Provision the native MCP server surface: create the endpoint, its owner
and its workspace, probe it on the internal origin, and refuse an
endpoint that never serves the stream. Baserow addresses a session
through the URL path, so meta/services.yml declares the endpoint key and
suffix the discovery layer composes the client URL from.
Split the role into a run-once guarded core. Registering the MCP surface
makes baserow a shared provider, and the variant-aware loader checks the
run-once flag before loading; without the flag as the first task a second
load request can include the role again.
Address the container by its hosting node. Migration and bootstrap ran
`container exec` on the manager while the replica sits on a worker, so
the resolved id existed nowhere the command could reach it. Re-resolve
after the post-migration restart as well: `service update --force`
replaces the container, and the bootstrap was still holding the id of the
one it replaced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The baserow (infinito_sso.py) and bookwyrm (header_auth.py) trusted-header bridges now read identity only from the X-Forwarded-* headers nginx overwrites from the oauth2-proxy auth response. The client-injectable X-Auth-Request-*/Remote-User/X-Forwarded-Name variants are dropped, closing an authenticated-user header-injection escalation (including a groups->superuser path) in the claim-less edge case where X-Forwarded-* would be empty.
Add SSO security e2e tests (test-oidc-security.js) to both roles: forged-header gate bounce, trusted-header bridge endpoint gating, SSO-disabled inertness, and injected-header re-identification of an authenticated session. Wire the new spec into baserow's playwright.spec.js.
Update the bookwyrm header_auth unit test: precedence now uses two listed headers, plus a regression guard asserting proxy-uncontrolled headers are ignored.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Baserow's native SSO is Enterprise-only, so gate the community image with the shared Keycloak oauth2-proxy and patch urls.py (via a custom Dockerfile) with a trusted-header bridge. The bridge provisions/repairs a local Baserow user from the oauth2-proxy identity headers and mints native refresh/access/user_session tokens, mirroring Baserow's own SSO redirect contract (?token=&user_session=).
proxy.conf.j2 performs the nginx handoff: an authenticated browser without a jwt_token cookie is 302'd to /api/infinito/sso/login/, which redirects back to /?token=&user_session= for the frontend middleware to consume. bootstrap_admin marks the superuser email_verified + completed_onboarding to skip onboarding.
Replace the LDAP service/variant with proxy-gating and rewrite the seaweedfs + persona Playwright tests to drive Baserow through its API using the SSO-minted JWT.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add files/playwright/test-seaweedfs.js (+ SEAWEEDFS_* playwright.env vars, spec require wiring, and removal of the playwright-service-flag nocheck above the seaweedfs service) for baserow, bookwyrm, mattermost, openwebui, peertube, penpot, pixelfed. Each test reuses the role's real login flow and triggers an upload that writes to the app's S3 bucket (file-field, avatar, chat attachment, composer photo, video), verified via the shared runSeaweedfsStorageCheck (bucket grew through the Filer UI).
openwebui: also export dismissAllOpenModals from _shared.js (used by the new test) and match the uploaded file by basename (not the full filename) to avoid the extension-split false-negative.
Exempt gitea and opentalk via meta/services.yml nocheck markers (seaweedfs-playwright + playwright-service-flag): gitea has no automatable UI login in this stack (oauth2-proxy + OIDC account-link / native login both fail; personas blocked); opentalk only writes S3 for recordings/whiteboard exports, which need the recorder service + a live multi-party meeting.
Builds on 9b6c6415f (shared runSeaweedfsStorageCheck helper + consumer lint).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements docs/requirements/021-sso-flavor-migration.md atomically:
* Schema: every role's meta/services.yml replaces the parallel
`oauth2:` / `oidc:` top-level blocks with a single `sso:` block
carrying `enabled`, `shared`, and a `flavor` discriminator
(`oidc` | `oauth2` | `saml`; default `oidc`). Flavor-specific
sub-keys live under `sso.<flavor>.*` (`sso.oauth2.{origin,acl,
allowed_groups}`, `sso.oidc.plugin`).
* Provider role: roles/web-app-oauth2-proxy/ is deleted in its
entirety; its 5 sidecar templates move under
roles/web-app-keycloak/templates/sso_proxy/, and the per-consumer
rendering task lives at roles/web-app-keycloak/tasks/sso_proxy.yml.
web-app-keycloak now declares `provides: sso`.
* Runtime: new resolver utils/roles/applications/services/sso.py
centralises the SSO predicates (`is_enabled`, `is_proxy_gated`,
`is_oidc_native`) and the oauth2 sub-values
(`oauth2_origin_{host,port}`, `oauth2_acl`, `oauth2_allowed_groups`).
Three lookup plugins consume the resolver: `sso` (single-app
predicate access), `sso_proxy_consumers` (enumerates oauth2-flavored
consumers), `sso_oidc_plugin` (renamed from `oidc_flavor`, Nextcloud
plugin selector). sys-stk-backend, sys-svc-compose, sys-svc-proxy
and plugins/filter/compose_volumes.py all gate on
`lookup('sso', ..., 'is_proxy_gated')` instead of manually combining
`enabled` and `flavor`.
* Identifier renames repo-wide: `services.<entity>.ports.local.oauth2`
→ `ports.local.sso`; `PORT_BANDS.local.oauth2` → `PORT_BANDS.local.sso`;
`OAUTH2_PROXY_*` env/Jinja vars → `SSO_PROXY_*`;
`oauth2_proxy_cookie_secret` → `sso_proxy_cookie_secret`;
`OAUTH2_SERVICE_ENABLED` + `OIDC_SERVICE_ENABLED` collapse into
`SSO_SERVICE_ENABLED`; Playwright gating helpers
(isServiceEnabled/skipUnlessServiceEnabled/requireService/safeIsEnabled/
safeSkipUnlessEnabled) move from `oidc`/`oauth2` to `sso`.
* Dual-block resolution: per req's Background-Table, web-app-bookwyrm
is `flavor: oauth2`; web-app-gitea and web-app-friendica keep
`flavor: oauth2` with their existing `oauth2.acl.blacklist`
(/user/login) and `oauth2.acl.whitelist` (federation + discovery
endpoints) — preserving the operative oauth2-proxy gating.
* Tests: the two mutual-exclusion guards
(tests/integration/iam/oauth2_oidc/test_mutual_exclusive.py and
test_acl_mutual_exclusive.py) are deleted per Decision #10;
test_oauth2_contract.py is renamed and rewritten to
test_sso_contract.py, asserting that `flavor: oauth2` roles carry
`oauth2.origin.{host,port}` plus `ports.local.sso`; test_sso.py
(web-app integration) now requires the unified `sso:` block with an
explicit flavor or a `# nocheck: sso` opt-out; new
tests/lint/repository/no_legacy_sso_paths/ guards the source tree
against re-introducing the legacy strings.
* Docs: req 21 itself has every AC checked off, and reqs 006, 008,
009, 013, 015, 016, 019, 020 plus 10+ role READMEs and
docs/contributing/actions/testing/suppression.md are updated to the
unified SSO naming.
Empirically validated end-to-end against the validation app set
(web-app-keycloak, web-app-nextcloud, web-app-bookwyrm, web-app-gitea,
web-app-friendica, web-app-dashboard) in matrix variants 0 and 1; v2
also passes the 4 target roles' Playwright after a documented
pre-existing KC_HOSTNAME-drift workaround (separate concern, not
caused by this refactor).
BREAKING CHANGE: every consumer of `services.oauth2.*`,
`services.oidc.*`, `OAUTH2_PROXY_*`, `OAUTH2_SERVICE_ENABLED`,
`OIDC_SERVICE_ENABLED`, `oauth2_proxy_cookie_secret`,
`oauth2_proxy_application_id`, `ports.local.oauth2`, the
`web-app-oauth2-proxy` role, or the legacy gating helper service names
(`oidc`/`oauth2`) must migrate to the unified `sso` shape documented
in docs/requirements/021-sso-flavor-migration.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The LDAP scenario asserts the oauth2-proxy → Keycloak (LDAP-federated)
handoff, which only renders a Keycloak login form when both `ldap` and
`oidc` services are deployed. Gating solely on `ldap` made the spec run
under the LDAP-only variant (oidc=false, oauth2=false), where
`performKeycloakLoginForm` then 60-s-timed-out because no redirect to
Keycloak ever fires. Skipping when oidc is off keeps the scenario as a
combined-mode smoke test and stops the false fail on LDAP-only deploys.
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5