The Docker updater watches image plus version, the repository updater
repository plus ref. A dozen pins fell outside both - an app_version, a
release, a tag in a registry neither speaks - so nothing ever told anyone
they had gone stale.
Such a pin now names its upstream next to itself in an `update:` block:
git_tags, registry_tags, npm, http_regex or a role-local script, with
`match` selecting a tag flavour and `strip` removing a prefix the pin does
not carry. utils/update/source.py resolves them beside the two existing
updaters, `python -m cli.contributing.update.source` bumps them, the
update-version-sources job opens one PR per role, and
tests/external/update/source warns while a bump is pending.
Two lints hold the rule: every semver pin is watched by one of the three
updaters or opted out with a reason, and a semver only ever sits behind
`version`, `<what>_version` or `ref` - which renames moodle's release to
app_version and simpleicons' local_version to local_tag, the latter being
the tag of a locally built image rather than an upstream version. A
declaration naming a key the entity does not carry, or a type the resolver
does not know, fails the lint instead of resolving nothing in silence.
Picked from feature/store-i18n (94d607fd0a) onto current main. Two things
differ from the original: svc-ai-lmstudio no longer carries an app_version
pin, so its declaration is dropped, and web-app-stalwart's webui_version,
added since, declares the git tags of the webui repository.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fourteen roles repeated the same two lines to say they use the gateway: a
`shared` flag gated on group_names, and an `enabled` flag conjoining that gate
with LITELLM_CHAT_MODEL_SERVED. Both are now single-sourced.
`shared` becomes literal true. The flag means the provider is a shared instance
rather than one deployed per consumer, and a central gateway is always that;
the dynamic form only said "shared if deployed", which `enabled` already
decides. The 50 shared pins under `litellm:` leave meta/variants.yml with it.
The tree had already noticed: 20 of those 50 lines carried
`# nocheck: variants-static-override`, two of them with copy-pasted text about
container_backup. This narrows e5de4e085a for one service key rather than
reversing it; every other dynamic flag keeps the group_names form.
`enabled` becomes `{{ LITELLM_USABLE }}`, defined in group_vars/all/16_ai.yml.
That shorthand is only possible because is_explicit_truth learns about it.
The resolver reads a dependency out of the flag TEXT — "in group_names" in
value — so a constant hides the role id and the provider silently leaves the
static closure of every role referencing it. Measured: the old expression
resolves True, `{{ LITELLM_USABLE }}` resolves False. GROUP_GATED_CONSTANTS
names the constants whose own definition carries the gate, and the docstring
states the obligation: a SPOT of this kind that is not listed there drops its
provider without a word.
The wider fix, accepting any Jinja as dynamic, was measured and rejected: 35
other flags carry a Jinja value without the marker (MCP sidecars, javascript
and SSO gates, recaptcha), and they would all enter closures they are not in
today.
A literal shared flag is no longer dynamic, so test_dynamic_flags wants the
`# nocheck: dynamic-flag` its own message documents for legitimate exceptions;
where a marker already existed the rule list is extended rather than a second
comment added.
Behaviour is unchanged where it counts. The closure keeps litellm with the same
app counts (wordpress 26, openwebui 23, hermes 23, mediawiki 22, flowise 23),
unrelated Jinja still resolves False, and the truth table of the new enabled
form matches the old one in all four served/deployed combinations. Three roles
resolve without litellm, and `git show HEAD:` proves that predates this change:
zammad pins enabled false in variant 0 at line 39, nextcloud at line 97.
Six unit tests cover the resolver, including one asserting that every
registered constant is actually defined in group_vars, so an entry cannot
become a dead promise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Run 34421944328 n8n#1: Open WebUI 0.11.0 ships only a Streamable HTTP
MCP client. n8n 1.95.3's MCP Server Trigger speaks SSE only and answered
the client's POST to /webhook/infinito-mcp/sse with 404, so "every
registered MCP server answers Open WebUI's client" failed.
n8n moves to 1.100.1 and the managed trigger to typeVersion 2, which
serves Streamable HTTP at /mcp/<path>. meta/mcp.yml declares
transport: streamable_http at /mcp/infinito-mcp (the trigger path stays
infinito-mcp) and points source_url at the 1.100.1 tree. Open WebUI's
supported_transports drops sse, which its client never spoke; no
provider declares sse any more, so no pairing is lost.
n8n#0: the guest spec probed ${APP_BASE_URL}${MCP_ENDPOINT_PATH} and
expected a refusal of >= 300 without an event stream. The trigger is
exposure: internal, so the public vhost must answer 404; the spec now
asserts exactly that through mcpEndpointUrl(..., N8N_BASE_URL), and the
bearer guard itself is proven in-cluster by the CLI MCP contract.
Requirement 035 and the MCP audit table follow the version and
transport.
Upgrade path, read from upstream at both tags: the postgres migrations
are identical (45/45) and the only new common migration is
AddProjectDescriptionColumn, an additive nullable column; BREAKING-
CHANGES.md lists only 1.98.0 in range (route metric format, Form node
tag attributes, Node >= 20), none of which this deployment uses. A fresh
1.100.1 install ran all 89 migrations and passed the MCP bridge, server,
non-member and guest specs locally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
start_interval is the cadence while start_period runs, and only while it runs.
Once the window closes the probe falls back to interval, so a service that
becomes ready just after it pays a whole tick anyway and the cadence never
reached it. Six of the seven flavors were shaped that way, Curl worst: a thirty
second window against a one minute interval.
Measured across 151 converge waits in four job logs, 63 sit exactly on a tick
boundary, 36 in the thirty second step and 27 in the sixty second one.
Attributed by application, web-app-seaweedfs is the largest at 1501s over
sixteen waits with a median of 57.7s: it probes with curl and fell straight into
the gap. web-app-zammad probes with connect, whose window is fifteen minutes,
and its 154s median is real boot time with nothing to recover.
So the window moves to ten minutes and the steady state interval to two, and the
flavor overrides that sat below them go: Curl, Wget and Connect lose interval
1m, Http its twenty second window, Nc its ten. Connect keeps fifteen minutes.
Neither number costs anything while a container works. start_period delays
nothing, it only stops failures counting, and interval no longer touches
convergence at all since that hangs on the window alone; it is steady state
load, which drops from 120 probes an hour per service to 30.
Forty six role files follow. Twenty seven declarations go that repeat the new
default or undercut it, an undercut window being the defect itself. Eight
windows longer than ten minutes keep their value and now say why. The literal
blocks and the three Dockerfiles this repository builds spell every timing out,
because outside the lookup an omission takes docker's value and not the
platform's.
A fourth lint rule keeps the shape: start_period must outlast one interval,
checked against the effective values, so raising interval without the window
cannot quietly bring the cliff back.
Two faults in the lint surfaced while building it and are fixed here. It
compared timings as strings, so 600s and 10m read as different values, and it
matched the healthcheck key exactly, so a line carrying a trailing nocheck was
skipped whole, which is how the two swarm-init partials went unexamined.
One regression, bounded. A container that starts and never turns healthy is
neither rejected nor errored, so stack_ready.sh only calls it fatal after three
killed tasks, and each cycle now spans the longer window. That reaches twenty
minutes rather than six, capped there by swarm_stack_converge_retries at 600
with a two second delay, and it lands only on runs that were failing anyway.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The gateway publishes only models it has a backend for and renders model_list: [] when neither ollama nor lmstudio is deployed and no OpenRouter key is set. LITELLM_CHAT_MODEL fell back to openrouter/auto without checking that key, so consumers were configured for a model the gateway does not carry and every prompt failed with a 400.
Observed in the Mattermost#1 CI job: litellm.log carries 12 occurrences of "Invalid model name passed in model=openrouter/auto" next to 400 Bad Request, and tests/test-litellm-agent.js failed on every attempt while the rest of the suite passed.
Make the fallback conditional on the key so the name is empty when nothing is served, promote LITELLM_CHAT_MODEL_SERVED from the role vars to group_vars where consumers can see it (it was the third copy of this logic and the only correct one), and switch the 14 consumers from "litellm is deployed" to "litellm serves a model". The Playwright service flag reads the same lookup, so the spec skips together with the Ansible gate. The bool filter carries weight: the folded scalar yields the string False, which Jinja treats as truthy.
A new unit test renders both expressions against Jinja and pins the invariant that a model name exists exactly when a model is served, including the case where ollama preloads embedding models only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The SSO gate handed X-Forwarded-Access-Token to every oauth2-fronted upstream, so each of the 28 gated roles received a full-scope bearer for the signed-in user while exactly one, n8n, decodes it. The token also grows with the realm's registered origins, and LAM's Apache rejects a header field above 8190 bytes (Moodle#0, run 33689701895).
Consumers now declare services.sso.oauth2.pass_access_token. Without it oauth2-proxy already answers the auth request without the token, and the gate blanks the upstream header rather than dropping the directive, because nginx inherits proxy_set_header as an array and an unset header would let a client-supplied one through. The new lint keeps declaration and use in step in both directions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
83c1c729de gave every provider a group_names-gated services entry per MCP
client, including the clients it refuses with mcp_consumer: false. The gate
is what makes the inventory resolver plan provider and client into one round,
so 19 of the repo's 82 co-deploy pairs started a client for a pairing the
provider had already declined. flowise is a live MCP client of qdrant,
homeassistant and prometheus; the other 17 providers were bringing up its
node stack for nothing.
The entries now read enabled: false, shared: false, mcp_consumer: false, and
the variants that pinned them to true are gone. Setting those variants to
false instead is not an option: test_variants_no_static_override forbids any
variant override of a literal base value in either direction.
bond leaves with them, and a new lint holds that line: collect_role_resources
skips a literally disabled entry before it reads any resource key, so a bond
there describes a cost nobody pays. Thirteen entries unrelated to MCP carried
one and are cleared too.
test_mcp_consumer_services_entry demanded the group_names shape for every
client entry, refused ones included, and now demands the opposite there.
dynamic-flag keeps its rule and takes its own documented per-key exemption.
make docs redraws twenty graphs: the edges go, the nodes stay as
'openwebui ❌' and 'flowise ❌', so the refusal is visible rather than read as
an integration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
allowed_consumers was twenty hand-kept lists of which fourteen were identical, so every new client meant an edit in every provider. A client now declares services.<own-entity>.mcp_consumer: true once and a provider refuses one with mcp_consumer: false, which is also what tells a deliberate exclusion apart from a forgotten entry.
The group_names-gated consumer entries give the inventory resolver the co-deploy edge meta/mcp.yml never had: one of sixty-nine matrix rounds carried an MCP client before, twenty-three role/round pairs do now. bond 0.5 keeps the clients out of round 0 so the host memory budget still holds.
BREAKING CHANGE: meta/mcp.yml no longer accepts allowed_consumers; declare services.<entity>.mcp_consumer on the client instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The oauth2 gate declared no allowed_groups at all while the role carried an mcp RBAC role nothing consulted, so it admitted anyone the proxy authenticated. It now admits the role's own administrator and mcp groups, and a lint derives the client set from meta/mcp.yml rather than a list, which is how the gap surfaced.
Two idempotence defects went with it. The run minted a public-API key, found it again next time and counted that as a change, so the task never converged; and it left that workflow-scoped key standing after every deploy although nothing read it. It is now minted per run and revoked before the run ends. The server workflow also connected nothing, and the trigger serves exactly the tools that reach it over an ai_tool connection, so it served none; it now carries one checked-in read tool with an explicit input schema.
The client side did not exist. It renders an agent workflow with one MCP Client Tool per discovered provider, each pinned to that provider's allowlist, because the node defaults to including every tool an upstream happens to serve. Credentials go through the internal API since the public one of this tag can only create and delete them, never converge an existing one. Every node type, typeVersion and connection literal was read from the pinned source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
834 commits from the Tor onion-service branch against 299 of ours, from merge
base 7b646bdece: 127 conflicted files, 3506 files changed.
The two sides are largely orthogonal. Theirs adds svc-net-tor and a `tor` service
across the role tree, plus two sweeping refactors: shipped scripts sorted by
language (files/ruby/, files/python/, files/shell/, scripts/lint/*.sh) and the
unit suite moved under tests/unit/python/. Ours is requirement 036, the native AI
gateway, plus the MCP role work. Most conflicts were both sides appending to the
same service map, resolved as unions.
Resolutions that were not unions:
Credentials moved namespace. Theirs renamed meta/schema.yml to meta/secrets.yml
and re-addressed credentials as secrets.credentials.<name>. Git carried our
litellm_api_key blocks through the rename, but every consumer we added still read
'credentials.<name>', which no longer resolves. All 45 call sites are migrated.
plugins/filter/container_volumes.py is deleted by theirs and relocated to
plugins/lookup/container_volumes.py, where it carries the same tmpfs defect our
f85996b43 had just fixed: a hard-coded {"size": ...} that silently drops a per
mount `mode`. The fix is re-applied in the relocated file, as that commit's merge
note anticipated.
compose.yml keeps only INFINITO_PLAYWRIGHT_REPORTS_BASE_DIR. Theirs also forwards
INFINITO_PLAYWRIGHT_STAGE_BASE_DIR; that line is deliberately dropped, per the
analysis recorded in 45804e9ad -- STAGE has a drift-proof role-vars fallback,
while forwarding it promotes a setdefault-pinnable .env value above that SPOT.
tasks/stages/01_constructor.yml takes their include, ./tasks/utils/setup/group.yml,
because their refactor removed tasks/groups/*-roles.yml, leaving our include
target nonexistent. Our task name is kept, since svc-virt is in the loop.
Makefile swarm-zombie is a union: their validate plus teardown, then our
lab_subnet cleanup, which their side dropped while leaving lab_subnet.sh as the
only orphaned reference in the file.
01_bootstrap.sh keeps our deterministic --ip pinning, which distinguishes an
already-attached node from a real failure, over their `|| true`.
Their language-sorted layout orphaned references our side still held: zammad's
two scripts/apply/*.rb, jenkins' java-with-ca-trust.sh, and the notify topics
their handlers renamed to hyphenated form. All corrected.
roles/sys-svc-compose/files/shell/swarm/stack_ready.sh gains our latched-update
block: paused, rollback_paused, rollback_started and rollback_completed exit 2
rather than polling a state that cannot resolve without another deploy.
config_from_run is unioned to (title, logged, jobs); the production caller in
trigger/__main__.py now passes jobs, without which our suite suppression would
have been inert.
READMEs are regenerated rather than hand-merged: 15 LiteLLM rows and 91 Tor rows
now derive from the merged metadata, which is itself evidence the meta merge is
coherent.
Verified: 5161 unit tests pass. The single failure, test_query.py TestSortSpec,
also fails on fork/feature/svc-net-tor at b51d2f9919, measured in a baseline
worktree -- so this merge introduces no new unit-test failure. Two modules are
excluded from that run because `baudolo`, a dependency their branch introduces,
is not installed on this host.
Not verified: no deploy has run against the merged tree, and make quality has not
been run end to end here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
AI Agent nodes read their endpoint from a stored credential, not from the
environment, so the gateway base URL and this role's virtual key have to land in
n8n's credential store. files/provision_ai.py logs in as the owner and upserts an
openAiApi credential under the deterministic name infinito:litellm.
The write goes through the internal /rest routes because that is the only place
the pinned 1.95.3 exposes credential creation: the public /api/v1 key this role
already mints for MCP carries workflow scopes and cannot create a credential.
That is why this is a second script rather than another call inside
provision_mcp.py.
n8n encrypts credential data at rest and never returns it, so there is nothing
to compare against and the managed credential is overwritten rather than
reconciled. The script prints CHANGED or OK so the task can report change state
without pretending to have diffed a value it cannot read.
env.j2 sets only N8N_AI_ENABLED. An earlier revision of this work templated
N8N_INSTANCE_AI_MODEL_URL, which does not exist in 1.95.3 -- it was invented
rather than measured, and has been removed along with the requirement table row
that repeated it. The one real AI environment variable in that release,
N8N_AI_ASSISTANT_BASE_URL, expects n8n's own assistant service rather than an
OpenAI-compatible endpoint, so the credential store is the only usable surface.
vars/main.yml also carries N8N_MCP_CREDENTIAL_NAME. It belongs to the MCP work
rather than to this change, but a file cannot be split across commits and this
order is the safe one: the MCP tasks land later and find the constant already
present, where the reverse would reference a variable that does not exist yet.
Verified: the spec runs rather than skipping -- it appears in the variant-2
JUnit as "administrator: the managed openAiApi credential answers a prompt
through the in-cluster gateway".
Not verified: I confirmed it executed, not its verdict. The owner-cookie login
is also unexercised on an sso-only variant, and because the credential is
rewritten every run, an operator's manual edit is replaced without notice.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
/healthz answers 200 with the database unreachable, so a container that cannot serve a single request still reports healthy. Recreating the shared postgres under a running n8n left exactly that state: the provisioning task then retried 30 times against a container the orchestrator called healthy, and took the whole round down with it.
Measured before and after the redeploy: healthz 200 / healthz-readiness 503 / rest-settings 503 "Database is not ready!", then 200 across all three.
1834987066 made the same switch for the owner-bootstrap probe; this closes the remaining call site.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
72fd9c870 required the onion in every variant but exempted variant 1, on the
argument that the minimal round is the one place the stack runs without it. That
argument does not hold: the onion is part of the deployment under test, not a
feature bolted onto the full shape. A round that skips it is not a smaller
deployment, it is a different one.
So the exemption is gone and 95 variant-1 entries pin the onion on. Two
exclusions remain, both read from data rather than a comment: a role with no tor
block has no onion to pin, and a role whose meta/services.yml pins tor.enabled to
a literal false has already declared it has none.
That put the rule in conflict with test_coverage, which requires both polarities
of every dynamic flag: with tor on everywhere, the false side has no variant left
to live in. 94 roles take the exemption that contract already provides for
exactly this - "flags whose group-derived value is a hard invariant that variants
must never override", the same one 4e6ef2542 used for the seaweedfs frontend.
web-app-nextcloud needs none: its variant 8 pairs the clearnet-only PeerTube and
keeps the false polarity.
Measured, because the declaration is not what CI runs. assign_tor gives the onion
to every second capable entry with the run number as the parity switch, so more
capable variants do not mean proportionally more onion jobs: across five roles
and 21 entries the count goes 8 -> 10 on an even run and 9 on an odd one. The
clearnet path also survives - checkmk reports v1=false on run 0 and v1=true on
run 1, so both states are still covered across two consecutive runs. What the
94 markers give up is a declarative guarantee in variants.yml, not the coverage
itself.
The real cost is weight, not job count. web-app-nextcloud variant 1 goes from
3.09GB reservation / 7.27GB limit to 18.26GB / 43.01GB once svc-net-tor and its
closure join, so the cheap round is no longer cheap. Every variant stays under
the 32/64GB budget, and the same effect applies to the other 94 unmeasured.
Verified: tests/lint 336 passed / 307 subtests, tests/integration/roles/meta/
variants plus the role-meta lints 39 passed. The rule was checked in both
directions - it reported the variant-1 offenders before the flips and none after.
Not measured: what the heavier rounds do to wall-clock, against swarm jobs capped
at 355 minutes and one that has hit that ceiling before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every variants.yml header states the rule the bond feeds: variant 0 carries each
tightly-coupled (bond>=1, same-host) service, while loosely-coupled (bond<1,
separate-host) partners are excluded from the closure and distributed across
later variants to keep every host under budget. tor was declared bond: 1 in all
101 consumers, so it had to sit in every variant-0 closure.
It does not belong there. The onion is a separate-host provider reached over the
node's hidden service, the same shape as the bridged partners that already carry
0.5, and f1dff50fb established both the reasoning and the precedent when it
dropped xwiki and bigbluebutton from 1 to 0.5: bridged partners with their own
role and their own spec, whose bond declaration was the outlier rather than
their placement.
This also unblocks the variant-level tor contract. Requiring a non-baseline
variant to pin the onion on while tor still counted as tightly coupled would
have pulled variant 0's closure requirements along with it.
Verified: tests/lint 336 passed / 307 subtests and tests/integration/roles 107
passed / 610 subtests, including test_resource_budget over every variant's
deduplicated footprint and the bond-aware test_order closure.
Not measured, and the honest cost: f1dff50fb's own caveat applies unchanged
here. Whether redistributing a service out of the baseline closure buys back
wall-clock is not established; role-runtimes has the per-role seconds and no run
has been made with this shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ten provider roles served an MCP surface that other roles consume, but
were never declared as shared services, so the registry did not know
them. Declaring them pulls in the recursion contract every registry
service owes: seven roles move their entry tasks into tasks/00_core.yml
behind the run_once flag, so the service loader cannot include them a
second time.
pretix already had a run_once block, but set the flag last; the flag now
comes first, before the body it protects.
Seven include templates under sys-svc-container decided how a container was
probed, and they read their inputs from template-local `{% set %}` scope.
That scope leaks: a value set for one service silently reached every service
below it, which is how taiga's front and gateway ended up probing a port
declared for a different service, and how bluesky's frontend probed a PDS
endpoint.
Probes now live in utils/docker/healthcheck.py, one class per flavor behind a
PROBES registry, and each service declares its own:
healthcheck:
flavor: curl
path: health/ready
start_period: 20m
`port_key` picks another entry under ports.internal for the services that
expose their probe elsewhere (keycloak on management, nextcloud talk on
signaling). Without a flavor the entry must carry an explicit test argv, so a
missing declaration fails loudly instead of rendering a probe against nothing.
Rendering HEAD's templates against the new output confirms 49 of 56 call
sites are byte-identical; the remaining seven are covered by an Ansible run.
Three probes change on purpose: erpnext's backend gains a check it never had,
bluesky's frontend drops the leaked PDS path, and msmtp_curl moves from a
hardcoded localhost:80 to the service's own port on 127.0.0.1 like every
other flavor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three conflicts, none resolved by picking a side wholesale:
- Makefile: took the incoming ACT_INPUTS, which routes through SWARM_DISTROS
instead of inlining the same expression a second time.
- test-e2e-playwright/02_run_one.yml: took the incoming rc handling. An absent
rc now counts as failure; the previous default(0) let an aborted Playwright
run pass silently, contradicting the debug message right above it.
- web-app-peertube spec: combined both. Kept gotoOnion and resolveTimeout,
which this branch's lint enforces, and adopted the incoming retry-inside-poll
for the OIDC button plus its networkidle wait.
The declared values were guesses that ran up to 60x the size of the image they belong to: seaweedfs asked for 30GB against a 104MB image, nextcloud for 20GB against 353MB. Because min_storage feeds the storage guard, the runner packer and the sufficient-storage filter, those numbers made hosts look too small and pruned caches that deploys did not need to lose.
Every service that declares min_storage together with image and version now carries the measured compressed transfer size of that image plus 200MB of headroom. Sizes were read from the registries through utils.docker.registry.manifest_transfer_size, the same path the headroom test uses, so the declarations and the gate agree by construction. Values are written in MB throughout, matching the existing 500MB / 100MB / 50MB style.
119 declarations across 89 roles. Range: 206MB (memcached) to 3473MB (ollama); four exceed 1GB. The 84 min_storage entries that name no image are untouched, since there is nothing to measure them against.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Moves web-app-checkmk, web-app-jellyfin, web-app-n8n,
svc-registry-cache and svc-registry-docker from alpha to beta, pulling
them into the default CI test-deploy lifecycle envelope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per-role deploy-mode opt-out moves from meta/tests.yml 'skip:' to meta/services.yml <entity>.modes.{compose,swarm}.enabled on the primary entity. get_role_skip now derives from it; get_role_mode_enabled added. A new lint requires every role shipping templates/*compose*.yml.j2 to declare both mode flags. Migrates 107 services.yml and drops 11 skip-only tests.yml. Also removes the variant_status deployability gate so swarm runs one job per variant unconditionally (variant_status.py and deployable_variant_indices deleted, complexity model simplified). Adds the i8matix alias.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rename the role, its test tree, the primary entity key
(volume-2-local), the derived vars (BKP_VOLUME_2_LOCAL_*,
SYS_SERVICE_BACKUP_VOLUME_2_LOCAL), the run-once fact, and every
group_names consumer flag, include path, doc, and lint reference. The
container_backup service key and the on-disk backup-docker-to-local
tree keep their names: both are contracts with existing consumer
entries, snapshot trees, and the baudolo pull tooling.
Operators must rename the svc-bkp-container-2-local inventory group and
disable the previous versioned units on already-provisioned hosts; the
pre-deploy snapshot glob derives its base from the new role name and
will not find them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every invokable stack role that declares named volumes in meta/volumes.yml now carries the standard container_backup consumer entry: enabled resolves via 'svc-bkp-container-2-local' in group_names, shared stays literally true since there is no per-consumer backup instance. Playwright/dynamic-flag/bond-baseline suppressions ride on the block per the established idioms; stale explanatory comments in the touched files are dropped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
n8n CE caches isInstanceOwnerSetUp per process without cross-replica invalidation, so the swarm topology default of 3 replicas left stale replicas bouncing logged-in sessions to /setup (variant 1) and caused session-crash churn during the reschedule test (variant 0). Pin to 1 replica; multi-main needs licensed queue mode. Add the conventional /healthz wget healthcheck so swarm convergence and the chaos-harness Health.Status probe carry a real readiness signal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
n8n was merged (from main) serving a canonical domain without a tor service block, and its local subnet 192.168.106.16/28 collided with svc-net-tor. Declare the complete tor block (meta/services.yml with the playwright-service-flag nocheck, meta/variants.yml pinning services.tor.enabled true in variant 0 and false in the no-auth variant) and move svc-net-tor's nominal (host-networked) subnet to 192.168.106.32/28. Fixes the tor-contract, variant-coverage, bond-baseline, playwright-env and subnet-overlap/duplicate test failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add bond:1 to all 9 enabled+shared services in web-app-n8n/meta/services.yml
- Fix web-app-n8n/meta/variants.yml V3 postgres shared:false → shared:true (only V2 is standalone)
- Remove dead PIHOLE_SSO_PROXY_CA_CONTAINER_PATH var from web-app-pihole/vars/main.yml
- Add nocheck:url marker for dead link in web-app-mastodon/README.md
- Fix LDAP sign-in button selector in _shared.js (button[type=submit] → getByRole)
