Every script a role ships now lives under `files/<language>/`, and the unit
suite is split the same way: `tests/unit/python/` beside new sibling trees for
the other languages. `tests/lint/filesystem/test_role_files_layout.py` keeps it
that way; directories whose shape is dictated from outside carry a `.nocheck`
naming the constraint (Docker build contexts, WordPress mu-plugins, the Joomla
extension, Odoo addons, Playwright suites, the `files/test/test.sh` harness
that `test-e2e-cli` resolves generically).
This cannot be applied in halves. Moving a file and repointing what names it
are the same change: 14 references resolve only at deploy time, so the tree is
green either before or after, never between.
Those 14 were found by static resolution over every reference class, not by the
test suite -- a full `make quality-high` was green while all of them were
broken:
* 7 `src:` values built from a role variable holding a bare filename
(svc-bkp-remote-2-local, decidim, espocrm, friendica, joomla, pixelfed x2).
The variable doubles as the destination name inside the container, so the
language segment belongs at the call site, not in the variable.
* `sys-service/tasks/04_base.yml` resolved every consumer's systemd script
through `first_found(..., errors='strict')` over `files/script.{sh,py}`.
18 roles ship exactly that and have no template fallback: the play would
have died on each.
* `sys-front-inj-javascript` fell back to `<role>/files/javascript.js`; the
interface now reads `files/javascript/javascript.js`.
* `sys-front-inj-logout/templates/head_sub.j2` built the cache-busting mtime
path through `path_absolute(... 'files', ...)`.
* 4 `ansible.builtin.script:` invocations naming a bare command
(pull.py, prune.sh, set_postgres_superuser_password.sh, ganesha-serve.sh).
* `dev-python/files/shell/install.sh` pointed at a sibling role's script.
Depth-dependent paths inside the moved trees were bumped accordingly: 59
`parents[N]` computations, 12 relative climbs, and the per-role recover CLI,
whose path `cli/administration/recover/recoverers.py` still assembled from the
pre-move location.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolve the 80 open CodeQL/code-scanning alerts on this branch.
Security-sensitive fixes:
- cli/administration/deploy/development: break the unsafe import cycle by
extracting the env/arg helpers into a leaf module `env.py`, giving the
load-time DAG compose -> common -> deps -> env.
- web-app-bluesky login-broker server.js: prototype-pollution guard on
cookie parsing, CR/LF + control-char log sanitisation, HTML-escaped
exception text, and a ReDoS-bounded handle regex.
- web-app-baserow SSO: harden the open-redirect `next` handling.
- network diagnose probes: require TLS >= 1.2.
- actionlint installer: validate tar members against path traversal.
- decidim/apt-purge lint regexes: rewrite to avoid catastrophic backtracking.
- 6x Playwright URL regexes anchored; crs-k/stale-branches pinned to a commit SHA.
Mechanical cleanups: unused imports/globals/locals, empty-except comments,
import-and-import-from, implicit-string-concat, multiple-definition,
unreachable/useless-assignment.
False positives are intentionally left in place (Django settings patches,
Odoo __manifest__, side-effect imports, cross-module symbols).
Recurrence guards:
- import-linter contract (pyproject + tests/lint) locks the dev-deploy
package acyclic; a new cycle now fails CI instead of only CodeQL.
- new lint test requires every bandit (S###) `noqa` to carry a justification.
- BLE001 (blind-except) added to ruff as a ratchet (tests/roles exempt,
current production offenders grandfathered).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The baserow (infinito_sso.py) and bookwyrm (header_auth.py) trusted-header bridges now read identity only from the X-Forwarded-* headers nginx overwrites from the oauth2-proxy auth response. The client-injectable X-Auth-Request-*/Remote-User/X-Forwarded-Name variants are dropped, closing an authenticated-user header-injection escalation (including a groups->superuser path) in the claim-less edge case where X-Forwarded-* would be empty.
Add SSO security e2e tests (test-oidc-security.js) to both roles: forged-header gate bounce, trusted-header bridge endpoint gating, SSO-disabled inertness, and injected-header re-identification of an authenticated session. Wire the new spec into baserow's playwright.spec.js.
Update the bookwyrm header_auth unit test: precedence now uses two listed headers, plus a regression guard asserting proxy-uncontrolled headers are ignored.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Baserow's native SSO is Enterprise-only, so gate the community image with the shared Keycloak oauth2-proxy and patch urls.py (via a custom Dockerfile) with a trusted-header bridge. The bridge provisions/repairs a local Baserow user from the oauth2-proxy identity headers and mints native refresh/access/user_session tokens, mirroring Baserow's own SSO redirect contract (?token=&user_session=).
proxy.conf.j2 performs the nginx handoff: an authenticated browser without a jwt_token cookie is 302'd to /api/infinito/sso/login/, which redirects back to /?token=&user_session= for the frontend middleware to consume. bootstrap_admin marks the superuser email_verified + completed_onboarding to skip onboarding.
Replace the LDAP service/variant with proxy-gating and rewrite the seaweedfs + persona Playwright tests to drive Baserow through its API using the SSO-minted JWT.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5