0a52433dcb gave the standalone request fixture a Tor-resilient GET,
because the bundled socks client caps the CONNECT at 30s and a cold
onion circuit fails a request regardless of its timeout. POSTs and calls
made through context.request still went out once, and a circuit Tor
rejected ("Socks5 proxy rejected connection") was not recognised as
transient at all.
apiFetchOnion now takes the verb from opts.method and calls
request.fetch, so it serves both APIRequestContexts; apiGetOnion becomes
its GET shorthand. The rejection joins the transient patterns. Retries
stay onion-only and transport-only: clearnet keeps a single attempt and
HTTP or other errors re-throw at once.
The Mattermost LiteLLM spec routes its login, users/me, users/username
and channels/direct calls through it. The /posts call that sends the
prompt stays a single attempt, because a replayed post would message the
bot twice. The Hermes administrator spec reads /v1/models through
apiGetOnion.
env.test.js pins a POST surviving a rejected circuit, the single
clearnet attempt, no retry of a non-transport error over Tor, and the
GET shorthand.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
playwright.config.js collects `**/*.@(spec|test).js`, so a module named
test-<something>.js runs only when its role's playwright.spec.js requires it.
Three roles wrote theirs as standalone specs with a top-level test() instead:
the MCP guest guards of n8n and wordpress, and the OIDC login of hermes. All
three have been dead files since they were added, so every MCP surface was
believed to be probed by a hostile guest and hermes' oauth2-proxy round trip
to be covered while none of those assertions had ever executed.
Each moves to the exports.register shape its siblings use and is appended to
its aggregator. Nothing else changes: `git diff -w` on this commit is the
test.use line becoming the register wrapper plus one require per aggregator,
and no assertion is touched. The module-level
test.use({ignoreHTTPSErrors: true}) goes away because all three aggregators
already set it for the tests they register, and a test.use inside register()
would not apply anyway. registerMcpDisabledState moves inside register() so
the switched-off case comes with it, which the addon specs do not cover since
they skip when the addon is off.
Registering them also subjects them to test.beforeEach(shared.beforeEach).
That is safe here: wordpress sets a viewport and asserts env presence, n8n
does the same and clears cookies, hermes is a no-op. None authenticates, so
the guest guards stay guests.
wordpress is the only one of the three with a green job to lose, and its
status assertion is already proven there: addons/mcp-adapter.spec.js posts to
the same endpoint with maxRedirects 0 and asserts >= 400, it matches the
collector glob, and WordPress#1 passes. The permission callback runs at the
transport before the JSON-RPC method is parsed, so initialize is refused
exactly like tools/list.
A fourth dead module, openwebui's test-ollama-chat.js, gates on a service no
role renders and follows separately.
The contract check ran as an Ansible task in the middle of every provider deploy, and the two client checks ran the same way. A test that is part of the deploy cannot be run without deploying, cannot be re-run on its own, and reports its verdict as a deploy failure. Twenty-seven task files lose 491 lines to this.
It is now what it always was. Each provider ships files/test/test.sh, templates/test.env.j2 and meta/tests.yml, and test-e2e-cli stages one shared harness beside it: run.sh drives contract.sh in a throwaway container on the provider's own network, then isolation.sh for adapter-fronted providers. The read probe each provider offers moved from the calling task into meta/mcp.yml next to the allowlist it must satisfy, and the schema now rejects a read probe naming a tool outside that allowlist.
The bearer the test presents is the one a client resolves through mcp.credential, via the new mcp_client_bearer lookup over resolve_credential, which moved to utils.roles.applications.mcp so it is the same function mcp_servers renders every client connection with. The probe presented whatever the calling role passed, which for the fifteen adapter-fronted providers is a different secret than any client holds.
Sidecar isolation is read from the engine rather than measured inside the container, so it no longer needs a delegation to the node holding the task: attachment is compared by network name, which drops the gwbridge special case, and a swarm worker says it cannot measure instead of skipping silently.
Retrying is bounded by wall clock against MCP_DEADLINE_SECONDS, which scales through the same lookup('timeout') as the harness budget it has to stay under. A flag that is neither true nor false aborts rather than reading as off.
mcp-provider-probe becomes mcp-provider-cli-test: an enabled provider must ship the test rather than include the task. mcp-probe-bearer becomes mcp-adapter-bearer, tying ADAPTER_BEARER to the declared credential key now that no probe include carries it. A new integration test renders the shared env template for every provider through Ansible's own templar, so a later change to it breaks visibly instead of poisoning twenty deploys quietly.
Hermes and OpenClaw keep their client-side proof as CLI tests of their own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The role-files-layout lint wants scripts under files/ sorted into
per-language folders, which dfe7a7fdd did for 24 of them. Playwright suites
are exempt: the runner copies the tree as it stands, discovery works by path
and the specs import their helpers relatively, so sorting by extension would
break both.
83 roles already carry the marker; hermes, homeassistant, litellm and
openclaw were missing it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Twenty-five specs called the Playwright APIs with default or hardcoded
timeouts. Routed over Tor those budgets are too small, so a spec fails on
transport latency rather than on the behaviour it asserts.
Route the waits through resolveTimeout and reach pages via gotoOnion, the
helpers the tor branch introduced for exactly this. The remaining changes in
the diff are import wrapping around those calls.
The repository lint enforces this: a raw numeric timeout in a role spec is
rejected with a pointer to resolveTimeout, which is how a hardcoded 500ms
wait added during this session was caught.
Merge work rather than authored here; not deployed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The agent drives MCP clients that reach providers with the credentials
the deployment issued, so an unauthenticated surface hands that reach to
anyone. sso was declared off behind a suppression; it is now group-gated
like every other role, admitting the administrator and mcp groups.
The API path and the health endpoint stay open, because clients
authenticate there with their own token and a gate would break both. A
Playwright spec drives the redirect through Keycloak and skips itself
when the service is off.
Render every discovered server into the agent's own config, filtered to
the auth schemes a client can actually present, so no entry carries a
credential the server would reject.
Render hermes' config after the stack exists and before the handlers
flush; the other order fired compose up while the config was still
missing.
Own the config file as the container user. Rendered as root it stays
unreadable to the agent, which then falls back to its built-in defaults
silently and reports only that the server is unknown, pointing the reader
at the wrong layer.
Assert what these clients expose: neither ships an admin surface listing
its configured servers, so the specs hold the API to refusing an
unauthenticated caller, which is what keeps the per-server bearers out of
reach.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first agent workload of requirement 032. Its compose service pins
runtime: to the fact svc-virt-kata publishes, so model-generated code
runs behind a kernel or syscall boundary rather than plain runc. The pin
goes through compose_only because docker stack deploy discards the key;
swarm relies on the node-default runtime and a placement constraint
instead.
Hermes is not a dashboard. The container starts its gateway and serves an
OpenAI-compatible API on 8642, which shapes three decisions: the env
block configures API_SERVER_*, inference points OLLAMA_BASE_URL at the
LiteLLM gateway (Hermes' Ollama client speaks the same wire format), and
the vhost declares status_codes [200, 404] because the API server maps
only /health and /v1/*, so the bare root answers 404 by design and the
webserver health unit would otherwise fail the host.
SSO is off deliberately: an oauth2 proxy in front of a bearer-token API
breaks OpenAI-compatible clients. Authentication is API_SERVER_KEY, and
the guest spec asserts that /v1/models without it is rejected while the
administrator spec asserts the key unlocks the listing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5