start_interval is the cadence while start_period runs, and only while it runs.
Once the window closes the probe falls back to interval, so a service that
becomes ready just after it pays a whole tick anyway and the cadence never
reached it. Six of the seven flavors were shaped that way, Curl worst: a thirty
second window against a one minute interval.
Measured across 151 converge waits in four job logs, 63 sit exactly on a tick
boundary, 36 in the thirty second step and 27 in the sixty second one.
Attributed by application, web-app-seaweedfs is the largest at 1501s over
sixteen waits with a median of 57.7s: it probes with curl and fell straight into
the gap. web-app-zammad probes with connect, whose window is fifteen minutes,
and its 154s median is real boot time with nothing to recover.
So the window moves to ten minutes and the steady state interval to two, and the
flavor overrides that sat below them go: Curl, Wget and Connect lose interval
1m, Http its twenty second window, Nc its ten. Connect keeps fifteen minutes.
Neither number costs anything while a container works. start_period delays
nothing, it only stops failures counting, and interval no longer touches
convergence at all since that hangs on the window alone; it is steady state
load, which drops from 120 probes an hour per service to 30.
Forty six role files follow. Twenty seven declarations go that repeat the new
default or undercut it, an undercut window being the defect itself. Eight
windows longer than ten minutes keep their value and now say why. The literal
blocks and the three Dockerfiles this repository builds spell every timing out,
because outside the lookup an omission takes docker's value and not the
platform's.
A fourth lint rule keeps the shape: start_period must outlast one interval,
checked against the effective values, so raising interval without the window
cannot quietly bring the cliff back.
Two faults in the lint surfaced while building it and are fixed here. It
compared timings as strings, so 600s and 10m read as different values, and it
matched the healthcheck key exactly, so a line carrying a trailing nocheck was
skipped whole, which is how the two swarm-init partials went unexamined.
One regression, bounded. A container that starts and never turns healthy is
neither rejected nor errored, so stack_ready.sh only calls it fatal after three
killed tasks, and each cycle now spans the longer window. That reaches twenty
minutes rather than six, capped there by swarm_stack_converge_retries at 600
with a two second delay, and it lands only on runs that were failing anyway.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A healthcheck written outside the container_healthcheck lookup inherits nothing
from utils/docker/healthcheck, and docker offers nowhere to put a replacement.
daemon.json carries storage, logging, DNS, registries and runtimes, and no
health key at all, so an omitted timing lands on docker's own value rather than
the platform's. The two disagree where it matters most: docker starts a
container with no start period, which leaves start_interval no window to act in.
That is why the hand-written blocks never gained the cadence.
The three images this repository builds itself now carry it. openldap and
postgres also drop to the platform interval, and bluesky gains the start window
it never had:
svc-db-openldap/files/Dockerfile --interval=30s ... --start-interval=5s
svc-db-postgres/templates/Dockerfile.j2 --interval=30s ... --start-interval=5s
web-app-bluesky/.../Dockerfile --start-period=30s --start-interval=5s
Six literal blocks move to the platform interval as well: magento, redis,
elasticsearch, matrix and both sys-svc-rdbms partials. Since start_interval
exists, interval no longer touches convergence and is steady state load alone.
Sixteen values that stay where they are now name the mechanism that keeps them
there. Two are worth reading. web-app-kix overrides start_period and nothing
else on purpose, letting the image's own HEALTHCHECK supply test, interval,
timeout and retries; filling those in would have overwritten what upstream tuned.
The memcached and redis swarm-init partials probe every second and deliberately
run with no start window, which is why start_interval is absent rather than
forgotten.
The rest name their probe: occ boots the whole Nextcloud stack, tor re-parses
its torrc instead of asking a running service, opensearch is still forming a
cluster, matrix waits on a file another step writes to a share.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A transient Debian/Ubuntu mirror fetch aborts a docker build layer with exit 100 (it killed the web-app-nextcloud swarm openldap build while the same image built fine elsewhere). New lint under tests/lint/docker/dockerfile/apt/ flags any RUN with apt-get update/install that omits Acquire::Retries; retrofit all 15 apt Dockerfiles with -o Acquire::Retries=3. Both apt lints move into the apt/ subpackage. dnf retries by default and apk has no equivalent flag, so both stay out of scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Move `rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*` before `apt-get update` in every
Debian-based Dockerfile so a stale base-image-baked InRelease
(Valid-Until expired) cannot abort the build layer with exit 100. The
trailing rm at end-of-RUN never ran because `apt-get update` aborted
first; the leading rm forces a fresh fetch from the configured source.
Affected: moodle, bridgy-fed, bookwyrm (2 RUN), postmarks, taiga
backend, svc-db-openldap, svc-db-postgres, jenkins, joomla, mediawiki,
odoo, suitecrm (2 RUN), wordpress.
Add tests/lint/docker/dockerfile/test_apt_update_purge_lists.py to
enforce the contract repo-wide: every `RUN` containing `apt-get
update` MUST `rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*` first in the same RUN, and
MUST NOT pass `Acquire::Check-Valid-Until=false` (which would silence
apt's replay-protection rather than refresh the list).
Rename roles/web-app-taiga/templates/Dockerfile.{back,front}.j2 to
Dockerfile.{backend,frontend}.j2 and update the matching tasks/
main.yml template refs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Rework Docker image to start from a clean slapd.d and data dir
- Bootstrap cn=config via slaptest from generated slapd.conf
- Deterministic MDB initialization (creates data.mdb on first start)
- Enforce correct ownership and permissions for slapd, config, and DB
- Add logging and fatal guards for broken bootstrap states
- Make memberof check optional in healthcheck
- Ensure base LDAP tree and OUs via Ansible (root, people, groups, roles)
- Cleanup Docker hardening vars
Result: stable, reproducible OpenLDAP container startup with clean volumes.
https://chatgpt.com/share/6966b019-d604-800f-86c2-d6ee04129130
Migrate `svc-db-openldap` from `bitnamilegacy/openldap` to a locally built `infinito/openldap:local` image (Debian bookworm-slim) with a bootstrap `entrypoint.sh` that initializes `slapd.d` and an MDB backend from `LDAP_SUFFIX/LDAP_ROOT_DN/LDAP_ROOT_PW`.
* Add Dockerfile + entrypoint + healthcheck scripts
* Persist config + data in separate volumes (`/etc/ldap/slapd.d`, `/var/lib/ldap`)
* Switch cn=config operations to `ldapi:///` with SASL EXTERNAL (`-Q -Y EXTERNAL`)
* Simplify env template to only `LDAP_SUFFIX`, `LDAP_ROOT_DN`, `LDAP_ROOT_PW`
* Refactor docker init into `02_docker.yml` and update compose template (build context)
* Update LDAP tasks/handlers to use `OPENLDAP_BIND_DN/OPENLDAP_BIND_PW`
* Remove outdated Bitnami-specific docs and credential reset logic
https://chatgpt.com/share/6965c921-3304-800f-9e8f-d2f10d273f1b
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5