unsafe-inline re-admits the inline execution an XSS needs and unsafe-eval re-admits string-to-code, so a CSP relaxation must be verified against the running app rather than copied from another role. The new lint requires a nocheck marker plus a Reason on the flag's own line, so a marker cannot drift to the neighbouring directive.
The 197 pre-existing grants across 70 roles are checked out with a TODO: they were never verified and still have to be.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
svc-ai-ollama 0.32.13->0.32.14, svc-bkp-volume-2-local's drill scratch alpine 3.21->3.24, penpot's frontend/backend/exporter 2.17.0->2.17.1 in lockstep because they speak one internal interface, prometheus alertmanager v0.33.1->v0.34.0, seaweedfs 4.41->4.42, semaphore v2.19.7->v2.19.8, snipe-it v8.7.0->v8.7.1-alpine.
Declared only - none of these images was pulled or started. alertmanager is the sole minor bump and the one whose configuration could break; the alpine jump spans three releases but carries only the drill's find -delete and ls -A, which the next drill run exercises anyway.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
72fd9c870 required the onion in every variant but exempted variant 1, on the
argument that the minimal round is the one place the stack runs without it. That
argument does not hold: the onion is part of the deployment under test, not a
feature bolted onto the full shape. A round that skips it is not a smaller
deployment, it is a different one.
So the exemption is gone and 95 variant-1 entries pin the onion on. Two
exclusions remain, both read from data rather than a comment: a role with no tor
block has no onion to pin, and a role whose meta/services.yml pins tor.enabled to
a literal false has already declared it has none.
That put the rule in conflict with test_coverage, which requires both polarities
of every dynamic flag: with tor on everywhere, the false side has no variant left
to live in. 94 roles take the exemption that contract already provides for
exactly this - "flags whose group-derived value is a hard invariant that variants
must never override", the same one 4e6ef2542 used for the seaweedfs frontend.
web-app-nextcloud needs none: its variant 8 pairs the clearnet-only PeerTube and
keeps the false polarity.
Measured, because the declaration is not what CI runs. assign_tor gives the onion
to every second capable entry with the run number as the parity switch, so more
capable variants do not mean proportionally more onion jobs: across five roles
and 21 entries the count goes 8 -> 10 on an even run and 9 on an odd one. The
clearnet path also survives - checkmk reports v1=false on run 0 and v1=true on
run 1, so both states are still covered across two consecutive runs. What the
94 markers give up is a declarative guarantee in variants.yml, not the coverage
itself.
The real cost is weight, not job count. web-app-nextcloud variant 1 goes from
3.09GB reservation / 7.27GB limit to 18.26GB / 43.01GB once svc-net-tor and its
closure join, so the cheap round is no longer cheap. Every variant stays under
the 32/64GB budget, and the same effect applies to the other 94 unmeasured.
Verified: tests/lint 336 passed / 307 subtests, tests/integration/roles/meta/
variants plus the role-meta lints 39 passed. The rule was checked in both
directions - it reported the variant-1 offenders before the flips and none after.
Not measured: what the heavier rounds do to wall-clock, against swarm jobs capped
at 355 minutes and one that has hit that ceiling before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
7a70d27b7 made a variant that switches SSO on also switch the onion on, because
that pairing is where the platform breaks in ways clearnet never shows. The same
argument reaches further than SSO: a Secure cookie is dropped, an https identity
provider refuses to embed, and crypto.subtle is undefined for any feature on a
non-secure origin, not only for a login. A variant that never runs the onion is
not testing the deployment users get.
So the rule now covers every variant of a role that declares a tor block.
Variant 1 stays exempt - it is the minimal, partner-free round every role
declares and the one place the stack is exercised without the onion at all - and
a role whose meta/services.yml pins tor.enabled to a literal false is skipped
outright, because that declaration already says the role has no onion and needs
no comment repeating it.
That found 137 variants. 101 were variant 1. Of the rest, 28 are the LDAP-only
auth-isolation rounds, which gain real coverage from running LDAP over the onion
and are flipped on here. Four cannot: svc-net-tor is the provider itself, and
nextcloud's variant 8 pairs the clearnet-only PeerTube. Both carry a marker
naming the reason; opentalk and coturn need none, since their services.yml pins
the literal false the rule now reads.
Flipping them exposed a contract that contradicted itself. test_auth_isolation
and test_non_baseline_explicit_disables demanded `shared: false` beside
`enabled: false`, while variants-static-override flagged that same line as a
static override - which is why all 133 of them carried a nocheck marker. The
demand only makes sense where `shared` is dynamic: a literal base value cannot
leak through deep-merge, so restating it protects nothing. Both contracts now
ask for it only in that case, and the 133 lines are gone.
The result is a stricter rule with fewer lines: 189 insertions against 193
deletions.
Verified: tests/lint 336 passed / 307 subtests, tests/integration/roles 107
passed / 610 subtests. The rule is checked in both directions - it reported 137
offenders before the resolution and none after.
Not measured: 28 additional onion rounds cost matrix wall-clock, against swarm
jobs already capped at 355 minutes and one that has hit that ceiling before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every variants.yml header states the rule the bond feeds: variant 0 carries each
tightly-coupled (bond>=1, same-host) service, while loosely-coupled (bond<1,
separate-host) partners are excluded from the closure and distributed across
later variants to keep every host under budget. tor was declared bond: 1 in all
101 consumers, so it had to sit in every variant-0 closure.
It does not belong there. The onion is a separate-host provider reached over the
node's hidden service, the same shape as the bridged partners that already carry
0.5, and f1dff50fb established both the reasoning and the precedent when it
dropped xwiki and bigbluebutton from 1 to 0.5: bridged partners with their own
role and their own spec, whose bond declaration was the outlier rather than
their placement.
This also unblocks the variant-level tor contract. Requiring a non-baseline
variant to pin the onion on while tor still counted as tightly coupled would
have pulled variant 0's closure requirements along with it.
Verified: tests/lint 336 passed / 307 subtests and tests/integration/roles 107
passed / 610 subtests, including test_resource_budget over every variant's
deduplicated footprint and the bond-aware test_order closure.
Not measured, and the honest cost: f1dff50fb's own caveat applies unchanged
here. Whether redistributing a service out of the baseline closure buys back
wall-clock is not established; role-runtimes has the per-role seconds and no run
has been made with this shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
meta/schema.yml held credential definitions and their runtime values, but the
name said 'schema' and read like structural metadata next to services.yml and
volumes.yml. Nothing in the file is a schema in the sense the other meta files
use the word, and a contributor had to open it to learn it holds secrets.
62 role files renamed. ROLE_FILE_META_SCHEMA becomes ROLE_FILE_META_SECRETS and
keeps its role as the SPOT the path is built from.
Two readers bypassed that constant and spelled the name themselves:
utils/cache/applications.py built meta_dir / 'schema.yml' twice, and
plugins/lookup/application_gid.py carries the filename in the marker list it
detects application roles by. Left behind, the rename would not have raised —
credentials would have resolved empty and the role would have stopped counting
as an application.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
compose_replicas defaults to len(groups[application_id]), so the swarm deploy ran 3 semaphore replicas. The stock entrypoint runs 'semaphore setup' plus db.Migrate on every container start with no advisory lock, so all three raced the migration chain on a fresh DB. The loser hit migrations_pkey on version 2.3.1, and its rollback path deleted the winner's ledger row without undoing the schema. Every later start then replayed v2.3.1 against the newer session table and died on 42601, so the stack never converged.
Upstream OSS is single-instance regardless: the HA node registry, schedule deduplicator and orphan cleaner are pro_impl stubs returning nil.
Seen in CI run 31128575683, job 92710765438.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every conflicted hunk resolves onto the swarm-nfs side, because on all six
files it is the strict superset: it carries the display-name codec
(utils/roles/display.py) the CI role selections now encode through, and the
sequencing glyph move from 910748ec4. svc-net-tor holds no unique content on
any of them -- runs.py even had non-conflicted hunks already calling `codec`,
so keeping its side would have left a NameError.
The lint fallout is settled in the same commit, as 4afc9b770 did for the
previous merge: the shell-or-true lint lives on svc-net-tor (c505ce746) and
swarm-nfs brings two unmarked `|| true` sites with it. Both get a nocheck
reason rather than a rewrite, because neither swallows anything -- the
slaptest call is the measured exception of c4bbbba93 and has_cn_config decides
right below it, and the dockerd restart is followed by an is-active poll that
fatals. In both the exit code was never the authority.
make quality green end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
compose_replicas defaults to len(groups[application_id]), so the swarm deploy ran 3 semaphore replicas. The stock entrypoint runs 'semaphore setup' plus db.Migrate on every container start with no advisory lock, so all three raced the migration chain on a fresh DB. The loser hit migrations_pkey on version 2.3.1, and its rollback path deleted the winner's ledger row without undoing the schema. Every later start then replayed v2.3.1 against the newer session table and died on 42601, so the stack never converged.
Upstream OSS is single-instance regardless: the HA node registry, schedule deduplicator and orphan cleaner are pro_impl stubs returning nil.
Seen in CI run 31128575683, job 92710765438.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Seven include templates under sys-svc-container decided how a container was
probed, and they read their inputs from template-local `{% set %}` scope.
That scope leaks: a value set for one service silently reached every service
below it, which is how taiga's front and gateway ended up probing a port
declared for a different service, and how bluesky's frontend probed a PDS
endpoint.
Probes now live in utils/docker/healthcheck.py, one class per flavor behind a
PROBES registry, and each service declares its own:
healthcheck:
flavor: curl
path: health/ready
start_period: 20m
`port_key` picks another entry under ports.internal for the services that
expose their probe elsewhere (keycloak on management, nextcloud talk on
signaling). Without a flavor the entry must carry an explicit test argv, so a
missing declaration fails loudly instead of rendering a probe against nothing.
Rendering HEAD's templates against the new output confirms 49 of 56 call
sites are byte-identical; the remaining seven are covered by an Ansible run.
Three probes change on purpose: erpnext's backend gains a check it never had,
bluesky's frontend drops the leaked PDS path, and msmtp_curl moves from a
hardcoded localhost:80 to the service's own port on 127.0.0.1 like every
other flavor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three conflicts, none resolved by picking a side wholesale:
- Makefile: took the incoming ACT_INPUTS, which routes through SWARM_DISTROS
instead of inlining the same expression a second time.
- test-e2e-playwright/02_run_one.yml: took the incoming rc handling. An absent
rc now counts as failure; the previous default(0) let an aborted Playwright
run pass silently, contradicting the debug message right above it.
- web-app-peertube spec: combined both. Kept gotoOnion and resolveTimeout,
which this branch's lint enforces, and adopted the incoming retry-inside-poll
for the OIDC button plus its networkidle wait.
The declared values were guesses that ran up to 60x the size of the image they belong to: seaweedfs asked for 30GB against a 104MB image, nextcloud for 20GB against 353MB. Because min_storage feeds the storage guard, the runner packer and the sufficient-storage filter, those numbers made hosts look too small and pruned caches that deploys did not need to lose.
Every service that declares min_storage together with image and version now carries the measured compressed transfer size of that image plus 200MB of headroom. Sizes were read from the registries through utils.docker.registry.manifest_transfer_size, the same path the headroom test uses, so the declarations and the gate agree by construction. Values are written in MB throughout, matching the existing 500MB / 100MB / 50MB style.
119 declarations across 89 roles. Range: 206MB (memcached) to 3473MB (ollama); four exceed 1GB. The 84 min_storage entries that name no image are untouched, since there is nothing to measure them against.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rewrite all 254 role descriptions to a uniform noun-phrase schema
(function-first, no leading verb, no trailing period, <=120 chars) and
enforce it via the extended description lint. Rename 12 role README H1
titles for clarity (e.g. Backup Container to Local -> Backup Docker
Volumes, CSS Service -> Corporate Design, NGINX Legal -> Imprint) and
regenerate their Cosmos and Quick Setup sections. Overview table
regenerated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add cli.build.readme.overview (make readme-index / make docs) rendering a
roles overview in the root README: Name, Lifecycle, Homepage, Video,
Description, Integrated with, Install. New info-media lint requires
homepage + video in every invokable role's meta/info.yml (opt out via
'# nocheck: info-media' in meta/main.yml); backfilled 147 roles with
researched, adversarially-verified homepages and official videos.
Retire the 'unsupported' lifecycle value: fold it into 'eol' as a valid
live end-of-life status (shipped but untested/unmaintained) across the
stage lists, symbol glossary, allow-list lint and docs. Retag confluence,
jira, minio, phpldapadmin to eol and magento to pre-alpha.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per-role deploy-mode opt-out moves from meta/tests.yml 'skip:' to meta/services.yml <entity>.modes.{compose,swarm}.enabled on the primary entity. get_role_skip now derives from it; get_role_mode_enabled added. A new lint requires every role shipping templates/*compose*.yml.j2 to declare both mode flags. Migrates 107 services.yml and drops 11 skip-only tests.yml. Also removes the variant_status deployability gate so swarm runs one job per variant unconditionally (variant_status.py and deployable_variant_indices deleted, complexity model simplified). Adds the i8matix alias.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bump every outdated image pin and repository ref to latest except
web-app-nextcloud (kept on 33-fpm-alpine). Covers keycloak, gitlab (6
services), matrix, opentalk, jira, confluence, espocrm, magento
opensearch, elasticsearch, rabbitmq, qdrant, ollama, seaweedfs,
semaphore, wordpress, taiga, bluesky (image + social-app ref), bookwyrm
ref, roulette-wheel, simpleicons, registry cache/docker, and the
svc-runner base image. Includes major jumps (elasticsearch 9, rabbitmq
4, opensearch 3, espocrm 10, registry 3, node 26, ubuntu 26.10) that
are pin-only and still need a deploy validation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rename the role, its test tree, the primary entity key
(volume-2-local), the derived vars (BKP_VOLUME_2_LOCAL_*,
SYS_SERVICE_BACKUP_VOLUME_2_LOCAL), the run-once fact, and every
group_names consumer flag, include path, doc, and lint reference. The
container_backup service key and the on-disk backup-docker-to-local
tree keep their names: both are contracts with existing consumer
entries, snapshot trees, and the baudolo pull tooling.
Operators must rename the svc-bkp-container-2-local inventory group and
disable the previous versioned units on already-provisioned hosts; the
pre-deploy snapshot glob derives its base from the new role name and
will not find them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Variant 0 pins the backup consumer flag enabled so the matrix baseline exercises the in-group branch; every other variant pins it disabled (shared: false carries the static-override suppression since the base value stays literally true). The matrix and wordpress variant entries move their services mapping to the list-item head so the static-override line parser resolves the override paths; yaml semantics are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every invokable stack role that declares named volumes in meta/volumes.yml now carries the standard container_backup consumer entry: enabled resolves via 'svc-bkp-container-2-local' in group_names, shared stays literally true since there is no per-consumer backup instance. Playwright/dynamic-flag/bond-baseline suppressions ride on the block per the established idioms; stale explanatory comments in the touched files are dropped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
