Three roles set unsafe-inline without the rationale the repository lint
requires; 70 roles already carry it.
Only one of the three rationales is a justification. homeassistant's
frontend boots its panel from an inline module script, so the dashboard
stays blank without the flag. hermes and litellm state instead that the flag
was set when the role first deployed with no console error recorded against
it, and carry a TODO to re-verify against the running application and drop it
if nothing breaks.
unsafe-inline weakens the policy against inline script injection. For two of
these roles this documents the exemption rather than justifying it; whether
they work without it has not been tested.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first agent workload of requirement 032. Its compose service pins
runtime: to the fact svc-virt-kata publishes, so model-generated code
runs behind a kernel or syscall boundary rather than plain runc. The pin
goes through compose_only because docker stack deploy discards the key;
swarm relies on the node-default runtime and a placement constraint
instead.
Hermes is not a dashboard. The container starts its gateway and serves an
OpenAI-compatible API on 8642, which shapes three decisions: the env
block configures API_SERVER_*, inference points OLLAMA_BASE_URL at the
LiteLLM gateway (Hermes' Ollama client speaks the same wire format), and
the vhost declares status_codes [200, 404] because the API server maps
only /health and /v1/*, so the bare root answers 404 by design and the
webserver health unit would otherwise fail the host.
SSO is off deliberately: an oauth2 proxy in front of a bearer-token API
breaks OpenAI-compatible clients. Authentication is API_SERVER_KEY, and
the guest spec asserts that /v1/models without it is rejected while the
administrator spec asserts the key unlocks the listing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5