PHP_MEMORY_LIMIT and PHP_OPCACHE_MEMORY_CONSUMPTION were both the host's
RAM divided by 30, read from two keys in meta/services.yml: 533M on a
16 GB host, 2133M on a 64 GB one, beside a container limited to 3g either
way. They are now half and an eighth of that limit through
lookup('service_memory_mb'), which renders 1536M and 384M on every host.
The lookup sits in env.j2 and the two meta keys are gone. It reads the
applications payload, and meta/services.yml is part of that payload, so
a call from there would run back into the render that asked for it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The list form could publish a host:container pair and nothing else, so thirteen blocks stayed hand-written: the ones needing a protocol suffix, a port range, the swarm long syntax with mode host, or a container-port-only publish. Each of those duplicated numbers the role already declares in meta/services.yml, which is the drift the lookup exists to remove.
The lookup keeps the list form unchanged for its 93 existing call sites and gains a dict form: transport emits one item per protocol, container 'same' serves the services that cannot remap (STUN/TURN, media relays), mode 'host' emits the long block an edge role needs in swarm so the client address survives the hop, publish 'ephemeral' emits the container port alone, and key names the block for Discourse's launcher file, whose expose: list is what becomes docker run -p there. A declared {start, end} mapping renders as start-end on both sides, so a relay range needs no term of its own.
svc-prx-openresty had no ports block at all and bound 80 and 443 as literals in its template, while torrc.j2 carried a third literal 80 for the hidden service. None of the three referenced the others. openresty now declares the ports, the compose template reads them, and the onion's port 80 comes from ports.onion.http through TOR_ONION_EXTRA_PORTS.
Three blocks stay raw, each with the reason it cannot route through one call: keycloak's sso_proxy maps a published port owned by the consuming role to a container port owned by web-app-keycloak, and matrix's ansible flavor takes element on 8080 and federation on 8048 from the upstream playbook rather than from this repo's ports.internal.
The enforcing lint scanned only files with compose in the name and only double-quoted list items, so nine of the thirteen blocks were invisible to it. It now reads every role template that can carry a ports block, catches unquoted items, protocol suffixes, ranges, flow style and the long syntax, and tracks the block by the indentation of its key: keying on the next line closed the block on anything shaped like a key, which target, published, protocol and mode all are. Under expose: only a real mapping counts, because there the single-segment form documents a container port and publishes nothing.
Verified by rendering all 110 container_ports call sites through the real templar, the real lookup and the real merged applications view.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Run 34421944328 Nextcloud#1 timed out "waiting for a signed-in Nextcloud
shell after the login redirect". 4164f37981 turned sso on in variant 1
while ldap stays off there, so that round logs in through sociallogin
instead of oidc_login - the first variant, on this branch or on main,
that runs sociallogin against an onion issuer. oidc_login goes through
Nextcloud's HTTP client, which honours the proxy in proxy.config.php;
sociallogin builds its own client and reads only
social_login_http_client['proxy'], so its token exchange never reached
the onion Keycloak. The template now sets the same tor SOCKS proxy for
it, inside the existing "sso on and the OIDC host is an onion" branch.
The spec only treated 5xx documents as a page failure, so a refused
callback surfaced as a 60s (x5 over tor) wait for a shell that could not
come. A 4xx on /apps/sociallogin/ or /apps/oidc_login/ now counts as
the page itself failing, reported without the query so no code leaks.
The plugin loop printed every item, including the OIDC client secret,
into the include line of a public CI log; it now labels by plugin key and
honours MASK_CREDENTIALS_IN_LOGS.
_shared.js grew past 250 lines; its page and modal helpers move to
_page.js and _shared.js re-exports them, with an identical export
surface.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
start_interval is the cadence while start_period runs, and only while it runs.
Once the window closes the probe falls back to interval, so a service that
becomes ready just after it pays a whole tick anyway and the cadence never
reached it. Six of the seven flavors were shaped that way, Curl worst: a thirty
second window against a one minute interval.
Measured across 151 converge waits in four job logs, 63 sit exactly on a tick
boundary, 36 in the thirty second step and 27 in the sixty second one.
Attributed by application, web-app-seaweedfs is the largest at 1501s over
sixteen waits with a median of 57.7s: it probes with curl and fell straight into
the gap. web-app-zammad probes with connect, whose window is fifteen minutes,
and its 154s median is real boot time with nothing to recover.
So the window moves to ten minutes and the steady state interval to two, and the
flavor overrides that sat below them go: Curl, Wget and Connect lose interval
1m, Http its twenty second window, Nc its ten. Connect keeps fifteen minutes.
Neither number costs anything while a container works. start_period delays
nothing, it only stops failures counting, and interval no longer touches
convergence at all since that hangs on the window alone; it is steady state
load, which drops from 120 probes an hour per service to 30.
Forty six role files follow. Twenty seven declarations go that repeat the new
default or undercut it, an undercut window being the defect itself. Eight
windows longer than ten minutes keep their value and now say why. The literal
blocks and the three Dockerfiles this repository builds spell every timing out,
because outside the lookup an omission takes docker's value and not the
platform's.
A fourth lint rule keeps the shape: start_period must outlast one interval,
checked against the effective values, so raising interval without the window
cannot quietly bring the cliff back.
Two faults in the lint surfaced while building it and are fixed here. It
compared timings as strings, so 600s and 10m read as different values, and it
matched the healthcheck key exactly, so a line carrying a trailing nocheck was
skipped whole, which is how the two swarm-init partials went unexamined.
One regression, bounded. A container that starts and never turns healthy is
neither rejected nor errored, so stack_ready.sh only calls it fatal after three
killed tasks, and each cycle now spans the longer window. That reaches twenty
minutes rather than six, capped there by swarm_stack_converge_retries at 600
with a two second delay, and it lands only on runs that were failing anyway.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A healthcheck written outside the container_healthcheck lookup inherits nothing
from utils/docker/healthcheck, and docker offers nowhere to put a replacement.
daemon.json carries storage, logging, DNS, registries and runtimes, and no
health key at all, so an omitted timing lands on docker's own value rather than
the platform's. The two disagree where it matters most: docker starts a
container with no start period, which leaves start_interval no window to act in.
That is why the hand-written blocks never gained the cadence.
The three images this repository builds itself now carry it. openldap and
postgres also drop to the platform interval, and bluesky gains the start window
it never had:
svc-db-openldap/files/Dockerfile --interval=30s ... --start-interval=5s
svc-db-postgres/templates/Dockerfile.j2 --interval=30s ... --start-interval=5s
web-app-bluesky/.../Dockerfile --start-period=30s --start-interval=5s
Six literal blocks move to the platform interval as well: magento, redis,
elasticsearch, matrix and both sys-svc-rdbms partials. Since start_interval
exists, interval no longer touches convergence and is steady state load alone.
Sixteen values that stay where they are now name the mechanism that keeps them
there. Two are worth reading. web-app-kix overrides start_period and nothing
else on purpose, letting the image's own HEALTHCHECK supply test, interval,
timeout and retries; filling those in would have overwritten what upstream tuned.
The memcached and redis swarm-init partials probe every second and deliberately
run with no start window, which is why start_interval is absent rather than
forgotten.
The rest name their probe: occ boots the whole Nextcloud stack, tor re-parses
its torrc instead of asking a running service, opensearch is still forming a
cluster, matrix waits on a file another step writes to a share.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
42ebd9ea71 gave the healthcheck SPOT start_interval, the cadence docker uses
while start_period is still running. A block a template writes out itself
bypasses the SPOT and never gained it. Measured across the repository: 46 such
blocks, 40 of them already carrying start_period, not one carrying
start_interval.
Without it a probe fires only every interval, so a service ready after two
seconds is reported healthy at the next tick and a stack converges no faster
than its coarsest quantisation. That lands in sys-svc-compose's swarm converge
wait, 1551.7s per CI job over 38 stack deploys.
Twenty five of the blocks move into meta/services.yml and render through
container_healthcheck. Each keeps an explicit test rather than picking a flavor:
a flavor would replace the command instead of carrying it across.
The move is lossless by construction. probes.py block() writes
overrides.get(key, default) for interval, timeout, retries, start_period and
start_interval, so a declaration repeating the literal values renders the same
block plus the missing cadence. Checked per block against the old values: the
only difference is start_interval 5s, nothing changed, nothing lost.
Twenty one stay literal. Seventeen interpolate a template variable, whose value
resolves in a scope meta/services.yml does not share, so moving them would be a
rewrite rather than a transcription. Four interpolate nothing and still cannot
move: svc-db-memcached and svc-db-redis probe every second in their swarm
service partial, where a 5s start cadence would report healthy later than the
block already does, and the sys-svc-rdbms and keycloak sso_proxy partials render
for the consuming role's application_id, so their declaration has no single
meta/services.yml to live in. Each carries a nocheck naming its reason.
All twenty one gain start_interval. Three also gain start_period, without which
the key does nothing at all, since it only applies while the start period runs.
That widens their failure tolerance rather than narrowing it: bluesky from 90 to
120 seconds, magento from 50 to 80, the mariadb partial from 180 to 210.
pixelfed spelled its probe as a bare string and now spells it CMD-SHELL. Docker
reads both as a shell command; only the YAML shape changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The hub serves 94 tools across 23 categories, write tools included, and enabling the ExApp switches every category on. That surface was published on the public vhost and every discovered client was handed an app password for it. svc-ai-mcp-adapter now sits in front in mcp_passthrough mode: clients present credentials.mcp_bearer to contextagentmcp and reach the nine read tools of calendar, contacts and files, which files/mcp/tools.json names and the sidecar enforces per call. Those three categories are the ones whose upstream is_available is unconditional, so the served set does not vary with which optional apps a deployment installs.
Enforcing it in the sidecar rather than in each client is what makes it hold: web-app-openwebui renders no per-tool filter at all, so a client-side include list would have bounded two consumers out of three.
06c13e7f3e withdrew the declared path from the edge for exactly this reason - "that surface is what the adapter exists to narrow". Nextcloud answers the same route under a second spelling, without the /index.php front controller, which try_files rewrites back onto the route after the edge has already declined to block it. The withdrawal becomes a regex covering both, and only where stripping the front controller changes the path, so the four adapter providers without one render unchanged.
The app password is minted after the stack renders, so it reaches the sidecar through upstream.env and rebuild.yml rather than the compose environment: compose up resolves env_file while creating the container, a restart does not. The sidecar is the last service in the template because a Jinja set has no block scope and its env_file would otherwise displace the one talk, whiteboard and talk_recording each carry.
Two suites cover what nothing measured: the vhost template rendered without a container, asserting both spellings are withdrawn, and every shipped tools.json loaded through the adapter own loader, so a bad contract fails in a second instead of as a probe timing out an hour into a deploy. The guest spec probed mcp.endpoint.path, which this change makes the proxy answer 404 for its own reasons; it now probes all three public paths and requires no MCP body.
Not yet deployed: the sidecar build, the upstream.env delivery and the hub answering exactly nine tools are unverified against a running stack.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The contract check ran as an Ansible task in the middle of every provider deploy, and the two client checks ran the same way. A test that is part of the deploy cannot be run without deploying, cannot be re-run on its own, and reports its verdict as a deploy failure. Twenty-seven task files lose 491 lines to this.
It is now what it always was. Each provider ships files/test/test.sh, templates/test.env.j2 and meta/tests.yml, and test-e2e-cli stages one shared harness beside it: run.sh drives contract.sh in a throwaway container on the provider's own network, then isolation.sh for adapter-fronted providers. The read probe each provider offers moved from the calling task into meta/mcp.yml next to the allowlist it must satisfy, and the schema now rejects a read probe naming a tool outside that allowlist.
The bearer the test presents is the one a client resolves through mcp.credential, via the new mcp_client_bearer lookup over resolve_credential, which moved to utils.roles.applications.mcp so it is the same function mcp_servers renders every client connection with. The probe presented whatever the calling role passed, which for the fifteen adapter-fronted providers is a different secret than any client holds.
Sidecar isolation is read from the engine rather than measured inside the container, so it no longer needs a delegation to the node holding the task: attachment is compared by network name, which drops the gwbridge special case, and a swarm worker says it cannot measure instead of skipping silently.
Retrying is bounded by wall clock against MCP_DEADLINE_SECONDS, which scales through the same lookup('timeout') as the harness budget it has to stay under. A flag that is neither true nor false aborts rather than reading as off.
mcp-provider-probe becomes mcp-provider-cli-test: an enabled provider must ship the test rather than include the task. mcp-probe-bearer becomes mcp-adapter-bearer, tying ADAPTER_BEARER to the declared credential key now that no probe include carries it. A new integration test renders the shared env template for every provider through Ansible's own templar, so a later change to it breaks visibly instead of poisoning twenty deploys quietly.
Hermes and OpenClaw keep their client-side proof as CLI tests of their own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
sys-stk-front-proxy prefers a role's own templates/proxy.conf.j2 over a
shared flavour, and an override replaces the flavour whole - including
every cross-cutting include living inside it. Expressing your own
locations should not cost you the MCP policy.
It did. f5272fa85f added that policy to both flavours and to nextcloud,
and the one provider whose native path most needed hiding renders from
its own template, so /mcp kept reaching baserow. The deploy was
failed=0 the whole time: the template produced no line at all, and a
green recap says nothing about a line that never existed. Reading the
rendered vhost is what found it.
Two overrides also lacked the prometheus locations, so nextcloud and
checkmk had no /healthz/live and no per-request metrics. That include
guards itself and emits nothing where prometheus is absent.
The required set is the intersection of the two flavours, so a concern
added to both is demanded of the overrides on the next run without
anyone maintaining a list. Location snippets are excluded, being what an
override exists to replace, and the set is only asked of roles that
actually serve MCP - demanding it of the rest would report noise and
teach the reader to skip the report.
A second rule covers a latent case the intersection cannot: a gated
override needs the oauth2 endpoint and the raised header buffers, both
of which live in one flavour only. All six carry them today, and nothing
made them.
Baserow's image mounts the MCP app on the ASGI root unconditionally, so
mcp.enabled only decides whether an endpoint record exists. The
application's own vhost kept routing /mcp/*: switched off it answered
401 Endpoint not found., and a refused credential is still a surface.
Switched on it is worse - the adapter narrows fourteen upstream tools to
four, and the publicly routed native path reaches all fourteen for
anyone holding the endpoint key. web-app-homeassistant had the same
shape, an exposure: internal surface reachable publicly. Both now 404
there and stay reachable on the container network.
The public surfaces get the edge limits the contract already declared.
Zones are written per role by the role that owns them, in the shape
web-app-prometheus uses, because one round-scoped file would drop another
application's zones on the next deploy. The rate is concurrent_requests
per second rather than an eighth limit key: a client allowed N in flight,
each bounded by timeout_seconds, cannot sustain more unless every call
returns instantly. A refusal is 429, not nginx's 503, because a client
that should back off must not read it as an outage. stream_seconds
finally binds something - the adapter holds no stream, the proxy does.
The shared location snippet's three timeouts become parameters defaulting
to the 900s they hard-coded, so no existing vhost changes.
Found by the disabled-state assertion 7d8e7e87ff added, which had never
run: its helper was never staged, so the two defects hid each other.
834 commits from the Tor onion-service branch against 299 of ours, from merge
base 7b646bdece: 127 conflicted files, 3506 files changed.
The two sides are largely orthogonal. Theirs adds svc-net-tor and a `tor` service
across the role tree, plus two sweeping refactors: shipped scripts sorted by
language (files/ruby/, files/python/, files/shell/, scripts/lint/*.sh) and the
unit suite moved under tests/unit/python/. Ours is requirement 036, the native AI
gateway, plus the MCP role work. Most conflicts were both sides appending to the
same service map, resolved as unions.
Resolutions that were not unions:
Credentials moved namespace. Theirs renamed meta/schema.yml to meta/secrets.yml
and re-addressed credentials as secrets.credentials.<name>. Git carried our
litellm_api_key blocks through the rename, but every consumer we added still read
'credentials.<name>', which no longer resolves. All 45 call sites are migrated.
plugins/filter/container_volumes.py is deleted by theirs and relocated to
plugins/lookup/container_volumes.py, where it carries the same tmpfs defect our
f85996b43 had just fixed: a hard-coded {"size": ...} that silently drops a per
mount `mode`. The fix is re-applied in the relocated file, as that commit's merge
note anticipated.
compose.yml keeps only INFINITO_PLAYWRIGHT_REPORTS_BASE_DIR. Theirs also forwards
INFINITO_PLAYWRIGHT_STAGE_BASE_DIR; that line is deliberately dropped, per the
analysis recorded in 45804e9ad -- STAGE has a drift-proof role-vars fallback,
while forwarding it promotes a setdefault-pinnable .env value above that SPOT.
tasks/stages/01_constructor.yml takes their include, ./tasks/utils/setup/group.yml,
because their refactor removed tasks/groups/*-roles.yml, leaving our include
target nonexistent. Our task name is kept, since svc-virt is in the loop.
Makefile swarm-zombie is a union: their validate plus teardown, then our
lab_subnet cleanup, which their side dropped while leaving lab_subnet.sh as the
only orphaned reference in the file.
01_bootstrap.sh keeps our deterministic --ip pinning, which distinguishes an
already-attached node from a real failure, over their `|| true`.
Their language-sorted layout orphaned references our side still held: zammad's
two scripts/apply/*.rb, jenkins' java-with-ca-trust.sh, and the notify topics
their handlers renamed to hyphenated form. All corrected.
roles/sys-svc-compose/files/shell/swarm/stack_ready.sh gains our latched-update
block: paused, rollback_paused, rollback_started and rollback_completed exit 2
rather than polling a state that cannot resolve without another deploy.
config_from_run is unioned to (title, logged, jobs); the production caller in
trigger/__main__.py now passes jobs, without which our suite suppression would
have been inert.
READMEs are regenerated rather than hand-merged: 15 LiteLLM rows and 91 Tor rows
now derive from the merged metadata, which is itself evidence the meta merge is
coherent.
Verified: 5161 unit tests pass. The single failure, test_query.py TestSortSpec,
also fails on fork/feature/svc-net-tor at b51d2f9919, measured in a baseline
worktree -- so this merge introduces no new unit-test failure. Two modules are
excluded from that run because `baudolo`, a dependency their branch introduces,
is not installed on this host.
Not verified: no deploy has run against the merged tree, and make quality has not
been run end to end here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The context_agent ExApp calls back into the same php-fpm pool it is being
proxied from: its UserAuthMiddleware resolves the bearer against
/ocs/v2.php/cloud/user while a child is already parked forwarding the MCP
request out to the ExApp. Every in-flight MCP request therefore occupies TWO
children. Below twice mcp.limits.concurrent_requests the two legs deadlock, and
because the ExApp's callback carries no timeout the pool never recovers -- which
is why the Context Agent sat unhealthy rather than merely slow.
services.nextcloud.performance.php.fpm now sizes the pool explicitly:
max_children 16, start_servers 4, min/max spare 4/8. request_terminate_timeout
is 900s and must not drop below the proxy's fastcgi_read_timeout; lower kills a
child while nginx is still waiting on it, equal means only work nginx has
already abandoned gets reclaimed.
The readiness path was spending the same scarce workers. /healthz/ready had no
location of its own, so it fell through to `location /`, was rewritten to
/index.php/healthz/ready and booted a full Nextcloud request on a php-fpm child
once per probe interval against a pool of five. It is an exact-match location
returning 200 from nginx now, with access_log off, and never reaches PHP.
The pool file is rendered through render_replicated_templates.yml so swarm peers
receive it too, and mounted from meta/volumes.yml at a path that sorts after
zz-docker.conf, which reopens the [www] section last -- mount it earlier and the
image's own values win while the deploy looks correct.
The context_agent healthcheck moves from a hand-written probe in compose.yml.j2
to the shared container_healthcheck lookup, declared as flavor curl on path
heartbeat with start_period 20m. The ExApp installs dependencies on first boot
and legitimately outlives a 60s start period, which is the other half of why it
reported unhealthy.
Not verified: none of this has deployed. max_children 16 is derived from twice
concurrent_requests rather than measured against real memory use, and the
mount-ordering requirement is read from the image layout rather than confirmed
against a merged pool config in a running container -- if it sorts wrong the
whole change is inert while appearing correct. request_terminate_timeout 900s
also means a genuinely stuck request now holds a child for fifteen minutes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mount pipeline was split across two layers: compose_volumes and
container_volumes lived as filter modules that ansible's filter loader
rejected on every start ("has no attribute 'FilterModule'", two warnings
per run), while the same-named lookups wrapped them thinly. The filter
bodies now live inside their lookups (the tor_socks precedent), the
filter files are gone, and the render tests moved next to the lookup
tests.
As lookups they see the templating context, so the application_id term
every call site passed back to its own role is gone too: both lookups
read application_id from context and fail loudly when it is missing.
107 templates and nfs_prep.yml drop the term; the calls collapse to
lookup('compose_volumes') and lookup('container_volumes', service_name).
The container_volumes call is now canonical - four leading spaces,
service_name in the service position, | indent(4) - enforced by a new
lint (test_container_volumes_call_shape). Normalizing the 85 literal
call sites surfaced that erpnext keyed its meta/volumes.yml mounts by
container name instead of compose service key, the only role to do so;
its meta now uses the service keys. wordpress's column-0 call, which
rendered its first line at top level, is indented like every other.
Template logic that only restated meta/volumes.yml is deleted: mailu fed
compose_volumes an extra_volumes dict whose eight names were looked up
from the very meta file compose_volumes reads itself; zammad's init and
railsserver extra mounts were the volumes.yml entries minus the two
services, which the meta now lists (the when-gated OIDC binds included).
Conditionality that meta cannot express stays in code, but in role-local
lookup plugins instead of template loops: matrix_bridge_mounts renders
the per-bridge registration mounts, nextcloud_extra_volumes the
feature-gated whiteboard/recording volumes (type: volume entries are
declared unconditionally by compose_volumes, so gating must happen
before it).
Parity is proven, not assumed: every mechanically rewritten template is
byte-identical to HEAD after the transformation regexes (95/95), and the
semantic roles render identically through the real functions against
HEAD's meta - zammad across six sso/tls polarities, all seven erpnext
services, mailu's top level. make test-lint passes complete.
Also: suitecrm's compose template pins container_extra_hosts with
host_alias (the SOCKS proxy URL host.docker.internal never resolved in
compose+tor), and the five disabled mautrix bridge addons use the
empty-default config lookup so templating the applications dict stops
emitting 125 errors per batch in every CI job.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
3529 invalid comments in 528 files, grandfathered in while the linter
only saw the working-tree diff. Removal ran through the linter's own
collectors, so detection and deletion cannot drift: a comment whose
opener line is blank before it and whose closer line is blank after it
loses all its lines, anything else loses only the comment region, and a
line left holding a bare delimiter goes with it.
Five files keep their comments behind a nocheck marker instead. Four are
upstream configs whose inline docs are upstream's own (mautrix, systemd
journald, nextcloud-oidc-login, MediaWiki). In littlejs the
commented-out entries ARE the deactivation mechanism for an example
tile, so deleting them would delete configuration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
integration_mastodon asserted the provisioned oauth_instance_url resolved to
the literal "microblog.infinito.example". That value is not fixed: the addon
hook writes lookup('tls','web-app-mastodon','url.base') into it
(meta/addons/integration_mastodon.yml:12), so on an onion node the plugin
correctly received http://microblog.<onion>/ and the spec failed for being
right. The product was never wrong; the assertion was pinned to a clearnet
name.
The partner URL now reaches the spec the way every sibling bridge spec already
gets it, from the same lookup the hook uses:
playwright.env.j2 MASTODON_BASE_URL, gated on services.mastodon.enabled
_shared.js read and exported as mastodonBaseUrl
the spec compares host against host, not against a literal
web-app-fediwall already wires MASTODON_BASE_URL from this exact lookup
(templates/playwright.env.j2:12), so the name and the source are the
established ones; this adds the gate, so the variable renders empty instead of
naming an undeployed partner.
The guard in front of the comparison is not decoration: without it an empty
MASTODON_BASE_URL would reach new URL("") and abort the spec with a TypeError
instead of an assertion anyone can read.
The evidence that this is the whole difference: integration_peertube runs the
identical shape against shared.env.peertubeBaseUrl and PASSED in the same red
run, on the same onion node where integration_mastodon failed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
extra_hosts is the one compose key a service may not carry twice. The onion SSO
back-channel pin was emitted by a Jinja partial that six roles included, while
six other services wrote the key by hand; nothing stopped a service from
receiving both. YAML then either rejects the document or keeps one list and
drops the other, silently.
The partial becomes plugins/lookup/container_extra_hosts.py, and every pin now
goes through it. Callers add their own entries with extra_hosts=[...], the way
container_volumes already takes extra_volumes=, and the lookup merges them after
the automatic pin and deduplicates in first-seen order. With nothing to emit it
returns an empty string.
The swarm address reasoning from 7b1839681 is preserved and now written down in
the plugin rather than only in that commit: the pin must NOT be host-gateway in
swarm, because that alias resolves per node while openresty publishes :80 with
mode: host under node.role == manager. It carries the stack host's address,
which reaches every task because the compose file is rendered once with the
manager as inventory host. The mode is read as compose_mode_force or
DEPLOYMENT_MODE, not the bare cluster mode, so a role with an override does not
lose its pin and its overlay at once.
Two roles kept a pin that now collides with the automatic one, and both are
resolved the same way -- the hand-written entry stays for clearnet and yields
the .onion case to the lookup, which picks the address per mode. In
web-app-mailu the three conditional entries move into a role-local
mailu_extra_hosts lookup exposed as MAILU_EXTRA_HOSTS, because an eight-line
conditional expression in the template argument is worse than the block it
replaced. It returns its entries as separate results, so vars/main.yml uses
query(); plain lookup() would join them into one comma-separated string.
tests/lint/ansible/jinja/test_compose_extra_hosts_use_lookup.py fails on any
literal extra_hosts: key in a role template, so the invariant survives the next
author who needs a pin. It follows test_compose_ports_use_container_ports_lookup:
the raw construct is forbidden, the lookup is not mandated per service -- a
service with no pins is correct without it, and the swarm branch raises when
facts are absent, which would turn a no-op into a failure surface for containers
that never speak OIDC.
Equivalence checked by rendering rather than by reading: under the trim_blocks +
lstrip_blocks the stack-host action forces for compose.yml.j2, both former call
site shapes (indented, and matrix's column 0) emit byte-identical text to the
new form when the block applies. The no-op case differs -- a whitespace-only
line where the include emitted none -- and yaml.safe_load returns the same
document for both.
31 unit tests; make test-lint 325 passed. Does not touch web-app-espocrm, whose
missing pin is a separate claim and gets its own commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Eight prose references still pointed at the pre-rename root, and one of them
did more than mislead a reader: the addons lint told an author to reach a
secret through lookup('config', application_id, 'credentials.<name>') at the
exact moment it rejected their literal, so the guidance produced the next
defect. The check itself only tests whether the value is templated, so no
enforcement changes here.
variants.md gains the reason rather than a corrected list. A variant entry is
baked into host_vars raw, which makes its top-level key the inventory path, so
a key no meta topic produces is silently discarded. The previous list drifted
precisely because it stated the set without stating why it was the set.
design/variants.md was wrong twice over: the old root, and an argument order in
lookup('config', 'credentials', '<provider>') that could never have resolved.
The erpnext key was checked against svc-db-mariadb/vars/main.yml rather than
prefixed on faith.
Left alone on purpose: test_credentials_roundtrip and the layout lint name
meta/schema.yml and schema/main.yml as history and as the legacy directory the
lint forbids. Both are correct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
meta/schema.yml became meta/secrets.yml, but its content still landed at
applications.<app>.credentials — the one meta file whose payload did not sit
under a root named after the file. Every other topic obeys that rule:
meta/volumes.yml goes to volumes, meta/rbac.yml to rbac. Credentials now go to
secrets.credentials.
The path exists exactly once, in utils/manager/credential_key.py, and
OVERRIDE_SECTION is derived from its two segments rather than spelled beside
them, so the dotted form used by --set and the nested form used by the
inventory cannot drift. Six consumers read it: the loader, the generator, the
CLI override parser, the two emit helpers, and the four lookup validators.
--set now accepts exactly one key shape,
applications.<app>.secrets.credentials.<key>. The three short forms are
rejected instead of guessed at: the same short key names different credentials
on different apps. That also retired primary_app_id, which only existed to
disambiguate them.
Three defects surfaced while wiring this up. _apply_one_role_schema still wrote
to the old root, so an app's own credentials would have moved while its
providers' stayed behind. web-app-pgadmin reads through
lookup('applications', ...).credentials.<key>, an access path no regex over
lookup('config', ...) could see, and would have deployed with an empty postgres
password. And _META_NON_GENERIC_TOPICS still listed 'schema' — a bare topic
name, invisible to any path search — so the generic file-root loop assigned the
raw schema under secrets and the follow-up write landed inside the cached
document, truncating keycloak's four credentials to one for every later
reader.
tests/integration/ansible/lookups/config/test_credentials_roundtrip.py pins both
directions of the seam and the cache invariant that last defect broke.
Existing inventories still carry the pre-rename root; migrating them is
deliberately out of scope here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
75 commits: the socialhome role reimplemented against the project it actually
deploys, native-login specs for funkwhale and shopware, a window.open IdP
handoff and a settings-link fallback in the shared persona helpers, a swarm
converge budget that gives up on a terminal task, and a long tail of role
fixes.
Eleven conflicts. The shared persona helpers (keycloak.js, logout.js) take the
incoming structure — they gained real behaviour this branch never had — with
this branch's resolveTimeout convention re-applied over it and
confirmKeycloakLogoutIfPrompted re-attached at every return point; without it
the Keycloak SSO session outlives the logout. playwright.config.js keeps this
branch's version: both sides set actionTimeout, but ours routes through an env
var and 15s is too short behind an onion. socialhome's spec takes the incoming
content — 2dbd6eb10 found the role described the wrong upstream project
entirely — and keeps gotoOnion and expectHstsWhenTls, since demanding HSTS over
a plaintext onion is a false failure. Both READMEs were regenerated rather than
merged by hand.
Three collisions arrived with no conflict marker at all, because each side
changed a different place in a different file:
- group_vars/all/18_swarm.yml declared swarm_stack_converge_retries twice.
Same value, so nothing breaks today; editing the documented one would have
silently changed nothing.
- svc-net-tor and web-app-socialhome both claimed 192.168.74.0/24. Socialhome,
the newer role, moves to 192.168.75.0/24.
- web-app-socialhome/meta/schema.yml arrived as a new file, so ef5ea7cb5's
rename never saw it. Its credential would not have resolved and the role
would have deployed with an unusable administrator account.
The incoming specs also needed this branch's conventions: raw timeouts wrapped,
four page.goto calls routed through gotoOnion, a request.get given an
onion-aware timeout, and 21 roles marked playwright-service-flag over the tor
block this branch added to them.
make quality green on the merge result.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
libcurl refuses a .onion host by name (RFC 7686, error 6) before it
consults /etc/hosts, extra_hosts or DNS, so the platform's DNS+iptables
onion egress cannot serve a server-side backchannel at all. Measured:
curl --noproxy '*' -> exit 6
curl --resolve auth.<onion>:80:127.0.0.1 … -> exit 6
--resolve fills curl's own cache strictly earlier than getaddrinfo and
is still refused, which makes sys-svc-container's onion_oidc_socks
template -- extra_hosts, despite its name -- a no-op for every libcurl
client. Only a configured proxy makes curl skip the check.
Since 9d91fbea8 emptied proxy.config.php.j2 there is no such proxy, while
svc-net-tor's exclusive/primary defaults replace Keycloak's clearnet
domain and KC_HOSTNAME pins the issuer to the onion. Nextcloud's
oidc_login discovery call therefore dies inside PHP, /apps/oidc_login/oidc
returns 500, and oidc_login_auto_redirect sends /login straight there.
Restoring the old socks5h://host.docker.internal:9050 alone would make it
worse: tor runs as a single manager-pinned replica publishing SOCKS with
mode: host, so only the replica on that node could connect and a
deterministic failure would become a 2-in-3 flake. In swarm, though, tor
is NOT host-networked -- that branch is compose-only -- and it already
binds SocksPort 0.0.0.0, so the shared overlay is a usable path from
every node.
Give svc-net-tor a shared_net overlay with alias 'tor' and dial it by
service name. Attachment is gated by a new consumer kind, onion_sso: the
consumer's services.sso.enabled AND the provider's services.tor.enabled.
Both are group-membership derived, so the conjunction is exactly "the
issuer is an onion" and stays false in clearnet deployments -- which
matters because the service registry is not filtered to deployed roles.
The existing kinds could not express it: keying on sso alone would also
hold without tor, and keying on tor would miss Nextcloud's variant 2,
which disables its own onion yet still needs the client path.
tor_socks_proxy keeps the swarm/compose split in one place so the six
roles sharing this defect need not restate it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Blocking a persona removes the only end-to-end proof that a role's auth chain
works. docs/contributing/artefact/files/role/playwright.specs.js.md:146 has
always required each flag to carry a one-line nocheck stating the role contract
that justifies it, plus a matching paragraph in the role's README or TODO.
Nothing enforced it, so 89 flags across 46 roles carried neither.
The lint mirrors test_has_spec's shape and uses is_suppressed_at with
mode="line-above", so the marker must sit directly above its flag -- a blank
line between them breaks the association, which is what the persona helper's
reader will look at. A literal =false blocks nothing and is exempt; the
sso-conditional ternary is not, because it blocks in every variant that pins
services.sso.enabled false.
Writing 89 reasons turned out to be the point. Five roles audited in one pass
blocked for five entirely different mechanisms, all of which read as the same
shrug behind a bare =true: pgAdmin's login id is the account e-mail rather than
the Keycloak username; phpMyAdmin authenticates as the MariaDB root account;
GitLab's seeded password belongs to the built-in root, not the administrator;
Mastodon's tootctl accounts create never sets a password; phpLDAPadmin binds
with an LDAP DN and a different secret. Further out: MediaWiki removes the form
that would accept the Keycloak secret ($wgPluggableAuth_EnableLocalLogin=false)
and bounces anonymous requests back into the IdP, so the unauthenticated
landing the contract asserts can never be observed; Mattermost Team Edition has
no native OIDC, so Keycloak rides the GitLab OAuth slot behind a relabelled
link; MinIO's console returns redirectRules: null and renders no SSO button at
all; XWiki's administrator is an XWikiUsers object with no password property.
Two flags turned out to be unjustifiable and are gone rather than annotated.
web-app-mailu gated PERSONA_GUEST_BLOCKED on services.dashboard.enabled, but
runGuestFlow does one anonymous goto and asserts no signed-in marker -- it
never touches the dashboard. A leftover from a helper version that entered
through the dashboard account menu. And web-app-mig's rationale claimed the
role is an in-app module of web-app-dashboard; it has its own compose stack,
healthcheck and canonical domain, and dashboard is merely a tile consumer.
Nine of the reasons say plainly that the block is not a role property but a gap
in the shared persona helpers -- decidim's sign-out is a data-method link the
generic click cannot activate, fider's SSO entry is a two-step modal, taiga,
wordpress, xwiki, odoo and penpot bind OIDC on a path the personas never visit,
jenkins blocks unconditionally although its OIDC variant looks runnable, and
opentalk's own spec proves both personas work. That list did not exist before;
it is the actual yield here, not the 89 comment lines.
45 pre-existing comments came into the comment lint's scope because this sweep
touched their files -- it only inspects files that differ from HEAD. 28 of them
were the banner "Service gate flags rendered for closure.", every one sitting
above a line that is not a service gate flag at all, orphaned by the
alphabetical re-sort these templates once got.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The block sat under services but never behaved like a service. A service has
exactly one providing role, declared with provides, so the registry can map the
key to that role and consumers bind their flag to its presence. No role declares
provides: mcp. There are seventeen providers and the pairing is done by
allowed_consumers inside the block itself.
Every rule that enforces the service model therefore needed an exemption for it:
a shared-provider suppression in fourteen roles, a playwright-service-flag
suppression, and two freshly added exemptions in the dynamic-flag and
variants-static-override checks. Four independent rules, four escape hatches,
one cause. They are all gone now, together with a bond key that only the
resource budgeter reads and only for entries under services, and a wordpress
addon bridge that pointed at a service block that no longer exists.
The block moves to meta/mcp.yml. The applications loader maps meta/<name>.yml to
applications.<app>.<name> generically, so the move needs no wiring; the file
takes the same shape as meta/rbac.yml. Every config path follows, the variant
overrides are lifted out of their services map, and the vocabulary module leaves
the services package because it no longer describes one. roles_with_service
gains an explicit topic parameter rather than an implicit fallback, so nothing
silently resolves against the wrong container.
Files that are otherwise unrelated to this move are included where the committed
tree would otherwise keep pointing at a path that no longer resolves: thirteen
vars files, eleven playwright env templates and one task file.
Takes the revert of the rendered system config. The MCP work had added the
proxy service name and its swarm DNS name as trusted domains to
system.config.php.j2, which the revert deletes; both entries move back to
vars/system.yml as trusted_domains 1 and 2, where they lived before aeefb1407.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This reverts commit 41063206a.
It broke every swarm nextcloud deploy. system.config.php.j2 opened with
<?php
{%- macro php_str(value) -%}
and the leading dash strips the newline after `<?php`, so under Ansible's
trim_blocks the file renders as `<?phpreturn [`. Run 30848540165:
ParseError: syntax error, unexpected token "=>", expecting "]"
in /var/www/infinito/system.config.php:2
#0 /var/www/html/lib/private/Config.php(229): include()
Config->readData() includes the file, so occ upgrade, every later occ call and
every php-fpm request died on an uncatchable compile error. The template had
been verified by rendering it with plain Jinja defaults, which do not match the
ones Ansible uses - the check confirmed the escaping and missed the line above.
A one-character fix (`{% macro`) is correct and was verified end to end, but the
commit is reverted rather than repaired, because its premise did not survive
review:
- The failure it targeted is not deterministic. The same task ran 13 times
across the swarm jobs of run 30830377785 and passed 12 times, including a
second fedora job on the same commit and topology. It is an ~8% flake.
- It does not remove the mechanism. 03_upgrade.yml:8 runs
`occ maintenance:repair --include-expensive` unconditionally, and upstream
Repair.php sets the maintenance system value twice with no guard - two
exclusive locks on the same NFS config.php per deploy, unretried.
- The benefit is largely illusory. Config.php:279 var_exports the whole merged
cache back into config.php, so the nine values land in the locked file anyway
on the first maintenance:repair, with a larger payload.
- It traded away occ's exit-code confirmation that Nextcloud accepted the
values, and moved them from the shared NFS volume to a node-local bind.
The remaining exposure is the unretried occ calls in 03_upgrade.yml; a bounded
retry there is the smaller and better-targeted change and is left for its own
commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nine sequential `occ config:system:set` calls each open config.php exclusively.
In swarm that file lives on the NFS share behind every replica, and the seventh
call could not take the lock:
In Config.php line 306:
Could not acquire an exclusive lock on the config file
/var/www/html/config/config.php
stdout shows six values written before the abort, so the run left a partial
configuration behind. That failed the swarm web-app-nextcloud 5 job in run
30830377785 while every PLAY RECAP on the other nodes reported failed=0.
The same nine values now come from templates/config/system.config.php.j2, which
rides the additional-config channel the role already uses for redis, ldap and
the rest: rendered to NEXTCLOUD_HOST_CONF_ADD_PATH, mounted read-only, merged by
zzz-infinito.config.php after config.php so its values win. That path never
takes an exclusive lock, and it runs before the stack starts, since all nine
values are statically derived and none needs a live container.
Two behaviours are deliberately not carried over. The --type flags become native
PHP types, which is stricter than the string coercion occ applied. And nothing
confirms the file was accepted any more, where occ's exit code did; a read-only
`config:system:get` would restore that assurance at the cost of an occ call, and
is left out until someone wants it.
php_str() escapes backslashes and single quotes, matching the idiom already used
for the redis password in memcache.config.php.j2. Without it a quote in any
value would be a PHP syntax error, and include_once would drop every additional
config file, not just this one.
vars/system.yml and 02_manager_ops/05_system_config.yml are gone; the later task
files shift down one number so test_task_file_numbering stays satisfied.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Seven include templates under sys-svc-container decided how a container was
probed, and they read their inputs from template-local `{% set %}` scope.
That scope leaks: a value set for one service silently reached every service
below it, which is how taiga's front and gateway ended up probing a port
declared for a different service, and how bluesky's frontend probed a PDS
endpoint.
Probes now live in utils/docker/healthcheck.py, one class per flavor behind a
PROBES registry, and each service declares its own:
healthcheck:
flavor: curl
path: health/ready
start_period: 20m
`port_key` picks another entry under ports.internal for the services that
expose their probe elsewhere (keycloak on management, nextcloud talk on
signaling). Without a flavor the entry must carry an explicit test argv, so a
missing declaration fails loudly instead of rendering a probe against nothing.
Rendering HEAD's templates against the new output confirms 49 of 56 call
sites are byte-identical; the remaining seven are covered by an Ansible run.
Three probes change on purpose: erpnext's backend gains a check it never had,
bluesky's frontend drops the leaked PDS path, and msmtp_curl moves from a
hardcoded localhost:80 to the service's own port on 127.0.0.1 like every
other flavor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three conflicts, each resolved by combining both sides rather than picking one.
compose.yml passes both env vars through to the container: swarm-nfs adds
INFINITO_SWARM_MGR_IP, this branch adds INFINITO_TOR_SOCKS_PORT, and neither
substitutes for the other.
daemon.json.j2 takes the data-root block from swarm-nfs and keeps HEAD's dns
key. The incoming side writes networks.internet.dns directly; lookup(
'container_dns') already returns that value as its clearnet entry and prepends
the docker0 bridge on a Tor node in compose mode, so the incoming form is a
strict subset and dropping it loses nothing.
The WordPress CA-trust addon spec gains skipUnlessServiceEnabled("sso") from
swarm-nfs alongside HEAD's gotoOnion and resolveTimeout, and asserts on the
Plugin Name the mu-plugin header declares - the mustuse screen renders that,
not the filename - with resolveTimeout applied to the literal the incoming
side left bare.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
occ status reads the shared volume, so it reports installed: true from
any replica whose php-fpm never started. That is how two of three swarm
tasks stayed healthy with FailingStreak 0 while serving nothing: swarm
kept them in the service VIP backend set and roughly two thirds of
fastcgi connects were refused, which the front nginx turned into 502.
Require the listener before the state check. A socket probe against the
declared fpm port fails immediately when nothing is listening, and only
then does the existing occ status run, so both claims have to hold.
The port comes from the same single point of truth the nginx sidecar
uses for its fastcgi target, so the probe and the proxy cannot drift.
The cron service keeps the state-only check on purpose: its entrypoint
is cron.sh and it listens on no port.
This makes a replica that is stuck before php-fpm visible instead of
advertised. A deploy whose replicas do not serve will now fail to
converge rather than report success.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The php-fpm listener port lived as a literal 9000 in the nginx sidecar
config, and the application user as a literal www-data in both
healthchecks, while the role already carried NEXTCLOUD_DOCKER_USER and
declares every other internal port in meta/services.yml.
Declare the listener as services.nextcloud.ports.internal.fpm and read
it through the config lookup, the same shape the moodle and magento
roles use for their fpm listeners and the same shape this role already
uses for the signaling and recording ports. That also satisfies the
port lint, which requires every *_PORT constant in a role's vars to
resolve through the lookup rather than carry a literal.
The rendered output is unchanged: the port is still 9000 and the user
is still www-data. After this change no www-data literal remains in the
role's code; the occurrences under docs/ stay as they are, since those
are copy-paste operator recipes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The init gate is the image entrypoint, so it decides when a swarm task
starts php-fpm. For task slots other than 1 it spun on
flock -n "$INIT_LOCK" true
against /var/www/html, which is an NFS4 export in swarm. flock(1) opens
a path argument O_RDONLY and takes an exclusive lock; over NFS flock is
emulated as a whole-file POSIX write lock, which requires the descriptor
to be open for writing, so the call returns EBADF on every iteration.
The loop reads any non-zero exit as "lock still held" and never breaks.
Slots 2 and 3 therefore never reached the entrypoint and never started
php-fpm, while their occ-status healthcheck kept passing off the shared
volume, so swarm left them in the service VIP backend set and roughly
two thirds of fastcgi connects were refused.
The version.php comparison that preceded the lock is not a sufficient
gate on its own: version.php is rsynced before occ maintenance:install
runs, so it flips true mid-install.
Replace both loops with a readiness poll that only passes once the
instance reports installed, out of maintenance, with no pending database
upgrade, and at the image version. That needs no file locking, so the
mount semantics stop mattering, and it holds for the upgrade path too.
Matching is plain POSIX case rather than grep so busybox flag variants
cannot change the outcome.
occ refuses to run as root, so the poll needs the application user. The
gate ships from files/ and cannot template, so the user arrives as an
environment variable fed from the existing NEXTCLOUD_DOCKER_USER single
point of truth. The lookup sits inside the non-primary branch, which
keeps compose and slot 1 starting even without it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nextcloud carries no MCP server of its own, so the role runs the Context
Agent as an ExApp: render its container while MCP is enabled, wait for
its heartbeat, register it with AppAPI, add the MCP route, enable it, and
only then mint the app password clients present.
Split the credentials by origin. The shared secret between the AppAPI
proxy and the ExApp is generated by this deployment and stays a vault
credential; the app password is minted by Nextcloud through occ and is
persisted through sys-token-store instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reaching an onion address required each role to point its own http client
at the tor socks proxy, which then carried clearnet traffic too — fatal
in the test network, which has no exit, and the reason nextcloud needed a
per-host exclusion list.
The egress router already redirects tor's virtual range to the TransPort
and dnsmasq already forwards .onion to tor's DNSPort; the piece missing
was reachability. dnsmasq listened on loopback only, which docker
discards, so containers never saw it. It now also answers on the docker
bridge, the daemon points there with the clearnet resolver kept as
fallback, and the role's own onion resolves to a container-reachable
backend instead of loopback.
Nextcloud drops its proxy block and the exclusion list; every other role
gets the same behaviour without configuring anything.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The role routes all outgoing traffic through tor so it can reach
keycloak on its onion address, but the test tor network has no exit, so
every app download ran into a two-minute timeout and the deploy aborted
on the mandatory oidc_login plugin. All 20 required apps resolve to
githubusercontent hosts after redirects, so excluding those plus the
appstore API is enough; onion traffic still goes through the proxy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nextcloud reached its OpenAI-compatible backend through Flowise, which
only forwarded to the LiteLLM sidecar that Flowise no longer runs. The
consumer flag, the activation condition and the endpoint now bind to
svc-ai-litellm directly, one hop shorter.
The endpoint switches from Flowise' public TLS URL to the internal
gateway address plus /v1, so a container-to-container call no longer
travels through the reverse proxy.
The api_key stops crossing a role boundary: it was read from
web-app-flowise credentials.llm_master_key, handing Nextcloud
administrative access to the whole gateway, and is now this role's own
per-consumer virtual key.
The litellm variant pin sits on variant 7 rather than 3 because adding
the gateway to variant 3 pushed that round past the matrix memory budget.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves the runner Dockerfile to the lint-standard Acquire::Retries=3
and keeps the collabora TODO wording; hardens the merged tree for the
stricter lints (apt retries in the tor Dockerfile, shell-or-true
markers, comment cleanup).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The infinito config loader was appended to the occ-managed config.php with a shell printf while the image entrypoint was still in its post-install write phase; the entrypoint read config.php before the append and wrote it back after, clobbering the loader, so /var/www/infinito extras (oidc_login_provider_url among them) never reached Nextcloud and /apps/oidc_login/oidc answered 500 in the compose e2e job. Install the loader as config/zzz-infinito.config.php after occ reports installed instead: Nextcloud merges config/*.config.php on every read, occ never rewrites those files, and the entrypoint rsync excludes /config/, so no clobber path remains. A file mount was rejected because a non-empty config/ suppresses the entrypoint's base-config copy on first install. The loader now declares $CONFIG directly (additional config files load after unset($CONFIG)), cron gets the /var/www/infinito bind it silently lacked, and the dead include-path vars and host render go away.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New roles/sys-svc-container/templates/env.j2 sets TZ={{ HOST_TIMEZONE }} and LANG=C.UTF-8. Every role env.j2 includes it at the top; it renders via stack_host_template, the same engine that resolves the includes in compose.yml.j2, so it works in both compose and swarm. TZ/LANG are removed from the individual role env.j2 so each value stays single-source.
New lint tests/lint/ansible/test_env_base_include.py verifies every role env.j2 includes the base and never re-sets a base-owned key (keys derived from the base file).
mattermost and gitea meta/volumes.yml drop the /etc/timezone host-path bind: swarm hard-rejects a task whose bind source is missing on the node (Debian-trixie nodes have no /etc/timezone). TZ now comes from the base env. /etc/localtime bind also dropped; the container timezone follows TZ.
Non-directive comments were removed from the touched env.j2 (banners, restatements, reference URLs, narration) so the changed files pass the comment-lint; only tool directives remain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The custom Dockerfile ran mkdir -p /var/www/html/config, which broke the
stock image's empty-/var/www/html invariant: Docker then had image content
at the shared nextcloud_data mount point and did a non-idempotent copy-up
os.Mkdir(config) per container. compose up --force-recreate starts
nextcloud and cron concurrently, so both raced that mkdir and the loser
crashed with 'failed to mkdir .../_data/config: file exists'. Reproduced
char-for-char locally (31/60 with the infinito bind, 7/80 without, so the
bind is only an aggravator); removing the image content gives 0/80.
Drop the Dockerfile mkdir so /var/www/html stays empty and the stock
entrypoint (reached via nextcloud-init-gate.sh -> /entrypoint.sh) creates
config/ as www-data with no copy-up. The mkdir only existed to pre-seed
config as www-data because binding infinito at /var/www/html/config/infinito
forced Docker to create config/ root:root; move that bind (and its
NEXTCLOUD_DOCKER_CONF_ADD_PATH loader path) out to /var/www/infinito so
config/ is owned by www-data and config.php stays writable. Keeps type:
bind, so the swarm config-object fix from 699008a16 is not reverted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The internal proxy declared a static upstream to nextcloud:9000, which
nginx resolves at config-parse time and treats as fatal (exit 1) on
NXDOMAIN. In swarm the nextcloud service name only appears once a task
passes its healthcheck, and the NFS-backed first-run init held the lock
~25s, so every proxy task that started in that window crashed with
'host not found in upstream', swarmkit's recent-failure penalty pinned
all replacements onto the manager, and the worker-placement gate failed.
Drop the static upstream and resolve nextcloud:9000 through a variable
(set $php_handler; fastcgi_pass $php_handler) using the http-level
resolver already emitted, mirroring the whiteboard/talk runtime
resolution in the same file: nginx now starts and returns 502 until the
app is healthy instead of crash-looping, so replicas keep their worker
placement. Validated with nginx -t.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Scale the login helper's waitForVisibleCandidate call-sites and the Sign In / Log out clicks through resolveTimeout, and wait for network idle after logout so the slow keycloak end-session redirect chain over Tor settles before the logged-out state is probed.
Skip the Talk-admin and SeaweedFS-filer specs on onion targets (WebRTC HPB/STUN/TURN and a clearnet-only filer UI). Assert the XWiki partner host against XWIKI_BASE_URL from the env instead of a hard-coded clearnet host, so the check holds on both clearnet and onion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
On an onion node the OIDC issuer (Keycloak) is a .onion; libcurl (oidc_login's Guzzle client) refuses to resolve .onion per RFC 7686, so the server-side OIDC backchannel (discovery/token/jwks) fails. Set Nextcloud's system proxy to socks5h://host.docker.internal:<tor-socks> and expose the host Tor SOCKS to the app container via extra_hosts, both gated on SSO being enabled and the Keycloak domain being an onion. No-op on clearnet nodes.
Hoist the repeated services.sso.enabled and Keycloak-domain lookups into NEXTCLOUD_SSO_ENABLED and NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_HOST constants (mirroring MATRIX_OIDC_HOST) and use them across the role.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
