them from there, as requested in review. The values are unchanged.
The indexer entrypoint is now only our CA-import block followed by exec of the image's own /entrypoint.sh, mounted at /infinito-entrypoint.sh with an explicit command. The certs entrypoint is our own script: it downloads the cert tool only from packages.wazuh.com and fails if that download fails, so there is no silent fallback to the dev bucket. The manager node name is passed in as WAZUH_MANAGER_NODE for both compose and swarm.
The manager and the indexer do not set bootstrap.memory_lock, so memlock -1 is not needed and would let a leaking process pin all host RAM. nofile stays: it is a per-process limit and OpenSearch needs a high file-descriptor limit.
Tor: use the shared tor block (bond 0.5, enabled when svc-net-tor is in the node's groups, tor pinned on in both variants) so a node serves one network, onion on a Tor node and clearnet otherwise.
SPOT and sizing: WAZUH_INDEXER_URL replaces four hand-built copies of the indexer URL, and the indexer heap is half of mem_limit instead of a hardcoded 1g (unchanged for the current 2g limit).
Fixes: bcrypt_hash rejects secrets over 72 bytes; the Keycloak group-removal helper uses the same resolver as the add helper and checks every response (the realm is no longer URL-encoded, matching the add helper), and a failed cleanup fails an otherwise passing test; the swarm certs generator removes a stale container before each attempt; vm.max_map_count is set before the early handler flush; securityadmin failed_when now needs rc 0 and the success marker.
The regenerated role README also picks up generator drift (mailu to stalwart).
docker stack deploy ignores depends_on, so manager, indexer and dashboard were scheduled together with certs_generator and rejected with 'bind source path does not exist' for the cert files. stack_ready.sh treats a Rejected newest task as fatal, so the converge failed on its first poll whenever certs_generator had not finished first.
In swarm, the certs_generator service is no longer rendered. Instead the stack host pulls the generator image and runs it once with the same entrypoint, env and mounts, before the stack deploys. The run is checked against a completion marker (sha256 of certs.yml plus tool version) and all eight cert files. Compose mode renders the same output as before.
Existing swarm hosts: a host whose Wazuh stack is already running has no marker yet, so the next deploy stops with an explicit error rather than rotating the CA under the live services. Either run 'docker stack rm wazuh' and redeploy, or write the expected marker value given in the error to <instance>/certs.complete, then redeploy. Compose hosts are not affected.
Per Kevin's review: replaced hardcoded usernames (wazuh-wui, kibanaserver,
admin) across wazuh.yml.j2, compose.yml.j2, internal_users.yml.j2,
roles_mapping.yml.j2, config.yml.j2 and 00_core.yml with
lookup('users', ...) references, following the same pattern already
used by web-svc-coturn and web-app-semaphore. New meta/users.yml
declares web-app-wazuh-dashboard (kibanaserver) and web-app-wazuh-api
(wazuh-wui) as service accounts, and references the existing shared
admin key as a dependency (admin: {}), matching the same pattern used
by openbao, pgadmin, checkmk, semaphore and openldap.
Per CodeRabbit's security finding (CWE-269): scoped readonly_auditor's
index_patterns from '*' to 'wazuh-*', matching the role's own stated
'all Wazuh indices' description. The wildcard previously granted read
access to every index on the cluster, including other users' saved
objects and plugin state, beyond what the role needs or describes.
playwright.env.j2's SUPER_ADMIN_PASSWORD/USERNAME lines looked up
web-app-keycloak's secrets unconditionally, with no check that
Keycloak is actually part of the deploy. This has been true since the
role's first commit, but was silently masked: the role's old
tor: enabled: true pulled in svc-net-tor, which declares Keycloak as
its onion-SSO provider, so Keycloak always ended up in the deploy
regardless of variant.
Removing tor (fix(web-app-wazuh): serve clearnet only) correctly
stopped that accidental masking - variant 1 (SSO/LDAP off) no longer
pulls Keycloak in at all, so the unconditional lookup now fails with
'Key administrator_password not found', confirmed on both a fedora
(compose) and centos (swarm) CI run.
Guards both lookups on WAZUH_OIDC_ENABLED (vars/main.yml, already
resolved from services.sso.enabled - i.e. whether Keycloak is in
group_names), matching the existing guards on PERSONA_ADMINISTRATOR_
BLOCKED and SSO_SERVICE_ENABLED a few lines above in the same file.
Falls back to an empty quoted string when SSO is off, so the lookup
never executes on that branch.
Verified: rendered both lines directly with a stub lookup that raises
if called - confirms the lookup is never evaluated when OIDC is off.
Confirmed variant 0 (SSO on) is unaffected. 22 passing tests across
the role's playwright/lint/mcp-secret suites.
Not run: a live compose/swarm deploy of variant 1 - the actual proof
this resolves the CI failure, pending next CI run.
While investigating, found the same unguarded-lookup pattern exists in
web-app-zammad (reads svc-db-postgres's password with no check that
postgres is in the deploy) - flagged for Kevin, not touched here since
it's unrelated to anything this branch changes.
Wazuh carries no network-specific code any more: the onion front-proxy include, WAZUH_DASHBOARD_ONION_DOMAIN, the forked templates/proxy.conf.j2 vhost and the tor exclusive/primary overrides are gone. The role follows the Tor provider default like every other role with a Tor bond; serving one role on several networks returns generically in the multi-network change.
Without the forked vhost nothing forwards X-Forwarded-Host, so the dashboard OIDC redirect base is the static canonical url.base instead of trust_dynamic_headers.
Also: the dashboard port is read from one variable, the Playwright specs share wazuhLoginViaOidc and withBiberInGroup and assert worker-src blob:, PR-added explanatory comments are removed, and the root README lists the role.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Seven real, branch-caused failures surfaced after rebasing onto main
(v14.0.0, ~900 commits):
- opensearch_dashboards_yml volume: type: config -> type: secret
(renders a live OIDC client secret; was world-readable at 0444 in a
volume type the platform treats as non-sensitive, same fix pattern
as web-app-gitlab's rails_secrets_yml)
- meta/networks.yml: local.subnet collided with web-app-litellm
- meta/services.yml: indexer/console ports collided with
svc-ai-litellm and web-app-openclaw (both added during the gap)
- compose.yml.j2: healthcheck interval/timeout/start_period now go
through the SPOT lookup instead of hardcoded values
- README.md: regenerated Quick Setup section, fixed credits link
formatting
- docs/requirements/035-mcp-proxy-expansion.md: added web-app-wazuh
to the adapter_candidate list (has a real, currently-unpublished
API surface - manager :55000, indexer :9200 - not yet evaluated
for an MCP adapter, same bucket web-app-checkmk/prometheus sat in
before promotion)
Two regressions caught by re-verification and fixed in the same pass:
meta/services.yml briefly reached into a role var directly (fixed to
use the lookup('config', ...) pattern already used elsewhere), and the
credits-link fix dropped required bold markdown.
Remaining test failures after this fix are confirmed pre-existing and
unrelated: svc-net-tor's nftables guard rule (kernel EOPNOTSUPP), an
INFINITO_SWARM_STEP_TIMEOUT_MINUTES Makefile/default.env drift, and a
CI chunk-budget drift.
Registers Wazuh's onion vhost with the front proxy and makes OIDC login
work correctly on either domain, following up on Kevin's request to
integrate this into the PR so CI can actually verify it.
- tasks/00_core.yml registers a second, guarded front-proxy include for
the onion domain (WAZUH_DASHBOARD_ONION_DOMAIN | length > 0), using
the same swarm-mode 'dashboard' compose-service-key fix already
applied to the clearnet include.
- The dashboard's OIDC redirect URL is now derived per request
(opensearch_security.openid.trust_dynamic_headers, driven by
X-Forwarded-Host) instead of a single static base_redirect_url that
could only ever match one of the two domains. Requires this role's
own templates/proxy.conf.j2 (forked from sys-svc-proxy's
basic.conf.j2) since the shared vhost template doesn't forward that
header.
- Restores WAZUH_DASHBOARD_ONION_DOMAIN in vars/main.yml, which had
been dropped during an earlier commit-splitting cleanup in this same
branch's history; removes the now-unused WAZUH_DASHBOARD_BASE_URL.
Trimmed on rebuild: the roles/sys-front-tls/ hunks are dropped; they
served only the dual-stack attempt.
Verification status: make lint-ansible / test-lint / test-unit-python
all pass. Not yet exercised against a live svc-net-tor deployment or
real CI onion-mode run - that's the actual verification this commit
unblocks, per Kevin's note that CI can't confirm the implementation
works while this sits uncommitted.
The healthcheck test regex ended with an unescaped $ ('^(200|401)$'),
which docker compose config tolerates silently but docker stack config
(swarm mode's stricter validator) rejects outright: 'invalid
interpolation format ... you may need to escape any $ with another $'.
Escaped to $$. Verified locally: docker stack config now resolves the
correct literal ^(200|401)$ regex. Confirmed via the actual PR CI run
(#414, 33759579296) that this explains all 5 swarm-mode failures
(debian, ubuntu x2, fedora), regardless of TLS mode - manager/dashboard
have no healthchecks, and no other $-ending pattern exists elsewhere
in the role's templates.
Add single-node Wazuh stack (manager, indexer, dashboard) as a new
Ansible role, integrated with the platform's Keycloak realm via native
OIDC and secondary LDAP authorization, with three-tier RBAC.
- Pins wazuh/wazuh-{manager,indexer,dashboard}:4.14.6 and
wazuh-certs-generator:0.0.4 (one-shot cert bootstrap job)
- No external database: wazuh.indexer (OpenSearch) is self-contained
- Auth: native OIDC against Keycloak, working end-to-end after two
infra fixes (JVM cacerts trust for the indexer's outbound calls to
Keycloak, front-proxy vhost wiring)
- LDAP wired as a secondary, authentication-independent authorization
backend (group-based backend_roles enrichment only)
- RBAC: three roles (administrator, security-analyst, readonly-auditor)
via the platform's standard meta/rbac.yml + rbac_group_path pipeline
- Documents a genuine upstream Wazuh bug: wz-home as the default
landing route throws an uncaught client exception for any
non-all_access role; default route moved to OpenSearch Dashboards'
own /app/home
Addressed two full rounds of review feedback (Kevin, Alejandro):
WEB_PROTOCOL usage, service-account naming, comment cleanup, shared
Keycloak-admin-helper extraction, a real TOCTOU race in RBAC test
setup, a Mermaid auth-flow diagram, meta/services.yml placement for
the certs-generator, CA-trust-path SPOT usage, CSP tightening
(including a genuine worker-src: blob: requirement found via live
testing), and a loud (non-silent) dev-bucket fallback warning.
Rebased onto main after a 3-month gap; brought the role in line with
~30 platform-convention changes introduced in that window (swarm
compose-template rules, Tor/onion contract, Playwright timeout/goto
wrappers, file layout, task numbering, comment policy, and more).
Live-deploy verification (9 iterations) found and fixed 6 further
real bugs invisible to lint/unit tests alone:
- credentials.* / meta/schema.yml -> secrets.credentials.* /
meta/secrets.yml (another platform-drift casualty)
- notify: "compose up" -> "compose-up" (day-one handler-name typo)
- local.subnet collision with web-app-mailu's /24
- missing primary: false alongside tor.exclusive: false, which let
the onion domain shadow the clearnet vhost entirely
- a second front-proxy include for the onion domain, later reverted
(see below)
- shared sys-stk-front-proxy/sys-front-tls TLS-lookup keying bug
(app-id-keyed vs. domain-keyed), which silently applied TLS to
Wazuh's onion vhost
The last two are related: enabling genuine dual-stack (clearnet +
onion) reachability for tor.exclusive: false surfaced a real bug in
two shared platform roles. That fix was verified safe against all 103
apps currently in the repo, but is deliberately NOT included here -
shared-role changes deserve their own PR and review, not to ride in
on a single app's feature branch. Wazuh's second front-proxy include
was reverted accordingly; the resulting onion-reachability gap is
documented in the README as a known, platform-scoped limitation.
make test: 5508 passed, 3 failed (all three trace to untracked local
scratch files - Dockerfile.bak, scripts/lab-*.sh - not present in any
CI checkout).
Prageeth Panicker
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5.5