#1115 raised HSTS to one year but set no X-Content-Type-Options,
Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy or HSTS includeSubDomains/preload,
because none of them is safe globally: nosniff lets ORB block no-cors
responses typed text/html, includeSubDomains on the apex covers hosts
the platform does not serve, and a server-level add_header is dropped
in every location that sets its own.
WEBSERVER_SECURITY_HEADERS (group_vars/all/04_webserver.yml) now holds
the platform values, all opt-in: nosniff false, no Referrer-Policy, no
Permissions-Policy, HSTS max-age one year without includeSubDomains or
preload. A role overrides any key under security_headers in its
meta/server.yml, an inventory under
applications.<role>.server.security_headers.
The new security_headers filter merges both, rejects unknown keys,
wrong types, unknown Referrer-Policy tokens, non-printable header values
and preload without includeSubDomains or below a one-year max-age, and
composes the HSTS value.
- nosniff, Referrer-Policy and Permissions-Policy are set in the Lua
header filter of content_security_policy.conf.j2, next to CSP, so a
location's own add_header cannot drop them. Referrer-Policy is only
set when the upstream sends none; Permissions-Policy only on HTML
documents.
- HSTS stays the single server-level add_header in nginx_ssl_header.j2,
now with the per-app value. A second emitter in Lua would duplicate
the header. It stays inside the TLS branch, which onion vhosts never
enter, so an onion vhost gets no HSTS even when its app opts in.
No role opts in yet, so rendered vhosts are unchanged.
Closes#1123
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Proxy:
- server_tokens off, X-Powered-By stripped from upstream responses,
HSTS max-age raised to one year.
- No global X-Content-Type-Options: under nosniff, ORB (step 3.4)
blocks no-cors cross-origin responses typed text/html, e.g. tracking
beacons answered with an empty 204.
PHP (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619):
- New role sys-svc-compose-php installs a shared ini (expose_php Off,
session.upload_progress.enabled 0, fatal_error_backtraces 0 for
PHP 8.5, interim memory_limit -1) and a PHP-FPM [www] drop-in
(pm.max_requests = PHP_FPM_MAX_REQUESTS) once per stack host,
before 04_files renders any compose file.
- The host file names carry a sha1 prefix of the controller-side
source, so a content change alters every PHP app's compose.yml and
recreates it, also on remote deploys where compose_volumes cannot
read the stack host file and hashes the path instead.
- 20 PHP roles mount the ini as a compose/swarm config into their
image's scan dir; moodle, nextcloud and shopware also mount the FPM
drop-in. Magento keeps its own pool: its php-fpm.conf has no
include= and is rendered without notify.
- Joomla's php-upload.ini now loads as zzz-joomla-uploads.ini so its
own memory_limit wins: the media API compares Content-Length with
toBytes(memory_limit) and rejects every upload at -1.
TODOs record the memory_limit revert condition and accepted
trade-offs, Akaunting on PHP 8.1, FusionDirectory on PHP 7.4 and the
public Keycloak admin console.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Host, X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Proto, X-Forwarded-Port and
X-Forwarded-Ssl were written out separately in the html, ws and upload
locations and in the Prometheus health probes, and the copies had drifted:
ws and upload never sent Port and Ssl, and the probes sent only Host, which
is how the Shopware readiness probe came to see plain http.
headers/forwarded.conf.j2 now holds the set and every one of those locations
includes it. The html location renders the same headers as before. ws and
upload additionally send Port and Ssl with the values the html location
already gives the same backend. The ready and live probes gain X-Real-IP and
X-Forwarded-For, and the live probe the three X-Forwarded headers as well.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Run 34421944328 odoo#0 loaded assets over the node onion that the page
could not use.
build_csp_header mirrors every clearnet token that carries the primary
domain onto the node onion, but kept its scheme. Onion vhosts are served
in plaintext, so a sibling like https://cdn.<onion> never matched the
http://cdn.<onion> request it was meant to allow. Onion siblings now map
https to http and wss to ws; the clearnet token is unchanged.
The body filter rewrote external asset origins to the onion mirror only
in HTML, so stylesheets kept pulling https://<origin> directly. When an
app has tor enabled and external asset origins, the header filter now
also flags text/css responses on .onion hosts (dropping Content-Length,
since the body changes), and the body filter runs those through the same
buffer and mirror rewrite and returns before the HTML injections. The
flag is set under the same Jinja condition that renders the mirror
block, so a flagged response always has a rewrite to run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
mcp/vhost.conf.j2 wrapped its whole body in `{% if not mcp_acl_gated %}`.
That skipped the serve block, which was the intent, but it also skipped the
withdrawal loop underneath it. An ACL-gated vhost therefore rendered no
`location` for its MCP paths at all, so requests fell through to the
application's generic location and the endpoint was reachable behind
nothing but the SSO proxy ACL.
Folding the gate into the `mcp_served` expression keeps the serve block
gated while letting the withdrawal loop run in every case. With an empty
`mcp_served` both declared paths differ from it, so both are withdrawn with
`return 404`.
The behaviour is latent today: only moodle and wordpress declare
`exposure: public`, and both carry `flavor: oidc`, so `is_proxy_gated` is
false and the branch is never taken. This closes the hole before a role
combines public exposure with an oauth2 proxy flavor.
test_mcp_vhost_exposure.py could not reach the branch: its lookup stub
returned "" for every non-config kind, so mcp_acl_gated was always falsy.
It now resolves is_proxy_gated and oauth2_acl, and gained the bool filter
that the internal-exposure cases never needed because `mcp.exposure ==
'public'` short-circuits before it. Rendering the pre-fix template under
gating yields zero withdrawals; the new one yields two.
The hub serves 94 tools across 23 categories, write tools included, and enabling the ExApp switches every category on. That surface was published on the public vhost and every discovered client was handed an app password for it. svc-ai-mcp-adapter now sits in front in mcp_passthrough mode: clients present credentials.mcp_bearer to contextagentmcp and reach the nine read tools of calendar, contacts and files, which files/mcp/tools.json names and the sidecar enforces per call. Those three categories are the ones whose upstream is_available is unconditional, so the served set does not vary with which optional apps a deployment installs.
Enforcing it in the sidecar rather than in each client is what makes it hold: web-app-openwebui renders no per-tool filter at all, so a client-side include list would have bounded two consumers out of three.
06c13e7f3e withdrew the declared path from the edge for exactly this reason - "that surface is what the adapter exists to narrow". Nextcloud answers the same route under a second spelling, without the /index.php front controller, which try_files rewrites back onto the route after the edge has already declined to block it. The withdrawal becomes a regex covering both, and only where stripping the front controller changes the path, so the four adapter providers without one render unchanged.
The app password is minted after the stack renders, so it reaches the sidecar through upstream.env and rebuild.yml rather than the compose environment: compose up resolves env_file while creating the container, a restart does not. The sidecar is the last service in the template because a Jinja set has no block scope and its env_file would otherwise displace the one talk, whiteboard and talk_recording each carry.
Two suites cover what nothing measured: the vhost template rendered without a container, asserting both spellings are withdrawn, and every shipped tools.json loaded through the adapter own loader, so a bad contract fails in a second instead of as a probe timing out an hour into a deploy. The guest spec probed mcp.endpoint.path, which this change makes the proxy answer 404 for its own reasons; it now probes all three public paths and requires no MCP body.
Not yet deployed: the sidecar build, the upstream.env delivery and the hub answering exactly nine tools are unverified against a running stack.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
f5272fa85f derived the 404 from mcp.endpoint.path, which for an
adapter-fronted provider names the sidecar. Mattermost declares /mcp
there and answers on /plugins/mattermost-ai/mcp-server/mcp, so the proxy
blocked a path the application never served while the native surface
stayed reachable. Baserow passed only because its two paths coincide -
one role agreeing proved nothing about the other four.
That surface is what the adapter exists to narrow: it serves four tools
out of fourteen, and the native path reaches all fourteen.
adapter.upstream_path joins upstream_network and upstream_transport in
meta, and the four roles whose upstream lives on their own vhost declare
it there. Gitea does not: its upstream is a separate sidecar on its own
network, so it has nothing to hide on the application's vhost, and the
absence says that.
The roles read the value back through lookup('config', ...) rather than
keeping a second copy, so the path is stated once.
The template now separates the two roles the old variable conflated:
endpoint.path is what gets served, and only where the surface is public
and enabled; every declared path that differs from it gets a 404. Three
tests pin the distinction rather than the outcome - mattermost's two
paths must differ, gitea must declare none, and a passthrough provider
must say where its upstream lives.
b8759a363e closed this for html.conf.j2 and its message said 'every proxy
location', so the class read as done. Three proxying snippets never got
it: ws, upload and media.
They are not covered by inheritance. nginx inherits proxy_set_header as
an array, so a location declaring any of its own discards every one from
the enclosing block, and proxy_pass_request_headers defaults to on. A
grep for the strip found exactly one include site before this commit,
which means there was nothing above those locations to inherit either.
So every websocket, upload and image location forwarded whatever
X-Forwarded-User the client sent, to applications that authenticate by
believing that header. Reached through ws_generic (mastodon, espocrm,
odoo), nextcloud's signaling and whiteboard, peertube's websocket and
tracker, and collabora's /cool/.
The lint asks the file whether it proxies rather than keeping a list of
snippet names. It grants no exemption for an SSO branch: html.conf.j2
carries both, and an exemption keyed on the SSO reference would keep it
green after the strip was deleted from the other branch.
Baserow's image mounts the MCP app on the ASGI root unconditionally, so
mcp.enabled only decides whether an endpoint record exists. The
application's own vhost kept routing /mcp/*: switched off it answered
401 Endpoint not found., and a refused credential is still a surface.
Switched on it is worse - the adapter narrows fourteen upstream tools to
four, and the publicly routed native path reaches all fourteen for
anyone holding the endpoint key. web-app-homeassistant had the same
shape, an exposure: internal surface reachable publicly. Both now 404
there and stay reachable on the container network.
The public surfaces get the edge limits the contract already declared.
Zones are written per role by the role that owns them, in the shape
web-app-prometheus uses, because one round-scoped file would drop another
application's zones on the next deploy. The rate is concurrent_requests
per second rather than an eighth limit key: a client allowed N in flight,
each bounded by timeout_seconds, cannot sustain more unless every call
returns instantly. A refusal is 429, not nginx's 503, because a client
that should back off must not read it as an outage. stream_seconds
finally binds something - the adapter holds no stream, the proxy does.
The shared location snippet's three timeouts become parameters defaulting
to the 900s they hard-coded, so no existing vhost changes.
Found by the disabled-state assertion 7d8e7e87ff added, which had never
run: its helper was never staged, so the two defects hid each other.
3529 invalid comments in 528 files, grandfathered in while the linter
only saw the working-tree diff. Removal ran through the linter's own
collectors, so detection and deletion cannot drift: a comment whose
opener line is blank before it and whose closer line is blank after it
loses all its lines, anything else loses only the comment region, and a
line left holding a bare delimiter goes with it.
Five files keep their comments behind a nocheck marker instead. Four are
upstream configs whose inline docs are upstream's own (mautrix, systemd
journald, nextcloud-oidc-login, MediaWiki). In littlejs the
commented-out entries ARE the deactivation mechanism for an example
tile, so deleting them would delete configuration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Penpot 0 of run 31543714113 hung every OIDC login for 900 s. The Penpot backend is a JVM app and JDK 26 offers `Upgrade: h2c` on a plaintext POST. The generic HTML location relayed that upgrade verbatim and hardcoded `Connection: upgrade`, so Keycloak answered 101 Switching Protocols and continued in HTTP/2 framing. nginx proxies HTTP/1.1 and cannot consume those frames: it emitted chunked response headers with status 400 and zero body bytes, then held the connection until proxy_read_timeout. The client died on "chunked transfer encoding, state: READING_LENGTH" at oidc.clj:459, and Playwright timed out at 150 s long before that.
Measured, not inferred. Against Keycloak 26.7.0 the same token POST, differing only in the three upgrade headers, returns 401 with a 93-byte body without the offer and 101 Switching Protocols followed by HTTP/2 frames with it. Through nginx carrying the pre-fix directives the h2c request reproduces the CI signature exactly - status 400, Transfer-Encoding chunked, zero body bytes, elapsed equal to proxy_read_timeout - while the same request through the patched config returns the complete 401. The non-h2c path is byte-identical across both configs at 379 header bytes and 93 body bytes, and real WebSockets take the default branch unchanged.
Two maps in http{} do the work: $proxy_upgrade blanks the Upgrade header for h2c so nginx omits it, and $connection_upgrade answers close. html.conf.j2 also stops hardcoding `Connection: upgrade` on every HTML request, which misstated the hop state on requests that carried no Upgrade header at all. ws.conf.j2 already paired `Upgrade $http_upgrade` with $connection_upgrade and moves to $proxy_upgrade so the pair stays coherent under the new h2c branch.
Refusing the upgrade also removes a proxy/backend desync surface rather than adding one.
The comment deletions are the diff-scoped comment lint un-grandfathering the touched files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Strict-Transport-Security strip in the shared per-location partial
was gated on 'lookup(tls, app, enabled)', so on plaintext transports
(onion, and pure-http clearnet) it never rendered and the upstream
app's own HSTS header (kix: max-age=31536000; openproject/Rails
force_ssl: same) leaked to the http client. That violates RFC 6797 and
the onion e2e TLS/HSTS specs caught it.
Make the strip unconditional. No behaviour change on TLS nodes: the
proxy still adds its own HSTS in the tls-gated ssl block of
nginx_ssl_header.j2. On http-only/onion vhosts nothing re-adds it (the
add is in the same tls-gated block), so the leaked upstream header is
simply removed — which is correct, since HSTS over plaintext is invalid.
Verified live: kix onion emits no HSTS header and its tls-hsts spec
passes; openproject rides the same shared partial.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
OpenCloud's proxy mounts an unconditional https-redirect middleware: any
request carrying X-Forwarded-Proto other than https gets a 308, with no
config toggle. Onion vhosts are plaintext, so the app 308-looped on
onion nodes and the webserver health gate aborted the deploy.
Make X-Forwarded-Proto overridable in the shared proxy location
templates (default $scheme, byte-identical for every other role) and
have opencloud assert https towards its backend.
Verified on a fresh onion node: opencloud deploys, the health gate
passes, the SPA loads over the onion, and its well-known, OIDC env and
CSP all resolve to http://auth.<onion>. The SSO E2E still flakes on
transient Tor SOCKS errors mid-flow (client-side multi-hop OIDC), which
is a Tor path property, not an app defect.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Over Tor a page served on an .onion still advertised a clearnet-only CSP and oauth2-proxy config, so onion origins were blocked (dashboard could not frame auth.<onion>; oauth2-proxy rejected the redirect back to the onion app). build_csp_header now mirrors the clearnet primary to the node onion per token; the keycloak oauth2-proxy config derives whitelist_domains and cookie_domains from the app resolved domains. Exclusive (onion-only) apps get onion tokens only, primary apps get both, non-tor apps stay clearnet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ws_generic vhost flavour (mastodon, espocrm, odoo) never rendered
the prometheus nginx locations that basic.conf.j2 includes, so those
apps served 404 on /metricz and /healthz/* and emitted no app= metric
label; the prometheus e2e spec failed for every ws_generic consumer.
Mirror the basic.conf.j2 include inside the ws_generic server block.
The include self-gates on prometheus_integration_active, so vhosts
without prometheus render byte-identically.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The healthz, media, upload and ws location templates called proxy_pass
without internal_port, so in swarm they fell back to
services.<entity>.ports.internal.http. Apps whose entity service has no
internal http port (e.g. bluesky) hard-failed the nginx config render
with resolve_upstream: swarm upstream needs
services.<entity>.ports.internal.http. Forward internal_port (default '')
like html.conf.j2 already does; no-op where it is not passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extract the csp, domains, and networks blocks out of roles/*/meta/server.yml
into dedicated meta files, each mapping to its own top-level applications key
via the recursive meta-walk:
csp: -> meta/csp.yml -> applications.<app>.csp
domains: -> meta/domains.yml -> applications.<app>.domains
networks: -> meta/networks.yml -> applications.<app>.networks
Residual nginx/proxy keys (status_codes, client_max_body_size, locations,
ip6_enabled, config_upstream_url) stay in server.yml; an emptied server.yml is
deleted. 98 server.yml -> 249 new files, 74 deleted.
- Consumers repointed applications.<app>.server.{csp,domains,networks} ->
applications.<app>.{csp,domains,networks} across templates, vars, tasks,
lookups and filters.
- Infra readers migrated: canonical_domains_map, application_domain_index,
build_ldap_role_entries, service-registry overlay discovery,
roles_with_service, and the file-based readers utils/domains/list.py +
utils/meta/scan.py (read the now-deleted server.yml directly).
- Detection + mapping: _META_TOPICS gains csp/domains/networks;
ROLE_FILE_META_{CSP,DOMAINS,NETWORKS} constants + ROLE_FILES entries.
- New self-expiring lint guard (test_server_meta_no_split_fields) fails if a
server.yml still carries a split field; auto-fails from 2026-12-28 as a
delete reminder.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolve 69 conflicts across ~70 files: union main's image-version bumps and new service fields (bond, resource limits) with the swarm branch's default_placement / NFS / IS_STACK_HOST config; retire the three per-deploy-type test workflows main still edited (consolidated into compose+swarm); adopt main's run-once 01_core dispatchers while re-applying each role's swarm guard. Fix the post-merge lint surfaced by main's stricter rules: bond + resource-budget keys, container-exec stack-host gating + resolver routing, leaky/dead proxy vars, suitecrm once-flag, xwiki variant nocheck, nextcloud oversized-block to gated include, matrix-mdad capped at 3g. make autoformat clean, make test green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A role's vars/main.yml is auto-loaded into play scope and persists, so proxy
override vars (webserver_*) leaked into the central front-proxy render of OTHER
roles (re-evaluated against the wrong application_id) — silently applying one
role's value elsewhere, or hard-failing when the lazy lookup hit a role lacking
the key (the seaweedfs<->matrix client_max_body_size crash).
- Templates (sys-svc-proxy html/upload/ws_generic, matrix synapse homeserver)
resolve client_max_body_size from the role's own server config
(lookup('config', application_id, 'server.client_max_body_size', '100m')).
- Move every role-level webserver_* out of vars/main.yml into task-scoped
include params (9 roles); they apply only to that role's proxy and can't leak.
- sys-stk-front-proxy resets webserver_* to safe defaults via task-scoped vars
on the render tasks, so a leaked value from any other source is neutralized;
a role's own include params (#20) still override the reset (precedence-tested,
direct + nested).
- Add test_no_leaky_proxy_role_vars lint forbidding webserver_* in vars/main.yml
(suppressable via '# nocheck: leaky-proxy-var').
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The gated filer/master branch defaulted the proxy upstream to the entity, so in swarm it resolved to seaweedfs:8333 (the S3 API) instead of the admin oauth2-proxy. Set proxy_service_key=sso-proxy + proxy_internal_port (keycloak's services.sso_proxy.ports.internal.http) so swarm routes to seaweedfs_sso-proxy:4180. html.conf.j2 gains an optional internal_port kwarg (default empty = no-op for existing callers; compose ignores it and keeps local_port).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reconcile main's object-store feature and pre-swarm deploy tasks with the branch's compose/networks/volumes SPOT and swarm lints.
objstore (seaweedfs/minio): standalone compose + embedded service templates migrated to the container_image/container_volumes/container_networks/compose_volumes/compose_networks/depends_on lookups; meta/volumes.yml on the canonical dict schema with s3.json and nginx.conf as type:config; embedded services made swarm-compatible via compose_only/compose_restart.
deploy tasks (erpnext, opentalk, seaweedfs, shopware, snipe-it, wordpress, yourls): container exec routed through the container_address resolver and gated on IS_STACK_HOST, shell module plus stack_host_template, no chdir or compose-verb forms.
Also removed orphaned vars, restored MAILU_INSTANCE_DIR, freed the seaweedfs subnet (192.168.206.0/24), stripped literal quotes from the nextcloud/bookwyrm env templates, and routed main's objstore compose_volumes tests through dir_var_lib.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Centralise the nginx proxy_pass directive in one source of truth (utils/networks/proxy.py + plugins/lookup/proxy_pass.py). Compose keeps the literal 127.0.0.1:<local> upstream; swarm resolves the service over the shared overlay at request time (variable upstream + http resolver) so a rescheduling backend never blocks openresty startup. Converts the html/media/upload/ws location partials, the keycloak oauth2 and login-iframe endpoints, and the logout endpoint to the lookup; adds the swarm resolver and the front-proxy service_key plumbing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Baserow's native SSO is Enterprise-only, so gate the community image with the shared Keycloak oauth2-proxy and patch urls.py (via a custom Dockerfile) with a trusted-header bridge. The bridge provisions/repairs a local Baserow user from the oauth2-proxy identity headers and mints native refresh/access/user_session tokens, mirroring Baserow's own SSO redirect contract (?token=&user_session=).
proxy.conf.j2 performs the nginx handoff: an authenticated browser without a jwt_token cookie is 302'd to /api/infinito/sso/login/, which redirects back to /?token=&user_session= for the frontend middleware to consume. bootstrap_admin marks the superuser email_verified + completed_onboarding to skip onboarding.
Replace the LDAP service/variant with proxy-gating and rewrite the seaweedfs + persona Playwright tests to drive Baserow through its API using the SSO-minted JWT.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Baserow's native SSO is Enterprise-only, so gate the community image with the shared Keycloak oauth2-proxy and patch urls.py (via a custom Dockerfile) with a trusted-header bridge. The bridge provisions/repairs a local Baserow user from the oauth2-proxy identity headers and mints native refresh/access/user_session tokens, mirroring Baserow's own SSO redirect contract (?token=&user_session=).
proxy.conf.j2 performs the nginx handoff: an authenticated browser without a jwt_token cookie is 302'd to /api/infinito/sso/login/, which redirects back to /?token=&user_session= for the frontend middleware to consume. bootstrap_admin marks the superuser email_verified + completed_onboarding to skip onboarding.
Replace the LDAP service/variant with proxy-gating and rewrite the seaweedfs + persona Playwright tests to drive Baserow through its API using the SSO-minted JWT.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements docs/requirements/021-sso-flavor-migration.md atomically:
* Schema: every role's meta/services.yml replaces the parallel
`oauth2:` / `oidc:` top-level blocks with a single `sso:` block
carrying `enabled`, `shared`, and a `flavor` discriminator
(`oidc` | `oauth2` | `saml`; default `oidc`). Flavor-specific
sub-keys live under `sso.<flavor>.*` (`sso.oauth2.{origin,acl,
allowed_groups}`, `sso.oidc.plugin`).
* Provider role: roles/web-app-oauth2-proxy/ is deleted in its
entirety; its 5 sidecar templates move under
roles/web-app-keycloak/templates/sso_proxy/, and the per-consumer
rendering task lives at roles/web-app-keycloak/tasks/sso_proxy.yml.
web-app-keycloak now declares `provides: sso`.
* Runtime: new resolver utils/roles/applications/services/sso.py
centralises the SSO predicates (`is_enabled`, `is_proxy_gated`,
`is_oidc_native`) and the oauth2 sub-values
(`oauth2_origin_{host,port}`, `oauth2_acl`, `oauth2_allowed_groups`).
Three lookup plugins consume the resolver: `sso` (single-app
predicate access), `sso_proxy_consumers` (enumerates oauth2-flavored
consumers), `sso_oidc_plugin` (renamed from `oidc_flavor`, Nextcloud
plugin selector). sys-stk-backend, sys-svc-compose, sys-svc-proxy
and plugins/filter/compose_volumes.py all gate on
`lookup('sso', ..., 'is_proxy_gated')` instead of manually combining
`enabled` and `flavor`.
* Identifier renames repo-wide: `services.<entity>.ports.local.oauth2`
→ `ports.local.sso`; `PORT_BANDS.local.oauth2` → `PORT_BANDS.local.sso`;
`OAUTH2_PROXY_*` env/Jinja vars → `SSO_PROXY_*`;
`oauth2_proxy_cookie_secret` → `sso_proxy_cookie_secret`;
`OAUTH2_SERVICE_ENABLED` + `OIDC_SERVICE_ENABLED` collapse into
`SSO_SERVICE_ENABLED`; Playwright gating helpers
(isServiceEnabled/skipUnlessServiceEnabled/requireService/safeIsEnabled/
safeSkipUnlessEnabled) move from `oidc`/`oauth2` to `sso`.
* Dual-block resolution: per req's Background-Table, web-app-bookwyrm
is `flavor: oauth2`; web-app-gitea and web-app-friendica keep
`flavor: oauth2` with their existing `oauth2.acl.blacklist`
(/user/login) and `oauth2.acl.whitelist` (federation + discovery
endpoints) — preserving the operative oauth2-proxy gating.
* Tests: the two mutual-exclusion guards
(tests/integration/iam/oauth2_oidc/test_mutual_exclusive.py and
test_acl_mutual_exclusive.py) are deleted per Decision #10;
test_oauth2_contract.py is renamed and rewritten to
test_sso_contract.py, asserting that `flavor: oauth2` roles carry
`oauth2.origin.{host,port}` plus `ports.local.sso`; test_sso.py
(web-app integration) now requires the unified `sso:` block with an
explicit flavor or a `# nocheck: sso` opt-out; new
tests/lint/repository/no_legacy_sso_paths/ guards the source tree
against re-introducing the legacy strings.
* Docs: req 21 itself has every AC checked off, and reqs 006, 008,
009, 013, 015, 016, 019, 020 plus 10+ role READMEs and
docs/contributing/actions/testing/suppression.md are updated to the
unified SSO naming.
Empirically validated end-to-end against the validation app set
(web-app-keycloak, web-app-nextcloud, web-app-bookwyrm, web-app-gitea,
web-app-friendica, web-app-dashboard) in matrix variants 0 and 1; v2
also passes the 4 target roles' Playwright after a documented
pre-existing KC_HOSTNAME-drift workaround (separate concern, not
caused by this refactor).
BREAKING CHANGE: every consumer of `services.oauth2.*`,
`services.oidc.*`, `OAUTH2_PROXY_*`, `OAUTH2_SERVICE_ENABLED`,
`OIDC_SERVICE_ENABLED`, `oauth2_proxy_cookie_secret`,
`oauth2_proxy_application_id`, `ports.local.oauth2`, the
`web-app-oauth2-proxy` role, or the legacy gating helper service names
(`oidc`/`oauth2`) must migrate to the unified `sso` shape documented
in docs/requirements/021-sso-flavor-migration.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Browser vendors deprecated X-Frame-Options/X-XSS-Protection/X-Download-Options/
X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies; CSP (rendered from each role's
meta/server.yml via build_csp_header) is the modern replacement. To make the
SPOT actually win against upstream apps (e.g. Keycloak/Quarkus still emits
X-Frame-Options), the proxy now hides those headers on every location type.
Includes a fail-loud lint that catches any future add_header / Header set/add
re-introduction in .conf / .conf.j2 / .htaccess / .j2 / .jinja / .tmpl files.
- sys-svc-proxy: new upstream_strips.conf.j2 partial bundles HSTS + the 4
deprecated header strips; included in html/media/ws/upload + web-svc-logout
+ web-app-oauth2-proxy locations (nginx array-replacement inheritance forces
per-location placement)
- web-app-keycloak: meta/server.yml frame-ancestors allows the primary-domain
wildcard with the dynamic TLS protocol so dashboard silent-check-sso iframe
loads cleanly
- web-app-dashboard/playwright: drop isOidcSilentCheckNoise — root cause is
now fixed, no noise filter needed
- web-app-dashboard/nginx + web-app-nextcloud/nginx: remove the deprecated
add_header lines themselves
- tests + docs: new lint registers `deprecated-http-header` suppression rule
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tooling integration
* add .markdownlint-cli2.jsonc, .ansible-lint, .ansible-lint-ignore
configs (permissive day-1: cosmetic rules disabled, semantic ones on)
* extend scripts/install/lint.sh with generic install_pip_pkg helper +
ensure_ansible_lint / ensure_galaxy_importer / ensure_markdownlint_cli2
ensure_* functions (pip / npm with sudo / --user / --break-system-packages
fallbacks). install_ansible_tools now also pulls ansible-lint and
galaxy-importer; new `markdown` install group.
* extend scripts/lint/ansible.sh to run ansible-lint after the existing
syntax-check.
* add scripts/lint/markdown.sh and scripts/lint/galaxy.sh runners. The
galaxy runner parallelizes via xargs (-P=$(nproc)), prints OK/FAIL per
role, and treats `bare-name dependency` errors as success since our
roles/ tree is not a Galaxy collection layout. All other Galaxy schema
errors still fail.
* Makefile: new lint-markdown and lint-galaxy targets, both wired into
`make lint`.
* CI: new workflows lint-markdown.yml and lint-galaxy.yml; lint-ansible.yml
now installs ansible-core + ansible-lint; ci-orchestrator wires both
new lint workflows into lint-gate.
Galaxy schema fixes
* shorten the canonical `galaxy_info.company` block from three lines to
two ("Kevin Veen-Birkenbach\nhttps://www.veen.world", 45 chars) so it
stays under Galaxy's hard 50-char limit. Updated everywhere: 229 role
meta/main.yml plus _CANONICAL_COMPANY in
tests/lint/repository/test_role_meta_main_galaxy_schema.py.
* shorten 19 over-long role descriptions to <=255 chars.
* add stub READMEs for sys-svc-compose-ca and sys-utils-service-loader.
Markdown baseline fixes
* markdownlint-cli2 --fix run repo-wide (formatting normalization
across CHANGELOG, role READMEs, docs).
* manual MD041 fixes: prepend H1 in 15 files (CHANGELOG, LICENSE,
TODO.md helpers, role README templates, etc.).
* MD025 / MD003 / MD001 / MD032 manual fixes for heading-style and
list-spacing edge cases.
* role README content polish: "## Single Point of Truth (SPOT)" headings
renamed to "## User data resolution" (D3 self-label rule).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two related cleanups extracted from the in-flight req-013 work because
they touch shared config layers (filter plugins, group_vars/all,
unrelated role templates) and deserve their own atomic commit so the
req-013 PR stays focused on the joomla/bluesky integration.
1. `on_off` filter (plugins/filter/on_off.py + unit tests)
Replaces the verbose `{{ x | bool | ternary('on', 'off') }}` idiom
that nginx, msmtp, unbound etc. need for their config syntax.
Coercion mirrors Ansible's `bool` filter; unknown strings raise
so templates can't silently mis-render. Migrated call sites:
- roles/sys-svc-mail-msmtp/templates/msmtprc.conf.j2 (4x)
- roles/sys-svc-proxy/templates/location/html.conf.j2
2. `NETWORK_PUBLIC_DNS_RESOLVERS` SPOT (group_vars/all/08_networks.yml)
New canonical list of public DNS resolvers used wherever a role
needs runtime external-hostname lookups (nginx `resolver`
directives, unbound `forward-addr`, etc.). Default
`[1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8]`. Migrated call sites:
- roles/web-app-mailu/templates/unbound.conf.j2 (forward-zone loop)
The IPv6 toggle in any nginx `resolver` directive comes from the
existing `NETWORK_IPV6_ENABLED` flag in the same file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Single atomic landing for three back-to-back role-meta refactor requirements
(see docs/requirements/008-role-meta-layout.md, 009-per-role-networks-and-ports.md,
010-role-meta-runafter-lifecycle-migration.md).
req-008 — role meta layout
* Move every role's metadata under meta/<topic>.yml with file-root
convention (no wrapping key matching the basename):
- schema/main.yml + config/main.yml.credentials → meta/schema.yml
- users/main.yml → meta/users.yml
- config/main.yml.server → meta/server.yml
- config/main.yml.rbac → meta/rbac.yml
- config/main.yml.compose.services + every other top-level key
of config/main.yml inlined under <entity>.<key>
→ meta/services.yml
- config/main.yml.compose.volumes → meta/volumes.yml
* Drop the legacy schema/, users/, config/ directories from every role.
* meta/schema.yml: support nested credential keys, optional `default:`
field (Jinja literal, not rendered/validated/regenerated), implicit
`algorithm: plain`.
* Materialised paths drop the `compose.` prefix:
compose.services.<e>.<…> → services.<e>.<…>
compose.volumes.<k> → volumes.<k>
<former-top-level>.<…> → services.<entity_name>.<former-top-level>.<…>
* Update every Python consumer (utils/cache, utils/manager, utils/applications,
plugins/lookup, plugins/filter, cli/*) plus every Jinja template, vars/*.yml
and task file to the new paths.
* No legacy fallback. Repository-wide grep for `compose.services.` /
`compose.volumes.` / `schema/main.yml` / `users/main.yml` / `config/main.yml`
is empty outside docs/requirements/ and tasks/utils/migrate_meta_layout.py.
* Add tests/lint/repository/test_role_meta_layout.py guarding against the
old paths returning, and an explicit lint guard that meta/variants.yml
files do not carry a `compose:` wrapper.
req-009 — per-role networks/ports
* Move group_vars/all/08_networks.yml.defaults_networks.local.<role>.{subnet,
dns_resolver} into roles/<role>/meta/server.yml.networks.local.{subnet,
dns_resolver}.
* Delete group_vars/all/09_ports.yml entirely; ports now live on the
service entity that exposes them at
roles/<role>/meta/services.yml.<entity>.ports.{inter,local,public}.
* Rename + int-cast every former top-level `services.<entity>.port`
field to `services.<entity>.ports.inter` (single int).
* Always-category-keyed maps for ports.local / ports.public; relay
spans use {start, end} integers.
* Add PORT_BANDS map to group_vars/all/08_networks.yml — single source
of truth for the per-<scope>.<category> band ranges, consumed by both
the new CLI helpers and the lint test.
* New CLI helpers (cli meta ports suggest, cli meta networks suggest)
walk the live role tree gap-first then increment-fallback, with
deterministic output and non-zero exit on capacity overflow.
* cli create role consumes both helpers when scaffolding a new role.
* Lint extensions: bare-int port shape rejection, host-bound port
collision check (single ints + relay span integers, inter excluded),
band-membership check with documented allow-list for the legacy
web-app-bigbluebutton.bigbluebutton.local.http: 48087 entry.
req-010 — run_after / lifecycle migration
* Move galaxy_info.run_after and galaxy_info.lifecycle out of
meta/main.yml into meta/services.yml.<primary_entity>.{run_after,
lifecycle}; <primary_entity> is the value returned by
get_entity_name(role_name).
* For multi-entity roles whose primary entity has no compose service
(web-app-bluesky → bluesky, web-app-matrix → matrix, desk/dev/drv/
gen roles), create a dedicated metadata-only top-level entry under
<primary_entity>.
* Introduce utils/roles/meta_lookup.py with get_role_run_after /
get_role_lifecycle that resolve <primary_entity> once and read from
meta/services.yml; degrade gracefully when meta/services.yml is
absent OR the field is absent; raise MetaServicesShapeError when the
file exists but is malformed.
* Update every consumer (utils/service_registry, utils/invokable,
cli/meta/applications/resolution/run_after/__main__, cli/meta/roles/
lifecycle_filter/__main__, cli/meta/applications/resolution/combined,
cli/build/{tree,graph,role_include}, cli/deploy/development/{common,
init,deps,deploy}, plugins/filter/canonical_domains_map, etc.) to
use the helper.
* Lint guards: no run_after/lifecycle in meta/main.yml; lifecycle
values restricted to {planned,pre-alpha,alpha,beta,stable,deprecated};
run_after/lifecycle never on a non-primary entity; empty run_after
lists rejected.
Also folded into this change set
* services_disabler now writes `services.<svc>.{enabled,shared}` into
host_vars instead of the old `compose.services.<svc>.{...}` path; the
discover/find pair walks meta/services.yml and only treats entries
carrying enabled/shared/provides as provider declarations (so
metadata-only entries from req-010 do not create spurious provider
rows).
* service_registry skips `run_after` deps whose target was filtered
out via SERVICES_DISABLED instead of failing the whole load.
* cli/mirror/resolver and cli/create/inventory/mirror_overrides emit/
consume the new applications.<role>.services.<svc>.image shape
(mirror.md updated to match).
* utils/domains/list.build_applications_from_roles now reads
meta/server.yml directly (it had been silently returning {} since
config/main.yml stopped existing).
* utils/roles/resource_validation.filter_roles_by_min_storage reads
meta/services.yml.<entity>.min_storage instead of the legacy
compose.services path.
* web-app-bluesky pre-clones the social-app build context BEFORE
sys-svc-compose so the build context is on disk by the time
sys-stk-front-proxy/tasks/main.yml flushes the docker build handler.
* 4 meta/variants.yml files (svc-ai-ollama, web-app-phpmyadmin,
web-app-wordpress, web-app-keycloak) lose their `compose: services:`
wrapper so deep-merge over meta/services.yml lands on the new
file-root shape.
Validation
* Unit tests: 1571 passed.
* Lint tests: 50 passed.
* Integration tests: 161 passed (1 skipped).
* Full-cycle fresh-purged-apps deploy succeeded for the 8-app validation
set: web-app-{nextcloud,wordpress,yourls,bigbluebutton,bluesky,gitea,
discourse,mattermost}.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The CSP header template still referenced the removed `domains` global
fact (former set_fact in tasks/stages/01_constructor.yml), causing
`'domains' is undefined` when sys-stk-front-proxy rendered the proxy
config for web-svc-cdn. The merged-domains map is now exposed via the
domains lookup; switch the template to `lookup('domains')` so
build_csp_header still receives the cross-app URL map it needs to emit
CDN/Matomo/Simpleicons/Dashboard/Logout/Keycloak entries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces inline `applications`/`users` merging with dedicated lookup
plugins and runtime hydration. Introduces `add_csp_hash` filter,
integrates sort into `find_dock_val_by_bkp_entr`, splits the Keycloak
one-shot realm import into `05a_realm_import_run.yml`, and fixes the
Mastodon administrator task YAML. Removes obsolete `csp_hashes` filter,
`sys-token-store` Jinja filter, and empty CLI setup modules.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Apply documentation.md rules across staged files (emojis after headlines, RFC 2119 keywords, correct link text, Credits format)
- Remove expired ChatGPT share URLs from 39+ role READMEs and templates
- Remove orphaned text after link deletion: bare # @see, {# @see #}, Discussion: #}, empty Chat Conversation sections, dangling "Conversation is here available.", "Refer to the conversation with ChatGPT ()", "See ChatGPT Conversation", "ChatGPT Session Transcript" references
- Remove empty ## Further Resources and ## Credits sections where no links remain
- Fix URL reachability test: treat 401/403/405 as ok, 429/500/503 as warn, Timeout as warn; add # nocheck: url suppression (inline and line-above)
- Add lint test for broken relative and repo-root-absolute markdown links
- Add # nocheck: url to AUR git clone URLs, CSP allowlist entries, and other non-browser URLs
- Restore docs.infinito.nexus/setup in documentation.md MUST NOT example
- Fix Mobilizon geospatial endpoints (Addok, Photon) reverted to original values with # nocheck: url
- Add integration test rule: MUST NOT write unit tests for integration test logic
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
