The image bump 9ed531a77e (#1254) put Stalwart v1.0.1 on main. v1.0.1
shows the password form right after the username, without the "Allow"
consent step that v1.0.0 asked for. test-login-native.js waited for that
button unconditionally, so "administrator: stalwart recovery admin
native login and logout" timed out after 60 s in every attempt
(locator.waitFor on getByRole('button', { name: /^allow$/i })).
The spec now waits for either the Allow button or the password field and
clicks Allow only when it is shown; the same check runs before the
dashboard assertion after sign-in. Both waits still fail when neither
element appears.
The change is identical to the one on feature/updater-lockdown-probe,
so the two lines do not conflict when they meet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Mailu assert accepted any non-empty forward on the rua user, so a
forward to a user without a mailbox let the deploy publish an rua address
whose alias delivers nowhere. A forward now satisfies the assert only when
its target carries a mailbox account.
production_facts.py let a later duplicate tag overwrite an earlier one, so
a record with two rua tags passed although receivers discard it (DKIM
tag-list rules, adopted by RFC 7489). dmarc_tags now raises on a duplicate
tag and check_dmarc reports the record as invalid. The rua comparison also
took the raw URI text, so a percent-encoded address or one followed by
mailto header fields never matched; the address is now cut at '?' and
percent-decoded after the size suffix is removed (RFC 6068).
Refs #1125
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both mail providers published "v=DMARC1; p=reject; ruf=...; adkim=s;
aspf=s" without a rua tag, so the domain owner received no aggregate
reports and could not see who sends in the domain's name or whether
legitimate mail fails alignment.
services.<entity>.dmarc.rua_user in web-app-stalwart and web-app-mailu
now names the users-catalogue key whose mailbox receives the aggregate
reports. It is set to administrator, the one user every deployment
provisions with a mailbox (user-administrator), and an inventory may
name another key. The address is built as <username>@<mail domain>,
which is the exact account or alias the provider creates, so the record
never points at an address the server does not serve. An assert in the
DNS task fails the deploy before any record is written when the user
carries no mailbox account (Stalwart), or neither a mailbox account nor
a forward alias (Mailu), so reports cannot bounce. Mailu's DMARC_RUA
env, which only feeds the record its admin UI suggests, now carries the
same local part instead of the unprovisioned "admin".
production_facts.py takes a required --dmarc-rua. check_dmarc parses
the record's tags and fails unless rua names that mailbox (size
suffixes and several URIs are accepted). The policy check now reads the
p tag instead of matching the substring "p=", which "sp=" also matched.
Closes#1125
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- test_prefix_grouped_files: files/sql/store_database.sql and
store_layout.sql become files/sql/store/database.sql and layout.sql.
- test_file_spot: test_store_guard.py builds the vars path with
ROLE_FILE_VARS_MAIN instead of a hard-coded "vars" / "main.yml" chain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the v1.0.0 port, closing holes a review and a local run found:
- WebUI sign-in: WebUI v2 sends an http:// client-metadata-document id
on the onion origin, which Stalwart v1.0.0 rejects (unknown http ids
get no CIMD fallback, trusted hosts require TLS). The recovery admin
under SSO hit the same wall with the bare id 'stalwart-webui'. Register
a public first-party x:OAuthClient 'stalwart-webui' with the WebUI's
callback and login URIs on the served origin, and always inject it as
the Application's oauthClientId. Native sign-in now shows Stalwart's
consent step; test-login-native.js clicks it and also runs under SSO.
- Store guard: the previous guard only checked a running 0.16 server; a
local run showed v1 writing into a 0.16 store whose server was stopped.
The guard now reads the store whenever one exists (shared: pg_database,
dedicated: volume) and fails on the 0.16 bigint layout. A host marker
written at the end of a successful v1 deploy lets restores and
redeploys with a stopped dedicated database pass; without the marker,
a stopped dedicated database fails with an explicit message instead of
a masked psql error. Queries retry while the database recovers.
- README: WebUI sign-in, guard semantics, restore and redeploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stalwart v1.0.0 rejects unknown JMAP properties ("Invalid property" ->
notCreated/notUpdated), validates OIDC tokens more strictly and refuses to
open a data store from before 1.0. Port the role and protect existing
installs:
- Milter: hostname/timeoutConnect/timeoutCommand/timeoutData become
host/connectTimeout/commandTimeout/dataTimeout; the existing milter is
looked up by host.
- Onion relay route: address becomes host.
- OIDC directory: requireAudience is gone. Set skipAudienceValidation and
unscopedTokens=interoperable on create and update, so Keycloak tokens
(no Stalwart audience, no mail scope) keep working for the WebUI and
Roundcube XOAUTH2.
- WebUI: send oauthClientId only with SSO enabled; without SSO the WebUI
falls back to its own client metadata document.
- Store guard: before anything changes, a running Stalwart whose table u
still has the 0.16 bigint layout stops the deploy and points to the
stalwart-migrate steps, which the README now documents under
"Upgrading from 0.16".
- Updater: pin the WebUI git_tags source to v2.* to match server 1.x.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The unauthenticated half of the relay probe passed on any 5xx answer.
A server that refused the recipient for another reason would have
counted as "relay denied". It now requires 550, the code Stalwart gives
for a denied relay.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Under SSO the role tried to let applications relay without SMTP AUTH by
widening the relay rule to the private networks. The rule compared the
peer address to the text of a CIDR, which never matches, so an
application could reach local mailboxes but got "550 5.1.2 Relay not
allowed" for every external recipient. Repairing the comparison would
have opened a relay, because published ports, Tor and the swarm mesh all
hand outside clients an address inside those networks.
Stalwart checks app passwords before it asks the external directory, so
a bot can authenticate while the directory is OIDC. With SSO enabled the
role now creates one app password per bot, acting for that account as
the recovery admin, and stores it in the token store the SMTP password
is already read from. A bot gets a new one when its entry is deleted in
Stalwart or its token is removed.
The relay rule is back to authenticated sessions only. The lookup loses
its SSO relay branch and the role its submission_via_relay flag, so an
SSO deployment submits on 465 with AUTH like every other one.
The role's CLI test now fails when an unauthenticated session is given
an external recipient, or when the bot credential is refused one.
Closes#793
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbach
Alejandro Roman