Moodle 303-redirects every request whose Host is not $CFG->wwwroot, and an MCP
client dialling the internal service name cannot follow that redirect from the
container network. The previous accommodation was on the wrong side: the probe
sent -H 'Host: <public domain>' and -H 'X-Forwarded-Proto: https' and pinned
mcp_probe_host to MOODLE_DOMAIN, so it asserted the endpoint works when spoofed
and said nothing about how a real client reaches it.
Both headers and the probe host are gone. Acceptance moves into config.php,
which reads MOODLE_INTERNAL_HOST -- rendered from MOODLE_MCP_SERVICE_KEY -- and,
when the incoming HTTP_HOST matches it, rewrites HTTP_HOST and SERVER_NAME to
the wwwroot host before Moodle's redirect logic runs. The comparison splits on
':' so a port cannot defeat the match, and a request from any other host is
untouched, leaving the canonical-host protection intact for real traffic.
None of that could have taken effect on a deployed instance. The bootstrap seeds
the code directory with `cp -an`, which never clobbers, so an existing volume
keeps its first-run config.php forever and every later config change is silently
discarded. moodle_refresh_config now copies the deployment-managed config.php on
every start, which is what makes the rewrite above reachable at all.
Not verified: no MCP call has been observed succeeding against the internal name
since the change. This is also the same failure class that ended the last
deploy on another role, where the client already shared the provider's network
and had the right alias registered, yet the DNS search suffix still resolved the
single-label name to the public ingress. If that applies here too, the Host fix
is correct and the request still never arrives -- and removing the spoofing
headers will surface it as a failure where the probe previously passed.
Two further consequences worth stating: config.php is now overwritten on every
start, so an operator edit inside the container is discarded; and the HTTP_HOST
rewrite runs in the hot path of every page load, narrow though its condition is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every MCP role keeps its task tree under tasks/utils/ without numeric
prefixes, so a caller can reach any of them through include_role
tasks_from. utils/roles/mapping.py holds that path as the single source.
Ansible resolves a relative include against the including file's own
directory when that file was reached by path, but against tasks/ when it
was reached through tasks_from. The same file therefore loaded from its
own role and failed from a caller using tasks_from. Every nested include
now names {{ role_path }}/tasks/utils/..., which holds under both bases,
and a lint walks each tasks_from entrypoint transitively to keep it so.
The exec-gating lint learns the same form, otherwise it loses the include
chain and reports inherited IS_STACK_HOST gates as missing.
The expression resolving a provider's stored token appeared eighteen
times. plugins/lookup/mcp_credential.py replaces it, and mcp_probe_owner
disappears from eight roles: it was only ever a step towards the bearer
and no probe read it.
The Hermes and OpenClaw probes stop aborting the play while it is still
running. Roles deploy in dependency order, so a client probing during its
own role can run before a provider exists at all, and failing there
prevents that provider from ever deploying. The verdict moves to the
reconciliation pass, gated on MCP_RECONCILE_STRICT, which the reconciler
sets and group_vars declares so the readers need no default.
The sys-svc-mcp-reconcile role is added here; wiring it into a stage is a
separate change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5