API is a plain mapping, so an inventory that configures three providers replaces the whole declaration from group_vars/all/18_api.yml instead of merging into it. inventories/development/default.yml declares openai, anthropic and openrouter, so github, google and jira did not exist in CI at all and lookup('api', 'github.client_id') raised.
A raising lookup inside a value the applications renderer is templating does not fail the render: _templar_render_best_effort returns the string untouched and, for a value carrying a non-env lookup(, refuses the fallback as well. The raw template text reached plugin_value.enabled | bool, which coerced it to False and emitted the deprecation warning that fails the deploy gate. Run 34893363518, job 104153194109 lost web-app-nextcloud to exactly that, for three integrations at once. The configvalue entries would have stored template text as the client id.
utils/api.py merges the scope's override over the declaration, so an override narrows values and never the provider set, and holds the enable rule: every credential a provider declares must carry a value. The api lookup reads through it; the new api_enabled lookup gates on it and returns a real boolean instead of a string a filter has to coerce.
The same class sat in group_vars/all/16_ai.yml and roles/svc-ai-litellm/meta/secrets.yml as bare API.<provider>.<key> dereferences; both now go through the lookups.
Two lints keep it shut. test_addon_enabled_renders_to_bool renders the whole applications map against a scope with API blanked, the most hostile override an inventory may legally write, and requires every addon gate to come out a boolean. test_api_accessed_via_lookup forbids a bare API dereference in Jinja under roles/, group_vars/ and inventories/.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The gateway could reach exactly one remote provider, through a bare
OPENROUTER_API_KEY group_var with an empty-string default and an `{% if %}`
around a single hardcoded model entry. OpenAI and Anthropic had no path at all.
All three are now declared in roles/svc-ai-litellm/meta/secrets.yml, which
mapping.py already calls the application config schema, so a key lands at
applications.svc-ai-litellm.secrets.credentials.<provider>_api_key like every
other credential. Each carries the `type` and `regex` its value must satisfy and
defaults to the central API.<provider>.api_key block, which keeps one
operator-facing place to fill a provider in while the role owns the shape.
type and regex had to become real to be worth declaring. 192 `validation:`
blocks sit in the role schemas today and not one line of Python enforces them,
so a `regex` would have joined a pile of decoration. validate_supplied_value
now runs on every path a value arrives from outside — the --set override, a
value already in the inventory, and the value standing next to a `default:`.
A generated value stays exempt because the algorithm that produced it is named
by the same schema and generate_value takes no schema argument. min_length is
deliberately left unenforced: the generators ignore it, so holding them to it
would fail where nothing is wrong.
The pattern is written for the paste, not for the vendor. OpenAI moved issuance
from sk- to sk-proj- without notice and Anthropic issues sk-ant-api03-; a schema
pinning a prefix would reject a valid key and abort inventory creation. `\S{20,}`
accepts every form those three issue today and one nobody has announced, and
rejects a trailing newline, an embedded space, a truncated copy and a
<placeholder>. A key pasted into the wrong provider's slot is caught at deploy
instead, where the route it publishes answers nothing.
The gateway iterates one LITELLM_REMOTE_BACKENDS list instead of three `{% if %}`
blocks; config.yaml.j2 and env.j2 read the same list and selectattr('key')
decides. LITELLM_CHAT_MODEL falls back to the first configured remote alias
rather than to a hardcoded openrouter/auto.
For CI the keys travel as INFINITO_API_{OPENAI,ANTHROPIC,OPENROUTER}_KEY through
default.env, the passthrough allowlist, the infinito service in compose.yml, the
workflow env block and the development inventory. The compose leg is not
optional: the env lint rejected the change without it, because a key the
inventory reads but compose does not forward resolves to empty inside the
container with no error. The workflow reads `secrets.X || vars.X` so a variable
works as asked while a secret wins, which matters because a variable is not
masked and the development inventory sets MASK_CREDENTIALS_IN_LOGS: false.
An unset key is not an error anywhere: the provider's routes stay unpublished
and the CLI test asserts their absence rather than skipping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add group_vars/all/18_api.yml defining the global API mapping (cloudflare, telegram, github, google, jira) and plugins/lookup/api.py — the single sanctioned reader that resolves a dotted 'provider.key' path against it and raises on unknown keys. Routing every proprietary/external credential access through one lookup keeps a single point to change how credentials are sourced. Includes the unit test covering nested resolution, subtree access, error paths, and templar handling.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5