Fourteen roles repeated the same two lines to say they use the gateway: a
`shared` flag gated on group_names, and an `enabled` flag conjoining that gate
with LITELLM_CHAT_MODEL_SERVED. Both are now single-sourced.
`shared` becomes literal true. The flag means the provider is a shared instance
rather than one deployed per consumer, and a central gateway is always that;
the dynamic form only said "shared if deployed", which `enabled` already
decides. The 50 shared pins under `litellm:` leave meta/variants.yml with it.
The tree had already noticed: 20 of those 50 lines carried
`# nocheck: variants-static-override`, two of them with copy-pasted text about
container_backup. This narrows e5de4e085a for one service key rather than
reversing it; every other dynamic flag keeps the group_names form.
`enabled` becomes `{{ LITELLM_USABLE }}`, defined in group_vars/all/16_ai.yml.
That shorthand is only possible because is_explicit_truth learns about it.
The resolver reads a dependency out of the flag TEXT — "in group_names" in
value — so a constant hides the role id and the provider silently leaves the
static closure of every role referencing it. Measured: the old expression
resolves True, `{{ LITELLM_USABLE }}` resolves False. GROUP_GATED_CONSTANTS
names the constants whose own definition carries the gate, and the docstring
states the obligation: a SPOT of this kind that is not listed there drops its
provider without a word.
The wider fix, accepting any Jinja as dynamic, was measured and rejected: 35
other flags carry a Jinja value without the marker (MCP sidecars, javascript
and SSO gates, recaptcha), and they would all enter closures they are not in
today.
A literal shared flag is no longer dynamic, so test_dynamic_flags wants the
`# nocheck: dynamic-flag` its own message documents for legitimate exceptions;
where a marker already existed the rule list is extended rather than a second
comment added.
Behaviour is unchanged where it counts. The closure keeps litellm with the same
app counts (wordpress 26, openwebui 23, hermes 23, mediawiki 22, flowise 23),
unrelated Jinja still resolves False, and the truth table of the new enabled
form matches the old one in all four served/deployed combinations. Three roles
resolve without litellm, and `git show HEAD:` proves that predates this change:
zammad pins enabled false in variant 0 at line 39, nextcloud at line 97.
Six unit tests cover the resolver, including one asserting that every
registered constant is actually defined in group_vars, so an entry cannot
become a dead promise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The gateway publishes only models it has a backend for and renders model_list: [] when neither ollama nor lmstudio is deployed and no OpenRouter key is set. LITELLM_CHAT_MODEL fell back to openrouter/auto without checking that key, so consumers were configured for a model the gateway does not carry and every prompt failed with a 400.
Observed in the Mattermost#1 CI job: litellm.log carries 12 occurrences of "Invalid model name passed in model=openrouter/auto" next to 400 Bad Request, and tests/test-litellm-agent.js failed on every attempt while the rest of the suite passed.
Make the fallback conditional on the key so the name is empty when nothing is served, promote LITELLM_CHAT_MODEL_SERVED from the role vars to group_vars where consumers can see it (it was the third copy of this logic and the only correct one), and switch the 14 consumers from "litellm is deployed" to "litellm serves a model". The Playwright service flag reads the same lookup, so the spec skips together with the Ansible gate. The bool filter carries weight: the folded scalar yields the string False, which Jinja treats as truthy.
A new unit test renders both expressions against Jinja and pins the invariant that a model name exists exactly when a model is served, including the case where ollama preloads embedding models only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two leftovers of my own. The sweep that removed the reverse client entries
appended a newline where it cut a block, which at end of file leaves a blank
line after the last key in four services.yml. And the two cache-read nocheck
comments in the bond editor were written past the line limit, so the
formatter breaks their read_text calls across three lines and carries the
comment to the closing paren.
The wrap does not cost the suppression: test_no_uncached_file_reads matches
the statement, not the line the directive sits on, and passes on this form.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four MCP clients each carried a services entry for homeassistant, and
openwebui and flowise one for baserow, with matching run_after lines. Those
predate the admission refactor: since then the co-deploy edge lives on the
provider, where mcp-consumer-services-entry enforces it, and homeassistant
and baserow already carry an entry for every client they admit. The client
copies stated the same relation a second time.
The asymmetry gives them away. Open WebUI consumes twenty MCP servers and
declared three of them; the other seventeen work because the bridge is built
from MCP_DISCOVERED_SERVERS, never from the client's own services map.
Drop the run_after lines in the same move: a run_after target must be backed
by a services entry, so one cannot go without the other. Hermes and OpenClaw
lose the whole key, homeassistant being its only entry, because a bare
run_after parses as null rather than an empty list.
Keep qdrant on flowise, which renders QDRANT_URL and QDRANT_API_KEY into the
container and is a real dependency, and keep prometheus everywhere as the
ordinary metrics edge.
Open WebUI stops dragging both providers into every round it joins, which
brings moodle variant 2 from 64.75 GB back to 62.75 GB, under the budget the
preceding commit pushed it over.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
allowed_consumers was twenty hand-kept lists of which fourteen were identical, so every new client meant an edit in every provider. A client now declares services.<own-entity>.mcp_consumer: true once and a provider refuses one with mcp_consumer: false, which is also what tells a deliberate exclusion apart from a forgotten entry.
The group_names-gated consumer entries give the inventory resolver the co-deploy edge meta/mcp.yml never had: one of sixty-nine matrix rounds carried an MCP client before, twenty-three role/round pairs do now. bond 0.5 keeps the clients out of round 0 so the host memory budget still holds.
BREAKING CHANGE: meta/mcp.yml no longer accepts allowed_consumers; declare services.<entity>.mcp_consumer on the client instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four roles gained a canonical domain without a tor service block. Declare it
the way 84b22b37a8 did for n8n: bond 0.5, enabled on 'svc-net-tor' in
group_names, shared, with the variant pins alongside.
The nocheck directives carry the two exemptions: the service has no persona
surface for the playwright flag, and the sso-variant-tor combination requires
the onion in every variant, so the false polarity has no variant left to
live in.
hermes also moves its local http port from 8089 to 8092, because 8089
belongs to web-app-socialhome. That is a separate concern riding along in the
same file; splitting it would need interactive staging.
This is merge work rather than authored here: it follows the established
pattern and the port collision is real, but none of it has been deployed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The service declared no replica count, so it took the topology default of
three and spread them over two nodes while its state directory is one NFS
export shared by all of them. The agent keeps that state in SQLite, and the
swarm run shows what concurrent writers do to it: one replica exits with the
database reported as not a database, another cannot even create the state
directory.
Those exits are what started the restart storm the run then failed on, and
they are runtime independent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The agent drives MCP clients, so holders of its application-scoped mcp
role must reach it, which completes the set of three client roles whose
gate now admits that group. The README follows the renamed assert task.
The block sat under services but never behaved like a service. A service has
exactly one providing role, declared with provides, so the registry can map the
key to that role and consumers bind their flag to its presence. No role declares
provides: mcp. There are seventeen providers and the pairing is done by
allowed_consumers inside the block itself.
Every rule that enforces the service model therefore needed an exemption for it:
a shared-provider suppression in fourteen roles, a playwright-service-flag
suppression, and two freshly added exemptions in the dynamic-flag and
variants-static-override checks. Four independent rules, four escape hatches,
one cause. They are all gone now, together with a bond key that only the
resource budgeter reads and only for entries under services, and a wordpress
addon bridge that pointed at a service block that no longer exists.
The block moves to meta/mcp.yml. The applications loader maps meta/<name>.yml to
applications.<app>.<name> generically, so the move needs no wiring; the file
takes the same shape as meta/rbac.yml. Every config path follows, the variant
overrides are lifted out of their services map, and the vocabulary module leaves
the services package because it no longer describes one. roles_with_service
gains an explicit topic parameter rather than an implicit fallback, so nothing
silently resolves against the wrong container.
Files that are otherwise unrelated to this move are included where the committed
tree would otherwise keep pointing at a path that no longer resolves: thirteen
vars files, eleven playwright env templates and one task file.
Render every discovered server into the agent's own config, filtered to
the auth schemes a client can actually present, so no entry carries a
credential the server would reject.
Render hermes' config after the stack exists and before the handlers
flush; the other order fired compose up while the config was still
missing.
Own the config file as the container user. Rendered as root it stays
unreadable to the agent, which then falls back to its built-in defaults
silently and reports only that the server is unknown, pointing the reader
at the wrong layer.
Assert what these clients expose: neither ships an admin surface listing
its configured servers, so the specs hold the API to refusing an
unauthenticated caller, which is what keeps the per-server bearers out of
reach.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
MCP_DISCOVERED_SERVERS resolves every server-direction role to its internal URL, the bearer the server role minted, and its transport, dropping any server without a token so no client renders a connection it cannot authenticate.
OpenClaw moves from 2026.3.11 to 2026.7.1 because the pinned version has no configuration surface for outbound MCP servers at all: its validator rejects mcpServers, the shipped bundle carries no bundle-mcp, and the ACP path refuses per-session servers while pointing at a gateway config that does not exist there. 2026.7.1 reads mcp.servers, which the template now renders. The gateway command gains its run subcommand because the bare gateway no longer starts anything.
Reachability was the missing half: openclaw sat on its own networks only, so the hub name resolved through the DNS wildcard to the ingress instead of the container. The hub overlay now declares an mcp consumer key, which attaches every role carrying services.mcp.
A probe task runs openclaw mcp probe after the handlers flush and fails the deploy when a configured server does not answer. Without it the previous run reported failed=0 while the client could not reach anything.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The second agent of requirement 032, pinned to the same isolating runtime
as hermes. Unlike hermes it exposes a browser Control UI rather than a
bearer API, so it takes the oauth2 proxy flavour with its own sso port;
a proxy in front of a browser surface is correct where it would break
OpenAI-compatible clients.
Three deploy failures shaped this role. OpenClaw maps no environment
variables onto config keys, so it restart-looped on 'Missing config' and
then on 'non-loopback Control UI requires allowedOrigins'; both now come
from a rendered openclaw.json mounted as a config. That render must run
after sys-stk-full, because it notifies compose up and the handler would
otherwise fire before the compose file exists. And the process runs as
root: OpenClaw refuses a config file not owned by the running uid and
writes cron state into its home, neither of which a non-root user can do
against the platform's root-owned volume and config mount. gVisor is the
isolation boundary here, not the in-guest uid.
The administrator persona is blocked: the Control UI is a WebSocket SPA
behind gateway device pairing with no DOM logout control for the shared
helper. The SSO round-trip itself is covered by test-oidc-login.js, which
drives the full unauthenticated to Keycloak to authenticated path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5