The contract check ran as an Ansible task in the middle of every provider deploy, and the two client checks ran the same way. A test that is part of the deploy cannot be run without deploying, cannot be re-run on its own, and reports its verdict as a deploy failure. Twenty-seven task files lose 491 lines to this.
It is now what it always was. Each provider ships files/test/test.sh, templates/test.env.j2 and meta/tests.yml, and test-e2e-cli stages one shared harness beside it: run.sh drives contract.sh in a throwaway container on the provider's own network, then isolation.sh for adapter-fronted providers. The read probe each provider offers moved from the calling task into meta/mcp.yml next to the allowlist it must satisfy, and the schema now rejects a read probe naming a tool outside that allowlist.
The bearer the test presents is the one a client resolves through mcp.credential, via the new mcp_client_bearer lookup over resolve_credential, which moved to utils.roles.applications.mcp so it is the same function mcp_servers renders every client connection with. The probe presented whatever the calling role passed, which for the fifteen adapter-fronted providers is a different secret than any client holds.
Sidecar isolation is read from the engine rather than measured inside the container, so it no longer needs a delegation to the node holding the task: attachment is compared by network name, which drops the gwbridge special case, and a swarm worker says it cannot measure instead of skipping silently.
Retrying is bounded by wall clock against MCP_DEADLINE_SECONDS, which scales through the same lookup('timeout') as the harness budget it has to stay under. A flag that is neither true nor false aborts rather than reading as off.
mcp-provider-probe becomes mcp-provider-cli-test: an enabled provider must ship the test rather than include the task. mcp-probe-bearer becomes mcp-adapter-bearer, tying ADAPTER_BEARER to the declared credential key now that no probe include carries it. A new integration test renders the shared env template for every provider through Ansible's own templar, so a later change to it breaks visibly instead of poisoning twenty deploys quietly.
Hermes and OpenClaw keep their client-side proof as CLI tests of their own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Home Assistant writes the owner password into the auth store on its volume
during onboarding and never reads the environment again. When the deploy
rotates credentials the container gets the new value and the store keeps the
old one, so the login that every later step needs is refused.
The provisioning script returned that refusal as an ordinary step, and the
/auth/token call that followed failed on a missing result key - a message about
the transport for a problem in the credentials. It now exits on any login flow
that does not reach create_entry, naming the account.
That turns a five-minute wait into an immediate branch: the retry loop stopped
only on success, so a password that will never be accepted was tried thirty
times. The loop now also breaks on the refusal, and only that one outcome is
allowed past failed_when - a crash or a traceback still fails the task, which
matters because the step after this reads a token out of stdout.
hass --script auth change_password reaches the store through the filesystem, so
it needs no working login. The hub holds the store in memory, hence the restart
before the same mint runs again.
e3caa074b2 fixed the account one layer in: the MCP service account, through
admin_change_password, which needs an admin token. This is the login that
issues that token, so without it that fix cannot be reached at all.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The image ships docker-ce-cli and no daemon; sys-svc-container installs
and starts that, and a role reaches it through a sys-stk-* stack. This
role pre-created its overlay network before that include, so on the
compose path the branch that probes the bridge ran against a socket that
was not there yet:
Error connecting: ... FileNotFoundError(2, 'No such file or directory')
It fails late and unrecognisably. The play spends three minutes in the
constructor and the base roles first, the container reports healthy
throughout because its probe cannot ask about a daemon that is not due
yet, and the error surfaces as a network probe rather than as 'docker is
not running'. Swarm hides it entirely, since those nodes have docker
before the play reaches the role.
minio, discourse, openldap, seaweedfs and prometheus all order it the
other way. minio is the closest model: load the stack, create the
network, and let the later flush_handlers start the stack, so the network
exists before anything needs it and docker exists before anything
creates it.
The rule compares the two line numbers in each task file. It caught this
one at line 5 against line 11.
Twelve callers load their scripts with the relative form
lookup('file', 'name.py'), which resolves against the role's files/
directory. dfe7a7fdd moved those scripts into files/python/ without
updating them, so the MCP provisioning and probes of baserow, checkmk,
flowise, gitlab, homeassistant, jellyfin, n8n, openwebui and pretix, plus
n8n's AI gateway task, all resolved a path that no longer exists.
This is the second time the same relocation left callers behind. After
2aec4326a fixed the php paths, the claim that no stale references remained
came from grepping the worktree, which already carried the corrected paths;
HEAD still held the old ones. The check has to run against the commit.
Verified against HEAD this time: the eleven remaining stale relative lookups
are exactly the files in this bundle, and no other loading form (copy src,
script) carries a stale path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nine roles reached their MCP surface as the deployment administrator or with
an account password kept beside the account in credentials. A Moodle site
admin bypasses every capability check, a Nextcloud app password is not
scopable, a Gitea token reads every private repository, and a GitLab token on
root reads every private project. Each role now declares its own principal in
meta/users.yml and provisions it, so the exposed surface is what the service
role permits. jellyfin, zammad and snipe-it kept their account but took its
password from a credential named token; they read the registry too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The reconciler addresses a client with tasks_from: utils/mcp.yml, which
only works when every role offers its MCP work at the same path. The
files were named per role, and on the two agents the work sat inline in
the entry point, where nothing but a full role run could reach it.
The filter docstring pointed at the pre-rename path and now names the
file that exists.
Every MCP role keeps its task tree under tasks/utils/ without numeric
prefixes, so a caller can reach any of them through include_role
tasks_from. utils/roles/mapping.py holds that path as the single source.
Ansible resolves a relative include against the including file's own
directory when that file was reached by path, but against tasks/ when it
was reached through tasks_from. The same file therefore loaded from its
own role and failed from a caller using tasks_from. Every nested include
now names {{ role_path }}/tasks/utils/..., which holds under both bases,
and a lint walks each tasks_from entrypoint transitively to keep it so.
The exec-gating lint learns the same form, otherwise it loses the include
chain and reports inherited IS_STACK_HOST gates as missing.
The expression resolving a provider's stored token appeared eighteen
times. plugins/lookup/mcp_credential.py replaces it, and mcp_probe_owner
disappears from eight roles: it was only ever a step towards the bearer
and no probe read it.
The Hermes and OpenClaw probes stop aborting the play while it is still
running. Roles deploy in dependency order, so a client probing during its
own role can run before a provider exists at all, and failing there
prevents that provider from ever deploying. The verdict moves to the
reconciliation pass, gated on MCP_RECONCILE_STRICT, which the reconciler
sets and group_vars declares so the readers need no default.
The sys-svc-mcp-reconcile role is added here; wiring it into a stage is a
separate change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The eight roles whose MCP server is built into the application now end their MCP
step with the shared contract probe. It builds URL and Authorization header from
the role's own declaration, calls initialize and tools/list, invokes one
deterministic read tool per role, and compares the served surface against the
declared allowlist. It cannot be a Playwright test: the check needs the real
provider credential and a Playwright run would capture it in its trace.
Eleven sites wrote the MCP token into the store under the administrator's
identity while their metadata declared an owner of their own. The schema lint
forbids administrator as a credential owner, so declaration and storage
disagreed, and the probe would have looked for the bearer under the declared
owner and found nothing. They now read the declared owner.
The role body runs per host, so the mint ran on every node in the play.
mint_long_lived_token deletes the existing token under the same client
name before creating a new one, so each node invalidated its
predecessor while the store persisted the first one. Clients then got a
401 on every call. A deploy-time probe now asks the hub whether the
stored token still authenticates, re-mints only when it does not, and
refuses the deploy when even the fresh token is rejected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The role declared a server-direction MCP service but never provisioned one, and the declared endpoint pointed at /mcp_server/sse, the legacy path. Home Assistant serves MCP under /api/mcp, and its mcp_server integration has no YAML schema, so the config entry only exists through the config-entries flow API.
The provisioning script drives that path over the container loopback: onboard the administrator when the hub is fresh (falling back to the login flow when it is not), mint a long-lived token over the websocket API, then create the mcp_server config entry with it. The token is persisted through sys-token-store, which is why meta/users.yml registers the key; a second role registering a token for the same user only works since the per-key user merge.
The whole path is skipped when a token already exists, so a redeploy costs one lookup. Handlers flush before it runs because the hub container has to exist before anything talks to its API.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first MCP server role: where the agent roles consume tools, this one
offers them. Its services.mcp block declares an internal streamable-HTTP
endpoint gated on an agent being deployed, so the surface only exists
when something can use it, and it stays read-only because a privileged
auth subject must not carry mutating tools.
Home Assistant rejects any request carrying X-Forwarded-For from an
undeclared proxy, answering 400 for every call behind the platform's
reverse proxy. The role therefore renders a configuration.yaml that
trusts the stack subnet, keeping default_config so mounting the file does
not drop the integrations Home Assistant generates on first start.
As a shared_net provider its compose file references its own network as
external, which nothing creates in compose mode, so the role pre-creates
it the way prometheus, minio and seaweedfs already do. The vhost declares
status_codes [200, 302, 405] because the health probe sends HEAD and the
hub answers 405.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5