registerMcpDisabledState and registerMcpGuestRejection opened with
expect(endpointUrl).toBeTruthy(). normalizeBaseUrl turns an unset base
into "", so mcpEndpointUrl() still returns "/mcp", which is truthy, and
Playwright resolves the relative path against baseURL (APP_BASE_URL or
http://127.0.0.1). A role whose own base URL variable was missing
therefore probed some other host and could pass.
Both probes now require /^https?:\/\/[^/]+/. Every caller builds its URL
from a base that lookup('tls', ..., 'url.base') renders as
"<scheme>://<domain>/", so the check holds in tor mode
(http://<app>.<onion>.onion/) and in clearnet mode (https:// or http://
with TLS off) alike, and fails only when the base is unset.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The hub serves 94 tools across 23 categories, write tools included, and enabling the ExApp switches every category on. That surface was published on the public vhost and every discovered client was handed an app password for it. svc-ai-mcp-adapter now sits in front in mcp_passthrough mode: clients present credentials.mcp_bearer to contextagentmcp and reach the nine read tools of calendar, contacts and files, which files/mcp/tools.json names and the sidecar enforces per call. Those three categories are the ones whose upstream is_available is unconditional, so the served set does not vary with which optional apps a deployment installs.
Enforcing it in the sidecar rather than in each client is what makes it hold: web-app-openwebui renders no per-tool filter at all, so a client-side include list would have bounded two consumers out of three.
06c13e7f3e withdrew the declared path from the edge for exactly this reason - "that surface is what the adapter exists to narrow". Nextcloud answers the same route under a second spelling, without the /index.php front controller, which try_files rewrites back onto the route after the edge has already declined to block it. The withdrawal becomes a regex covering both, and only where stripping the front controller changes the path, so the four adapter providers without one render unchanged.
The app password is minted after the stack renders, so it reaches the sidecar through upstream.env and rebuild.yml rather than the compose environment: compose up resolves env_file while creating the container, a restart does not. The sidecar is the last service in the template because a Jinja set has no block scope and its env_file would otherwise displace the one talk, whiteboard and talk_recording each carry.
Two suites cover what nothing measured: the vhost template rendered without a container, asserting both spellings are withdrawn, and every shipped tools.json loaded through the adapter own loader, so a bad contract fails in a second instead of as a probe timing out an hour into a deploy. The guest spec probed mcp.endpoint.path, which this change makes the proxy answer 404 for its own reasons; it now probes all three public paths and requires no MCP body.
Not yet deployed: the sidecar build, the upstream.env delivery and the hub answering exactly nine tools are unverified against a running stack.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nine roles enabled an MCP surface without a browser-side spec, so nothing
ever asked what the endpoint answers a caller with no credential at all.
Lift gitea's assertion into two shared registrars and register them per
role, and give each role the MCP_SERVICE_ENABLED flag they gate on.
mcpEndpointUrl now takes the base URL rather than reading APP_BASE_URL
unconditionally: jellyfin and zammad export their own base variable, and
declaring APP_BASE_URL for them would un-skip the shared guest persona,
which collapses itself on that variable being absent.
The env-gate scanner follows require("./x") into the shared harness so a
gate declared there counts as consumed, and strips block comments first
so service-gating.js's own doc examples do not credit EMAIL, SSO and OICD
to every role that imports it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every role-local MCP spec gates itself on the service flag and skips when the surface is off, so nothing ever checked that switching it off removes it. A surface still serving after the flag went false was indistinguishable from one that was never deployed: both read as a green skip. The gating helper had no inverse at all, so there was no way to assert what a disabled service must not do.
A shared assertion now probes the endpoint with both a GET and a POST while the flag is false and fails on any answer that shows something listening. It counts 401 and 403 as listening, which is the point: a refused credential still means the surface is there. The check is transport-agnostic because the roles differ in their enabled-state probes, over SSE, Streamable HTTP or plain JSON-RPC, while an endpoint that is gone answers none of them. Each role passes its endpoint URL as a thunk, since some resolve it only once a test is running.
The coverage lint requires the registration, and derives the role set from meta/mcp.yml rather than from a filename convention, which is how the tenth role surfaced: its spec is not named like the other nine.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5