An mcp grant lets its holder drive clients that reach admitted providers
with the credentials the deployment issued, not the caller's own, so the
role is declared per application and never spans them.
The unit test pins that boundary directly: a scoped grant reaches only
the named application, an unscoped one reaches nothing, and an ordinary
role still spans everything. The Keycloak realm builder, the LDAP entry
builder and the Open WebUI reconciler all resolve membership through the
one module this covers.
The second agent of requirement 032, pinned to the same isolating runtime
as hermes. Unlike hermes it exposes a browser Control UI rather than a
bearer API, so it takes the oauth2 proxy flavour with its own sso port;
a proxy in front of a browser surface is correct where it would break
OpenAI-compatible clients.
Three deploy failures shaped this role. OpenClaw maps no environment
variables onto config keys, so it restart-looped on 'Missing config' and
then on 'non-loopback Control UI requires allowedOrigins'; both now come
from a rendered openclaw.json mounted as a config. That render must run
after sys-stk-full, because it notifies compose up and the handler would
otherwise fire before the compose file exists. And the process runs as
root: OpenClaw refuses a config file not owned by the running uid and
writes cron state into its home, neither of which a non-root user can do
against the platform's root-owned volume and config mount. gVisor is the
isolation boundary here, not the in-guest uid.
The administrator persona is blocked: the Control UI is a WebSocket SPA
behind gateway device pairing with no DOM logout control for the shared
helper. The SSO round-trip itself is covered by test-oidc-login.js, which
drives the full unauthenticated to Keycloak to authenticated path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbach
