The onion port probe gave every SOCKS connect 60s, half of Tor's
SocksTimeout (120s by default; torrc does not set it), although its own
docstring argued that abandoning an attempt before SocksTimeout is
destructive. Every attempt authenticates with fresh credentials, so Tor
builds a whole new rendezvous for it and keeps working on it until
SocksTimeout. The probe walked away first and called the port dead. The
other raw onion connects in the repository, the svc-db-* CLI tests and
test-e2e-playwright's wait_onion_reachable.sh, wait 120s per attempt.
Run 40128751852 shows how often an attempt needs more than that. Of 178
svc-net-tor CLI runs in its 89 compose onion jobs, three lost their
first attempt to the 60s timeout and connected on the second within
seconds (Shopware#1, Hugo#1, n8n#1; the CLI test took 77-79s against
the usual 1-16s), and Hugo#1's other run took 40s on a single attempt. When
the stall outlasts the 70s until the second attempt, the probe fails
while the HTTP probe reaches the same onion port seconds earlier:
OpenBao#1 (run 39166850273, job 118050491920, the original failure of
#1048) and Socialhome#1 (run 40088473634, job 121019758461). In the
Socialhome job tor.log holds no line for either attempt, because Tor
never reached its own verdict.
ONION_PORT_TIMEOUT is now 130: SocksTimeout plus room for Tor's
once-per-second expiry sweep, so an attempt ends with Tor's own answer
(reply 0x06, and a "Giving up" notice in tor.log, which the rescue
artifact captures) instead of the probe's. The second attempt now starts
at 140s and ends at 270s, so the probe rides out every stall the old
budget did, and any stall shorter than about 260s instead of about 120s.
A green run still costs one connect per port, and a refused or unmapped
port still fails at once. A unit test pins the window above Tor's
SocksTimeout and fails as soon as torrc sets its own.
That doubles what a dead port costs, and meta/tests.yml caps the whole
CLI test. The largest compose onion deploy in run 40128751852 probes 19
domains and 5 ports; with everything dead that is 19 x 350 + 5 x 260 +
10 = 7960s, beyond the 7200s that 069df39027 set for the same reason.
9000 keeps the full failure output for up to 22 domains.
Closes#1214
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A pin like 'alpine', 'stable', 'lts' or 'buildx-stable-1' names no version,
so nothing can compare it to anything: the bump job skips it and the pin
drifts with whatever upstream last pushed under that name. Each of these
fifteen now names its release, which is the precondition for the freshness
pipeline to see it at all.
Every conversion was placed against the tag it replaces, and none of them
is a downgrade. Six resolve to a byte-identical digest and are pure
relabelling (memcached, redis, the two debian bases, jenkins, xwiki); four
are genuinely newer than what the moving tag carried, so those roles will
deploy a later version than before (nginx moves past the 1.31.5 behind
'alpine', buildkit past the v0.32.2 behind 'buildx-stable-1', dockerize
past a 'latest' older than v0.10.0); openresty and pretix keep their
version and differ only by build.
fider is the one that loses something: 'stable' carries a rebuild pushed
twelve days after v0.36.0, which is still the newest versioned tag
upstream publishes. An unnamed rebuild cannot be tracked, so the pin takes
the named release and the updater can raise it when v0.37.0 lands.
The flavor invariant keeps the families apart: jenkins stays on '-lts' and
xwiki inside '-postgres-tomcat', so no bump can cross into a different
runtime.
svc-runner loses a 'nocheck: docker-version' that has become dead. The
marker suppresses two checks at once, so while it stood buildkit was held
out of the daily freshness warning as well; removing it puts the role back
in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
group_vars/all/README.md forbids role-specific configuration in that directory, and 19_tor.yml held five variables no role but svc-net-tor ever read. They now live where the README points: the values an operator may override in meta/services.yml, where the inventory's applications block is deep-merged on top, and the derived ones in vars/main.yml.
The exception is the egress virtual range, which moves the other way into 08_networks.yml. It is not a property of the role but a claim on shared address space, and 0f6728a4c1 records what a collision costs: tor's upstream default 10.192.0.0/10 swallowed the docker pool at 10.208.0.0/12, and every connection to a container address came back as 'errno 104 Connection reset by peer'. The two numbers that must not overlap now sit one line apart.
The onion's HTTP forward becomes a declaration rather than a derivation. lookup('tor_ports') walks group_names and collects what those roles declare under ports.onion; port 80 belongs to svc-prx-openresty, which a node acquires through sys-stk-front-proxy and which therefore appears in no dependency list an inventory carries. A node provisioned with --include svc-net-tor published an onion forwarding SSH and nothing else, leaving every app it serves unreachable - measured as ERR_SOCKS_CONNECTION_FAILED in the CI instructions replay. The new role-local tor_extra_ports lookup composes the flagged forwards with the derived ones and collapses a port named twice, since torrc writes one HiddenServicePort line per entry.
Not moved: tor_ports stays in plugins/lookup because tor_reachable imports from it and three database roles use that; and the flags sit outside ports.onion because every key there mirrors a port the role declares under ports.local, which neither sshd nor the front proxy is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A port under ports.local or ports.public binds an address on the stack host, which is what a HiddenServicePort can forward to. Whether it should be forwarded has a cost in both directions: silently off leaves a service unreachable that the operator believes is on the onion, and silently on publishes a database, an admin interface or a SOCKS proxy to everyone holding the onion address. Neither belongs in a default, so the flag is now mandatory and every false carries the reason it is false.
The first run produced 165 findings, of which 131 were one architectural fact repeated rather than 131 decisions. Four groups are therefore settled once in the lint instead: the proxy-fronted http, sso and websocket, because the node onion already forwards port 80 to the reverse proxy that routes every vhost, oauth2 hop and socket upgrade behind it; the implicit-TLS variants, because Tor is already the transport encryption and container_ports drops those listeners when TLS is off, which an onion deployment always is; the categories a hidden service cannot carry, listed once in plugins.lookup.tor_ports.UDP_ONLY_CATEGORIES, which the lint imports rather than restates; and any entity that already answers the question through exposed:.
That leaves 23 real per-port decisions, each with a reason naming its own consumer. svc-net-tor keeps its own socks, trans and dns off the onion: a published SOCKS port is an open proxy, and SocksPolicy cannot refuse it because the forward arrives from the node's own address.
Mailu turns smtp, submission, imap and pop3 on, which is what makes sending and receiving work over the onion, and leaves sieve off because ManageSieve manages filters rather than mail. Measured end to end through the merged applications view, across all 105 roles the deploy now forwards exactly 25, 110, 143 and 587.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
lifecycle is a selection axis rather than a label: cli/meta/ci/validate.py
hands --lifecycles to matrix.entries_of, so a run whose envelope admits beta
but not alpha picks svc-net-tor up from now on. Recent sweeps ran with an empty
envelope and are unaffected.
The maturity call is the operator's; this commit only records it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The per-flavor multipliers lived in test-e2e-playwright's vars, where only
that role could read them. The CSP health check needs the same number: it
probes onion vhosts through the Tor proxy, where the checker's navigation
budget has to grow by the same factor as a Playwright wait.
They now sit in svc-net-tor's meta/services.yml next to services.tor.flavor,
the key they are indexed by, and the Playwright var reads them through
lookup('config', 'svc-net-tor', 'services.tor.timeout_multipliers'). That
lookup resolves from the role defaults, so it answers even where svc-net-tor
is not part of the round, which is how the flavor was already read.
The flavor-coverage test moves to the tor role and reads the new location;
the values (chutney 2, public 5) and what the Playwright run computes from
them are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The marker names the reason a role has no upstream homepage or demo video, and
it sat in meta/main.yml because a comment-only info.yml parses to an empty
document, which the schema lint rejected outright. So the exemption lived one
file away from the two fields it explains, and a reader looking for the video
found neither the field nor the reason it was missing.
The schema lint now accepts an empty document exactly when it carries the
marker, and that is what allows the move. The media lint reads the marker from
info.yml rather than main.yml, and its failure message names that same file, so
the fix it suggests lands where the absent field would have gone.
A hundred and two roles follow. Every occurrence was a standalone comment on
the second line of main.yml, directly under the document start, so the move is
a line delete and an insert at the same offset. Seventy-three roles already had
an info.yml and gain the line; twenty-nine get one whose whole content is the
document start and the marker. All hundred and two reasons carry over verbatim,
including the thirty-five bespoke ones.
Nothing downstream sees a change. Of the four readers of meta/info.yml, three
coerce a null parse through `or {}` behind an isinstance guard, and
utils/cache/applications.py skips a falsy parse before assignment, so
applications.<role>.info stays absent for the twenty-nine exactly as it was
while the file did not exist.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The probe abandoned each attempt at --max-time 30 while Tor's SocksTimeout
sits at its 120s default (no SocksTimeout anywhere in the repo; positive
control SocksPort hits templates/torrc.j2:1). It gave up at a quarter of
Tor's working window, and destructively: every retry opens a fresh SOCKS
connection, discarding the descriptor fetches and rendezvous retries Tor
was still working through.
Run 32284541284 job 96178512465 shows the cost. Ansible recorded start
07:22:17.260, end 07:26:33.366, delta 0:04:16.105994. The first domain
burned its deterministic 6x30 + 5x10 = 230s and failed; the second then
succeeded on its first attempt but needed ~23s of that 30s window - 77%
of the limit. The transient had cleared at t~233s. The first domain's
budget ran out three seconds short of it.
Two round numbers, one behaviour: 5 attempts at 60s is 340s of patience
against today's 230s, so the same transient now has 107s of margin
instead of -3s, and a 23s connect sits at 38% of the window instead of
77%. LAM#1 (job 96179137200) is the near-miss that corroborates it - four
dead attempts, then a ~4s success on the fifth.
meta/tests.yml is required, not optional. roles/test-e2e-cli/tasks/run_one.yml:74
runs the script under `timeout {{ _cli_timeout }}`, and with no meta/tests.yml
this role fell through to the 3600s default in roles/test-e2e-cli/defaults/main.yml:3.
Widening the window moves the all-domains-fail ceiling from 16 domains to
11, and a 13-domain role demonstrably exists (Jellyfin#0, four passes of
"13 probed, 0 failed"). 7200 restores the headroom.
The `|| true` goes with it: the script runs under `set -uo pipefail` with
no -e, so the command substitution's exit code was already discarded and
line 63 branches on ${code}. tests/lint/filesystem/shell/test_no_or_true.py
never saw it because its regex wants #, ; or EOL after `true` and a `)`
follows here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
7a70d27b7 made a variant that switches SSO on also switch the onion on, because
that pairing is where the platform breaks in ways clearnet never shows. The same
argument reaches further than SSO: a Secure cookie is dropped, an https identity
provider refuses to embed, and crypto.subtle is undefined for any feature on a
non-secure origin, not only for a login. A variant that never runs the onion is
not testing the deployment users get.
So the rule now covers every variant of a role that declares a tor block.
Variant 1 stays exempt - it is the minimal, partner-free round every role
declares and the one place the stack is exercised without the onion at all - and
a role whose meta/services.yml pins tor.enabled to a literal false is skipped
outright, because that declaration already says the role has no onion and needs
no comment repeating it.
That found 137 variants. 101 were variant 1. Of the rest, 28 are the LDAP-only
auth-isolation rounds, which gain real coverage from running LDAP over the onion
and are flipped on here. Four cannot: svc-net-tor is the provider itself, and
nextcloud's variant 8 pairs the clearnet-only PeerTube. Both carry a marker
naming the reason; opentalk and coturn need none, since their services.yml pins
the literal false the rule now reads.
Flipping them exposed a contract that contradicted itself. test_auth_isolation
and test_non_baseline_explicit_disables demanded `shared: false` beside
`enabled: false`, while variants-static-override flagged that same line as a
static override - which is why all 133 of them carried a nocheck marker. The
demand only makes sense where `shared` is dynamic: a literal base value cannot
leak through deep-merge, so restating it protects nothing. Both contracts now
ask for it only in that case, and the 133 lines are gone.
The result is a stricter rule with fewer lines: 189 insertions against 193
deletions.
Verified: tests/lint 336 passed / 307 subtests, tests/integration/roles 107
passed / 610 subtests. The rule is checked in both directions - it reported 137
offenders before the resolution and none after.
Not measured: 28 additional onion rounds cost matrix wall-clock, against swarm
jobs already capped at 355 minutes and one that has hit that ceiling before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every variants.yml header states the rule the bond feeds: variant 0 carries each
tightly-coupled (bond>=1, same-host) service, while loosely-coupled (bond<1,
separate-host) partners are excluded from the closure and distributed across
later variants to keep every host under budget. tor was declared bond: 1 in all
101 consumers, so it had to sit in every variant-0 closure.
It does not belong there. The onion is a separate-host provider reached over the
node's hidden service, the same shape as the bridged partners that already carry
0.5, and f1dff50fb established both the reasoning and the precedent when it
dropped xwiki and bigbluebutton from 1 to 0.5: bridged partners with their own
role and their own spec, whose bond declaration was the outlier rather than
their placement.
This also unblocks the variant-level tor contract. Requiring a non-baseline
variant to pin the onion on while tor still counted as tightly coupled would
have pulled variant 0's closure requirements along with it.
Verified: tests/lint 336 passed / 307 subtests and tests/integration/roles 107
passed / 610 subtests, including test_resource_budget over every variant's
deduplicated footprint and the bond-aware test_order closure.
Not measured, and the honest cost: f1dff50fb's own caveat applies unchanged
here. Whether redistributing a service out of the baseline closure buys back
wall-clock is not established; role-runtimes has the per-role seconds and no run
has been made with this shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
libcurl refuses a .onion host by name (RFC 7686, error 6) before it
consults /etc/hosts, extra_hosts or DNS, so the platform's DNS+iptables
onion egress cannot serve a server-side backchannel at all. Measured:
curl --noproxy '*' -> exit 6
curl --resolve auth.<onion>:80:127.0.0.1 … -> exit 6
--resolve fills curl's own cache strictly earlier than getaddrinfo and
is still refused, which makes sys-svc-container's onion_oidc_socks
template -- extra_hosts, despite its name -- a no-op for every libcurl
client. Only a configured proxy makes curl skip the check.
Since 9d91fbea8 emptied proxy.config.php.j2 there is no such proxy, while
svc-net-tor's exclusive/primary defaults replace Keycloak's clearnet
domain and KC_HOSTNAME pins the issuer to the onion. Nextcloud's
oidc_login discovery call therefore dies inside PHP, /apps/oidc_login/oidc
returns 500, and oidc_login_auto_redirect sends /login straight there.
Restoring the old socks5h://host.docker.internal:9050 alone would make it
worse: tor runs as a single manager-pinned replica publishing SOCKS with
mode: host, so only the replica on that node could connect and a
deterministic failure would become a 2-in-3 flake. In swarm, though, tor
is NOT host-networked -- that branch is compose-only -- and it already
binds SocksPort 0.0.0.0, so the shared overlay is a usable path from
every node.
Give svc-net-tor a shared_net overlay with alias 'tor' and dial it by
service name. Attachment is gated by a new consumer kind, onion_sso: the
consumer's services.sso.enabled AND the provider's services.tor.enabled.
Both are group-membership derived, so the conjunction is exactly "the
issuer is an onion" and stays false in clearnet deployments -- which
matters because the service registry is not filtered to deployed roles.
The existing kinds could not express it: keying on sso alone would also
hold without tor, and keying on tor would miss Nextcloud's variant 2,
which disables its own onion yet still needs the client path.
tor_socks_proxy keeps the swarm/compose split in one place so the six
roles sharing this defect need not restate it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
variants.yml held a single entry, so the CI coverage the previous commit
unlocked would have exercised chutney only — a private, offline Tor net
built for tests. The public flavor is the production path and stayed
uncovered.
Variant 1 overrides flavor and use_entry_guards and nothing else:
resources fall through to meta/services.yml, which is sized for the one
tor container, whereas variant 0 raises them for chutney's ~9 in-container
nodes. Guards stay off for the same reason variant 0 turns them off — a
degraded entry guard must not stall the node.
Swarm splits per variant and now runs two jobs for this role; compose
bundles both into one.
Unproven: whether a public-flavor container bootstraps into the real Tor
network from a GitHub runner. The internal loopback probe is fatal, so a
failed bootstrap fails the job hard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
modes.compose.enabled and modes.swarm.enabled were both false, and a
stack role is forced host=false, so all three test_<mode> columns were
false and the CI discovery filter (test_<mode> == true) dropped the role
from every matrix. It was resolved into the priority whitelist as a new
role and then silently filtered out again — svc-net-tor was only ever
exercised indirectly, as a dependency other roles pull in.
The flag is read solely by the discovery model and the README generator;
nothing in the deploy path consults it, so this has no runtime effect.
meta/categories.yml pins the whole net category to compose/swarm false,
which fits svc-net-wireguard-{core,plain,firewalled}: none of them ships
a compose template. svc-net-tor does, and is the only role in the
category that does, so it takes the category-modes exemption the lint
provides rather than bending the category default for three host roles.
Regenerated READMEs follow: svc-net-tor now carries its mode symbols in
every cosmos diagram that names it as a dependency.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The egress router reached for ansible.builtin.package with a literal
name, which bypasses the per-distro mapping the registry exists for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The test variant (meta/variants.yml, variant 0) switches the tor
service to the chutney flavor: the image ships chutney and the
entrypoint boots a private Tor network inside the container (all nodes
on 127.0.0.1, so the design is identical under compose host-networking
and swarm). The entrypoint bootstraps from /opt/chutney (chutney
creates its net/ state CWD-relative), extracts the DirAuthority/
TestingTorNetwork lines into /run/tor/chutney-net.conf and fails fast
when that file ends up empty, since the node would otherwise silently
join the public network. torrc %includes the conf only for the chutney
flavor.
Descriptor publish and rendezvous now run at localhost speed: per-app
onion e2e suites dropped from minutes to seconds in the compose
validation. The test variant also raises the footprint to
2g/1.0cpu/512pids (measured: at 1g/0.25 the ~9 extra tor nodes pin the
caps and desc publishing stalls); meta/services.yml stays static on
the public flavor and the old production footprint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pin tor to the manager (host-published SOCKS/DNS live on the stack
host), forward HiddenServicePorts and the dnsmasq onion fast path to
the node address instead of loopback (dead-ends in task netns),
tolerate an empty clearnet-upstream capture, detect foreign dnsmasq
drop-ins before claiming the listener, and transfer onion_self_reach
to remote targets via script.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Playwright onion gate probed the app onion over Tor and silently
SKIPPED the whole suite when it did not answer — a broken onion could
go green. Remove the gate: the probe now waits hard (40x15s, covering
normal 2-5 min descriptor publication) and an unreachable onion fails
the deploy loudly. Reachability is part of what is under test.
The readiness probe treated transport-level failures (status: -1) as
'< 500', satisfying its until condition on attempt 1 and never using
its retries (nextcloud [0,1] died to TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME this way).
Require a real HTTP status >= 100 so transport errors retry.
Tor pins one long-lived entry guard; its own log showed ours degraded
('failing more circuits than usual ... 38 collapsed, 21 timed out'),
which throttles every flow of the node at once — the most plausible
cause of the 89-minute descriptor-publication outage and the
intermittent ERR_SOCKS_CONNECTION_FAILED in E2E. New config key
services.tor.use_entry_guards (default true keeps the Tor default and
production anonymity posture); the matrix variant pins it false so test
deployments render UseEntryGuards 0 and a single bad relay cannot stall
the node. Anonymity is not under test there, only reachability.
Verified: full svc-net-tor closure deploy over onion with the gateless
semantics, failed=0, every onion suite executed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New web-svc-mirror role: an nginx vhost that proxies and caches exactly
the external asset hosts aggregated from all deployed applications' CSP
whitelists (external_asset_origins filter) under first-party paths
(/<origin-host>/...), refusing every other upstream. svc-net-tor
consumes the service, so any tor deployment automatically serves the
mirror on its onion.
For apps with services.tor.enabled the shared body filter rewrites
external asset URLs in HTML to the onion mirror (onion sessions only;
clearnet untouched) and the CSP builder allows the mirror origin in the
asset directives. The dashboard's keycloak-js vendoring is reverted:
onion sessions now load the adapter through the mirror, clearnet loads
jsdelivr directly as before.
Verified: variant=0 deploy green (failed=0), dashboard 14/14 over onion
with keycloak-js served through the mirror, mirror spec green, health
check accepts the 404 vhost root.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
n8n was merged (from main) serving a canonical domain without a tor service block, and its local subnet 192.168.106.16/28 collided with svc-net-tor. Declare the complete tor block (meta/services.yml with the playwright-service-flag nocheck, meta/variants.yml pinning services.tor.enabled true in variant 0 and false in the no-auth variant) and move svc-net-tor's nominal (host-networked) subnet to 192.168.106.32/28. Fixes the tor-contract, variant-coverage, bond-baseline, playwright-env and subnet-overlap/duplicate test failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove the inline/trailing comments added across the Tor egress-router, onion-domain, mailu-notls and vault round-trip changes, per the repo no-comments convention. Comment-only: no code behaviour changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Route any outbound TCP to a *.onion address through Tor, protocol-agnostically (HTTP, SMTP, IMAP, ...), while clearnet traffic resolves normally and goes direct. Implemented on the target host and gated on TOR_EGRESS_ROUTER_ENABLED: torrc gains AutomapHostsOnResolve + AutomapHostsSuffixes .onion + VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4 + TransPort/DNSPort; a dnsmasq drop-in split-resolves *.onion via the DNSPort (clearnet upstreams embedded inline, since an AppArmor-confined dnsmasq may only read /etc/dnsmasq.d/**) and the host resolver points at it; an iptables nat OUTPUT rule redirects the automapped virtual range to TransPort. Verified in-container: http://<app>.<node-onion>/ returns 200 with no SOCKS wrapper, clearnet DNS + HTTPS stay direct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mint the node onion during provisioning and write its address straight into applications.svc-net-tor.services.tor.node, dropping the INFINITO_TOR_NODE_ONION env indirection: ensure_node_onion (was init_env) mints/reuses the .onion-identity key files + returns the address (no env write); identity_hs_dir/IDENTITY_DIRNAME move to utils.tor_onion so cli and utils share the path SPOT; provision.apply_tor_node_onion sets services.tor.node in host_vars when svc-net-tor is deployed (run by 'inventory provision' at deploy time, and the svc-net-tor role copies the same key files into the daemon); domains.py reads services.tor.node; nginx_vhosts reads the key file instead of os.environ; INFINITO_TOR_NODE_ONION removed from default.env/passthrough/compose + the inventory env-lookup. Bonus: the address now lives in the persistent key files, surviving .env regeneration by make test/autoformat.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
meta/services.yml gains tor.node (node onion address, filled per environment by the inventory) and tor.ports.local.socks (SOCKS port single source of truth). torrc renders SocksPort via the tor_socks lookup; the role test.sh takes TOR_SOCKS from the environment instead of a hard-coded 127.0.0.1:9050.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Domain-serving roles reference the svc-net-tor provider via a tor: block. Consumers declare enabled (dynamic group_names gate) and shared: true (static — onion is always the shared node model, inline nocheck: dynamic-flag). The provider svc-net-tor additionally declares exclusive/primary defaults that consumers inherit via resolve_service_config unless overridden.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Turn a NAT/edge node into a full Tor v3 onion node: DOMAIN_PRIMARY
becomes the node's .onion, so the whole stack (web, SSO, LDAP, CA)
resolves onion domains and is reachable over Tor without a public IP,
port forwarding, VPS or DynDNS.
- utils/tor_onion.py: offline v3 key mint (address + HiddenServiceDir
key files), verified against a known key->address test vector.
- cli .../inventory/onion: `init-env` pre-mints the node onion, writes
INFINITO_DOMAIN(+_RE) into .env and authoritative key files into
.onion-identity/hs (idempotent). The onion is a deploy-time input;
no in-deploy random minting (that would not match the pre-set domain).
- roles/svc-net-tor: Tor sidecar (Debian-built, network_mode: host),
installs the minted keys, torrc with one node HiddenService + a SOCKS
proxy restricted to loopback/DiD ranges. files/test.sh probes every
served onion domain over the Tor SOCKS.
- tls: .onion -> TLS off (onion v3 crypto is the transport auth; LE
cannot sign .onion) + app-level flavor override.
- harness/DNS: coredns resolves the onion zone via INFINITO_DOMAIN;
skip the clearnet DNS sanity check for onion; raise nginx
server_names_hash_bucket_size to 128 for long onion server_names.
- test-e2e-playwright: gated browser SOCKS proxy (PLAYWRIGHT_PROXY) +
navigation/action timeouts so specs reach .onion over Tor and fail
fast; the onion node points it at the Tor SOCKS.
- docs/requirements/031: full design.
Verified: dashboard + SSO (Keycloak) + 9 apps reachable over Tor
(HTTP 200 through the node hidden service). make test green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
