A provider overlay keyed on services.mcp.enabled and .shared admitted every
MCP-capable role, servers included, because those flags carry no direction. Each
provider's network therefore collected every other provider and the result was a
mesh in which any sidecar could reach any application. The new mcp_client
consumer kind additionally requires services.mcp.direction to be client or both,
and the four provider overlays switch to it.
A sidecar rendered its networks with the same lookup as its provider and
inherited that provider's consumer attachments, which it neither needs nor
should have. own_network_only keeps it on the provider network alone. A provider
whose own topology is default_net contributes no attachment line at all, and a
bare networks: key is not a list, so the flag returns nothing in that case and
lets the sidecar fall back to the project default, which is that provider's own
network.
MCP_DISCOVERED_SERVERS resolves every server-direction role to its internal URL, the bearer the server role minted, and its transport, dropping any server without a token so no client renders a connection it cannot authenticate.
OpenClaw moves from 2026.3.11 to 2026.7.1 because the pinned version has no configuration surface for outbound MCP servers at all: its validator rejects mcpServers, the shipped bundle carries no bundle-mcp, and the ACP path refuses per-session servers while pointing at a gateway config that does not exist there. 2026.7.1 reads mcp.servers, which the template now renders. The gateway command gains its run subcommand because the bare gateway no longer starts anything.
Reachability was the missing half: openclaw sat on its own networks only, so the hub name resolved through the DNS wildcard to the ingress instead of the container. The hub overlay now declares an mcp consumer key, which attaches every role carrying services.mcp.
A probe task runs openclaw mcp probe after the handlers flush and fails the deploy when a configured server does not answer. Without it the previous run reported failed=0 while the client could not reach anything.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first MCP server role: where the agent roles consume tools, this one
offers them. Its services.mcp block declares an internal streamable-HTTP
endpoint gated on an agent being deployed, so the surface only exists
when something can use it, and it stays read-only because a privileged
auth subject must not carry mutating tools.
Home Assistant rejects any request carrying X-Forwarded-For from an
undeclared proxy, answering 400 for every call behind the platform's
reverse proxy. The role therefore renders a configuration.yaml that
trusts the stack subnet, keeping default_config so mounting the file does
not drop the integrations Home Assistant generates on first start.
As a shared_net provider its compose file references its own network as
external, which nothing creates in compose mode, so the role pre-creates
it the way prometheus, minio and seaweedfs already do. The vhost declares
status_codes [200, 302, 405] because the health probe sends HEAD and the
hub answers 405.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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