834 commits from the Tor onion-service branch against 299 of ours, from merge
base 7b646bdece: 127 conflicted files, 3506 files changed.
The two sides are largely orthogonal. Theirs adds svc-net-tor and a `tor` service
across the role tree, plus two sweeping refactors: shipped scripts sorted by
language (files/ruby/, files/python/, files/shell/, scripts/lint/*.sh) and the
unit suite moved under tests/unit/python/. Ours is requirement 036, the native AI
gateway, plus the MCP role work. Most conflicts were both sides appending to the
same service map, resolved as unions.
Resolutions that were not unions:
Credentials moved namespace. Theirs renamed meta/schema.yml to meta/secrets.yml
and re-addressed credentials as secrets.credentials.<name>. Git carried our
litellm_api_key blocks through the rename, but every consumer we added still read
'credentials.<name>', which no longer resolves. All 45 call sites are migrated.
plugins/filter/container_volumes.py is deleted by theirs and relocated to
plugins/lookup/container_volumes.py, where it carries the same tmpfs defect our
f85996b43 had just fixed: a hard-coded {"size": ...} that silently drops a per
mount `mode`. The fix is re-applied in the relocated file, as that commit's merge
note anticipated.
compose.yml keeps only INFINITO_PLAYWRIGHT_REPORTS_BASE_DIR. Theirs also forwards
INFINITO_PLAYWRIGHT_STAGE_BASE_DIR; that line is deliberately dropped, per the
analysis recorded in 45804e9ad -- STAGE has a drift-proof role-vars fallback,
while forwarding it promotes a setdefault-pinnable .env value above that SPOT.
tasks/stages/01_constructor.yml takes their include, ./tasks/utils/setup/group.yml,
because their refactor removed tasks/groups/*-roles.yml, leaving our include
target nonexistent. Our task name is kept, since svc-virt is in the loop.
Makefile swarm-zombie is a union: their validate plus teardown, then our
lab_subnet cleanup, which their side dropped while leaving lab_subnet.sh as the
only orphaned reference in the file.
01_bootstrap.sh keeps our deterministic --ip pinning, which distinguishes an
already-attached node from a real failure, over their `|| true`.
Their language-sorted layout orphaned references our side still held: zammad's
two scripts/apply/*.rb, jenkins' java-with-ca-trust.sh, and the notify topics
their handlers renamed to hyphenated form. All corrected.
roles/sys-svc-compose/files/shell/swarm/stack_ready.sh gains our latched-update
block: paused, rollback_paused, rollback_started and rollback_completed exit 2
rather than polling a state that cannot resolve without another deploy.
config_from_run is unioned to (title, logged, jobs); the production caller in
trigger/__main__.py now passes jobs, without which our suite suppression would
have been inert.
READMEs are regenerated rather than hand-merged: 15 LiteLLM rows and 91 Tor rows
now derive from the merged metadata, which is itself evidence the meta merge is
coherent.
Verified: 5161 unit tests pass. The single failure, test_query.py TestSortSpec,
also fails on fork/feature/svc-net-tor at b51d2f9919, measured in a baseline
worktree -- so this merge introduces no new unit-test failure. Two modules are
excluded from that run because `baudolo`, a dependency their branch introduces,
is not installed on this host.
Not verified: no deploy has run against the merged tree, and make quality has not
been run end to end here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Matrix was the one role that already shipped an AI credential and pointed it at
the vendor, and four separate defects kept it from reaching the gateway. Each
one hid the next, so fixing fewer than all four still leaves a surface that
reports green and answers nothing.
The schema rejected the gateway by construction.
`chatgpt_bridge_openai_api_key` validated `^sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{40,}$` -- OpenAI's own
key format -- with algorithm `plain`. A LiteLLM virtual key cannot satisfy that
pattern, so no amount of configuration could have worked. It is `sk_prefixed`
with a length check now, and a `litellm_api_key` entry joins it in the same
shape the other eight consumers use.
The bridge reached Synapse over the public ingress. MATRIX_HOMESERVER_URL was
MATRIX_SYNAPSE_URL, an https URL on the canonical domain, so every login left
the container network, crossed openresty and came back. A 502 taken while
Synapse was still starting still consumes an rc_login.address slot, and once
that bucket empties the bridge dies on M_LIMIT_EXCEEDED and restarts into the
same wall: measured at 139 restarts on the local stack. MATRIX_SYNAPSE_LOCAL_URL
addresses the container directly over plain http on the internal port.
MATRIX_SYNAPSE_URL stays public where it has to be -- public_baseurl, Element,
and the mautrix bridges, which are a separate concern and untouched here.
Nothing ordered the bridge behind Synapse. Synapse itself depends on the mautrix
bridges, but matrix-chatgpt-bot is not one of them, so it was free to start
first and spend its login quota on a homeserver that was not listening. It now
waits for `service_healthy`.
The specs could not read their own configuration. templates/playwright.env.j2
renders MATRIX_PLUGINS_JSON through dotenv_quote, and both
test-litellm-chatgpt.js and test-bridge-roster.js called JSON.parse on the raw
value. The parse returned a string rather than an object, so `plugins.chatgpt`
was undefined: the litellm spec aborted after 0.99s claiming the plugin was off,
and the roster spec quietly downgraded itself to a skip. Both decode through
decodeDotenvQuotedValue first.
00_core.yml verifies the shared gateway contract before dispatching to either
flavor, so an empty virtual key or a base URL that resolves outside the
deployment fails ahead of any container work.
Verified: the decode fix by execution -- the spec previously died at 0.99s on
plugins.chatgpt and now runs through to the invite poll at line 202. The
contract assertions and the credential ran ok in a variant-2 deploy, which also
exercises the schema change end to end.
Not verified: the local URL and the health gate have not deployed yet, so
whether they break the crash loop is still open. Behind them sits a separate
defect this commit does not address -- matrix-synapse's process does not trust
the platform CA (openresty logs TLS alert 48 from its address) and
RegularPolicyForHTTPS caches one SSL context for the process lifetime, which
breaks every outbound HTTPS call Synapse makes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Synapse on an onion node could never complete SSO: it has no Tor, so the
http://auth.<onion> issuer was unresolvable server-side (discovery/jwks/
token), and Synapse hard-rejects non-https issuers on top.
- runner/hostpin.{sh,service}: pin the onion auth host to the runner's real
default gateway (node OpenResty) from /proc/net/route, Before=docker.service
so nested containers see it from their first request; host-gateway is
unusable in nested DinD (resolves to the inner docker0)
- Synapse bind-mounts the runner's /etc/hosts; token iss stays the onion
issuer the browser uses
- bootstrap.service: PassEnvironment (systemd units do not inherit container
env; MATRIX_MDAD_PLAYBOOK_TAGS only worked via its fallback default)
- vars.yml.j2: skip_verification on onion (Synapse's escape hatch for
issuers without https; Tor provides transport security per RFC 7686)
- 02_render_inventory: drop the MDAD bootstrap marker + bounce the runner on
inventory changes — mode=update reconfigures the nested stack at all now
- MATRIX_SERVER_NAME follows matrix_domain onto the onion so MXIDs built from
it (DM spec, bridge configs) reference users that exist
- specs: shared Firefox onion fixture (16 files), gotoElementApp reload-retry
against Element's Tor-triggered init race, seaweedfs spec gates on the
filer frontend, env uses canonical_url consumer=
Verified in-container: SSO 302 to onion Keycloak, admin+biber OIDC login,
E2EE DM admin<->biber, CSP — all green over Tor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5