Sending to a .onion needs two things of the node: a resolver that answers the suffix, and a route from the container to Tor's transparent port. Neither existed. Compose pointed Mailu at unbound, which knows nothing about .onion, and in swarm Tor's DNSPort and TransPort listen inside the container where the host's dnsmasq and nat rules cannot reach them, so the forwarding rules that were already there pointed at a closed port on every swarm node.
Compose resolves through unbound, which now forwards the onion zone to Tor's DNSPort on the bridge it already owns. The forward alone would have answered SERVFAIL: the signed root proves that onion does not exist, so with auto-trust-anchor-file set every answer below it validates as bogus, and Tor's DNSPort can supply no DS. The zone is therefore declared insecure. Swarm resolves through the node dnsmasq instead, which every container already uses because container_dns puts the bridge resolver into daemon.json wherever svc-net-tor is deployed, and which now reaches Tor because its ports are published host-mode next to the SOCKS port that was published there already.
The transport rule changed target rather than mechanism. REDIRECT rewrites the destination to the primary address of the interface the packet arrived on, which is a different project bridge for every role, so Tor would have had to listen on all of them. A DNAT naming the bridge keeps one listener, and in swarm the same address reaches the published port through the proxy docker runs there.
That leaves the exposure. SocksPort has SocksPolicy; DNSPort and TransPort have no equivalent, and a swarm-published port carries no host address to bind to, so in swarm the packet filter is their only boundary. Compose needs none, because there Tor binds loopback and the bridge and nothing else. The swarm guard admits this deployment's own address space and drops the rest, and it is installed as a unit ordered after docker rather than as ansible-applied rules: nothing here persists netfilter state, so docker recreating its chains at boot would have left Tor back on the wildcard with the guard gone. It rebuilds its chain instead of appending to it, because the appending version could only ever be loosened. It hooks INPUT and DOCKER-USER both, since host-local traffic reaches a published port through docker's proxy and external traffic through FORWARD.
The deploy now proves all of it back and fails when a rule is missing, the router no longer runs on swarm nodes that carry no Tor, and the CLI test probes the forwarded ports over SOCKS instead of assuming a HiddenServicePort line means a reachable service.
Measured so far: Tor accepts the non-loopback binds and reports circuit-established, and the chain, its order and the DOCKER-USER hooks read back correctly from a deployed host. The swarm path is not yet exercised.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The list form could publish a host:container pair and nothing else, so thirteen blocks stayed hand-written: the ones needing a protocol suffix, a port range, the swarm long syntax with mode host, or a container-port-only publish. Each of those duplicated numbers the role already declares in meta/services.yml, which is the drift the lookup exists to remove.
The lookup keeps the list form unchanged for its 93 existing call sites and gains a dict form: transport emits one item per protocol, container 'same' serves the services that cannot remap (STUN/TURN, media relays), mode 'host' emits the long block an edge role needs in swarm so the client address survives the hop, publish 'ephemeral' emits the container port alone, and key names the block for Discourse's launcher file, whose expose: list is what becomes docker run -p there. A declared {start, end} mapping renders as start-end on both sides, so a relay range needs no term of its own.
svc-prx-openresty had no ports block at all and bound 80 and 443 as literals in its template, while torrc.j2 carried a third literal 80 for the hidden service. None of the three referenced the others. openresty now declares the ports, the compose template reads them, and the onion's port 80 comes from ports.onion.http through TOR_ONION_EXTRA_PORTS.
Three blocks stay raw, each with the reason it cannot route through one call: keycloak's sso_proxy maps a published port owned by the consuming role to a container port owned by web-app-keycloak, and matrix's ansible flavor takes element on 8080 and federation on 8048 from the upstream playbook rather than from this repo's ports.internal.
The enforcing lint scanned only files with compose in the name and only double-quoted list items, so nine of the thirteen blocks were invisible to it. It now reads every role template that can carry a ports block, catches unquoted items, protocol suffixes, ranges, flow style and the long syntax, and tracks the block by the indentation of its key: keying on the next line closed the block on anything shaped like a key, which target, published, protocol and mode all are. Under expose: only a real mapping counts, because there the single-segment form documents a container port and publishes nothing.
Verified by rendering all 110 container_ports call sites through the real templar, the real lookup and the real merged applications view.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
3529 invalid comments in 528 files, grandfathered in while the linter
only saw the working-tree diff. Removal ran through the linter's own
collectors, so detection and deletion cannot drift: a comment whose
opener line is blank before it and whose closer line is blank after it
loses all its lines, anything else loses only the comment region, and a
line left holding a bare delimiter goes with it.
Five files keep their comments behind a nocheck marker instead. Four are
upstream configs whose inline docs are upstream's own (mautrix, systemd
journald, nextcloud-oidc-login, MediaWiki). In littlejs the
commented-out entries ARE the deactivation mechanism for an example
tile, so deleting them would delete configuration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extract the csp, domains, and networks blocks out of roles/*/meta/server.yml
into dedicated meta files, each mapping to its own top-level applications key
via the recursive meta-walk:
csp: -> meta/csp.yml -> applications.<app>.csp
domains: -> meta/domains.yml -> applications.<app>.domains
networks: -> meta/networks.yml -> applications.<app>.networks
Residual nginx/proxy keys (status_codes, client_max_body_size, locations,
ip6_enabled, config_upstream_url) stay in server.yml; an emptied server.yml is
deleted. 98 server.yml -> 249 new files, 74 deleted.
- Consumers repointed applications.<app>.server.{csp,domains,networks} ->
applications.<app>.{csp,domains,networks} across templates, vars, tasks,
lookups and filters.
- Infra readers migrated: canonical_domains_map, application_domain_index,
build_ldap_role_entries, service-registry overlay discovery,
roles_with_service, and the file-based readers utils/domains/list.py +
utils/meta/scan.py (read the now-deleted server.yml directly).
- Detection + mapping: _META_TOPICS gains csp/domains/networks;
ROLE_FILE_META_{CSP,DOMAINS,NETWORKS} constants + ROLE_FILES entries.
- New self-expiring lint guard (test_server_meta_no_split_fields) fails if a
server.yml still carries a split field; auto-fails from 2026-12-28 as a
delete reminder.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Iterative root-hints resolution is unsupported in nested Docker (per the role
README), so the mailu admin's DNSSEC AD-flag check fails in CI/DinD where unbound
ran iteratively. UNBOUND_FORWARD_DNS only detected WSL2 (microsoft in /proc/version);
extend it to DOCKER_IN_CONTAINER so unbound forwards to NETWORK_PUBLIC_DNS_RESOLVERS
(still DNSSEC-validating) under DinD too. Bare-metal stays iterative.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DNSSEC-validating resolver as a central engine, mirroring the svc-db pattern (meta/services flags, overlay topology, per-consumer 02_init). Replaces per-app embedded unbound sidecars (e.g. mailu).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5