A port under ports.local or ports.public binds an address on the stack host, which is what a HiddenServicePort can forward to. Whether it should be forwarded has a cost in both directions: silently off leaves a service unreachable that the operator believes is on the onion, and silently on publishes a database, an admin interface or a SOCKS proxy to everyone holding the onion address. Neither belongs in a default, so the flag is now mandatory and every false carries the reason it is false.
The first run produced 165 findings, of which 131 were one architectural fact repeated rather than 131 decisions. Four groups are therefore settled once in the lint instead: the proxy-fronted http, sso and websocket, because the node onion already forwards port 80 to the reverse proxy that routes every vhost, oauth2 hop and socket upgrade behind it; the implicit-TLS variants, because Tor is already the transport encryption and container_ports drops those listeners when TLS is off, which an onion deployment always is; the categories a hidden service cannot carry, listed once in plugins.lookup.tor_ports.UDP_ONLY_CATEGORIES, which the lint imports rather than restates; and any entity that already answers the question through exposed:.
That leaves 23 real per-port decisions, each with a reason naming its own consumer. svc-net-tor keeps its own socks, trans and dns off the onion: a published SOCKS port is an open proxy, and SocksPolicy cannot refuse it because the forward arrives from the node's own address.
Mailu turns smtp, submission, imap and pop3 on, which is what makes sending and receiving work over the onion, and leaves sieve off because ManageSieve manages filters rather than mail. Measured end to end through the merged applications view, across all 105 roles the deploy now forwards exactly 25, 110, 143 and 587.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
f85996b43a added this mount on the premise that "checkmk's entrypoint runs
`omd create --no-tmpfs`, so the site's tmp directory is never mounted and the
site cannot come up cleanly", and noted that checkmk had not been watched
starting with it. The premise does not hold. `--no-tmpfs` persists TMPFS=off, so
omdlib never mounts anything and keeps ~/tmp as an ordinary directory on the
site volume; upstream runs it that way inside containers on purpose, because a
tmpfs mount there would need privileges (Werk 6528).
The mount was not solving a problem, it was the problem. Without a mode, Docker
28 creates a tmpfs as 755 root, and the site user cannot mkdir in it; with one,
compose honours it but `docker stack deploy` does not, because the compose to
swarm conversion builds TmpfsOptions from SizeBytes alone
(docker/cli cli/compose/convert/volume.go:146-170). That is why the key flipped
four times in two days and why run 34421944328 still crash-looped on swarm with
`PermissionError: '/omd/sites/cmk/tmp/apache'` after the mode came back.
Measured on the pinned checkmk/check-mk-raw:2.4.0p32, one container with the
tmpfs and one without, same volume layout otherwise:
healthy after 45s 45s
~/tmp tmpfs 751, site user, 192K -> 188K
login.py p50/p90 9.4 / 11.1 ms 8.1 / 10.8 ms
No difference that matters, and the directory OMD creates is exactly the one the
mount used to shadow. The image declares no VOLUME, so nothing anonymous takes
its place. Checkmk's own docs call the mount a performance option, and Werk
19700 recommends leaving it off because it breaks `omd restore`, which matters
here with `backup.no_stop_required: true`.
An entrypoint wrapper that chmods the path was tried first and rejected before
it landed: `docker stack config` refuses the `"$@"` it needs, and
sys-svc-compose-ca turns any longer `bash -c` argv into rc 127.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The default is what varies between Docker versions, not the explicit value.
Measured by starting each engine and reading the mount back:
engine tmpfs without mode tmpfs with mode 1777
29.7.2 1777 root honoured
28.5.2 755 root 1777 root
A checkmk site runs as uid 1000, so a root-owned 755 tmp makes omdlib fail
`mkdir /omd/sites/cmk/tmp/apache` and the container restarts forever. That is
exactly what run 34348821577 shows, on runners reporting Docker 28.0.4.
f3eba39cae removed `mode: "01777"` here after measuring on 29.7.2 alone, where
the default happens to match, and so replaced the mechanism that behaves the
same everywhere with the one that does not. The mode comes back.
The validator loses the ban with it. Its stated reason, that `docker stack
deploy` drops the key, is a different claim from the one the removing commit
made, and neither survives the measurement above for the compose path this
failure came from; it now checks the type and nothing more.
One thing this does not settle. The note this repository kept on the earlier
attempt records run 33923190220 failing the same way on 28.0.4 while the mode
WAS set. That contradicts the 28.5.2 row and did not reproduce, so either the
patch releases differ or that diagnosis was wrong. The next run decides it:
read the engine version out of the rescue artifact and check whether the site
tmp comes up 1777.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
checkmk crash-looped in swarm on run 33923190220, 82 convergence attempts,
with PermissionError [Errno 13] on '/omd/sites/cmk/tmp/nagvis' raised from
omdlib/tmpfs.py:294 while OMD populated the site's tmp skeleton.
The mount is not the problem and must stay. Upstream's docker-entrypoint.sh
runs `omd create --no-tmpfs` and the comment above it states the site tmp
directory "might have been pre-created by docker when the --tmpfs option is
used", so supplying that tmpfs externally is the intended pattern, not a
workaround.
The mode was the problem. container_volumes coerces a declared mode with
int(text, 8), so "01777" reaches the stack file as the decimal 1023. Docker
29.7.2 reads that as raw mode bits and mounts 1777; the CI hosts run 28.0.4
and produced a directory the owning uid could not write. 0o1023 leaves the
owner with no permission bits at all, which is exactly the failure.
Docker's own default is already 1777, sticky and world-writable, which is
what a site tmp needs, so the declaration could only ever match it or break
it. Dropping the key restores the default. Measured on 29.7.2 in both
`docker compose` and `docker stack deploy`: a mode-less tmpfs mounts 1777 and
uid 1000, the uid `omd create -u 1000` gives the site, creates nagvis in it.
The validator now rejects tmpfs 'mode' outright rather than checking it is
octal. An octal check cannot help when the encoding itself does not survive
to the container the same way on every engine version. merge/svc-net-tor
still carries the old declaration and will fail this check if it lands.
supported_version and minimum_version sat in 24 roles and were read by no template, no task and no lookup. Their only consumer was the audit report version column, which turned false the moment an automated image bump ran: qdrant reported a verified version nobody had verified, two releases long. Both leave MCP_KEYS, so a role that declares them again fails the schema lint instead of carrying a field with no effect.
Requirement 025 mandated minimum_version as a MUST and 035 carried it in an example; both are corrected here, otherwise the repository would contradict its own code.
The gate then surfaced five dead docs.mattermost.com links. Mattermost moved to /administration-guide/ and /deployment-guide/, and every replacement was probed for 200 rather than guessed. The MCP page is gone with no successor, so mattermost now points at mcpserver/README.md in the Agents repository, the source rather than a rendered mirror.
Both concerns share three files - mattermost's meta/mcp.yml, requirement 025, and the generated audit.md, which derives from a source of each - so splitting them would commit an artifact that does not match its sources.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An MCP client spec signs in through the client's own OIDC button, which
redirects to Keycloak. Every provider put its MCP pairing in the lean variant,
and that variant pinned sso off - so the round that exists to prove the pairing
was the one round without an identity provider. Run 33574056480 shows what that
costs: openwebui's MCP specs reached _shared.js:131 and died on "openwebui OIDC
sign-in button must be visible on the auth page".
The rule now demands two things of the variant that carries the consumers: the
provider pins sso on, and each admitted consumer, in the variant that round
actually pulls in, does not pin it off. The second half matters because a round
deploys every dependency at its own index and falls back to variant 0 only when
the dependency has fewer, so the client shipping alongside is that one and not
the client's variant 0. A role that declares no sso, or pins it to a literal
false because upstream speaks no OIDC, is exempt from a flag it cannot have.
Twenty roles moved to satisfy it. Ten already had a second sso: false pin and
only needed the flip. Six could host the pairing in variant 0, which already
has sso on, and dropped back to two variants. Six kept a third lean variant to
carry the false polarity variants-coverage wants. moodle and mattermost took
swaps instead: moodle's variant 1 is the mandated LDAP-only branch, and
mattermost was already at the three-variant cap with sso on in its variant 2.
nextcloud also turns context_agent on in that round, the ExApp that serves the
endpoint - with it off the round proved nothing it was built to prove.
The rule moves to tests/lint/ansible/services/ because it reads meta YAML and
executes nothing, which is where integration.md says such a check belongs, and
its suppression key joins the catalog it was never listed in.
nextcloud_exapp_reregister becomes nextcloud_exapp_renew: mcp-secret-masking
matches `register:` unanchored, so the substring in the old name read as a task
that prints a secret. register.yml already masks the two tasks that carry one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mcp-consumer-variant guard demanded three things of a provider's MCP
round: every admitted consumer enabled, each of them pinned `services: null`
so it dragged no dependencies along, and no other service left enabled. Two
of those were the rule legislating a round's contents rather than checking
that the pairing gets proven at all.
Keep the first and drop the rest. What else the round carries is the role's
own call, so the tor/litellm exemption, the datastore exemption and the
`allowed` set they fed have no reader left and go with them.
Strip the 63 `services: null` pins the rule forced across 20 variants, all
written bare as `services:`. The topic-emptying capability behind them
stays: apply_topic still normalises None to {} for the inventory payload,
and the unit tests still cover it. Only the uses and the mandate are gone.
That leaves overridden_providers scanning a repository with nothing left to
find, so its three assertions passed over an empty dict and would have
stayed green however the function broke. Rebuild them on a synthetic role
tree, which also covers the case the repository scan never held: a variant
naming a plain flag is not an override.
Removing the pins changes what deploys. Measured across all 20 variants: 18
identical, prometheus#1 grows 23 to 31 roles, moodle#2 grows 31 to 32 and
crosses the memory budget until the following commit shrinks it back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A round deploys a provider once, so the role that pulls it in is the only place that can say how lean it has to be. A variant entry may now carry any application config topic under a service it depends on: a mapping deep-merges, so naming one key changes that key alone, and null empties the topic. Empty was the case that needed a marker of its own, because merging an empty mapping is a no-op and would leave exactly the services the round was trying to shed.
The topic vocabulary and the merge semantics live in utils.roles.applications.topics, which is also where resources.py now gets them rather than spelling the same null-or-merge out a second time. Collecting who demands what stays in the inventory tree, refuses two roles demanding different values for one provider in the same round, and skips a role's own entity entry so the existing services.<own>.users declarations are not read as overrides.
The CI set-cover learns the same fact. Its greedy cover retires a role's variant-0 row when an earlier row of another role embeds it, on the stated premise that embedding pulls the provider's variant 0. A variant that dictates that provider's config breaks the premise from the other side: whatever ran, it was not the provider as the provider declares it. Such a pair now covers nothing, so the retired row keeps its job, its artefact and its verdict.
Measured on the current tree: 20 override pairs, 41 covered rows before and after, so nothing is revoked today. The rule bites the moment an override lands in a row that covers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The contract check ran as an Ansible task in the middle of every provider deploy, and the two client checks ran the same way. A test that is part of the deploy cannot be run without deploying, cannot be re-run on its own, and reports its verdict as a deploy failure. Twenty-seven task files lose 491 lines to this.
It is now what it always was. Each provider ships files/test/test.sh, templates/test.env.j2 and meta/tests.yml, and test-e2e-cli stages one shared harness beside it: run.sh drives contract.sh in a throwaway container on the provider's own network, then isolation.sh for adapter-fronted providers. The read probe each provider offers moved from the calling task into meta/mcp.yml next to the allowlist it must satisfy, and the schema now rejects a read probe naming a tool outside that allowlist.
The bearer the test presents is the one a client resolves through mcp.credential, via the new mcp_client_bearer lookup over resolve_credential, which moved to utils.roles.applications.mcp so it is the same function mcp_servers renders every client connection with. The probe presented whatever the calling role passed, which for the fifteen adapter-fronted providers is a different secret than any client holds.
Sidecar isolation is read from the engine rather than measured inside the container, so it no longer needs a delegation to the node holding the task: attachment is compared by network name, which drops the gwbridge special case, and a swarm worker says it cannot measure instead of skipping silently.
Retrying is bounded by wall clock against MCP_DEADLINE_SECONDS, which scales through the same lookup('timeout') as the harness budget it has to stay under. A flag that is neither true nor false aborts rather than reading as off.
mcp-provider-probe becomes mcp-provider-cli-test: an enabled provider must ship the test rather than include the task. mcp-probe-bearer becomes mcp-adapter-bearer, tying ADAPTER_BEARER to the declared credential key now that no probe include carries it. A new integration test renders the shared env template for every provider through Ansible's own templar, so a later change to it breaks visibly instead of poisoning twenty deploys quietly.
Hermes and OpenClaw keep their client-side proof as CLI tests of their own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Thirteen of sixteen MCP sidecar entries carried no enabled at all, so
collect_role_resources fell back to _looks_like_container and billed every
one of them as running. Three roles already gated theirs on mcp.enabled;
the rest now do the same, gitea twice because it is the only role with a
vendor container behind the adapter.
The fifteen adapter roles then read services.<key>.enabled instead of
mcp.enabled, so the compose block and the task gates follow the services
entry rather than running beside it on a second path. The six plugin and
native roles keep reading the topic: they ship no sidecar entry to point at.
The three-level resolution is not new. KEYCLOAK_LOGOUT_PANEL_ENABLED has
the same shape and depth and gates a task the same way, and the same value
reaches JAVASCRIPT_SERVICE_ENABLED, where service-gating.js throws on
anything but "true" or "false" — an unresolved chain would have been
killing keycloak's Playwright run since 575a5a87ac.
This does not change what the resource model counts: _is_enabled reads the
unrendered Jinja and still treats it as on. What it buys is one switch
instead of two, and a declaration that matches it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
83c1c729de gave every provider a group_names-gated services entry per MCP
client, including the clients it refuses with mcp_consumer: false. The gate
is what makes the inventory resolver plan provider and client into one round,
so 19 of the repo's 82 co-deploy pairs started a client for a pairing the
provider had already declined. flowise is a live MCP client of qdrant,
homeassistant and prometheus; the other 17 providers were bringing up its
node stack for nothing.
The entries now read enabled: false, shared: false, mcp_consumer: false, and
the variants that pinned them to true are gone. Setting those variants to
false instead is not an option: test_variants_no_static_override forbids any
variant override of a literal base value in either direction.
bond leaves with them, and a new lint holds that line: collect_role_resources
skips a literally disabled entry before it reads any resource key, so a bond
there describes a cost nobody pays. Thirteen entries unrelated to MCP carried
one and are cleared too.
test_mcp_consumer_services_entry demanded the group_names shape for every
client entry, refused ones included, and now demands the opposite there.
dynamic-flag keeps its rule and takes its own documented per-key exemption.
make docs redraws twenty graphs: the edges go, the nodes stay as
'openwebui ❌' and 'flowise ❌', so the refusal is visible rather than read as
an integration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
enabled and shared were hand-maintained in 24 roles and wrong in both
directions. Both now resolve from the mcp_consumer edges already declared
in meta/services.yml: a server takes the consumers it admits, a client
takes the servers that admit it, and the pair renders as "'peer' in
group_names or ...", or False when no peer is admitted at all. setdefault
keeps meta/mcp.yml and meta/variants.yml as the override channel, so
pinning either key still wins.
The resolved block replaces the mapping instead of being written into it.
_build_role_base_config parks the YAML cache's own object under mcp, so an
in-place setdefault injected the derived keys into every later raw read and
made test_mcp_schema pass alone but fail in a directory run.
The derivation keys on peer presence, never on a peer's own value: a
re-entrant read under _RENDER_GUARD returns the unrendered dict.
Four lints now ask the resolver instead of reading meta/mcp.yml, which they
could not do while the key was hand-written. That is what exposed the eleven
missing hostile-path specs the previous commit closed.
Carries one change that belongs to the WordPress probe but shares a file
with this one: the tool allowlist moves to the hyphenated names the adapter
actually serves.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
allowed_consumers was twenty hand-kept lists of which fourteen were identical, so every new client meant an edit in every provider. A client now declares services.<own-entity>.mcp_consumer: true once and a provider refuses one with mcp_consumer: false, which is also what tells a deliberate exclusion apart from a forgotten entry.
The group_names-gated consumer entries give the inventory resolver the co-deploy edge meta/mcp.yml never had: one of sixty-nine matrix rounds carried an MCP client before, twenty-three role/round pairs do now. bond 0.5 keeps the clients out of round 0 so the host memory budget still holds.
BREAKING CHANGE: meta/mcp.yml no longer accepts allowed_consumers; declare services.<entity>.mcp_consumer on the client instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
834 commits from the Tor onion-service branch against 299 of ours, from merge
base 7b646bdece: 127 conflicted files, 3506 files changed.
The two sides are largely orthogonal. Theirs adds svc-net-tor and a `tor` service
across the role tree, plus two sweeping refactors: shipped scripts sorted by
language (files/ruby/, files/python/, files/shell/, scripts/lint/*.sh) and the
unit suite moved under tests/unit/python/. Ours is requirement 036, the native AI
gateway, plus the MCP role work. Most conflicts were both sides appending to the
same service map, resolved as unions.
Resolutions that were not unions:
Credentials moved namespace. Theirs renamed meta/schema.yml to meta/secrets.yml
and re-addressed credentials as secrets.credentials.<name>. Git carried our
litellm_api_key blocks through the rename, but every consumer we added still read
'credentials.<name>', which no longer resolves. All 45 call sites are migrated.
plugins/filter/container_volumes.py is deleted by theirs and relocated to
plugins/lookup/container_volumes.py, where it carries the same tmpfs defect our
f85996b43 had just fixed: a hard-coded {"size": ...} that silently drops a per
mount `mode`. The fix is re-applied in the relocated file, as that commit's merge
note anticipated.
compose.yml keeps only INFINITO_PLAYWRIGHT_REPORTS_BASE_DIR. Theirs also forwards
INFINITO_PLAYWRIGHT_STAGE_BASE_DIR; that line is deliberately dropped, per the
analysis recorded in 45804e9ad -- STAGE has a drift-proof role-vars fallback,
while forwarding it promotes a setdefault-pinnable .env value above that SPOT.
tasks/stages/01_constructor.yml takes their include, ./tasks/utils/setup/group.yml,
because their refactor removed tasks/groups/*-roles.yml, leaving our include
target nonexistent. Our task name is kept, since svc-virt is in the loop.
Makefile swarm-zombie is a union: their validate plus teardown, then our
lab_subnet cleanup, which their side dropped while leaving lab_subnet.sh as the
only orphaned reference in the file.
01_bootstrap.sh keeps our deterministic --ip pinning, which distinguishes an
already-attached node from a real failure, over their `|| true`.
Their language-sorted layout orphaned references our side still held: zammad's
two scripts/apply/*.rb, jenkins' java-with-ca-trust.sh, and the notify topics
their handlers renamed to hyphenated form. All corrected.
roles/sys-svc-compose/files/shell/swarm/stack_ready.sh gains our latched-update
block: paused, rollback_paused, rollback_started and rollback_completed exit 2
rather than polling a state that cannot resolve without another deploy.
config_from_run is unioned to (title, logged, jobs); the production caller in
trigger/__main__.py now passes jobs, without which our suite suppression would
have been inert.
READMEs are regenerated rather than hand-merged: 15 LiteLLM rows and 91 Tor rows
now derive from the merged metadata, which is itself evidence the meta merge is
coherent.
Verified: 5161 unit tests pass. The single failure, test_query.py TestSortSpec,
also fails on fork/feature/svc-net-tor at b51d2f9919, measured in a baseline
worktree -- so this merge introduces no new unit-test failure. Two modules are
excluded from that run because `baudolo`, a dependency their branch introduces,
is not installed on this host.
Not verified: no deploy has run against the merged tree, and make quality has not
been run end to end here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
checkmk's entrypoint runs `omd create --no-tmpfs`, so the site's tmp directory
is never mounted and the site cannot come up cleanly. Declaring it needs a tmpfs
with sticky, world-writable permissions, which the volume layer could not
express.
container_volumes built the tmpfs options as a hard-coded single key:
if mount.get("size") is not None:
tmpfs_entry["tmpfs"] = {"size": mount["size"]}
so a `mode` in the declaration was accepted by the schema and silently dropped by
the renderer. It now accumulates size and mode and attaches the key only when
something is set, coercing mode to the int docker expects. mounts.py validates
both the bind and tmpfs spellings through _is_octal_mode and names the expected
shape in the error, so `1777` or `0o1777` fails at render with a readable message
instead of producing the wrong bits.
Capability and consumer land together deliberately. Split apart, checkmk's
mode: "01777" would pass validation, be dropped at render, and the tmp directory
would come up without the sticky bit while everything reported success.
checkmk declares site_tmp as a tmpfs at the site's tmp path with size 512m and
mode 01777. The site name moves into services.checkmk.site, and CHECKMK_SITE
reads it through lookup('config', ...) instead of hard-coding "cmk", so the mount
target and the variable cannot drift.
MERGE NOTE: fork/feature/svc-net-tor carries acc9e25c0f, which deletes
plugins/filter/container_volumes.py and moves it to plugins/lookup/. That
relocated copy has the identical defect at lines 141-142 -- the same hard-coded
{"size": ...} -- and its _coerce_mode_int is wired only to the config-ref path.
It is not a competing fix, but this change will disappear at merge unless it is
re-applied in the lookup.
Verified: the unit suite passes, 4448 tests, including new coverage of the mode
path in test_container_volumes.py.
Not verified: checkmk has not been watched starting with this mount. Docker's
tmpfs mode also interacts with the container umask, so the effective bits on the
created directory were not inspected live. The new validation is fail-closed: a
role carrying a non-octal mode would now error at render rather than be ignored,
and while the suite is green, I did not grep every CHECKMK_SITE consumer for one
still assuming the literal "cmk".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
unsafe-inline re-admits the inline execution an XSS needs and unsafe-eval re-admits string-to-code, so a CSP relaxation must be verified against the running app rather than copied from another role. The new lint requires a nocheck marker plus a Reason on the flag's own line, so a marker cannot drift to the neighbouring directive.
The 197 pre-existing grants across 70 roles are checked out with a TODO: they were never verified and still have to be.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
72fd9c870 required the onion in every variant but exempted variant 1, on the
argument that the minimal round is the one place the stack runs without it. That
argument does not hold: the onion is part of the deployment under test, not a
feature bolted onto the full shape. A round that skips it is not a smaller
deployment, it is a different one.
So the exemption is gone and 95 variant-1 entries pin the onion on. Two
exclusions remain, both read from data rather than a comment: a role with no tor
block has no onion to pin, and a role whose meta/services.yml pins tor.enabled to
a literal false has already declared it has none.
That put the rule in conflict with test_coverage, which requires both polarities
of every dynamic flag: with tor on everywhere, the false side has no variant left
to live in. 94 roles take the exemption that contract already provides for
exactly this - "flags whose group-derived value is a hard invariant that variants
must never override", the same one 4e6ef2542 used for the seaweedfs frontend.
web-app-nextcloud needs none: its variant 8 pairs the clearnet-only PeerTube and
keeps the false polarity.
Measured, because the declaration is not what CI runs. assign_tor gives the onion
to every second capable entry with the run number as the parity switch, so more
capable variants do not mean proportionally more onion jobs: across five roles
and 21 entries the count goes 8 -> 10 on an even run and 9 on an odd one. The
clearnet path also survives - checkmk reports v1=false on run 0 and v1=true on
run 1, so both states are still covered across two consecutive runs. What the
94 markers give up is a declarative guarantee in variants.yml, not the coverage
itself.
The real cost is weight, not job count. web-app-nextcloud variant 1 goes from
3.09GB reservation / 7.27GB limit to 18.26GB / 43.01GB once svc-net-tor and its
closure join, so the cheap round is no longer cheap. Every variant stays under
the 32/64GB budget, and the same effect applies to the other 94 unmeasured.
Verified: tests/lint 336 passed / 307 subtests, tests/integration/roles/meta/
variants plus the role-meta lints 39 passed. The rule was checked in both
directions - it reported the variant-1 offenders before the flips and none after.
Not measured: what the heavier rounds do to wall-clock, against swarm jobs capped
at 355 minutes and one that has hit that ceiling before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
7a70d27b7 made a variant that switches SSO on also switch the onion on, because
that pairing is where the platform breaks in ways clearnet never shows. The same
argument reaches further than SSO: a Secure cookie is dropped, an https identity
provider refuses to embed, and crypto.subtle is undefined for any feature on a
non-secure origin, not only for a login. A variant that never runs the onion is
not testing the deployment users get.
So the rule now covers every variant of a role that declares a tor block.
Variant 1 stays exempt - it is the minimal, partner-free round every role
declares and the one place the stack is exercised without the onion at all - and
a role whose meta/services.yml pins tor.enabled to a literal false is skipped
outright, because that declaration already says the role has no onion and needs
no comment repeating it.
That found 137 variants. 101 were variant 1. Of the rest, 28 are the LDAP-only
auth-isolation rounds, which gain real coverage from running LDAP over the onion
and are flipped on here. Four cannot: svc-net-tor is the provider itself, and
nextcloud's variant 8 pairs the clearnet-only PeerTube. Both carry a marker
naming the reason; opentalk and coturn need none, since their services.yml pins
the literal false the rule now reads.
Flipping them exposed a contract that contradicted itself. test_auth_isolation
and test_non_baseline_explicit_disables demanded `shared: false` beside
`enabled: false`, while variants-static-override flagged that same line as a
static override - which is why all 133 of them carried a nocheck marker. The
demand only makes sense where `shared` is dynamic: a literal base value cannot
leak through deep-merge, so restating it protects nothing. Both contracts now
ask for it only in that case, and the 133 lines are gone.
The result is a stricter rule with fewer lines: 189 insertions against 193
deletions.
Verified: tests/lint 336 passed / 307 subtests, tests/integration/roles 107
passed / 610 subtests. The rule is checked in both directions - it reported 137
offenders before the resolution and none after.
Not measured: 28 additional onion rounds cost matrix wall-clock, against swarm
jobs already capped at 355 minutes and one that has hit that ceiling before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every variants.yml header states the rule the bond feeds: variant 0 carries each
tightly-coupled (bond>=1, same-host) service, while loosely-coupled (bond<1,
separate-host) partners are excluded from the closure and distributed across
later variants to keep every host under budget. tor was declared bond: 1 in all
101 consumers, so it had to sit in every variant-0 closure.
It does not belong there. The onion is a separate-host provider reached over the
node's hidden service, the same shape as the bridged partners that already carry
0.5, and f1dff50fb established both the reasoning and the precedent when it
dropped xwiki and bigbluebutton from 1 to 0.5: bridged partners with their own
role and their own spec, whose bond declaration was the outlier rather than
their placement.
This also unblocks the variant-level tor contract. Requiring a non-baseline
variant to pin the onion on while tor still counted as tightly coupled would
have pulled variant 0's closure requirements along with it.
Verified: tests/lint 336 passed / 307 subtests and tests/integration/roles 107
passed / 610 subtests, including test_resource_budget over every variant's
deduplicated footprint and the bond-aware test_order closure.
Not measured, and the honest cost: f1dff50fb's own caveat applies unchanged
here. Whether redistributing a service out of the baseline closure buys back
wall-clock is not established; role-runtimes has the per-role seconds and no run
has been made with this shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The adapter was the only image in the tree pinned by a hand-maintained digest,
and the pin was never recomputed by anything. It drifted twice: run 31374959721
lost seven of eight jobs to mirror/docker.io/python@sha256:6771159c... not
found, and the renewal to the newest upstream digest earlier today would have
reproduced it, because builds resolve FROM against the GHCR mirror while the
mirror is copied by tag and lags upstream by design.
The base is now FROM <image>:<version>, taken from the sidecar service in
meta/services.yml - the only file iter_role_images scans, so the tag the build
asks for is by construction the tag the mirror was told to copy. The version
moves from the moving 3.13-slim to 3.13.15-slim, which upstream stops rewriting
once published, and which the existing version drift job renews like every other
image.
With the build reading services.yml, the adapter block's digest, image and
version had no consumer left. They are removed together with the schema check
for the digest form, the warn-only drift test, and the manifest_digest helper
that existed only for it. What remains in the block describes the adapter rather
than the image it is built from.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reverts the twelve pins to 9662417a, the digest the GHCR mirror currently
carries for python:3.13-slim. The previous commit renewed them to the newest
Docker Hub digest, which is the wrong registry: builds resolve FROM against the
mirror whenever a mirror prefix is configured, and the mirror is copied by tag,
so it holds whatever the tag pointed at when the sync last ran. A pin ahead of
the mirror resolves to nothing there while a local build keeps working - run
31374959721 lost seven of its eight jobs to exactly that, as
mirror/docker.io/python@sha256:6771159c...: not found.
The external check measured Docker Hub and would therefore have kept advising
the change that breaks the build. It now resolves the source the build uses via
mirror_image, asks whether the pin exists there at all, and only falls back to
upstream when no mirror is configured.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three fields pinned artefacts and nothing recomputed any of them.
The adapter base digest was stale for all twelve provider roles: the tag
python:3.13-slim moved to ffb752e1 while every role still pinned 9662417a.
The GHCR mirror copies by tag, so the pinned manifest is one it was never
asked to copy - a mirrored build resolves FROM to nothing while a direct
build keeps working.
adapter.specification_sha256 matched no revision of the file it pins in ten
of twelve roles; three of the old values were byte-identical to the same
role's tools.schema_sha256, so they had been copied rather than computed.
The field is enforced nowhere at runtime, which is exactly why it needs a
check.
Add a hard lint for both offline pins, computing the tool digest with the
adapter's own policy.schema_digest so it cannot drift from the code that
enforces it in production, and a warn-only external check that reports a
base digest the upstream tag no longer resolves to.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
meta/schema.yml held credential definitions and their runtime values, but the
name said 'schema' and read like structural metadata next to services.yml and
volumes.yml. Nothing in the file is a schema in the sense the other meta files
use the word, and a contributor had to open it to learn it holds secrets.
62 role files renamed. ROLE_FILE_META_SCHEMA becomes ROLE_FILE_META_SECRETS and
keeps its role as the SPOT the path is built from.
Two readers bypassed that constant and spelled the name themselves:
utils/cache/applications.py built meta_dir / 'schema.yml' twice, and
plugins/lookup/application_gid.py carries the filename in the marker list it
detects application roles by. Left behind, the rename would not have raised —
credentials would have resolved empty and the role would have stopped counting
as an application.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The readiness gate ahead of it only polls the login page, which the site
serves before the administrator hash is written, so a single non-zero return
against a still-initialising site failed the whole deploy. Retrying matches
the neighbouring gate and is idempotent, since the task sets the same password
each time.
Corrects the two places that still described the break-glass credential as
seeded once on first run. The requirement notes stay as they are: they
describe the upstream CMK_PASSWORD variable, which is still first-run only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The digest shipped with the digest-pinning change was a valid but
superseded python:3.13-slim index that no tag points at any more. CI
pulls through a mirror that only copies manifests reachable from the
tags it syncs, so that digest was absent there and every adapter build
failed to resolve its base image.
The replacement is the digest the tag carries today, which resolves both
upstream and through the mirror. Removing the digest instead would trip
the schema lint that requires one.
The metadata named infinito/mcp-adapter:1.0.0 with an all-zero digest,
an image that does not exist, while the build actually used
python:3.13-slim. Declaration and artifact disagreed, so the declaration
proved nothing. Both now name the real base image and pin it by digest,
which a tag cannot guarantee across a rebuild.
The adapter base moves from the provider's service version to
mcp.adapter.digest, alongside the tool specification and its checksum.
Being an MCP client was enough to join a provider's overlay, so a single
admission anywhere reached every provider that opened one. Attachment now
requires both that the role speaks as a client and that the provider
lists it in mcp.allowed_consumers.
consumer.kind accepts a list so one overlay can carry both its
service-flag consumers and its MCP clients, which is what the vector
store needs.
Ten provider roles served an MCP surface that other roles consume, but
were never declared as shared services, so the registry did not know
them. Declaring them pulls in the recursion contract every registry
service owes: seven roles move their entry tasks into tasks/00_core.yml
behind the run_once flag, so the service loader cannot include them a
second time.
pretix already had a run_once block, but set the flag last; the flag now
comes first, before the body it protects.
Ten applications with no MCP server of their own get one without a line of code
inside them: qdrant, checkmk, fider, jellyfin, listmonk, pretix, prometheus,
snipe-it, zammad and libretranslate.
The sidecar is confined rather than trusted. It runs read-only, drops every
capability, forbids privilege escalation, publishes no port and joins only its
own provider's network, carrying neither that provider's alias nor the consumer
networks the provider itself joined. Its tool surface is a JSON contract, not
code: which tools exist, which upstream path each maps to and what shape the
arguments take. Adding a tool is a line of JSON, not a new image.
The image is built locally from the audited adapter source with the base image
as a build argument, so all ten share one reviewed build instead of ten upstream
dependencies. Each role provisions its own read-only identity in the language
its application speaks, and every adapter include is guarded by the role's MCP
flag, so switching it off leaves no container behind.
The block sat under services but never behaved like a service. A service has
exactly one providing role, declared with provides, so the registry can map the
key to that role and consumers bind their flag to its presence. No role declares
provides: mcp. There are seventeen providers and the pairing is done by
allowed_consumers inside the block itself.
Every rule that enforces the service model therefore needed an exemption for it:
a shared-provider suppression in fourteen roles, a playwright-service-flag
suppression, and two freshly added exemptions in the dynamic-flag and
variants-static-override checks. Four independent rules, four escape hatches,
one cause. They are all gone now, together with a bond key that only the
resource budgeter reads and only for entries under services, and a wordpress
addon bridge that pointed at a service block that no longer exists.
The block moves to meta/mcp.yml. The applications loader maps meta/<name>.yml to
applications.<app>.<name> generically, so the move needs no wiring; the file
takes the same shape as meta/rbac.yml. Every config path follows, the variant
overrides are lifted out of their services map, and the vocabulary module leaves
the services package because it no longer describes one. roles_with_service
gains an explicit topic parameter rather than an implicit fallback, so nothing
silently resolves against the wrong container.
Files that are otherwise unrelated to this move are included where the committed
tree would otherwise keep pointing at a path that no longer resolves: thirteen
vars files, eleven playwright env templates and one task file.
Seven include templates under sys-svc-container decided how a container was
probed, and they read their inputs from template-local `{% set %}` scope.
That scope leaks: a value set for one service silently reached every service
below it, which is how taiga's front and gateway ended up probing a port
declared for a different service, and how bluesky's frontend probed a PDS
endpoint.
Probes now live in utils/docker/healthcheck.py, one class per flavor behind a
PROBES registry, and each service declares its own:
healthcheck:
flavor: curl
path: health/ready
start_period: 20m
`port_key` picks another entry under ports.internal for the services that
expose their probe elsewhere (keycloak on management, nextcloud talk on
signaling). Without a flavor the entry must carry an explicit test argv, so a
missing declaration fails loudly instead of rendering a probe against nothing.
Rendering HEAD's templates against the new output confirms 49 of 56 call
sites are byte-identical; the remaining seven are covered by an Ansible run.
Three probes change on purpose: erpnext's backend gains a check it never had,
bluesky's frontend drops the leaked PDS path, and msmtp_curl moves from a
hardcoded localhost:80 to the service's own port on 127.0.0.1 like every
other flavor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three conflicts, none resolved by picking a side wholesale:
- Makefile: took the incoming ACT_INPUTS, which routes through SWARM_DISTROS
instead of inlining the same expression a second time.
- test-e2e-playwright/02_run_one.yml: took the incoming rc handling. An absent
rc now counts as failure; the previous default(0) let an aborted Playwright
run pass silently, contradicting the debug message right above it.
- web-app-peertube spec: combined both. Kept gotoOnion and resolveTimeout,
which this branch's lint enforces, and adopted the incoming retry-inside-poll
for the OIDC button plus its networkidle wait.
The declared values were guesses that ran up to 60x the size of the image they belong to: seaweedfs asked for 30GB against a 104MB image, nextcloud for 20GB against 353MB. Because min_storage feeds the storage guard, the runner packer and the sufficient-storage filter, those numbers made hosts look too small and pruned caches that deploys did not need to lose.
Every service that declares min_storage together with image and version now carries the measured compressed transfer size of that image plus 200MB of headroom. Sizes were read from the registries through utils.docker.registry.manifest_transfer_size, the same path the headroom test uses, so the declarations and the gate agree by construction. Values are written in MB throughout, matching the existing 500MB / 100MB / 50MB style.
119 declarations across 89 roles. Range: 206MB (memcached) to 3473MB (ollama); four exceed 1GB. The 84 min_storage entries that name no image are untouched, since there is nothing to measure them against.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rewrite all 254 role descriptions to a uniform noun-phrase schema
(function-first, no leading verb, no trailing period, <=120 chars) and
enforce it via the extended description lint. Rename 12 role README H1
titles for clarity (e.g. Backup Container to Local -> Backup Docker
Volumes, CSS Service -> Corporate Design, NGINX Legal -> Imprint) and
regenerate their Cosmos and Quick Setup sections. Overview table
regenerated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add cli.build.readme.overview (make readme-index / make docs) rendering a
roles overview in the root README: Name, Lifecycle, Homepage, Video,
Description, Integrated with, Install. New info-media lint requires
homepage + video in every invokable role's meta/info.yml (opt out via
'# nocheck: info-media' in meta/main.yml); backfilled 147 roles with
researched, adversarially-verified homepages and official videos.
Retire the 'unsupported' lifecycle value: fold it into 'eol' as a valid
live end-of-life status (shipped but untested/unmaintained) across the
stage lists, symbol glossary, allow-list lint and docs. Retag confluence,
jira, minio, phpldapadmin to eol and magento to pre-alpha.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Moves web-app-checkmk, web-app-jellyfin, web-app-n8n,
svc-registry-cache and svc-registry-docker from alpha to beta, pulling
them into the default CI test-deploy lifecycle envelope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per-role deploy-mode opt-out moves from meta/tests.yml 'skip:' to meta/services.yml <entity>.modes.{compose,swarm}.enabled on the primary entity. get_role_skip now derives from it; get_role_mode_enabled added. A new lint requires every role shipping templates/*compose*.yml.j2 to declare both mode flags. Migrates 107 services.yml and drops 11 skip-only tests.yml. Also removes the variant_status deployability gate so swarm runs one job per variant unconditionally (variant_status.py and deployable_variant_indices deleted, complexity model simplified). Adds the i8matix alias.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rename the role, its test tree, the primary entity key
(volume-2-local), the derived vars (BKP_VOLUME_2_LOCAL_*,
SYS_SERVICE_BACKUP_VOLUME_2_LOCAL), the run-once fact, and every
group_names consumer flag, include path, doc, and lint reference. The
container_backup service key and the on-disk backup-docker-to-local
tree keep their names: both are contracts with existing consumer
entries, snapshot trees, and the baudolo pull tooling.
Operators must rename the svc-bkp-container-2-local inventory group and
disable the previous versioned units on already-provisioned hosts; the
pre-deploy snapshot glob derives its base from the new role name and
will not find them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Variant 0 pins the backup consumer flag enabled so the matrix baseline exercises the in-group branch; every other variant pins it disabled (shared: false carries the static-override suppression since the base value stays literally true). The matrix and wordpress variant entries move their services mapping to the list-item head so the static-override line parser resolves the override paths; yaml semantics are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
