The contract check ran as an Ansible task in the middle of every provider deploy, and the two client checks ran the same way. A test that is part of the deploy cannot be run without deploying, cannot be re-run on its own, and reports its verdict as a deploy failure. Twenty-seven task files lose 491 lines to this.
It is now what it always was. Each provider ships files/test/test.sh, templates/test.env.j2 and meta/tests.yml, and test-e2e-cli stages one shared harness beside it: run.sh drives contract.sh in a throwaway container on the provider's own network, then isolation.sh for adapter-fronted providers. The read probe each provider offers moved from the calling task into meta/mcp.yml next to the allowlist it must satisfy, and the schema now rejects a read probe naming a tool outside that allowlist.
The bearer the test presents is the one a client resolves through mcp.credential, via the new mcp_client_bearer lookup over resolve_credential, which moved to utils.roles.applications.mcp so it is the same function mcp_servers renders every client connection with. The probe presented whatever the calling role passed, which for the fifteen adapter-fronted providers is a different secret than any client holds.
Sidecar isolation is read from the engine rather than measured inside the container, so it no longer needs a delegation to the node holding the task: attachment is compared by network name, which drops the gwbridge special case, and a swarm worker says it cannot measure instead of skipping silently.
Retrying is bounded by wall clock against MCP_DEADLINE_SECONDS, which scales through the same lookup('timeout') as the harness budget it has to stay under. A flag that is neither true nor false aborts rather than reading as off.
mcp-provider-probe becomes mcp-provider-cli-test: an enabled provider must ship the test rather than include the task. mcp-probe-bearer becomes mcp-adapter-bearer, tying ADAPTER_BEARER to the declared credential key now that no probe include carries it. A new integration test renders the shared env template for every provider through Ansible's own templar, so a later change to it breaks visibly instead of poisoning twenty deploys quietly.
Hermes and OpenClaw keep their client-side proof as CLI tests of their own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The audit read as prose, so a role could sit under a classification nobody had checked against its own declaration, and "blocked" could not be told apart from "nobody looked". The sections are now named after the exact values a role declares, which makes the section titles the vocabulary: one rule holds every role under its own declared classification, a second rejects a classification outside the vocabulary, and a third requires a named blocker per blocked role while forbidding a blocked role from shipping an enabled surface.
The report itself is generated from the roles' own metadata and a drift check imports the generator and compares against the committed file, which caught a stale report twice while this work was in progress. It lives under docs/contributing rather than beside the requirements, because a generated file in that directory reads like a finished criterion.
The criteria across seven requirement files now carry what they rest on: what closed them, or what blocks them and where that was measured. Two coverage limits stay stated rather than hidden: the report is built only from roles that declare an MCP block, so a role blocked without one is invisible to it, and a ticked criterion here means implemented and tested rather than proven in operation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
031, 032 and 033 named meta/schema.yml as the place credentials live, which
481666bdb renamed to meta/secrets.yml. 035 named role scripts without their
language folder, which dfe7a7fdd introduced.
Not cosmetic: a wrong location in a requirement costs real time. 036 asserted
that .running and group_names agree on a single-host round, and acting on
that claim configured every AI consumer with the openrouter/auto vendor model
until the gateway rejected it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tick 41 criteria across the MCP and AI requirements, each against a file
that carries the content or a line in a deploy log, leaving anything that
merely looked plausible unchecked.
Reword five criteria the implementation contradicted. Credentials now
follow their origin: a secret this deployment generates stays a vault
credential, one the application issues cannot be, because the vault
cannot generate it. OpenProject is licence-gated rather than pending.
Flowise prepares its instance rather than registering servers, since it
exposes no registry to register them in. A client is held to the server
list only where upstream offers one.
Replace the five audit-artifact criteria with three that describe what
the tree actually enforces. The generator and its committed file were
dropped: once every fact moved into the role that owns it, the artifact
was a copy that could only go stale, and grep answers the same question.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
kevinveenbirkenbachandClaude Opus 5